Luigi Galvani was a Brin-class oceanic submarine (displacement of 1,016 tons on the surface and 1,266 submerged).
Operational Life
1940
At the beginning of the hostilities, the Regia Marina had a small flotilla of submarines deployed in Italian East Africa (A.O.E. ). There were six ocean going submarines (Archimede, Galilei, Torricelli, Ferraris, Galvani, Guglielmotti ) and two costal vessels (Perla, Makallè). The Torricelli and Galvani had recently reached the area to replace the smaller Iride and Onice, which had been sent back to the Mediterranean. The Galvani was of recent construction (1938) and in good operational conditions.
The beautiful silhouette of the R. Smg Galvani (Photo Turrini Collection)
Apparently, during construction, the shipyard and the design engineers had properly consider the operational conditions the submarine would be experiencing, including tropical climates. Two primary issues had been considered and addressed: the presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean of violently potent storms (monsoons), and very high humidity (often 100%). The first issue was solved by providing the boats with sufficiently strong superstructures, which would not be torn away by the rough sea. The second issue, of greater importance, was solved by providing the submarine with an air conditioning system . Unfortunately, freon-based cooling equipment was not quite available , and the builder (Tosi of Taranto) opted for a methylchlorid-based system (CH3Cl). This was an odorless, colorless but highly toxic gas.
Following a plan of action developed in preparation for the upcoming hostilities, most Italian submarines left base (Massaua, Eritrea) on June 10th, 1940 directed to their patrol area; the Ferraris was sent off Djibouti, the Galilei off Aden, the Macallè off Port Sudan, and the Galvani, with the longest mission, was sent to the Gulf of Oman. The mission of the Galvani, expected to last about 28 days, was intended as a deterrent against the tanker traffic from the Persian Gulf. The boat reached the assigned area on the 23rd of June, but by then the secrecy of the mission had been already compromised.
The crew of the Galvani before the war. The first sailor to the right after the petty office is Antonio Fais (Photo Francesco Guarducci)
It is assumed that, even before the war, British authorities were expecting similar missions; therefore they had organized the necessary countermeasures. Unfortunately, with the capture of the Galilei (June 19th) the Royal Navy had come into possession of the complete operational plan of the small Italian submarine forces. This practice of sharing plans between boats operating in similar areas was highly questionable, and proved to be disastrous. Information in hand, the Royal Navy immediately redirected all the tanker traffic and, by the time the Galvani reached the Gulf of Oman, the ocean was clean of all commercial traffic.
The operational orders captured by British aboard the R. Smg Galilei were so detailed that the British knew the Galvani would be operating about 8 miles from the entrance to the Gulf of Oman. The corvette H.M.S. Falmounth and the destroyer H.M.S. Kimberly were immediately dispatched to the area. The evening of June 23rd, unaware of the situation, the Galvani entered the gulf and the usual tanker traffic was completely absent; thereafter, the vessel was sighted by the corvette Falmouth. The official British report states that the crew of the Falmouth sighted a shadow at about two and one half miles and moved closer to identify it, discovering it was a submarine proceeding on the surface. The reports continues:
“At 23:08 at about 600 yards, the Falmouth signaled “who’s there”, and then open fire with the 4” gun”. Lieutenant Commander (capitano di corvetta) Renato Spano, the captain of the Galvani, immediately ordered a crash dive, but while the boat was slow in submerging, and the stern section was still visibly out of the water and was hit by one of the shells. At this point, with the resistant hull badly compromised, chief 2nd class torpedoman Pietro Venuti (from the town of Codroipo, Udine) evacuated the aft torpedo room, locked himself in, and sealed the water-tight hatch. Immediately after, the Falmouth brought itself closer to the wounded submarine discharging a well-placed series of depth charges, which caused enormous damage.
