he Italian submarine Scirè was a vessel of the class “600” series “Adua”. This type of submarine was built for short cruises and was protected by a single hull and a false keel. This class of vessels obtained good results during W.W. II; they were robust and maneuverable, but their surface speed was too slow. Some participated in the Spanish Civil War.
On July 10th, 1940, under the command of Captain Pini, the unit was credited with the sinking of the 1,058 t. French steamer Cheick. The Scirè and her twin boat “Gondar” had different operational lives from the rest of the series. In August 1940, the unit underwent important structural modifications for the installation of cylindrical containers for the transport of sub-attack crafts of the S.L.C. (Siluro a Lenta Corsa), the famous “maiale” , and her command was transferred to Commander Borghese. Later, the conning tower was modified similarly to the German U-Boots, removing the highly visible enclosed deck and lowering the periscopes’ sleeves. The 100/47 gun was removed and a new A.A. machine gun added. The unit was fitted with three cylinders, one forward and two aft. Each cylinder could carry a single S.L.C. The Scirè and the Gondar were almost identical, but the forward cylinder of the latter did not have reinforcement rings thus allowing for the two units to be properly identified. Despite her notoriety, there actually are very few pictures of the Scirè, and of the few, many were manually retouched.
The Scirè near La Spezia
Between September 24 and October 3, and once again from October 21 to November 3 1940 it operated in two missions against the British naval base of Gibraltar. A new mission took place on May 15th 1941 and it was repeated on September 10th, this time achieving some results. The most important mission was the one of December 19th, 1941 when human torpedoes launched by the Scirè sank the battleships Queen Elisabeth and Valiant, the tanker Sagona and the destroyer Jervis in the shallow waters of the port of Alexandria.
The “U-Boot” style tower.
Later, Borghese relinquished the command of his submarine to Commander Zelich. After having left La Spezia on July 27th, 1942, the Scirè reached Leros from which she then headed towards the British port of Haifa. The unit left Leros on the 6th of August and waited at sea for information from a German reconnaissance unit; communication was lost thereafter. According to British records, the Scirè was lost on August 10th just outside the port of Haifa in Palestine where it was intercepted by the British torpedo-boat Isley and sunk with all men aboard. The bodies of two swimmers, Captain Chersi and P.O. Del Ben were washed ashore and buried in the local cemetery.
A relict of Scirè at the Naval Museum of La Spezia. (Photo Cristiano D’Adamo)
Between September 2 and 28, 1984 the Italian rescue ship Anteo recovered the remains of 42 of the 49 crew members and 11 operators aboard at the time of her lost. Parts of the hull, previously removed during a recovery attempt, are now displayed at the “Sacrario delle Bandiere” in Rome, and the naval museums in La Spezia and Venezia. The Scirè was one of only three Italian vessels to receive the Gold Medal for Valor.
The submarine Otaria was originally built by the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on behalf of the Portuguese Navy and assigned the name “Espadante” as part of a process of deep reorganization and modernization of the Iberian country’s Navy. The Otaria belonged to a class of only two units, the other submarine being the Glauco, and designed by Curio Bernardis on the basis of the experience acquired with the Squalo class.
The OTARIA in 1935 just before delivery to the Italian Navy (Photo Turrini)
Eventually, upon the cancellation of the contract by the Portuguese, the Italian Navy took over ownership, receiving the unit on October 20th, 1935. Upon completing the initial shake down and testing, the Otaria was assigned, along with the sister unit Glauco, to the IV Submarine Group based in Taranto. In late summer 1936, both units were then transferred to Naples. Between 1936 and August 1937, the unit completed three missing as part of Italy’s backing of Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War. Despite having completed one attack against a light unit, there were no registered successes. A year later, in 1938, both units were transferred to the Red Sea to join the Massaua submarine flotilla.
Having returned to Italy, at the beginning of the conflict the Otaria was assigned to patrol areas in the western Mediterranean. Soon after, the unit was selected as one of the boats to be relocated to the newly established Atlantic submarine base of Bordeaux. Departure took place on September 23rd under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Vocaturno. Five days later, on the 28th, the Otaria began the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar in adverse sea conditions and with great phosphorescence (luminosity of the sea water). Due to a failure with the hydraulic system, maneuvers took place utilizing the manual override for both the rudder and planes. This would be the first of many breakdowns this submarine and its crew would have to endure. Soon after, the crew began noticing waterways around the periscope gaskets and one of the propeller shafts. Despite the sudden and continue loss of depth, and mostly thanks to the complete absence of British patrols, the Otaria was able to cross the strait. Having consumed much more fuel than expected and with a diving depth limited to 30 meters due to the aforementioned infiltrations, the captain opted to abort his patrol mission and on September 30th headed directly for Bordeaux where the boat arrived on October 6th.
After a few days for refitting and to perform temporary repairs (the base was not yet fully equipped), the Otaria was once again sent on patrol leaving base on October 14th as part of the “Malaspina” group along with the Malaspina itself, Dandolo and Barbarigo. Three days later, while en route off the coast of Ireland, there was an encounter with a British Sunderland described in the mission report:
We sighted a plane coming out of a cloud at close distance (2 to 3,000 meters) moving in the opposite direction. Judging a dive too dangerous due to the [short] distance, we increased speed and since the plane did not respond to our signals, we opened fire. As soon as I saw the plane fixed on our direction and getting closer, I turned full rudder thus getting away from the launching path and, as soon as they were closer, we opened fire with two machine guns observing the plane being hit several times. The airplane, a Short Sunderland, repeated the same attack maneuver which we avoided with continuous turns and precise use of machine gun [fire]. I noticed that by turning at the last minute, in addition to giving the gunners a better target, the airplane could not follow our change of direction. During the exchange of fire, a bullet hit and destroyed the protection shield of the radio-finding antenna. The attack continued for 22 minutes and when the plane was hit at very close range (200 to 300 meters) by our machine guns, it suddenly lost altitude and veered away from us. Since we were heading the opposite direction, I ordered a crash dive limiting our depth to 40 meters until a safety plug could be installed to stop water infiltrations from the broken direction finding antenna. While submerged, we heard three loud explosions coming from the direction of the airplane which made us believe that they were getting rid of their load of bombs.
From the 23rd of October onward, the Otaria continued patrolling off the western coast of Ireland while the weather was particularly foul, causing the malfunction of the two upper torpedo tube launchers both forward and aft. Furthermore, both the hydraulic system used to elevate the periscope and the one controlling the rudder kept failing. From the end of October until the first few days of November, the boat sighted 4 ships and a tanker, but due to the impossible weather conditions an attack could not be even contemplated. On the 5th, at night, Captain Vocaturno launched two torpedoes against a large passenger ship which was proceeding with all lights obscured; there were no hits. On the 9th, while already on its return voyage to Bordeaux, the crew sighted an aircraft carrier escorted by three destroyers of which they lost sight very quickly, but for which they were able to send a discovery signal which was picked up by the Marconi.
Happy times: part of the crew of the Otaria (Photo courtesy Raccolta Romolo Maddaleni)
After the miserable patrol, the boat reached port on November 15th. The missing highlighted the inadequacy of the Glauco class design for patrol in the northern hemisphere: the conning tower was too visible, the exposed part of the hull too vulnerable to damage, and most of all, speed never exceeded 10 knots.
Sergeant Torpedoman Guido Maddaleni one of the crewmembers of the Otaria (Photo courtesy Raccolta Romolo Maddaleni)
After a period of refitting, the Otaria was once again sent on patrol leaving Bordeaux on January 24th, 1941 as part of the “Baracca” group along with the Baracca itself, Morosini, and Dandolo. Soon after departure, the boat began experiencing serious mechanical failures, including one with the hydraulic system used to control planes and rudder, the valves controlling the ballast tanks and dive tanks. Unable to fix these problems at sea, the boat returned to base arriving on February 1st.
After repairs, the Otaria was assigned to a mission off the coast of Ireland to be conducted in concert with the German ally and under the directives of B.d.U. (Befehlshaber der U-Boote). The boat was part of a deployment group which included U-boats and aerial reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe. The Otaria left port on February 2nd reaching its patrol area on the 13th and remaining there through the 24th. The events that took place during these few days are very confusing and still the object of much historical review.
On February 19th, the Luftwaffe signaled the presence of a convoy of about 30 ships, probably OB.288. During the events that followed, Italian and German submarines alike attacked the convoy, thus creating great confusion in regard to credits for the sinking. Confirmation of the fact that this area was full of submarines is given by the sighting of a periscope made on the 22nd of February by the Bianchi (57° 55’N, 17° 40’W). It is assumed that this could have been the periscope of the Marcello which, faced with intense antisubmarine activity, was lost in circumstances to this day unclear. The Otaria returned to Bordeaux on March 1st without having achieved any notable result.
On May 6th, another patrol began, this time as part of the “Morosini” group which included the Morosini itself along with the Bianchi and Barbarigo and again for a patrol in the North Atlantic. The boat reached the patrol area on the 10th, remaining there for 10 days. Differently from the previous missions, this time the Otaria was able to actively participate in the fight. Even during the transfer voyage the crew had sighted a motor ship, but the great difference in speed made any attack improbable. On the 10th, after having launched a torpedo against a destroyer, the Otaria was subsequently attacked by two aircrafts which swept the conning tower with machine gun fire killing three crewmembers. On the 11th, there was another torpedo launch against a ship which, possibly damaged, disappeared in a squall.
While in the patrol area, the Otaria was directed by Betasom to attack a convoy previously sighted by the Bianchi. Having failed to do so, on the 15th the unit was relocated, along with the Morosini, Bianchi and Malaspina to a different area. Soon after, the Morosini and Malaspina, having spent their fuel, began the return voyage to base while the Bianchi, Barbarigo (which had just arrived) and Otaria were relocated further north. During this phase, one of the propeller shafts failed, leaving the submarine to operate with only one engine. On the 19th, while the crew was still attempting a summary repair, the lookouts sighted the smoke of a convoy of about 23 ships escorted by 6 light units. This was SL.73, a slow convoy from Sierra Leone to Great Britain. Despite the handicap, the captain moved on conducting a courageous attack described in the mission report.
May 19th, 1941
08:30 While we were lifting the ball bearing of the right propeller shaft, we sighted smoke on the horizon far enough to leave us in doubt whether it may be clouds. We stopped the repairs and turned toward the smoke.
10:00 Smoke and masts are quite clearly defined indicating a convoy escorted by several destroyers bearing 60°. We proceed to bring ourselves to a better viewpoint. At about 18,000 k. bearing 35° true north we conformed a convoy of 24 ships on about three columns escorted from behind and from the sides by 3 destroyers and 3 corvettes for anti-submarine protection.
The convoy is at 350° off our bow. I cannot consider getting ahead of the convoy in daylight since my engines smoke copiously and, having interrupted the repairs on the left propeller shaft, I don’t know how much speed I may safely rely on.
I then head for the rear of the convoy with the intention of getting ahead of it at night.
22:00 We remain all day in sight of the convoy up to seeing the masts, but pulling back each time we started seeing funnels. From this viewpoint, we see that the convoy is made up of a ship of small displacement (2-3,000 t.) and only two larger cargo ships in the middle column toward the head of the convoy where the escort performs particular surveillance. About every 4 hours, from the main body of the convoy, a destroyer takes off to patrol the rear up to 5 miles away from the last unit. It is necessary to prevent the maneuver by rapidly reverting course. The convoy does not zigzag. The various observations confirm that the bearing varies at the most 10° off the main course.
22:10 I begin moving starboard of the convoy to get ahead of it. We sight a reconnaissance biplane on anti-submarine patrol. We dive and very far away and not directed at us, we hear the sound of explosions. We stay submerged for 1 hour and 25 minutes. While submerged, we pick up, still onto our bow, the convoy’s smoke. At sunset, the situation is as follows:
The convoy continues on course 65°. The submarine (with the starboard ball bearing overheating, and the portside propeller shaft leaking) is about 20 miles starboard of the convoy.
May 20th, 1941
Since we are much to the left of the convoy, I turn 90° to reach the convoy whether its course might be between 0° to 90°.
00:13 Full force ahead. After 5 minutes at this speed the main valve of the exhaust manifold and the exhaust pipes spew many sparks, which make the stern very visible.
We must slow down. Visibility is mediocre with scattered clouds which make the horizon visibility variably good.
3:30 We sight the bows’ shadows of the convoy and we head toward it.