2nd class torpedoman Pietro Venuti Gold Medal for Valor
With the realization that the boat was lost, but some of the crew could still be saved, the captain order the boat to the surface, but this was achieved only with great difficulties, probably due to the several tons of water aboard and the damage to the control equipment. Of the original crew of fifty-seven, 31 are saved by the British vessels, while the remaining 26, including three officers, disappear with the Galvani. At the end of the conflict, captain Spano wrote a report (1) narrating the events that brought about the loss of the Galvani:
“ At 2:09 of June 24th, according to our estimations, we were at about 50 miles for 130° from Little Qoin, when midshipman Car, subordinate to the navigating officer sighted a shadow starboard of the bow. I recognized the silhouette of a ship with Beta 10° to starboard with polar bearing 45° at a distance of 7-800 meters. We crash dove with a concurrent turn to port, while the enemy opened fire with all guns and a projectile exploded aft of the bridge. While diving, I heard another projectile explode on bridge; I shut the water-thigh hatch. While the submarine was submerging with a strong inclination forward and with the diving plains down, I experienced a sudden heeling over which corrected itself. I believe that the enemy’s hull almost touched our aft stays which, at that point, were about 2 to 3 meters below surface. A few second later, with the boat down by the bow at a depth of about 30 meters, a lifted some of the aft planes and at the same time the submarine was violently shaken by a nearby explosion of a cluster of depth charges. While the stern kept going down, I ascertained the following damage: No lights – rudder and plans were frozen – manometers were broken – removal of the main control panel in the control room and projection of this into the middle of the room – starboard electric motor went down to 600 rpm, while the port one stopped – I could not communicate with the other compartments. Since we were down 40° aft, I had the strong feeling that the boat was lost. I decided to emerge blowing all tanks. The submarine responded with great difficulty emerging only in part. I ordered the hatch open while the gunners came up to the conning tower . I follow them and I reminded the midshipman to destroy all codebooks. As soon as I was out, I made the following observations: Aft, to port, a destroyer – the submarine had the “T” of the post of aft antenna truncated – a great gash on deck – the water was up to the aft hatch, while the boat started sinking again. Realizing that I did not have the time to arm the gun and open fire due to the heavy listing, I ordered the crew on deck and those who were already there were told to abandon ship. Lieutenant Mondaini, walking through the gash in the plating, went forward to open the hatch from which the personnel of the aft compartments escaped. The water was almost at the hatch of the conning tower. No one came up to the deck, nor anyone replied to my calls inside the submarine. I assumed that no one was left behind, and I ordered the personnel grouped aft to jump into the water while the ocean starts pouring into the conning tower’s hatch. It was 02:17. I had just left the boat when it came upright with about 8 meters of the bow sticking out of the water, and then it rapidly sunk. Since come to surface, the boat had not remained afloat for more than two minutes. Meantime, the British gunboat had lowered two lifeboats which picked up the shipwrecked. I made sure that no one was still in the water, and then I also got aboard the lifeboat. Aboard the gunboat Falmouth, I made a roll call and I realized that 26 men were missing, including Captain (EN) Torzuoli, Lieutenant (EN) Bassetti, and midshipman Gemignani. The survivors were 31, including 4 officers. “
The crewmembers of the Galvani spent the rest of the war in a prisoners of war camp. (1) Lupinacci, P.F. Le operazioni in Africa orientale (Operations in East Africa). Ufficio Storico Marina Militare. Rome, 1976.
The ocean-going submarine Finzi was a boat of the Calvi class.
Muggiano (La Spezia) June 29th, 1935 the launch of the Finzi.
Operational Life
1940
The first war patrol of the submarine Finzi took place from the port of Cagliari, Sardinia on June 5th, 1940 (5 days before the official declaration of war). The boat reached the patrol zone off the Canary Islands and then returned to the Sardinian base on July 10th. The night of June 12th, when it was approaching Point Almina, the Finzi was attacked by the British destroyer H.M.S. Watchman, which forced Captain Dominici to remain submerged. Avoiding the attack, the crossing continued on the surface at a speed of about 12 knots with favorable weather conditions and no moonlight. The crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar took place without problems, and once in the assigned area, the boat did not encounter any enemy vessel. The mission of the Finzi had been planned in synchrony with the Cappellini, but this boat was forced to take refuge in Ceuta after an enemy attack. Despite the absence of tangible results, the mission was undoubtedly useful in assessing the British defensive network and confirming the possibility of crossing the Strait of Gibraltar without any particular problem. As a matter of fact, during the conflict not a single Italian submarine was lost during the crossing of the narrow strait.
The Finzi the day of its launch from the Shipyard of Muggiano (Photo Turrini)
Once back in Italy, the Finzi was assigned to the newly established Atlantic base of Bordeaux. The boat was part of the first transfer group from the domestic bases to the Acquitaine capital. This group included the Dandolo, Marconi, and Bagnolini, while the Barbarigo had already completed the transfer. On September 7th, the boat left La Spezia under the command of C.C. Alberto Dominici to cross the Strait of Gibraltar between the 12th and the 13th. Once off Vigo, the boat was attacked by an enemy aircraft which caused the loss of two crewmembers. Later on, Captain Dominici was able to alude an incoming enemy destroyer. Failing to detect enemy traffic, the Finzi left the patrol area and reached Bordeaux on the 29th of September. The arrival of the first Italian submarines in Bordeaux was received with great enthusiasm by the German ally.
On September 30th, Admiral Donitz, who practically was in charge of the Italian naval forces in the Atlantic even though they had some level of autonomy, conducted an official visit of the Bordeaux base of the Regia Marina. The admiral participated in a parade of six crews and personally visited two boats, the Finzi and the Malaspina. This was not a superficial visit, but direct contact between an old submariner and the enthusiastic crews and officers of the Italian vessels.
Admiral Donitz during his visit to the newly established Italian submarine base of Bordeaux (Photo U.S.M.M.)
Taking into consideration the greater range, better habitability and better performances (this factor would be later reevaluated) of the Italian submarines, Donitz decided that the Italian sharks would conduct operations between 58 20 N and 51 N and between 20 W and 27 W. This quadrant was west of the operational area occupied by the Germans and extended from the British Isles west. Eventually, due to operational reasons, the Italian area was shifted about 100 miles east, closer to the Scottish coast.
The Finzi, still under the command of C.C. Dominici, took to the sea for its first mission in the North Atlantic as part of the Bagnolini group. The vessel left mooring in Bordeaux on October 24th, 1940 along with the Bagnolini and the Baracca, while the Marconi took to the sea three days later. On October 30th, while the boat was still in transfer, west of the British Isles, the crew sighted a ship of about 3,000 t. at about 10,000 meters (quite a distance). The captain ordered a dive, but rough sea conditions made the vessel come up to the surface, thus allowing the merchant ship to become aware of the danger. After having fired a torpedo, which failed the target, the submarine was subjected to depth charge attacks (there were nine explosions) by the escorting units, without incurring any damage. Continuing its mission, Captain Dominici reached the patrol area on the 31st of the same month. After more than two weeks of back and forth navigation, on November 16th Betasom finally transmitted a discovery signal. The boat immediately began the approach, but it had to desist due to the horrible weather conditions. Two days later, another signal brought the diesel to a frenetic tempo while the vessel desperately sought to close on the enemy convoy. Unfortunately, marine fog and enemy aircraft called for diving and seeking refuge in the abyss. Later, having detected the speed of the convoy and believing this to be too high, Captain Dominici abandoned the chase.