0:40 We start distinguishing the shapes of the ships. The convoy continues proceeding with bearing 60° on three columns. I discard the idea of attacking the smaller ships to the side and I move toward the center of the convoy where the two larger ships are located. To their sterns, I sight smaller silhouettes, lower and faster which I assume to be destroyers and corvettes for anti-submarine patrol. To their sides, on both sides, another three silhouettes which go back and forth from the stern of the last larger ship to 45° ahead of the convoy. The formation is kept quite badly. The ships are not perfectly aligned one to the other and the patrol boats on the right were cutting over between the second and third column.
Once again, I discard the idea of attacking the smaller ship I have to my bow (2-3,000 t.) and I pass by its stern to attack the two larger ships. Crossing between the first and second column, I slowly catch up with the ships since being on parallel course our gain is minimal.
0:15 We are to the bow of the second ship and about 600 meters. We start turning starboard but we are fading too much by the stern, thus we slow down the turn to bring ourselves more toward the bow up to finding the boat 45° to the bow with bearing 150 at 450 meters.
4:20 Two torpedoes are released. I start turning starboard, but aware that to our stern some smaller silhouettes are moving toward us, I turn full rudder portside. First we hear a thump and we see, by the bow of the ship, a large column of water. A few seconds later, we hear a second hit and we see a large flare. The ship stops, whistles, bends toward the center and launches a flare sending out twice the signal “SSS n. 14 torpedoed”.
We move on to attack the second ship but noticed the three destroyers by the bow which had reverted course and are coming toward us. I turn more portside because I am sure not to have been sighted but I am thus unable to conduct the second attack. When I believe to be safe from the three destroyers, which have lit a blue projector, three subsequent illuminating rockets are sent in our direction, lighting us in full. The engines, which I have ordered full speed ahead, smoke and spark making a perfect reference point. The destroyers point toward us. We crash dive going down to 80 meters. As soon as we are submerged, I sense that the left propeller shaft lost the seal which we had to be tide down up to touch [ the ball bearing] and that the right ball bearing is overheating. We are forced to turn on the pumps to lighten the boat.
The hydrophones, in addition to the sounds from the convoy, distinctively pick up various sounds of turbines [destroyers] and motors [corvettes] which go away, come back and at times stop. After about 15 minutes of total silence, I decide to resurface to attack the convoy. While we are at 50 meters, the hydrophone picks up a turbine approaching. We move again back to 80 meters. At this depth, the sound of propellers passing above us is clearly heard, and a few seconds later, 4 extremely loud explosions, one by the bow, two toward the center, and one by the stern shake the boat.
The lights go off, all light bulbs break, the hydraulic pump stops, the levels shatter in a thousand pieces, the gauges’ hands go off scale. We move to manual controls. All the remaining equipment stopped: compass, power converter, etc. Nothing is working. From the rear compartment, I am informed that the seal of the left axel came off due to the explosion. In such conditions, I decide to return to base and move south using the life boat emergency compass.
I ordered the portside axel stopped and the pudding retainer pushed to the maximum. I kept the boat down by the stern so that the water in the rear bilges would not spill into the electric motors.
I took the boat down between 80 and 110 meters. The hydrophones once again indicated that the destroyers had stopped, up to the point when one of the moved full force ahead toward us. The rudder was already turned, so we pushed the portside propeller full force ahead.
Four new explosions shook the submarine causing a large water way from the compass repeaters and some minor leaks around the battery hold hatch. The explosions followed regularly, but the forth time around moved away quite rapidly. The situation was grave.
The boat was in the following conditions:
The portside axel is stopped to reduce water infiltrations which was nevertheless considerable (700 liters per hour). The starboard axel was overheating and could only be used seldom while cooling it down. High air pressure inside the hull due to a leak from one of the valves. Gyro stopped and magnetic compass unreadable. Bilges full of water and spilling over. Unable to use the asset pump due to the explosions.
For an hour, we remain around 100 and 112 meters quietly moving water and personnel from aft forward, alternating the use of the motor, and with a partial release from one of the tanks.
07:45 The main tank were empty, the bilges were spilling over the right axel ball bearing reached an unsustainable temperature. Fortunately, the hydrophones indicated that the destroyers were moving away.
08:30 I order the thermal engine readied, called the gunners to station, and while I kept the battle flag ready, I blew the tanks. As soon as the hatch was opened, I noticed that the horizon is quite narrow due to the presence of strong and low clods and fog. I ordered the diesel engine started and I moved away full force ahead. During the day, we made some emergency repairs to the damaged equipment. The bombs caused the breakage of the safety and protection glass of both periscopes. In such conditions, I decided to return to base and I turn south using the portable compass.
May 23rd, 1941
Still on my way back to base, we sighted a dingy with two men aboard. After a difficult maneuver, due to the condition of the sea, I took aboard two shipwrecked sailors, survivors of the 39 crewmembers of a French ship sunk with the gun by a british submarine, eather K26 or K36.
Signed C.C. Giuseppe VOCATURO
The ship in question was the “Starcross” the only vessel of the Exmouth Steamship Co. Ltd, a 4,662 t. steamship built in 1936 by the J L Thompson & Son shipyard of North Sand, Sunderland. The vessel, damaged beyond repair by the two torpedoes, but still afloat, was later sunk by the escort after the 40 crewmembers were rescued. According to the British report, this attack took place in position 51° 45’ N, 20° 45’ W. Due to the very precarious conditions, the submarine began the return voyage to base arriving in Bordeaux around the 24th of May, but not without first having saved, just off the Gironde, two French fishermen, only survivors of the fishing boat “Notre Dame de Chatelet” sunk by a British submarine.
(Photo courtesy Raccolta Romolo Maddaleni)
During this period, the Italian government wanted to return all submarines located in Bordeaux back to Italy. The issue was discussed at the highest levels, especially because Germany had only 30 submarines operational and needed the presence of the Italian boats. The German submarines were smaller and better suited for the Mediterranean, the Italian boats larger and more useful in the Atlantic. Still, Mussolini received permission from Hitler to withdraw the Italian submarines and on June 8th an order was issued in accordance. Soon after, on the 14th, Admiral Doenitz went to Berlin to request the reversal of this order. Admirals Reader, Weicholz, Riccardi and Parona were called to resolve a very difficult diplomatic and military situation. Finally, a compromise was reached; of the 27 Italian submarines still operating in the Atlantic, only 14 would be sent back. Eventually, due to war losses, only 10 submarines made the journey back, among them the Otaria (the other boats were the Argo, Dandolo, Veniero, Brin, Mocenigo, Velella, Emo, Otaria, Perla, and the Guglielmotti).
The Otaria left La Pallice on September 7th and, while approaching the Strait of Gibraltar, was sighted by light enemy units and attacked with depth charges which did not cause any damage. The crossing began at 1:30 AM on the 14th, navigating on the surface in excellent weather conditions and a waning moon. Around Cape Malabata, 6 miles east of Tangier, Morocco the submarine dove reemerging away from the highly patrolled area and well into the Mediterranean. Uneventfully, the Otaria arrived in Naples on September 19th to begin the grueling routing of transport missions and small patrol in the dangerous home waters. December 14th, 1941, laden with 11 tons of foodstuff, the boat left Naples arriving in Bardia on the 19th from which it left the same day. Upon arriving in Taranto, on the 24th of the same month, Captain Vocaturno passed command to Lieutenant Alberto Gorini, while his second in command, Lieutenant Amendolia became the commanding officer of the submarine Finzi.
From January 1st to mid April, the Otaria was assigned to the submarine school in Pula where it completed 16 training patrols to prepare new crews. In May 1942, it was sent back to Taranto. The same month, from the 4th to the 20th, it was on patrol north of Cape Caxine. In June, from the 13th to the 18th, the boat was sent on patrol off the Algerian coast where, on the 13th, it was attacked by a British Sunderland which was repelled by the intense fire of the submarine’s 13.2 mm Bredas. Two days later, having sighted an enemy formation, it failed to get close enough for a launch; eventually it returned to Cagliari.
The grueling routine continued with another patrol from June 29th through July 19th south of the Balearic Islands. In August the boat was once again off the Algerian coast until Midsummer Day. Thereafter, it returned to Cagliari and from there it was sent to Taranto for repair work requiring a better equipped base.
After a long period of refitting, several transport missions followed for a total of 119.6 tons of war materiel ferried to North Africa, including 63 tons of gasoline, 45 tons of ammunitions and 11 tons of foodstuff. In February, having assessed that the efficiency of the boat had greatly diminished, the submarine command sent the Otaria back to Pula where it completed another 79 training patrols.
On the day of the Italian unconditional surrender (September 8th, 1943), the Otaria was in Fiume (Istria). Following orders, it moved to Taranto to surrender. Instead, it was rerouted to Augusta from where the British authorities ordered the boat to Malta. On October 6th, the Otaria returned to Italy and was assigned to Taranto (under British occupation) where it was used as a training target until the end of the conflict. Soon after, it was removed from service and later sent to the junkyard. It was the end of a long operational life for which the Otaria had only a single sinking to its credit.
The Nani was one of the 11 boats of the “Marcello” class, one of the best produced by the Italian shipyards. Despite having entered service only in 1938, by 1941 the submarine was already worn out, proof of the intense efforts the Italian oceangoing boats had to endure, and to which corresponded the extreme sacrifices of the crews.
Operational Life
In the brief period between the outbreak of hostilities and its loss in 1941 for unknown reasons, the submarine Nani completed 6 missions under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gioacchino Polizzi, sinking 2 merchant ships for a total of 1,939 t.
The Nani with other boats of the MARCELLO class (Photo Giuseppe Carotenuto)
At the beginning of the hostilities (June 10th, 1940 for Italy), the Nani was part of the 22nd squadron of the 2nd group based in Naples. In preparation for the conflict, the boat was on patrol off Cape Bengut (Algeria), along with the Barbarigo, positioned 30 miles off the cost. After having failed to sight any vessel, the boat left the area on June 13th.
Soon after, the Nani was assigned to a new patrol area as part of a group, which included the Bandiera, Ascianghi and Santarosa. The Nani assumed its position on June 24th, 15 miles east of Port Mahon (Minorca). As for the many other boats that participated in this action, the Nani failed to make any contact, and eventually the boat returned to base.
The Nani at the shipyard while recharging the batteries (Photo USMM)
A third, and last patrol in the Mediterranean took place during the second half of July. The Nani, along with the Morosini, Faa di Bruno and Berillo, took position east of Gibraltar between July 15th and July 23rd. The Nani was assigned an area between Gibraltar and Cape Guillates (Morocco) and it was the west most boat in the formation. Between the 18th and the 22nd of July, the crew sighted several light units, but Captain Polizzi did not have any opportunity to conduct an attack. On the 22nd, after having sighted a large destroyer, Captain Polizzi launched two torpedoes, which failed to hit the target. This attack took place at 3:00 AM, 12 miles SE of Point Europa.
The Nani in Venice. The Campanile is visible above the bow (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
In September, the boat was ordered to the Atlantic departing Naples on the 29th of the same month. During the transfer, on October 5th, the submarine intercepted and sank the British armed trawler “Kingstone Shappire” of 356 t. Trawlers were high sea fishing boats built before the war and meant to be rapidly transformed into gunboats. In general, they were designed for harbor defense duties, but newer units were transformed into submarine chasers, while other into minesweepers. In 1939, the Royal Navy established the 5th Group in Mediterranean with 5 units. Thereafter, following operational orders, the boat patrolled off Madeira where, on the 27th intercepted and sank the small Swedish ship “Maggie” of 1,583 t. in service to the British. Confirmation of this ship’s service for the British is given by its participation in convoy HM 19 from Norway to Scotland in March 1940. Finally, on November 4th the vessel reached its final destination navigating up the Gironde to the new base of Bordeaux.
On December 13th, the Nani left the fluvial port of Bordeaux to begin the dangerous navigation down the river Gironde. Reached the Atlantic, the boat had to endure terrible weather conditions and the second in command and a gunner were seriously injured by a massive weave forcing the captain to return to port, where they arrived on the 17th to disembark the wounded personnel. During the transfer from La Pallice to Bordeaux along the river Gironde, the submarine was attacked by a British aircraft which, after a fierce gun battle, was downed. The pause in Bordeaux was brief; having replaced the wounded personnel, the Nani was again at sea on the 20th to resume its patrol West of Ireland.
Due to the delay in leaving port, the Nani was ordered the shortest route to the operational area. On January 3rd, Betasom received the last radio signal. Despite several attempts to re-establish communication, the boat never replied to the many calls that followed.