The massive conning tower of the Finzi before it was modified (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On the 22nd, while the ocean exploded ever more violently into whitecaps of gale force 8 or 9, the lookouts (very unpleasant job) detected the presence of a ship. After having dove to periscope depth (a maneuver typical of the Italian boats but not adopted by the Germans, who preferred remaining on the surface), the captain understood the challenges of keeping the boat hidden, thus giving up any bellicose intentions, and sought the security of the abyss. From the hydrophones, the crew detected the presence of a convoy of 10 or more ships escorted by auxiliary cruisers (recognizable by the alternative engines instead of the turbines installed on light units) and also the explosions of some depth charges far away. This litany of sighting, rough seas, and inability to attack continued until the 27th of November when, after having avoided a destroyer, the Finzi began the return voyage returning to Bordeaux on December 4th after having avoided an attack from a British submarine near the coast. The mission was certainly a failure, but at the same time the inability to conduct attacks was attributed to the deficiencies of the technical means more than the men. In particular, it was discovered that the air intake (mushroom valve) for the diesel engines was too exposed to the weather, forcing the use of the hatch on the turret. If the hutch shut, the crew suffered from a sudden loss of pressure due to the sucking action of the motor, but with the hatch open, tons of water would infiltrate inside the hull, causing damage and inconvenience. Practically, it had been quickly realized that the Italian boats were not designed for the terrible weather conditions of the North Atlantic.
1941
After the failed expectations in the north, the Italian submarines were relocated more to the south near Madera, the Strait of Gibraltar, Freetown, and the other islands of the mid-Atlantic. The first boat to be sent off Freetown was the Cappellini, and the Finzi followed it. Still under the command of C.C. Dominici, the Finzi left Bordeaux on March 10th, 1941 to patrol west of the Canary islands and east of the Island of Capo Verde (17 W, 21 W). Unfortunately, after several days of patrol in various areas and without having encountered any enemy traffic, the Finzi began the return voyage, reaching the Atlantic base on April 17th after the short mission. During this patrol Captain Dominici had discovered some convoys which were not attacked due to the presence of escort vessels. It is not known if the Italian command interpreted this lack of results by C.C. Dominici in negative terms, but at the end of the fruitless patrol he was transferred and C.V. Ugo Giudice assumed the command of the vessel. The first mission of the new skipper took place in the waters off Freetown and in coordination with the Marconi, the Tazzoli of Commander Fecia di Cossato, and the Calvi. Departing on August 1st, the Finzi reached the patrol area off the Strait of Gibraltar, 100 miles from Cape San Vincenzo. Without having accomplished any action, the boat returned to base at the end of the same month.
The Finzi returning from a successful patrol displaying the flags representing its successes in tons of enemy shipping sunk
On December 7th, the Finzi was again in action, this time to participate, between the 7th and the 29th, in the rescue of the crewmembers of the German raider “Atlantis” and the auxiliary cruiser “Python”. Due to special circumstances, the Italian boat brought the rescued sailors back to Saint-Nazaire instead of Le Verdon. The Torelli, Finzi, Tazzoli and Calvi transferred from the U-Boot 254 sailors utilizing rubber dinghy with which the German boats were equipped.
1942
After alterations made to the vessel (increased number of torpedoes, projectiles, fuel and supplies), the Finzi took again to the sea from Le Verdon on February 6th, 1942. Within a few days from the base, the crew had to repair one of the thermal engines. This repair work took over six days and was performed under particularly difficult circumstances. Due to this breakdown, on February 10th the captain could not attack a convoy. On the 28th of the same month, Betasom changed the boat’s final destination from the Bahamas to the Caribbean Sea. On March 3rd, the Finzi reached Mona Pass, but a serious failure of one of the exhaust manifolds’ shutoff valves prompted the relocation of the boat to an area not as much covered by the enemy aerial reconnaissance. The repairs required four days, and during this period the boat intercepted a tanker which could not be attacked. At this point, the crew discovered that both periscopes had failed and that the forward planes (used to control depth) were out of service and operated only sporadically.
Despite the mechanical failures, on the 6th of March 1942 the Finzi sank the French tanker MELPOMESE of 7.011 t. with four torpedoes (and not 7.001 as suggested by some sources). This tanker belonged to “Compagnie Ausiliarie de Navigation” and was built by “Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde” of Bordeaux in 1923 and had been in service to the MoWT (Ministry of War Transport) since 1940. The sinking took place in position 23° 35’N, 62° 39’W and all 49 crewmembers were later saved.
Soon after, the Finzi intercepted another ship, the Swedish steamship SKÅNE of 4,528 t. which was sunk the night of March 6th with three torpedoes and a few gun shells. This old steamship (passenger and freight) was built in 1921 by the shipyard “A/B Lindholmens” of Gothenburg, Sweden and belonged to the shipping company “Translatlantic, Rederiaktiebolaget”, also of Gothenburg. The Skåne had changed name in 1941 and at the time of the sinking the ship was known as the “Boren”. Some authors erroneously state that the Boren did not fall victim to the Finzi, but this is confirmed and it took place in position 20° 50’N, 62° 05’W. All 36 crewmembers were rescued.
Two days later, on March 10th, the Finzi began moving to a location previously agreed to transfer oil fuel to the Morosini. During this transfer, the crew sighted a tanker which was promptly sunk with six torpedoes. The motor tanker in question was the Norwegian CHARLES RACINE of 9,957 t. , built in 1937 by the shipyard “Odense Staalskibsvaerft” of Odense, Denmark and belonging to the “Skibs-A/S Snefonn”. The torpedoing took place in position 23° 10’N, 60° 28’W, and all 41 crewmembers were later rescued. On March 13th, after having transferred 21 tons of fuel to the Morosini, the Finzi began the long return journey, reaching Le Verdon in the afternoon of March 31, completing a certainly successful patrol.
After the well-earned rest and the necessary repair work, the Finzi was once again sent off the American coasts, this time along with the Tazzoli. The boat left base on June 6th, 1942 to reach Cuba and Santo Domingo. On June 20th, the submarine received 11 tons of oil fuel from the Da Vinci which was returning to base. Eventually, this fuel was later transferred to the Morosini. On July 9th, the Finzi reached the patrol area off the Crooked Island Passage (Bahamas) and then moved to the Windham Passage, and later off Haiti. The night of the 12th, the crew sighted a large passenger ship escorted by light units and airplanes which was not attacked.
After some relocations, on the 19th the submarine returned off the Island of Crooked. On the 20th it sighted a fast tanker escorted by destroyers which was not attacked. On the 23rd, the Finzi transferred 50 tons of oil fuel and 5 tons of drinking water to the Giuliani. On the 27th it transferred more oil fuel to the Morosini. On the 29th of July the boat failed to hit with any of the three torpedoes launched a passenger ship moving at about 18 knots. On the 31st, having run out of fuel, the boat began the return voyage. Despite the intense enemy aerial patrol off the estuary of the Gironde, the Finzi reached Bordeaux in the afternoon of August 18 without any inconvenience.
After the necessary maintenance work, the Finzi took again to the sea with the Tazzoli leaving on November 26th destined for Brazil. During refitting, T.V. Angelo Amendola had assumed the command. Unfortunately, on December 10th the various breakdowns detected aboard forced the boat back to base.
1943
During the maintenance period, there was another change of command; T.V. Amendola disembarked and was replaced by T.V. Mario Rossetto. Repair work completed, the boat left on February 11th, 1943 along with the Da Vinci for a mission off the African coast and the Indian Ocean. On March 18th, when the Finzi was ready to meet the Da Vinci for a conspicuous exchange of fuel, foodstuff, and more to allow the other submarine to continue on its mission well past the Cape of Good Hope , T.V. Rossetto sighted the British ship Lulworth and three torpedoes. Unfortunately, all weapons failed to operate properly.