Chief 2nd Class Gennaro Gagliano of Praiano, Salerno who perished aboard the Nani (Photo Michele Esposito)
Chief 2nd Class classe Francesco Mattiuzzi who also perished aboard the Nani (Photo Gian Ugo Mattiuzzi)
Machinist’s Mate Carlo Cappiello of Marina di Cassano, Piano di Sorrento (Naples) who perished aboard the Nani (Photo Giuseppe Carotenuto)
After the end of the conflict, British authorities claimed the sinking of the Nani in position 60° 15’ N, 15° 27 W (South East of Ireland) to the corvette Anemone. Italian navel authorities doubted the accuracy of this claim based on several factors. First, the position would have been 330 miles off the originally assigned patrol area, second even if Captain Polizzi had chased a convoy so far north, it would have been unlikely that other boats in the area had not also detected its presence. German war records indicate that four u-boats, U-38, U-95, U-105, and U-124 were just south of the area in question. None intercepted or chased a convoy.
Additional notes
It should be reasonable to assume that the Nani was lost due to unknown circumstances, possibly foul weather, between the date of the last radio signal (January 3rd) and the last possible date for its return to base (February 20th).
The submarine Naiade was one of the boats of the 600 class, series Sirena, built by the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone in 1931. Delivered to the Regia Marina on November 16th, 1933, at the beginning of the conflict it was assigned to the 61st Sq., VI Group based in Tobruk. In June 1940, the Naiade was one of the boats assigned to a patrol organized by MARICOSOM (Navy Submarine Command) off Solum and in which also participated the Lafolè, Diamante and Topazio. In the course of this action, on June 20th, the Diamante was sunk off Tobruk by the British submarine Parthian.
One of the rare photos of the NAIADE (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
The Naiade was assigned to a patrol area not too far from the British naval base of Alexandria, about 40 miles NW of the base when, on June 12th, it sighted a convoy made of barges and escorted by a gunboat. The captain, Lieutenant Luigi Baroni, attempted an attack on the surface with the deck gun, but the shells in the ready-to-use stowage on deck were damaged due to sea water infiltrations. Thus, having become the unwilling recipient of the enemy’s fire, the captain wisely decided to dive.
The same night, around 10 PM, the Naiade sighted a large tanker which was attacked with torpedoes. Of the three weapons ejected, one had an irregular course, but the other two hit the target causing the sinking of the Norwegian Orkanger of 8,029 t in position 31 42 N, 28 50 E.
This motor tanker built in 1928 by the shipyard Ateliers et Chantiers de la Seine Maritime Worms in France and belonging to the shipping company Westfal-Larsen & Co. of Bergen had been previously attacked and hit at 5:00 AM by a single torpedo launched by the submarine Nereide under the command of Lieutenant Mario Spano. With the sinking of the tanker 4 crewmembers lost their lives. After a systematic hunt conducted by the enemy, the Naiade returned to base on June 15th.
The boat returned to action in August with a patrol off Crete between the 10th and the 16th along with the Balilla. Both boats failed to detect any traffic of interest and returned to base.
In December, now under the command of Liutenant Pietro Notarbartolo, the Naiade was on patrol with the Neghelli and the Narvalo again off the port of Alexandria. The boat was assigned to an area 45 miles from Sidi el Barrani where, on the 14th, it sighted intense enemy activity. Around 7:40 PM, thus during the night, the captain began an attack maneuver with the periscope steering towards some of the units detected by the boat’s hydrophones. Meantime, British units, alerted by sonar detection, were already aware of the submarine’s presence. Soon after, the boat was centered by a cluster of depth charges which caused serious damages. Unable to remain underwater, at 8:30 PM the boat broke surface and then began self-destructing. In the freezing waters surrounding the submarine the British destroyers HMS Hyperion and Hereward (both H class units) were already waiting.
R.T Artemio Mancini war diary (Photo courtesy Cristian Romagnolo )
During this action sailor Gaetano Francoforte lost his life, but let radioman Artemio Mancini, one of the survivors, tell us the story:
Struck in full, smashed, we opened our eyes into the most sorrowful darkness and facing to the most horrendous destiny. By then, a sense of ill fate had taken over our souls and inexorably, it seemed to stretch us its jaws.
Under the light of a battery, we looked at the depth manometers; they had been broken by the awful explosion! But the voice of the commander was still firm, incisive and this revived us all: fifty submariners are never intimidated, but that was too much.
Our submarine, stricken in full by a launch of five depth charges, was spinning fast toward the abyss. There wasn’t much left to do and even I understood this while holding a hand to my heart and murmuring “mother”. My throat turned into a knot.
The irate voice of the commander awoke us all, but then an awful dipping of bow made us lose our last hope: “blow the tanks!” His voice, veiled of weeping and anger, raced through all the compartments and was lost into a macabre echo. The submarine bow’s surged upward, went strait up, and suddenly by the listing we realized that we had broke surface.
One by one, we escaped through the conning tower’s hatch and, once on deck, were welcomed by the angered meow of machineguns and shots from the cannons of the destroyers surrounding us. The commander understood that its duty was to help the crew, and after having opened the kingstones, he came on deck and began his mission.
The submarine, slowly, sunk into the sea while we look for shelter aboard two lifeboats lowered into the sea by the destroyers. What we had to face was a horrible scene: the sailors from aboard the lifesavers were hitting with rows and the buts of their guns the unfortunate ones who had gotten too close. I would prefer not to talk about this as to these days my heart skips a bit and a quiver grips me the throat.
To be more agile, I removed all of my cloths but a blue sweater. Soon after, the submarine, as if she was giving us her last regards, reappeared by the stern and then sunk forever.
During its brief operational life, the Naiade completed 8 patrols (both war and training) for a total of 48 days at sea covering 4,508 miles on the surface and 818 submerged.
Of the two British vessels involved in this action, H.M.S. Hyperion would have a very short life sinking a few days later, on the 22nd, off Pantelleria after having hit an Italian mine. HMS Hereward was instead sunk by German and Italian bombers off Creta on May 29th, 1941.
At the outbreak of the hostilities, the submarine Morosini was already in position off Cape Palos, Spain. During the night of the 15th of June, it located a small vessel presumed French, which was attacked without success. The following day, it sighted a large convoy escorted by several smaller naval units, but mostly due to the large distance between the boat and the targets, failed to reach a position suitable for an attack. On the 21st, it sighted a medium size merchantman against which it launched a torpedo at a short distance; still it failed to hit the target, most probably due to the adverse meteorological conditions. As it will be soon discovered in the Atlantic, torpedoes do not perform well in large swells.
In July, the Morosini was again at sea, this time to patrol the area between Cape of Gata (Almeria) and Cape Tres Forcas (Morocco). Once back to base, the boat was transferred to the shipyard for special refitting work in preparation for an assignment to the newly established submarine base of Bordeaux, in France. The Morosini belonged to the “II Gruppo”, “XXII Squadriglia” based in Naples, along with the Barbarigo, Emo, Marconi, Da Vinci. Still under the command of C.C. Alfredo Criscuolo, the Morosini left Naples the 25th of October, reaching the Strait of Gibraltar five days later, on the 31st. Here, the submarine proceeded, submerged, in fair weather conditions, and despite having picked up with the hydrophones sounds from patrolling British vessels, it proceeded through the strait undetected. Just off Tangiers, the boat experienced a sudden loss of control, quickly diving to a depth of 130 meters, but without experiencing any damage. This phenomenon would be experienced by many Italian boats and was caused by the strong currents present in the area. Completed the crossing, the submarine moved north, reaching a patrol area off Oporto (Portugal) on November 3rd. On the 16th, Betasom instructed Captain Criscuolo to move to 20° 00′ W since the Germans had provided information regarding the presence of British traffic from Gibraltar and Spain directed to Great Britain. On the 20th, further information alerted the crew of the presence of a nearby convoy, which, despite a search, could not be located. Eventually, the Morosini remained in the area until the 26th of November, and then reached Bordeaux on the 28th, thus completing its first Atlantic mission.
1941
The Morosini remained in port until January, eventually leaving La Pallice (the secondary base near La Rochelle) on the 22nd of January 1941 for a mission off the Irish coast. After having reached the pre-assigned area on the 29th, the boat was immediately reassigned farther west. During this operation, captain Criscuolo received two signals informing him of the presence of enemy traffic, but after patrolling the area, he was only able to locate two small boats full of shipwrecked sailors. Soon after, the boat moved to the newly assigned area of operations, meeting during the transfer, the Italian submarines Baracca and Dandolo, also assigned to the area.
On February 7th, at 22:08, the Morosini sighted an isolated man-of-war decisively larger than an escort unit, but, following standing orders, it did not attack. During this period, Italian submarine commanders were instructed not to attack larger warships to avoid the risk of sinking German raiders or ships captured by auxiliary cruisers. On the 8th, the Morosini sighted the Dandolo, and later a merchant ship against which it launched three torpedoes which, probably due to the strong swell, failed to reach the target. Eventually, the crew heard a powerful explosion and assuming success left the area . The night of the 17th, while the foul weather continued, lookouts sighted a large merchant ship which, soon after, was lost and, despite an intense search, never found again. On the 24th, without having encountered any other ship, the Morosini returned to Bordeaux, thus completing its second Atlantic mission. At the end of this mission, C.C. Criscuolo was reassigned and the command of the Morosini was transferred to C.C. Athos Fraternale.
The third mission began on April 30th and included other submarines: the Bianchi (C.C. Franco Tosoni Pittoni), Barbarigo (C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri) and the Otaria (C.C. Giuseppe Vocaturo). All boats left between the and of April and the 8th of May. In accordance with orders issued by B.d.U., the three companions were to take position between 61° 00 N ~ 58° 00 N, 25° 00’ W, while the Morosini would be further south in position 54° 00’ N – 53° 00’ N between 25° 00’ W and 30° 00’ W. The area between North America and the British Isles was divided in sectors: west of the 34th meridian German surface ships, then Italian submarines, and finally German U-Boats. The Italian boats were asked to cover areas further away from their base, mostly because of their larger displacement and greater endurance. On May 9th, Betasom informed the group of the presence of a convoy in position 54° 30 N 28° 30 W and moving west. The Morosini was the only boat which had already reach the assigned area and was able to engage the British tanker Vancouver of 5,729 t. with the deck gun, but the superior speed of the target allowed it to escape. The Barbarigo and Bianchi, having received signal from the Morosini, continued the hunt, but failed to locate the tanker.
On May 14th, Betasom transmitted another signal alerting the submarines of the presence of a large convoy of about 20 to 30 ships escorted by destroyers in position 55° 45’ N 13° 15’ W and moving SW at a speed of about 8 knots. On this day, the Morosini again attacked a British vessel, this time the Manchester Port of 5469 t., but the merchantmen escaped. On the 15th this ship was attacked, but not sunk, by the Barbarigo, which, despite having hit the merchantman with a torpedo, could not reach it due to a failed diesel engine. At this point, the submarine Malaspina had also reached the area, bringing the total number of Italian boats to five. In the days that followed, airplanes attacked various vessels; the Morosini experienced such an attack on the 15th. Eventually, having exhausted the fuel reserve, the boat began the journey back to base, reaching Bordeaux on the 20th of May.
With the general change of theater of operations for the Italian units from the North Atlantic to Gibraltar and the Azores, the Morosini left base on June 28th, 1941 for the middle Atlantic. At the same time, various boats were engaged in this new area, including the Da Vinci, Baracca, Malaspina, Cappellini, Torelli, Bianchi, Bagnolini and the Barbarigo. Eventually, only a small number of submarines were able to conduct an organized hunt for British traffic. On July 14th, the Morosini located the British cargo Rupert de Larrinaga of 5,358 t. traveling alone, which was sunk with torpedoes. This ship was built in 1930 by Lithgows, Ltd of Port Glasgow, was capable of 10 knots, and belonged to the Larringa Steamship Co. LTD of Liverpool; all 44 crewmembers were rescued. The following day, on the 15th, the “Ocean Boarding Vessel” Lady Somers of 8194 t. was also located and sunk. This second vessel was a passenger ship in service to the Royal Navy, was built by Cammell Laird & Co. of Birkenhead in 1929 and belonged to the Lady Somers LTD; all 175 crewmembers and passengers were saved. On the 19th, having exhausted most fuel reserves, the Morosini began the journey back to base. The date of its arrival in Bordeaux is not known, but it probably fell around the end of the month.
In August, the Morosini was again assigned to a mission off Gibraltar along with several other submarines. During this mission, Betasom coordinated the deployment of the Italian submarine screen based on information received from the Luftwaffe. On the 19th, at around 8:10 AM, the Morosini sighted a large convoy of 25 ships under strong escort, including airplanes. During the approaching phase, one of the two electric motors experienced a severe failure, thus forcing the captain to immediately return to base where it arrived on September 20th. After the necessary repairs, on November 18th, 1941 the submarine was again at sea for a new mission. On December 13th, at about 250 miles west-northwest of Palma, in the Canary Islands, the Morosini sighted a convoy of 15 ships heading east and immediately gave chase. At night, while approaching the convoy, the submarine was sighted by escort units, which immediately attacked, placing several depth charges well near the submarine’s hull, causing serious damages. Forced into abandoning the mission, the captain immediately returned to base. By the end of this mission, with the United States having entered the war, the area of operations suddenly expanded, thus bringing Italian submarines all the way to the American coast.