The Finzi on April 18th, 1943
The Finzi had to interrupt the chase of the merchant ship due to the failure of both diesel engines. At the same time the meeting with the Da Vinci was taking place, thus Rossetto gave Gazzana all the information so that he could chase, attack and sink the merchant ship. After the sinking, the Da Vinci took 90 tons of oil fuel, 6 tons of oil, 10 tons of drinking water, 3 small 450 mm torpedoes and foodstuff.
In the afternoon of March 28th, the Finzi intercepted and sank the Greek steamship GRANICOS of 3,689 tons. The sinking took place in position 02° N 15° 30’W, 30 crewmembers were lost and one, a Portuguese, was captured by the Finzi. Captain Rossetto wrote to us saying that ” The Granikos, loaded with iron ore, sank in very little time, less than 30 seconds, and for this reason most probably the crew did not have the opportunity to lower the life boats and could not save themselves, except Jaquim Rodriguez. He, holding on to a small piece of wood, was calling for help but hiding whenever the submarine search light was passing by because he was afraid of being machine gunned. Before departing Rio de Janeiro, the crew had been told that “submarines machine gunned shipwrecked sailors!”.
In the afternoon of March 29th (and not the 30th as cited by some sources), the Finzi sank the British ship CELTIC STAR of 5,575 tons. This old ship, built in 1918 by “Dunlop, Bremner & Co” of Glasgow was previously known as the Celtistar (1929) and Campana (1918). The ship belonged to “Union Cold Storage Co. Ltd” and the sinking took place in position 16° N, 17° 44’W. Two crewmembers died, a Canadian was captured, and the remaining 63 were later rescued. On April 18th the Finzi reached the estuary of the river Gironde and, while under escort by a German minesweeper, it triggered a magnetic mine which exploded under the keel at about 30 meters deep. Damages were minor, and the boat arrived in Le Verdon (at the estuary of the Gironde) without further problems. The mission, considering the transfer of fuel and the two sinkings, was considered a success. Unfortunately, the Da Vinci did not return to base.
Following negotiations with the Germans, the Finzi was one of the seven submarines designated to be transformed into transports. Supposedly, the idea of transforming these boats originated with C.V. Enzo Grossi, then commander of the base, who had realized that these submarines were no longer fitted for offensive operations. Grossi made a proposal to Adm. Donitz: in exchange for the seven Italian submarines, the Germans would transfer seven newly constructed U-boats to the Italian Navy. Although it could appear that the proposal was preposterous, it was actually warmly welcomed, especially because the Germans were producing a boat a day, but did not have enough personnel to man them.
As part of the final agreement reached between the two navies, the Krisgmarine transferred seven U-boats of the class VII-c (designated by the Italians as class ‘S’) in exchange of an equivalent number of Italian boats which, due to their dimensions, were better suited for the long voyage to Japan. Of the seven boats, only five began the journey. This operation was completely under German control, and the boats were assigned a German name, but retained their Italian crew. Of the five boats, the Tazzoli was lost soon after its departure, while the Barbarigo was probably lost soon after. Both losses were never documented and remain a mystery to these days. The two remaining transport submarines, the Bagnolini and the Finzi, were trapped by the events surrounding the Italian surrender while still in Bordeaux and never left.
The alterations made to the various boats were different; guns were removed, ammo depots were turned into oil depots. The attack periscope was removed, one of the heads and most of the on-board amenities were also removed to give room for goods. Work aboard the Finzi was completed in Le Verdon’s shipyard and the command transferred from T.V. Rosetto to T.V. Nicola Dellino. On September 8th, the boat was still in Bordeaux, delayed with various excuses by the Germans who had sensed the imminent Italian surrender. Considering the precarious condition of the vessel and the advanced decay of the machinery, the German Navy decided not to utilize the boat. On July 25th 1944, during the German retreat, demolition specialists of the Kriegsmarine scuttled the Finzi in the port of Le Verdon.
Our special thanks to Captain Rossetto for providing us with some corrections and additional information.