1942
On February 2nd 1942, the Morosini was again at sea, directed to an area northeast of the Island of Guadalupe in the Antilles. On February 23rd, it sighted in position 29° 10’ N, 28° 15’ W the British cargo Sagaing of 7,968 t. which was able to elude the submarine, thanks to superior speed. In fact, the Morosini was still overloaded with diesel fuel and could barely make 13 knots. The submarines of the Marcello class underwent substantial modification to increase range. Some of the ballast tanks were turned into additional diesel fuel depots, and the reserve of food and ammunition was also augmented. Despite the benefits, the initial few days at sea were quite dangerous since the boats were left with less than 10% buoyancy, lowering the boat up to 22 cm. Also, by redesigning some of the interior compartments, the number of torpedoes aboard was increased to 16.
On March 8th 1942, the Morosini received 21 tons of extra diesel fuel from the Finzi, thus allowing it to extend the days at sea. On the 11th of March it attacked a tanker launching two torpedoes, but failing both to hit the target and recognize the name of the vessel.
Just before sunset of the same day, Captain Fraternale intercepted the British cargo Stangarth of 5,966 t., sinking it in position 22° 45’ N, 57° 40’ W with the torpedo on the early hours of March 12th. We do not have additional information regarding this vessel. After the sinking, the Morosini relocated south-west of the original position, intercepting on the night of the 15th, the Dutch motor tanker Oscilla of 6,341 t. which was sunk by three(1) of the five torpedoes launched and a few 100 mm shells. The Oscilla was built in 1939 by Van der Giessen & Zonen’s Scheepswerven, NV Krimpen in the Netherlands, was capable of 12 knots, and belonged to ‘La Corona’ NV Petroleum Maatschappij; of the crew, 51 were saved, but 4 perished.
Continuing patrol, the Morosini came upon the British tanker Peder Bogen of 9,741 t. which, after dark had fallen, was hit the night of the 23rd by two torpedoes and eventually sank in the early hours of March 24th in position 24° 53’ N, 57° 30’ W by about 70 100 mm shells. This tanker was built in 1925 by the Dordr NV Scheepswerf Dordrecht of Dordrecht in the Netherlands. It was capable of 10 knots, and belonged to the South Georgia Co. Ltd; all 53 crewmembers were rescued. At this point, having exhausted all torpedoes, the submarine began the long journey home, reaching Bordeaux on April 4th. At the end of this mission, C.C. Fraternale was transferred and replaced by T.V. Francesco D’Alessandro.
On June 2nd, 1942 the Morosini left Bordeaux for a mission in the Caribbean, specifically northeast of the island of Puerto Rico. After the long transfer, the boat reached the area of operations on the 28th of June, and on the 30th it located and sank the Dutch motor ship Tysa of 5,327 t. in position 25° 33’ N, 57° 33’ W utilizing torpedoes and the deck gun. This ship was built in 1938 by P. Smith Jnr of Rotterdam, was capable of 13 knots, and belonged to the “Vrachtvaart’, NV Maatschappij: all 43 crewmembers were rescued. On July 19th, the submarine attacked, without success, a small military ship, possibly a gun boat or an armed merchant ship which followed the submarine for a little while, without attacking.
The Morosini coming along the Finzi, from which the picture was taken, to receive 21 t. of diesel fuel. The authors Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli give the date of this exchange on March 13th, 1942. (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
The Morosini coming along the Finzi, from which the picture was taken, to receive 21 t. of diesel fuel. The authors Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli give the date of this exchange on March 13th, 1942. (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On July 27th, as in the previous mission, it received 25 tons of diesel fuel from the Finzi, submarine with a very large fuel capacity, thus continuing operations for a few more days. On the 31st of July, having reached the minimal fuel reserve, it began the journey home. On August 5th, the Morosini informed base that it was in position 41° 00’ N 33° 00’ W and that it would reach base on the 10th at around 14.15. On the 8th, it sent a confirmation signal to Betasom in reply to instructions for the approach to the Gironde. At 23:00 of the 9th, Betasom sent another message informing the Morosini of the presence of a merchant ship and three German torpedo boats, but the submarine never confirmed receipt. The boat never reached base and it was assumed that it had been lost between 8° 80’ W and 3° 00’ W after 14:50 of the 8th. Possibly it was sunk at night by a plane equipped with radar, but it has never been confirmed.
(1) Oscilla was hit by two, not three torpedo’s according to the Dutch reports.
The MARCONI was the first of a series of 6 boats and which bears its name (Marconi Class). Of this class, 5 boats were sunk and one captured. The boat was laid down at the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on September 19th, 1938, launched on July 30th of the following year, and delivered to the Navy on February 2nd, 1940. After a brief period of training and testing, the boat was assigned to the 22nd Squadron, 2nd Submarine Group with its base in Naples.
The MARCONI still on the slip just before its launch (Photo USMM)
Operational Life
1940
The first war patrol of the submarine MARCELLO was particularly successful. In July 1940, a few weeks after Italy’s declaration of war, the Italian Submarine Command organized a large and continuous patrol line east of the Strait of Gibraltar. The area in question was patrolled by a total of 11 boats divided into 3 groups. The MARCELLO, along with the Emo, Dandolo and Barbarigo, was assigned to the first group. This patrol started on July 1st and lasted for almost two weeks. The Emo and MARCONI were assigned to the westernmost area. The Emo patrolled south of the meridian of Alboran (about halfway between the Moroccan and Spanish coast), while the MARCONI was assigned north of this meridian and closer to the Spanish coast.
The MARCONI receiving final touches before being delivered to the Navy (Photo USMM)
The MARCONI, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giulio Chialaberto, was already in position when, the evening of July 2, it sighted in position 36° 25’N, 03° 48’W a group of six destroyers. In the darkness of the night (it was about 30 minutes to midnight), the captain launched a single torpedo at about 1,000 meters from the nearest target. The weapon failed right away, assuming the wrong course, so a second weapon was also expended. The presence of such a large formation forced the MARCONI to seeking refuge in the depths of the sea, thus the results of the attack could not be immediately ascertained. Later reports would confirm that as a result of this action, H.M.S. Vortigen (D37) was hit and sustained damage, but was able to get back to base. H.M.S. Vortigen, a British destroyer of the V Class built in 1916, would eventually be lost on May 15th, 1942.
Toward the end of the patrol, on July 11th (possibly earlier), the MARCONI sighted another destroyer. After having made contact around 03:00, the captain moved the boat into a favorable attack position and launched a single torpedo. The weapon hit the British destroyer H.M.S. Escort which, along with H.M.S. Forester (H66), was returning to Gibraltar following operation “MA 5”. The attack took place in position 36° 20’N, 03° 40’W and, following the attack, the MARCONI had to avoid an attempted ramming by H.M.S. Forester. H.M.S. Escort was a destroyer of the E class built in 1933 and following the attack that had destroyed the forward boiler room, there was a failed attempt to tow it back to port.
Upon returning to Naples, the MARCONI was one of the earlier boats selected for service in the Atlantic. At the end of August, MARCICOSOM, the Italian submarine command, issued the necessary orders to transfer another group of submarines to the Atlantic. This group was to cross the treacherous Strait of Gibraltar during the new moon around September 2nd. The group included the MARCONI, Emo, Faà di Bruno, Giuliani, Baracca, Torelli, Tarantini, Finzi and Bagnolini.
The MARCONI, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giulio Chialamberto, left Naples on September 6th and reached the approach to the strait on the 11th. Having noticed the presence of British patrol units, the captain decided to cross the narrow and perilous strait underwater, eventually reaching the Atlantic side without any problems. Once in the Atlantic, the MARCONI assumed the assigned patrol position off Cape Finesterre just north of the position assigned to the Finzi, a boat under the command of Commander Alberto Dominici. The Marconi remained in the area from the 15th to the 28th. On the 19th, Captain Chialamberto sighted a small ship and proceeded to sink it. Unfortunately, it was the Spanish trawler Alm. Jose de Carranza of 330 tons, a neutral vessel used for commercial fishing. In due course, the first Atlantic mission of the MARCONI ended with its arrival in Bordeaux on September 29th. The permanence in Bordeaux was not long; in early October Betasom was asked by B.d.U. to organize two attack groups to join German forces in the north Atlantic. The MARCONI was assigned to the Bagnolini Group along with the Bagnolini itself, the Baracca, and the Finzi. The MARCONI left base on October 27th, the last of the group. Once at sea, the boat received a discovery signal in the afternoon of December 4th from the Malaspina. Despite the immediate search, the boat failed to locate the convoy previously signaled and continued on to the assigned area. Between the 6th and 8th of November, the MARCONI was in the patrol area spanning from 20° W to 26° W and from 55°20’N to 56°20’ N. On the 8th, the radioman aboard the submarine intercepted a radio message from the British cargo ship Cornish City of 4,952 tons which had claimed having heard a violent explosion. The MARCONI sighted the merchant ship and immediately after an escort unit forced it to seek refuge into the depths. The escort unit went on with the usual lengthy hunt dropping 14 depth charges, but missing the target because the captain had been very ingenious in taking the boat down to 125 meters. At that time, British escort units did not know that Axis boats could reach such depths. Eventually, the unit in question noticed fuel, oil, and wreckage bubbling to the surface and, assuming a kill, gave up the hunt.
It is known that the Cornish City was the lead ship of convoy HX.84 that on the 5th had been attacked and dispersed by the German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer. The commodore aboard this ship was trying to get the convoy back together when a German FW 200 attacked. One of the escort units, H.M.S. Havelock, assumed that the explosion had been caused by a torpedo and moved forward, eventually encountering the MARCONI.
On the 9th, having received a signal with the necessary instructions, the MARCONI moved on toward a position indicated by the Otaria as one of a naval formation including an aircraft carrier and a few destroyers. Instead of the formation, the MARCONI found a straggling merchant ship already damaged by a previous attack by a FW 200 of KG40 and ablaze. Past sunset, after a first failed attack, the MARCONI placed a torpedo into the side of the Swedish ship Vingaland of 2,734 tons (some sources give the displacement at only 2,720 tons). Original Italian documentation assumed that this ship was able to reach port, but this assumption, like many others, was mistaken. This Swedish ship was built in 1935 by the shipyard Eriksberg, MekaniskeVerkstads of Gothenburg and was part of convoy HX.84 from Halifax. The sinking took place in position 55°41’N, 18°24’W with a total of six casualties and 19 crewmembers later rescued.
A few days later, in the early morning of November 14th, the MARCONI sighted another merchant ship. It could have been the opportunity for another kill, but the boat had lost the use of the attack periscope since the beginning of the mission and the use of the second periscope brought part of the turret out of the water more than once. At about 2500 meters, a single torpedo was launched but failed the target and then the captain decided to give up the chase since the ship was faster than his boat. Two days later, and precisely on the 16th, the MARCONI received another signal but the severe weather conditions did not allow it to make much progress toward a fairly large convoy. On the 18th, another signal brought the boat on another chase, but there was no contact made and soon after the submarine had to return to base, reaching Bordeaux on November 28th.
After the usual period for refitting, the MARCONI was again sent to sea, this time off Oporto, Portugal. The boat left Bordeaux on January 16th, reaching the assigned area around the 21st. Here, the MARCONI waited off the estuary of the River Tago for a convoy of about 20 ships sailing up from Gibraltar and directed to England. On the 10th, aboard the submarine a considerable trail left by leaking fuel was detected. The seriousness of the problem suggested abandoning the search for the convoy, but the morning of the same day Captain Chialaberto attacked, while submerged, a merchant ship without identifying it and failing to sink it. On the 12th, the boat left the patrol area returning to Bordeaux on the 17th of February.
1941
After a long period of refitting, in May the MARCONI was assigned to a screen which included the Argo, Mocenigo, Veniero, Brin, Velella and Emo running north to south along 12°00’N. During the refitting preceding this mission, Lieutenant Commander Chialamberto had been transferred to the submarine Bagnolini and had been replaced by Lieutenant Mario Paolo Pollina. The precise date of the MARCONI’s departure from Bordeaux is not known, but took place between the19th and the 29th of May.
Lieutenant Pollina (first officer on the left) returning to base after a patrol in the Atlantic Ocean (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On the 30th, at 08:00, the crew sighted the British tanker Cairndale and proceeded to sink it with two launches of two torpedoes each. The attack took place in position 35°20’N, 8°45’W just west of the Strait of Gibraltar (170 miles from Cape Trafalgar). The position of the sinking was given by the British authorities in 35°19’N, 8°33’W with the reported loss of four crewmembers. The Cairndale was a motor tanker (oiler) of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and had been laid down in 1938 as the Erato. Built in 1939 by the Harland & Wolff of Belfast, it had a displacement of 8,129 tons. The reaction of the escort was immediate, but despite the launch of numerous depth charges, the boat lived to tell the story. The following day, Captain Pollina sank the Portuguese steam trawler Exportador I (given by some authors as Equador Primero) of 318 tons with the deck gun. It is not known why a neutral ship would become the target of the submarine, but we could assume that it was providing some service to the British forces.
At 23:50 on the night of June5th, the MARCONI sighted a convoy in position 35°05’, 11°45W. Along with the Velella, the MARCONI began approaching the convoy hoping to be able to break through the columns, but the intervention of one of the escorts forced it to withdraw. The attack was resumed in the early hours of the 6th, and at 04:22 the MARCONI launched two torpedoes against a large tanker described as type “Daghestan”. This was a tanker built in 1921 by the Short Bros. Ltd of Sunderland, displacing 5,842 tons and sunk by U 57 in 1940. According to the report presented by the MARCONI, one more ship was also damaged.
Two other torpedoes hit the British freighter Baron Lovat of 3,395 tons, sinking it, and one of the last weapons launched hit the Swedish cargo Taberg. The first vessel was built by Ayrshire Dockyard of Irvine in 1926 and belonged to the Hogarth Shipping Co. of Glasgow. The position of the sinking was given as 35°30N, 11°30’W and all 35 crewmembers were rescued. The Baron Lovat was carrying 3,245 tons of coke. Of the Taberg we have very limited information if only that it displaced 1,392 tons and was in ballast and thay only 6 out of the 22 crewmembers were later saved by a British ship.
The Baron Lovat and Taberg were part of convoy OG.63 from Liverpool to Gibraltar. The convoy had left Great Britain on May 25th with a total of 39 ships, later arriving in Gibraltar on June 7th after having lost 3 vessels. The British reports would indicate that in addition to the two ships sunk by the MARCONI, a third one (Glen Head), was sunk by an aircraft. During this operation, both the Velella and Emo conducted similar attacks but failed to score any success. Immediately after the audacious attack, the boat became the object of the attentions of the escort unit, and after the first few cannon shots, the captain took the boat underwater where it remained until the afternoon. The same night, having exhausted all the torpedoes, the MARCONI began the journey back to base.
After the usual refitting, the MARCONI was again assigned to a patrol, this time along with the Finzi, and again in the area just off the Strait of Gibraltar. The submarine left Bordeaux on the 3rd of August reaching the assigned area about 200 miles from the strait a few days later. On the 11th at 03:45 AM in position 37°32N, 10°20’W, the MARCONI attacked a small formation which included the corvette H.M.S. Convolvulus (K45) of the Flower class and the sloop H.M.S. Deptford (L53) of the Grimsby Class, launching two torpedoes against the latter one. Although the crew was convinced of having scored a hit, post-war records do not indicate any damage to the British units.
Meantime, it had been ascertained that a British convoy (HG.70 from Gibraltar to Great Britain) was on the move and all submarines in the area, both German and Italian, were sent on the hunt. On the 14th, the MARCONI sighted the merchant ship Sud, a Yugoslavian freighter of 2,598 tons. Having failed the attack with the torpedo, the MARCONI proceeded to finish the ship with the deck gun. Once the ship hit by many rounds came to a halt, the captain waited for the enemy crewmembers to abandon ship. Meantime, a German submarine, U 126 commanded by Korvettenkapitنn Ernst Bauer intervened, firing a few rounds into the hull of the sinking ship and claiming it as his own (he ended the war with a record of 119.110 tons sunk). All 33 crewmembers were later saved. The position of the sinking is given as 41°00’N, 17°41’W. For the record, the Sud belonged to the Oceania Brodarsko Ackionarsko Drustvo of Susak and was built in 1901 by Roger & Co. of Glasgow. Roger Jordan gives the displacement as only 2,520 tons. After the attack, the MARCONI continued chasing the convoy until the 17th and then began the return voyage to base reaching Bordeaux on August 29th. Immediately after, Lieutenant Pollina was disembarked due to health reasons and replaced by Lieutenant Commander Livio Piomarta who had already served aboard the submarine Ferraris.
On October 5th, the MARCONI was again at sea and directed to Gibraltar to intercept a convoy along with the Ferraris, Archimede, and Barbarigo. On October 22nd, the MARCONI was located 720 miles WNW of the strait. On the 25th, the Ferraris was scuttled after an aerial bombing (Catalina A of the 202 R.A.F. Squadron) and later attacked and sunk by the British destroyer H.M.S. Lamerton. On the 26th, the Ferraris made contact with the convoy. On the 28th, the MARCONI sighted many flares and, at 23:30, following a request from Betasom, it communicated its position (42°55’N, 21°55W).
The Marconi in Bordeaux in July 1941 after an extensive refitting which included the redesign of the conning tower (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
A German submarine, also in the area, indicated that at that point the MARCONI was about 30 miles south of the convoy. The same day, U-432 sank the British cargo Ulea (part of HG.75 including 17 ships, 4 of which were lost) at 05:09 in position 41°17N, 21°40W. Assuming that the positions given are accurate, the MARCONI was almost 100 miles from the position where the Ulea was lost. Furthermore, the MARCONI was north, not south of the convoy. In any event, this was the last time the whereabouts of the MARCONI were known. The submarine failed to return to base and was declared lost west of Gibraltar between October 28th and December 4th (the last date being the maximum endurance at sea).
Additional notes
Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli wrote in “Sommergibili in Guerra”: “[the Marconi] would be lost under the command of Liutenant Commander Livio Piomarta, probably sunk by mistake by the German submarine U.67 on October 28th, 1941 during an attack against a convoy off Portugal.” But suggestion that the submarine Marconi was sunk by the German U-boat U67 in 1941 has proved incorrect as the German boat was not at sea at the time of the Marconi’s disappearance
The MARCELLO was the first of a series of 11 boats and which bears its name (Marcello Class). The boat was laid down at the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on January 4th, 1937, launched on November 20th of the same year, and delivered to the Navy on March 5th, 1938.
Monfalcone, November 20th, 1937 – The launch of the MARCELLO. (Photo USMM)
After a brief period of training and testing, the boat was assigned to the 21st Squadron, 2nd Submarine Group with its base in Naples. Foles Buonamici commanded the MARCELLO from the 25th of September 1939 to the 22nd of February 1940. Later, the boat was under the command of Raffaele Barbera from February 23rd 1940 to April 4th, and later transferred to the command of Luigi Domini.
Operational Life
Even before the beginning of the hostilities, the MARCELLO was one of the six boats assigned to a screen to be deployed between Capo Palos, Cape Falcon and Cape Tenes in the western Mediterranean. The MARCELLO left Naples on June 5th, 1940 and while in navigation a failure of the cooling system caused a methyl chloride leak with subsequent poisoning of part of the crew. Thus the mission was abandoned and the boat returned to Cagliari on June 10th, the day of the declaration of war.
After the necessary repairs, the MARCELLO was called up to another mission with the MEDUSA for a short patrol 25 miles NE, 40 miles east of the Island of La Galite to be conducted in coordination with surface vessels of the 1st Naval Division against French traffic to North Africa. The boat arrived in the area on June 23rd, but then returned right away to port due to the cancellation of the action. Eventually, the boat reached Naples where the commanding officer, Luigi Domini was disembarked on July 29th and replaced by Carlo Alberto Teppati who would perish aboard the vessel in Atlantic.
During the month of August, the MARCELLO was part of another mission in the western Mediterranean (from the 2th to the 19th), which included the GONDAR and the ASCIANGHI, to patrol the area east of the Strait of Gibraltar, primarily around the 36th parallel. In those days operation “Hurry” was underway for the transport of aircraft from Gibraltar to Malta. Furthermore, the British had organized the bombardment of Cagliari by carrier-based aircrafts and also a diversionary action off the Balearic Islands. Despite the large activity at sea, the MARCELLO did not sight any vessel and, at the end of the mission, returned to port having navigated 2,432 miles.
The MARCELLO in Naples
At the end of this mission, the boat received orders to transfer to the Atlantic to become part of the new submarine base established in Bordeaux. The MARCELLO was part of a transfer group that included the BIANCHI, MOROSINI, and BRIN, while the MOCENIGO and VELELLA were delayed. After departure, which took place on October 31st (the day before the new moon), the boat crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to then go on patrol off Oporto. The MARCELLO, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlo Alberto Teppani, completed the difficult crossing the night of November 5th, submerged, with favorable weather conditions and without encountering any enemy vessel. During navigation the boat received orders to replace the BIANCHI which, due to damage suffered during the Strait of Gibraltar, had to make directly for the base. Thus, from the 7th to the 27th of November, the MARCELLO remained on patrol off Cape S. Vincenzo but without intercepting any target despite news received of a convoy departing Gibraltar. Having left the patrol area on November 27th, the boat arrived in Bordeaux for the first time on December 2nd.
In early January 1941, the MARCELLO left for its first mission completely in the Atlantic as part of a group that included the MALASPINA and TORELLI. The group was assigned an area between 59 30’ N, 53 00’ N and 17 00’ W, 20 00’ W. The MARCELLO left Le Verdon, at the estuary of the river Gironde, the night of January 11th to reach the area of operations six days later. As soon as he arrived, Commander Teppani sighted a convoy and moved to its stern to determine speed and direction. Soon after, a destroyer from the escort sighted the Italian boat (not too difficult due to the size of the conning tower), thus the MARCELLO had to dive even before launching the discovery signal. The enemy vessel launched only 5 depth charges, but they damaged the forward trim tank. After the all clear, the boat surfaced to launch the discovery signal. After assessing the seriousness of the damage, the MARCELLO aborted the mission on the 19th to return to Bordeaux. On the 20th, after having sighted a ship on the surface, the crew lost contact underwater (maybe due to problems with the hydrophones or the horrible weather conditions), and regained it once back on the surface where it attacked with the deck gun.
Despite Italian documentation dating back to 1963 which indicates that this attack failed, it has been ascertained that the MARCELLO indeed attacked and sank the Belgian ship “Portugal”, of 1,550 t. and not the Greek “Eleni” as indicated at the time by the xB-Dienst (naval cryptanalytic division). The “Portugal” was an old ship built in 1906 by the AG Neptun shipyard of Rostok (Germany) and previously known as the “Barman” (1922), “Consule Cords”, and “Minna Bolt”. The ship belonged to “Compagnie National Belge de Transports Maritimes”. It should be said that during the attack four gunners were dragged into the sea by the fierce weather. Three were rescued, but the fourth, probably stunned after an impact with the boat’s structure, disappeared between the waves despite the intense search. The MARCELLO continued on, arriving in Puillac on January 24th.
After a brief period at the base, the MARCELLO was again assigned to a mission, this time as part of the “Group Bianchi”, along with the BIANCHI, OTARIA, and BARBARIGO. The MARCELLO, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Teppani, left Bordeaux on February 6th with orders to reach an area between 14 00’ W and 17 00’ W and between 55 N and 56 N (a rectangle of about 61 by 101 miles). On the 18th, the MARCELLO was ordered to a new prearranged patrol area further north. The same day, the MARCELLO received orders to attack a large tanker that at 1330 was in position 6167 square 11 (to be determined) and previously damaged by an aircraft. On the 19th at 1205 (Rome Standard Time), the MARCELLO was ordered to a new area designated “B”. Later, at 1920, the MARCELLO and BARBARIGO were informed that an airplane had sighted a convoy in quadrant 4615 and the BARBARIGO was ordered to sub-quadrant 66 and the MARCELLO to sub-quadrant 46 both with orders to patrol along the parallel (East-West and vice-versa). The boats were also informed that Germans submarines were in the area of operations. On the 21st, at 0223, BETASOM issued a new set of orders. BARBARIGO was assigned to 46-67-36, BIANCHI to 46-99-52 and MARCELLO to 27-74-43. The following day, February 22nd at 0120, BETASOM sent another signal ordering the three submarines to patrol on a 45° route at a speed of 8 knots until further orders.
What follows are a series of assumptions often resulting from various mistakes made by the British and Italian naval authorities.
On the 24th at 1015, BETASOM ordered the submarines to communicate their position. The same order was issued again on the 25th at 1200. Later that day, at 2020, BETASOM ordered the BARBARIGO, BIANCHI and MARCELLO to move to a new position; 5399 11 for the BARBARIGO, 2799 44 for the BIANCHI and 6199 13 for the MARCELLO. The same message indicated a convoy of 25 ships in position 2715 sub quadrant 25 direction 270 at the speed of 7 knots at 1400. The following day, BETASOM indicated at 0220 that the convoy was at 2350 (of the previous day) in position 61 90, sub quadrant 56 moving at 8 knots in direction 230. The boats were ordered to converge.
On the 27th at 0215, BETASOM informed the submarines that the convoy was now dispersed and ordered the attack on two ships in position 56-99/66 moving at the speed of 4 knots in direction 270. The same day, BETASOM informed Rome at 1125 that they had lost contact with the MARCELLO. This telegram was followed by another one on the 9th of March in which BETASOM informed Rome of the following:
The morning of February 22nd at 1000, the BIANCHI sighted a “submerged submarine” in position 57° 55’ N, 17° 40’ W which could have been the MARCELLO. The same boat heard depth charges explosions, about 40 total, at 16:00 and again 21:15. The destroyer Montgomery, one of the old American four-stacks transferred to the Royal Navy by President Roosevelt, conducted an antisubmarine action in position 59° 00’ N, 17° 00’ W at 15:00 (16:00 Italian time) and it is believed that this action brought about the destruction of the Italian vessel. If the time is correct, between 10 AM (early morning in the area of operations and still under cover of darkness) and 4 PM the MARCELLO navigated no less than 68 miles while submerged. Assuming that the boat never came to the surface, it would be impossible for a boat of the MARCELLO class to cover 68 miles in 6 hours if not on the surface and at elevated speed.
If one also considers that the original document “German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War” published in 1946 by the Admiralty attributes the sinking of the MARCELLO to a Sunderland of the 210 Squadron of the R.A.F. on January 6th (a month before the boat left port) west of the Hebrides Islands, then we must assume that the necessary checks and double checks did not take place.
On March 18th, 1941 BETASOM and MARICOSOM finally declared the MARCELLO missing. Years went by and with the cessation of the hostilities the various historical departments attempted to shed light on many war events, amongst them the loss of the MARCELLO. On February 12th 1949 the Italian Navy officially requested the collaboration of the British authorities in clarifying these events. The first correction made was simple since the R.A.F. had claimed the MARCELLO following an attack by a Sunderland (4210) on January 6th, 1941 date in which the MARCELLO was still in Bordeaux.
Later, the British Admiralty forwarded a letter to the Italian authorities on May 17th, 1954 (HSL.159/54) in which they informed their former enemies that the information reported on page 52 of “Warship Losses” (Navi Perdute, Tomo I) indicating the loss of the MARCELLO following an attack by a British Hurricane (aircraft) was also erroneous. The British attempted to clarify the record by indicating that “the most likely cause of the MARCELLO’s destruction seems to have been the attack by the Motgomery at 1550 of February 22nd 191”.
The Italian inquire completed on October 9th, 1949 was indeed embarrassing has it not only mistakenly reported some of the data provided by the British, but also failed to provide for the necessary references. In essence, it looked like the only interested was closing the file and moving on to new matters. As noted on the original documentation, this new version was accepted by the Ufficio Storico (USMM) on November 15th, 1956 and a note was handwritten indicating that the book “Navi Perdute – Tomo I” would be updated accordingly. To these days, the causes of the MARCELLO’s loss are still unknown.
Additional notes
Clair Blair, the author of the book “Hitler’s U-Boot War” wrote: “During the night of February 23-25, five German boats and the Italian Bianchi attacked… During this melee, the Italian submarine Marcello, commanded by Carlo Alberto Teppani, arrived on the scene . One of the convoy escorts, the ex-American four-stack destroyer Montgomery, merely a month out of her overhaul and upgrade, spotted Marcello and attacked with guns and depth charges [1]. The attack was successful: Marcello sank with all hands. She was the first Axis submarine to fall victim to one of the American warship transferred to the Royal Navy in the “Destroyer Deal…”.
Giorgio Giorgerini, in his book “Uomini sul Fondo” (Men on the Bottom) published by Mondadori in 1994 wrote: “In the fist ten days of February the group “Bianchi” left Bordeaux (Bianchi, Marcello, Otaria, Barbarigo); unfortunately the Marcello lost all contacts: disappeared, without survivors. Some sources indicate February 21st as the possible date of the loss, and also indicate as the possible cause one of the three antisubmarine actions conducted by British ships. The first was conducted by the destroyer HURRICANE in position 56 19’ N, 07 59’ W. The second was conducted by the destroyer MOTGOMERY in position 59 00’ N, 17 00’ W. The third was conducted by the corvette PERWINKLE in position 59 18’ N, 14 32’ W. Nevertheless, none [of these actions] is positioned in full in the operational area of the Marcello which, starting February 19th, was between 57° 00’ N and 58° 00’ N.”
[1] We don’t know where he gets his gun attack from, the report from Montgomery is quite specific “attacked firm contact with six depth charges – there was no evidence of destruction”.
The submarine Malaspina was one of the six boats of the Marconi class. It was named after Alessandro Malaspina, the world-famous Italian navigator. Laid down in 1939 by the shipyard OTO of Muggiano, near La Spezia, the vessel was delivered to the Navy on June 20th, 1940, a few days after the beginning of the war. Following a relatively short period for the usual shake down, the boat was assigned to the submarine base of La Spezia.
R.Smg. Alessandro Malaspina (Photo Turrini)
Operational Life
1940
On July 29th, the Malaspina left La Spezia for a patrol into the Atlantic. Under the command of Commander Mario Leoni, the submarine crossed the Strait of Gibraltar the night of September 3rd, while proceeding at the maximum speed of 16 knots, and at 3:35 AM the crew sighted in the clear and luminescent night the menacing silhouette of an enemy destroyer. The captain gave the order to dive and, slowly the large vessel disappeared under the surface to meet, and fortunately avoid, a tragic destiny. Commander Leoni described these tense moments in his mission report:
“The submarine, as usual, for the first 30 to 40 seconds remained horizontal, dove one or two meters, and thereafter began going down by the bow. When the bow was down 10°, in leveling the aft planes, it is discovered that they are locked in a down 20° position. The forward planes are then set full up and at a depth of 20 meters I give orders to blow the emergency tank.
The submarine goes down quickly by the bow up to 35° and in a few seconds reaches the depth of 25 meters. After we passed the 15° down by the bow, I order the tanks closed and air to the ballast tanks (except the aft ballast tank), full blown.
The submarine, in seven or eight seconds, thus before the tank valves were closed, reaches a depth of 70 meters.
The opening of the air valves and the leveling of the two reserve air systems is done rapidly, but with great difficulties because personnel in the control room has fallen, since the beginning of the maneuver, near the forward passageway, while I am gripped to the controls of the hydraulic system, but cannot reach the telegraphs to order the engine stopped.
Although we keep pumping air into the tanks, ballast tanks and emergency tank, the submarine keeps going down quickly remaining 35° down by the bow.
Reached 130 meters, the descend slows down, but it does not stop. At a depth of 147 meters at the main gage (152 meters at the center of the hull and 165 meters forward) the submarine stops, and still 35° down by the bow remains at this depth for about 10 seconds and then begins to rise, first slowly and then rapidly.”
After surviving this ordeal and having successfully crossed the strait, the boat began its patrol and, on August 12th, intercepted the British tanker “British Fame”, a unit dispersed from convoy OB193 from Liverpool. The sinking took place in position 37° 44’ N, 22° 56’ W. Three of the crew members perished, one was captured as a prisoner of war, and the remaining 45 survived. According to Walter Ghetti, author of “Storia della Marina italiana”, Commander Leoni towed the surviving crew of the British vessel closer to land. This modern motor tanker, built in 1936 by the shipyards Swan, Hunter, & Wigham Richardson of Sunderland, belonged to the British Tanker Company of London.
Eventually, the Malaspina reached Bordeaux on September 4th, at 8:00 PM (Rome Standard Time). During this first patrol, the second in command was Lieutenant Oreste Odorici, while the navigation officer was sub-lieutenant Giovanni Volterra.
The Malaspina in Bordeaux. The crew is loading torpedoes (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On the last day of September, the Malaspina was visited by Admiral Doenitz as part of his inspection of the newly established Italian base of Bordeaux. Soon after, the boat would be again at sea for another patrol. This patrol is eloquently narrated by the U.S.M.M. (Historical Division of the Italian Navy) in the book “I sommergibili negli oceani”:
“The Malaspina (Commander Mario Leoni) left Bordeaux in the afternoon of October 9th and on the 18th of the same month reached the patrol area west of Scotland where it intercepted a discovery signal radioed by a German submarine. Having immediately changed course to approach the convoy, the boat continued for 30 hours, reaching position 59 25 N, 30 10 W without sighting the convoy, which meantime had dispersed.
The night of the 20th, the Malaspina attacked a ship of about 3,400 t. The first torpedo was deflected by the waves, and of a second launch of three torpedoes, one reached the target. The Malaspina began firing with the deck gun, but it soon had to interrupt due to the darkness of the night, which did not allow the crew to locate their hits, while it gave the ship, which had the advantage of better stability and a higher position, the possibility of closing their hits to the conning tower. Contact with the merchant ship, lost after a heavy squall, was later never re-established. On October 31st, at 13:15 in position 57 17 Nm 23 25 W with heavy sea and marine fog, the Malaspina sighted during a brief clearing a convoy of 7 ships at a speed of 12 knots on course due SW with the escort of two destroyers, one of which, placing itself constantly between the convoy and the submarine, forced the boat first to go away and then submerge. Thus, the boat lost contact with the convoy.
On November 4th, at 13:10 in position 51 00 N, 20 $) W, having left the patrol area two days ahead of schedule due to limited range, the boat sighted another convoy of 17 ships, on course due SSE, speed 8 knots, all vessels of limited displacement escorted by an auxiliary cruiser positioned at the end of the convoy. The submarine, which had kept uninterrupted contact, attempted around sunset to close distance, but the auxiliary cruiser, probably having sighted the submarine, maneuvered several times to remain in between, forcing the submarine to go away until darkness, when the opportunity of the Malspina to reestablish contact vanished.
On November 5th, at 7:10 at about 800 miles from the Gironde, near the 20th meridian, where at the time the largest part of the British traffic was routed, the Malaspina sited an auxiliary cruiser, a converted liner of great displacement on due course NW and which, having sighted the submarine, changed course to intercept the vessel at a speed of 20 knots. At about 5,000 meters, the cruiser opened fire, forcing the submarine to dive. Lost contact, and after two quick reappearances of the cruisers in between squalls, the Malaspina gave up the chase and moved on toward Bordeaux where it arrived in the afternoon of November 9th.”
1941
After a brief period for refitting, the Malaspina was again at sea on January 5th, 1941, assigned to the same operational area west of Scotland. On the 13th, the boat reached the assigned area where it continued the patrol until the 24th without detecting any traffic. Following orders from Betasom, Commander Leoni moved to a new area to the south where, within 2 days from its arrival, the crew sighted a destroyer which, due to the poor beta, could not be attacked. Again, in the morning of the 28th, Commander Leoni had the opportunity to attack another enemy vessel, this time an auxiliary cruiser moving at about 16 knots, but the distance to the target was too great to conduct a favorable attack. The 30th of January, the Malaspina left the patrol area, reaching Le Verdon February 28th. At the end of this patrol, Commander Leoni left the Malaspina to take command of the destroyer Malocello, while Lieutenant Giuliano Prini replaced him.
Captain Giuliano Prini, Gold Metal for Bravery Here in a picture as a Cadet. (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
Another unsuccessful patrol took place from the 23rd of April to early June as part of the Da Vinci patrol group. This time, despite having sighted a large convoy of over 20 ships west of Ireland, the boat failed to conduct an attack. As with other Italian submarines, operations in the North Atlantic were becoming less and less productive. According to the documentation provided by the U.S.M.M., on the night of May 3rd the Malaspina attacked, hitting with one torpedo the British liner Lycaon that, despite some substantial damage, was able to take advantage of the frequent squalls to elude the hunter. On the 20th, the Malaspina was attacked by an airplane, followed by three destroyers, which hunted the boat for over 9 hours making any offensive maneuver improbable and certainly impossible. This would be the last patrol north, as the following one took place off Gibraltar and produced two successes.
After having left Bordeaux on June 27th, following a very brief period of rest, the Malaspina was sent west of Gibraltar. On July 3rd, the crew sighted a destroyer, which could not be attacked due to unfavorable kinematics conditions. A few days later, on the 14th, Captain Prini hunted down the Greek merchant ship Nikiklis of 3,576 t. 105 miles southwest of the Azores. This older ship, built in 1921 by the Burger Shipyard as the Lingedijk belonged to the Maraitis Lines of Athens. Of the 28 crewmembers, 17 survived.
Only three days later, Captain Prini scored another success, this time the British merchant ship Guelma of 4,402 t. Belonging to “La Tunisienne Steamship Co”, the Guelma was built in 1928 by the Rhead Shipyard. The sinking took place in position 30° 44’ N, 17° 33’ W and all 41 crewmembers were rescued. After a few additional days on patrol, the Malaspina returned to base for another period of refitting, this time lasting until September.
On September 18th, 1941 Captain Romolo Polacchini, who since April had replaced Captain Also Cocchia as the Chief of Staff of Betasom, took over the command of the Italian Atlantic submarine forces from vice-admiral Angelo Parona, who, in the meantime, had been called to command a naval division. It is during this period that the Morosini was assigned to a new mission, along with the Da Vinci, Morosini and Torelli, west of the Strait of Gibraltar, a patrol area just visited during the previous mission and mode adapted to the characteristics of the Italian vessels. Thus, on September 7th, the Morosini sailed from Bordeaux still under the command of Lieutenant Prini. The official records indicate that the boat was due back to port in late October, but never arrived. On November 18th, the Italian authorities declared it lost at sea in unknown circumstances.
The fate of the Malaspina remained uncertain for several decades until, in March 2004, Dr. Axel Niestlè and Eric Zimmerman published a report crediting the loss of this submarine to an attack by a Sunderland. Part of this report reads:
“In some post-war publications the destruction of Malaspina is attributed to the attack of the destroyer HMS Vimy on 21 September 1941 while escorting convoy HG 73 enroute from Gibraltar to Liverpool. However this attack was actually directed against the Italian submarine Luigi Torelli, which suffered serious damage in the action, forcing the boat to return to base. Likewise, Malaspina was credited by the German U-boat Command and Betasom Command with a successful attack against convoy HG-73 in position BE 7648 (44.09’N / 21.45’W) on 24 September 1941. However, this credit was based entirely on the observation of a German reconnaissance aircraft of KG 40, which had sighted a convoy in the above given position and then noted two sinking steamers and another on fire at 1410 and 1425 hours. As there were no reported successes by either German or Italian submarines it was decided that the Malaspina must have been responsible. This decision was made despite the fact that there had been no signal from the boat made since her departure from Bordeaux and that also signals sent to her had gone unheeded. Moreover, there is no report of any Allied ships being lost or damaged in this area on that date.
A thorough examination of all Allied A/S-attacks during September 1941 in the Bay of Biscay and within the boundaries of the initial operational area assigned to Malaspina nevertheless revealed a very promising attack by Sunderland “U” of 10 Squadron RAAF on 10 September 1941 in position 46º23’N / 11º22’W. At 1200 hours, the aircraft sighted a fully surfaced submarine 1000 yards away on the port bow, running on course 260º and estimated speed of 8 knots. As the aircraft was at 1000 feet at the time of sighting and too close to make a direct attack, a turn was made to starboard and height lost to 50 feet. As the turn commenced the submarine submerged bow first. The aircraft closed and attacked down line of the submerging wash with the blue green shape of the submarine hull still visible when the Mk VII depth charges, set to explode at 50 and 100 feet, were released. The first depth charge was estimated to have been a direct hit between the conning tower and the stern and the second depth charge is thought to have been a hit forward of the conning tower. The third depth charge hung up and the fourth fell approximately 140 feet ahead of the submarine. After the attack the Sunderland climbed to 500 feet and turned to investigate a large red-brown patch approximately 100 yards from the position of the explosions. The front gunner observed what might have been the under wash of the submarine attacked but the observer stated that from the port midships position he distinctly saw the submarine stationary underwater partly in the brown patch. A second attack was made thereafter with the one remaining depth charge, which, however, failed to explode. A film of oil was observed on the surface three minutes after the first explosions. The aircraft then circled over the position for 20 minutes. The submarine, which was thought to be a German ocean going U-boat, was camouflaged with purple, green, and gray paint. No forward gun was visible and no members of the crew were seen. Afterwards the Sunderland carried out a search in the attack area until 1525 hours when the Prudent Limit of Endurance was reached and course was set back to base. 48 hours after this attack and within 35 miles of the position other aircraft investigating the area saw a large oil patch. Also oil bubbles two feet in diameter were gushing to the surface at the location but no air bubbles were seen.
From the description of the attack it is very likely that the boat attacked must have suffered at least serious damage if not sunk. From relevant German and Italian documents it is known that none of the Axis submarines transiting through the Bay of Biscay on 10 September 1941 and returning to base thereafter reported being attacked by aircraft this day at or anywhere near the position of attack. In addition, none of the German U-boats then at sea and lost thereafter could have been the target of the attack. The only boat in question was the outbound Malaspina, which could have reached the position of attack at the time given.
Based on the foregoing information it is proposed to amend the loss of the Italian submarine Alessandro Malaspina in the way that it was sunk on 10 September 1941 by depth charges from Sunderland “U” (serial # W3986) of 10 Squadron RAAF, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Athol Galway Hope Wearne, in position 46º23’N / 11º22’W.” Considering that the location of the attack was 435 miles from Bordeaux, and that the estimated speed of the vessel (8 knots) was the accurate cruising speed, it is reasonable to accept the findings of these two researchers as accurate and therefore the official Italian records should be emended.
The report of Dr. Axel Niestlè and Mr. Eric Zimmerman is copyrighted and reproduced with permission of the authors.
The submarine Glauco was built by CRDA of Monfalcone on behalf of Portugal, as part of a large reorganization and modernization plan of the navy of this Iberian country. The Glauco belonged to a class of construction comprising only two units, the other boat was the Otaria, and was designed by the naval engineer Curio Bernardis based on prior experience with the class Squalo.
1935, the Glauco is launched at the CRDA shipyard in Monfalcone near Trieste (Istituto Luce B060402)
Eventually, after the cancellation of the contract by the Portuguese government, the Regia Marina bought the vessels taking over the Glauco on September 20th, 1935. After the early stages of testing and sea trials, the Glauco was assigned, along the sister ship Otaria, the 4th Submarine Group based in Taranto. In the summer of 1936, both boats were moved to Naples. Between 1936 and August 1937, the boat completed two missions off Spain, part of the Italian assistance to Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the Glauco, at the time under the command of Commander Candido Corvetti, was part of a group of five submarines, which included in addition to the Glauco the Tazzoli, Toti, Marcello and Medusa, assigned to operate along the Algerian and Tunisian coastlines with the task of intercepting French and English traffic due to possible movements from Gibraltar. The Glauco was on patrol June 23rd to 26th in an area spanning from west of Cape Carbon and near Cape Corbellin. Here, on the night of 26th at around 2:50 AM, the crew sighted a ship with armed escort that was first attacked with the torpedo and then with the deck gun. Despite hitting the ship repeatedly, eventually the Glauco had to disengage; it was the Baron Erskine of 3657 t.
The Glauco at sea
In early July, the Glauco was again on a mission part of a group of eight submarines, some of which were assigned to areas off the island of Galite. Here, with the Scirè and Diaspro, the Glauco was on patrol on July 4th and 5th without spotting anything, just like like the rest of the group. A similar mission was repeated between the 9th and 11th after which the boat was reassigned to the new Atlantic base of Bordeaux. Before departure, the Glauco was in Naples for about two months to be adapted to its new roles in the Atlantic. During this period, Commander Corvetti passed the command to Commander Giuseppe Melina.
The Glauco was part of the group of 12 submarines that were added to operation in Atlantic in September to six previously arrived. Left Naples on September 26th, 1940, the boat crossed the Strait of Gibraltar on October 2nd and with many difficulties due to heavy wind on the surface and sudden loss of altitude while submerged. Once it reached Cape Malabata (Tangier), commander Melina continued on the surface taking advantage of darkness.
During the transfer to the assigned patrol area off the Azores, the Glauco attacked three ships, possibly military-type patrols, hitting one. The attack, which occurred at 4:35 am, has no reference in any British documentation. The location given was around 36 N and 6 W in practice halfway between Cape Spartel (south) and Cape Trafalgar (north).
The Glauco reached the area assigned for its patrol on October 6th. The following day, a maneuver approaching a convoy was aborted due to the presence of escort units. But restarted the maneuver, the Glauco sighted a second convoy. In all, about thirty ships were reaching a meeting point that would have provided prey in any circumstance, but this was not the case with the Glauco. The timidity of the first Italian operations in the Atlantic were certainly a disadvantage. After arriving in Bordeaux on October 22nd and following a review of the instructions issued to all vessels prior to their departure, it was assessed that the orders given to the commanders were too vague. More peremptory orders, such as those issued by the German command, they would have ensured greater successes.
It should also be remembered that the Glauco had one of the two diesel engines fail and therefore would have not been able to follow the convoy to the surface at a proper distance. It should be added that before arriving in Bordeaux, the Glauco was assigned to yet another mission along with the Da Vinci with the failed intention to attack another convoy.
After arriving in Bordeaux, the Commander Mellina was disembarked leaving the command to the Lieutenant Luigi Baroni. The first real Atlantic mission did not start until December 23rd when the Glauco was assigned to a patrol area off the coast of Scotland with a group that included the Da Vinci and the Nani. Having reached the assigned area on the 28th, the boat moved about 150 miles SE on January 6th due to the total lack of enemy traffic. The 9th at night and with good luminescence, the Glauco attacked a ship of 4000 t. with the torpedo. Having missed, the captain continued the attack on the surface with the deck gun. The prompt and accurate enemy fire created a difficult situation which was evaded with the help of machine guns from the bridge and a fast dive. The name of the merchant in question is not known, but considering that the Glauco reported having been hit by at least two rounds greater than 100 mm (the estimate of the ship’s officers was 120 or 152 mm), it certainly was a ship of a certain size .
Sadly, during the brief but violent confrontation, the gun officer sub lieutenant Carlo Marenco di Moriondo was fatally struck by shrapnel and disappeared into the sea. The young officer was the son of Admiral Alberto Marenco of Moriondo, commander of the 4th Marine Division. For this act of courage and dedication to the Navy, the sub lieutenant Marenco di Moriondo received the Gold Medal for Military Valor. At the end of the unsuccessful mission, the Glauco returned to base.
The following patrol began on January 27th off to Cabo Silleiro, Oporto and Cabo San Vicente off the Iberian Peninsula. On February 14th, sighted by light enemy units off the estuary of the Tagus river, the boat was the subject of a fierce attack with the launch of to about 130 depth charges which caused serious damage to the hull forcing the sudden return to the base.
After a long period of repairs, on June 18th, 1941, the Glauco left Bordeaux to return home, but even before reaching the Strait of Gibraltar, it was forced to return to base due to a failure with one of the internal combustion engines. After emergency repairs, the boat departed on the 24th of the same month, but it never reached the Mediterranean.
On June 27th, in the early afternoon while submerged off Cape Spartel, the Glauco was detected and attacked by the British destroyer HMS Wishart (Cdr. E.T. Cooper), a destroyer of the W class from the period immediately after the First World War. The same destroyer will be responsible for the sinking of U-74 in the Mediterranean in May 1942. Badly struck, the submarine was forced to the surface before being scuttled by its crew. Eight of the crew members were not able to escape and disappeared with the submarine. The rest of the crew, including the commander, were taken prisoners by the British.
The Reginaldo Giuliani was one of the four submarines of the “Liuzzi” class of the “Cavallini” type. Laid down on March 12th, 1939 it was launched on December 2nd of the same year and entered service on February 2nd of 1940, a few months before the beginning of the conflict. Like all boats of the same class, it was built by the Tosi shipyard of Taranto and was considered an ‘Ocean Going’ submarine capable of long range cruises. Although tested to only 100 meters maximum depth, operational life indicated a greater diving capacity, but a general vulnerability to rough seas and adverse atmospheric conditions.
The Reginaldo Giuliani upon its arrival in Gotenhafen (Gdynia) on April 6th, 1941
The submarine was named after a Catholic chaplain who fought in World War I and later participated in the occupation of Fiume with D’Annunzio and the war in Ethiopia. He died at the Battle of the Uarieu Pass in January 1934 and would thereafter become a Fascist hero.
There is no record of the training activity of the Giuliani during the brief period between being commissioned and becoming fully operational. At the beginning of the conflict in June 1940, it was assigned to one of the Italian submarine patrol lines. The one south of Gaudos was maintained by four boats — Salpa, Bagnolini, Tarantini, Giuliani – positioned about 20 miles apart. Of the four vessels, only the small Salpa failed to sight any traffic and returned to base on the 16th of June. The night of the 12th the Giuliani, under the command of Lieutenant Bruno Zelik, sighted a light unit very close and almost to the bow. forcing a quick disengagement through a rapid dive. The Bagnolini, on the other hand, was more successful in scoring, the same night and not too far away, the sinking of the British cruiser Calypso.
In July the Giuliani, along with the Bagnolini and Toti, was sent again south of Gaudos and closer to Derna (Lybia), for a patrol from July 15th through the 24th in which the Toti participated only after the 19th. After the uneventful patrol, in the early morning of the 27th Captain Zelik sighted a large submarine about 25 miles off Cape S. Maria di Leuca (Southern Italy). Unsure of the identity of the vessel and fearing that it could be the Bragadin, which was also returning to base, the captain disengaged ordering a dive soon after the crew had sighted the wake of a torpedo fired by the enemy unit.
At the end of this mission the boat received orders to transfer to the Atlantic Ocean to become part of the new submarine base established in Bordeaux. With command transferred to Lieutenant Commander Renato d’Elia, the Giuliani left Trapani (Sicily) on August 29th to then cross the Strait of Gibraltar on the 10th. The crossing, mostly completed while submerged, did not present any obstacle other than the strong wind and rough seas. Once in the Atlantic, the boat was assigned to a patrol area south of Madera, while the other vessels – Emo and Faà di Bruno – were positioned further north. During this patrol, which lasted from the 14th of September through the 30th, the Giuliani encountered only one armed merchant of unknown nationality which was attacked with the deck gun at a great distance. The attack had to be aborted due to a malfunction of the weapon.
In early October, on its way to the new base and upon reaching the mouth of the Gironde, the Giuliani joined the Baracca to make the final approach when an enemy submarine launched three torpedoes which fortunately failed to hit the vessels. This was the second time that the Giuliani would be attacked by another submarine. Eventually, its loss was caused by a submarine attack. In the following several weeks, numerous boats, including the Giuliani, left Bordeaux to complete short practice missions.
Between November 11th and 22nd, four more units were sent on patrol between 15 00 and 20 00 W and 55 20 and 53 20 N, west of the patrol area maintained by the Germans. This group was named “Giuliani”, after the leader boat, and included the Tarantini, Torelli and Argo. Having left Bordeaux on the 11th, the Giuliani reached the assigned patrol area on the 24th, sighting an auxiliary cruiser which was avoided by submerging. Thereafter, the boat started experiencing a series of mechanical failures which, at times, would jeopardize not just the mission but the boat itself. First, the outside cover of one of the forward torpedo tubes failed to open, then the forward horizontal planes failed completely while the rear ones defaulted to manual operations.
On the 29th of November, while trying to mend some of the damaged machinery, the Giuliani sighted three ships which could not be attacked on the surface due to the adverse sea conditions. Furthermore, with the forward planes unable to retract, navigation in rough waters could have seriously damaged the hull, causing grave deformations. Having assessed the impossibility of making further repairs at sea, the Giuliani began the return voyage to base which, on December 4th, was interrupted by the sighting of a British Sunderland flying boat. The submarine dove seeking shelter underwater but the malfunctioning of the forward planes – the forward planes were used to control depth – and slow manual operations of the rear planes, caused the vessel to lose control and reach a depth of 135 meters. Still, although this depth was far superior to the maximum allowed depth, there were no damages. Eventually, the Giuliani made it to port.
Meantime, having given up on the idea of creating a training center in France, Adm. Doenitz proposed Adm. Parona, the Italian commander of Betasom, to transfer Italian submarines to Germany to provide for advance training. Two boats were selected, the Giuliani and Bagnolini, at the time both undergoing repairs in Bordeaux, but eventually the Bagnolini was not sent due to operational needs. Thus, the Giuliani left Bordeaux on March 16th under the command of Commander Vittore Raccanelli, reaching Gotenhafen (Gdynia) on April 6th. While in transfer on March 19th, following a sighting by a German FW200, the boat joined U 46, Brin and Mocenigo on a hunt. Following the arrival in Germany, where command was transferred to Lieutenant Commander Adalberto Giovannini on the 21st, the Giuliani began an intense training activity which lasted many months. Giovannini was chosen for his experience and had the necessary knowledge to conduct the mission. Other famous Italian submarine commanders followed, including Enzo Grosso, Luigi Longanesi Cattani, Ugo Giudice and Mario Tei.
The Italian General Consul visiting the Giuliani in Danzig
At the submarine school, Italian officers and crews were trained on attack techniques and methodologies employed by the Germans . The school received a telegraph denomination of Marigammasom. The Italians were assigned by the Germans the submarine support ship Isar of 3850 t. which, in addition to providing logistical support, served as a moving target. For more complex training, convoy simulation, torpedo boats, gunboats and airplanes were provided by the 27th German Flotilla. Training courses lasted between two and five weeks with cruises of 10 to 20 days. In total, there were seven courses completed, while the eighth was cancelled due to weather conditions. Eventually, the Giuliani was needed back in active service and the Germans and Italians jointly agreed to close the training camp. On April 21st, 1942 command was transferred again, this time to Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Bruno who would take the boat back to France and on May 23rd, 1942 the Giuliani was once again in Bordeaux.
While the Giuliani was in Germany (occupied Poland), the Betasom’s primary area of operations had shifted from the North Atlantic to the Americas. Upon its return to base and following a brief period to ready the vessel, on June 24th the boat was already at sea under the command of Commander Giovanni Bruno. This mission in parallel with the Calvi was to bring the submarine up to the Windward Passage into the Caribbean. While still navigating toward the assigned area of operations, at 15:45 on July 16th, the Giuliani changed course trying to reach a merchantman previously attacked by another submarine. Having reached 22 00 N, 61 22 W and in sight of the vessel, the boat was attacked by a flying fortress which dropped three bombs which did not cause any damage, but forced a dive and abandonment of the attack. On the 24th of the same month, the Giuliani received 50 t. of fuel from the Finzi and was reassigned to a new operational area east of the Island of Guadalupe. Thereafter, in position 22 15 N 60 25 W it launched two torpedoes against a two-funneled motor vessel of new construction which, despite having been hit once, was able to run away at high speed. It has not been possible to identify the ship in question. The assigned patrol area was reached on the 29th of July, but soon after the boat was ordered south of the Islands of Capo Verde.
It was during this transfer that the Giuliani would score all of its operational successes. These attacks were carried out by torpedo and gun with the use of 10 torpedoes, four of which reached the target, five of which behaved erratically, and the last one was unable to leave the launch tube and was later exploded. The first victim, on the 10th in position 9 26N, 38 28W, was the Medon, a British ship of 5,444 t. built in 1923 by the Palmer Shipyards and belonging to the Ocean Steamshipping Co. All 64 crewmembers survived the sinking which was carried out with the use of the deck gun. On the 13th followed the American California, a 5,441 ship built in Los Angeles in 1920 and belonging to the States Steamship Co. The sinking, in position 9 21 N, 34 35W, was accomplished by the use of the deck gun and torpedoes and caused the loss of one crewmember while the remaining 35 survived. The following day on the 14th, another British vessel, the Sylvia de Larrinaga of 5,218t was the final victim. This armed vessel built in 1925 and belonging to the Larrinnaga Steamship Co Ltd Liverpool was disposed of by torpedoes in position 10 49N, 33 35W, resulting in three casualties. The remaining 50 crew members survived.
The eventful mission was at its end, and on the 16th the boat was ordered back to base due to the limited amount of ammunition and fuel remaining. The first two weeks of the long voyage back were ordinary, but at only 170 miles from base and while recharging its battery on the surface, the Giuliani was attacked by a Sunderland which was soon joined by two more. The attack was extremely violent both due to the volume of fire and the amount of bombs dropped. Captain Bruno was seriously wounded in his throat and was forced to transfer command to his second, Lieutenant Arezio Calzigna. Another crew member was also wounded. The intense machine gun fire from the Giuliani caused one of the airplanes, which had been repeatedly hit, to abort and, as later reported, land in Spain. Meantime, the Giuliani had been able to dive, but it was attacked two more times. The following day another attack followed and in this case bombs were dropped less than 30 meters away, causing grave damage. The ship report indicated:
September 2nd, 1942 12:44 From an altitude of about 30 meters the airplane drops four depth charges which fall one on deck, aft of the tower and then rolls into the sea, the other three within a few meters of the hull forward to the left. The bombs explode under the hull and the boat, hit full on, undergoes a very violent shock first, and then a tremble. I’m pushed upward and then fall on deck. The boat is hit full on by columns of water which completely cover it; it is still and heavily listing portside. The sea is covered in fuel which is copiously leaking out of the main tanks and the other tanks which still have any left. From the explosion, helmsman 3rd Class Andra Assali and gunner Francesco Perali are thrown into the sea. 12:50 The airplane comes back for another attack and opens fire with machine guns and launches another depth charge which falls 40 meters off the stern. Gunner Pietro Capilli, who at the time was holding the portside gun, suffers a broken arm. Double hull N. 3 portside has been completely removed. Even double hulls 2 and 4 portside must have also been seriously damaged. 13:40 The airplane, after having strafed the submarine, goes away. The inside of the submarine is devastated by explosions and there is no light. The boat is slowly recovering from listing, but at the same time is sinking. From double hull N. 2 seaside some fuel is leaking from holes caused by the machine gun fire. Gunner Mario Gentilini – shrapnel in the right thigh – and sailor Odilio Malatesta –loss of a finger and large wound on his right arm – are also wounded. Helsman Andrea Assali and gunner Francesco Perali are lost at sea.
The attack causes extremely serious damage which jeopardizes the boat’s sea worthiness such that the airplane crew considered the submarine lost. Instead, on the morning of September 3rd , the Giuliani was able to reach the Spanish port of Santander. The same port had previously provided safe harbor to the Torelli a few months earlier. From here, after lengthy repairs lasting more than two months, on November 8th the Giuliani was able to leave with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities and reach Le Verdon safely under the escort of the Luftwaffe the following day. This would be the last patrol for the Giuliani as an attack boat.
On February 8th, 1943 Dönitz proposed to the Italians to re-purpose the remaining submarine for transport service from France to Japan. In exchange, the Germans would transfer 10 VII-C class U-boats to the Italian Navy, and Italian crews and commanders began training in Germany soon after. Under the supervision of Rear-Admiral (E) Fenu, the remaining boats began extensive refitting work. The deck guns were removed, the ammunition magazines turned into additional fuel depots, the attack periscope removed, and a great part of the on board comforts, including one of the heads, removed to give space for cargo. The torpedo tubes were also sheared off. With the transformation of these few remaining boats, the Italian participation in the Battle of the Atlantic practically concluded.
Completing the necessary transformations, the Giuliani took to the sea on May 16th, 1943 along with the Tazzoli with a load of 130 t. of mercury, special steel, munitions and other war materiel. There was Italian personnel on board assigned to the Singapore base and two German civil engineers. The return voyage had already been booked with 135 t. of rubber and 70 t. of tin. Only a day into the voyage, the Giuliani returned to base to repair the forward planes, the same ones that had caused so much trouble before. On May 23rd, the boat was again at sea and on June 3rd, at about 120 miles off Madera, was attacked on the surface by a four-engine plane while under the illusory protection of sea fog . Following an exchange of gunfire and the dropping of two bombs, the Giuliani was able to vanish into the fog. On June 17th, Betasom ordered the Giuliani to a position 300 miles east of the Island of St. Helena for a rendezvous with the Tazzoli which never showed up
The Tazzoli, which was assumed by Betasom to have radio communication problems, was later presumed lost between the 18th and the 24th of May, most probably in the Bay of Biscay. After the war the Italian Navy conducted an inquiry with the assistance of the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy, but there was no confirmation of any successful Allied attack. The Giuliani continued on the long journey, reaching the Italian escort ship Eritrea in Sabang on July 28th. Under the escort of the Eritrea, the Giuliani reached Keppel Harbour (Singapore) on August 1st.
After September 8th, the Giuliani was surprised in Singapore by the events of the Italian armistice. The boat, already under German control, was manned by German personnel and the command transferred to Captain Heinrich Shäfer, while the Italian crew were sent to POW camps. Eventually, part of the crew opted to continue fighting along with the old allies and the Giuliani, now renamed UIT-23, continued serving until February 14th, 1944 when UIT-23 was sunk in the Straits of Malacca in position 04 27 N, 100 11 E, by torpedoes launched by the British submarine HMS Tally-Ho (P317). There were 26 casualties and 14 survivors. The Giuliani had served just a few days more than four years and was only a ghost of the original, proud submarine.