The R.Smg. Angelo EMO (named after the last Grand Admiral of the Republic of Venice) was one of a series of 11 boats of the Marcello Class. The boat was laid down at the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on February 2nd, 1937, launched on June 29th, 1938, and delivered to the Italian Navy on October 10th of the same year. After a brief period of training and testing, the boat was assigned to the 22nd Squadron, 2nd Submarine Group with its base in Naples along with the Barbarigo, Morosini, Marconi, and Da Vinci. The EMO, which was lost in 1942, was credited with the sinking of two ships for a total of 10,958 t. and completed 20 patrols, including 7 war patrols, 1 emergency transport from Italy to North Africa and several training and transfer missions. It also completed 24 training sorties while assigned to the submarine school of Pula.
The EMO the day of its launch at the C.R.D.A. of Monfalcone (Photo Tunnini)
In July 1940, a few weeks after Italy’s declaration of war, the Italian Submarine Command organized a large and continuous patrol line east of the Strait of Gibraltar. The area in question was patrolled by a total of 11 boats divided into 3 groups. The EMO, along with the Marcello, Dandolo and Barbarigo, was assigned to the first group (Area B). This patrol started on July 1st and lasted for almost two weeks. The Emo and Marconi were assigned to the westernmost area. The EMO patrolled south of the meridian of Alboran (about halfway between the Moroccan and Spanish coast), while the Marconi was assigned north of this meridian and closer to the Spanish coast.
On July 6th, at 14:50 the boat sighted while submerged a large naval formation at about 12,000 meters which included an aircraft carrier, two battleships and several destroyers heading east and it maneuvered to attack, but a sudden change of course of the presumably British force foiled the attempt. Completed its patrol, the EMO returned to Naples.
At the end of this mission, the boat received orders to transfer to the Atlantic to become part of the new submarine base established in Bordeaux. It departed Naples August 27th, 1940 and, as part of the transfer mission, it began a war patrol in Atlantic. Here, on September 9th, in position 41º 27N, 21º 50W the EMO located the British steamship Saint Agnes (5199 t.), a straggler member of convoy SLS.46 which had left Freetown escorted by merchant cruiser Dunnottar Castle. All 64 crewmembers were later saved. The Saint Agnes, built in 1918 and previously known as the War Briton (1919), Titan (1925) and Cape St. Agnes (1937) belonged to the Saint Line LTD and it was both torpedoes and shelled. Completed the patrol, the EMO reached Bordeaux on October 3rd, 1940.
After a very brief stop, the EMO was again at sea departing on October 31st. A few days later, on the 2nd and 3rd of November, while enduring horrific weather conditions, the boat lost Junior Chief Giuseppe De Giobbi, one of the lookouts, and had Lt. Carlo Liannazza seriously hurt. Despite a lengthy search, the seam was never found. Unable continue its patrol, the EMO returned to base reaching it the 6th. Thereafter, Lt. Carlo Liannazza was transferred to the CAGNI, while Lt. Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini (who eventually became the head of the Italian Navy from 1970 until 1973) became the new captain.
On December 5th, the EMO left for another patrol reaching the western shores of Scotland on the 14th and remaining in the general area until the 26th. There, it sighted and later attacked a 3 to 4,000 t. tanker, but failing to score a hit due to miserable weather conditions. On the 26th the crew sighted a destroyer which could not be attacked. Completed the patrol, the EMO reached Bordeaux on January 1st, 1941 where it remained for a prolonged period due to extensive maintenance work.
On March 3rd, the EMO was again at sea for a patrol West of Ireland. The boat was part of the Group “Velella” which included the Velella, Argo, Mocenigo, and the Veniero. The units were positioned in a large area between 59°30’N and 53°N and between 13°W and 25°W. Again, the German U-boats would patrol the area closer to the Irish and Scottish coast while the Italians, with their larger submarines, would patrol further west. On March 9th, while en route to intercept a convoy previously sighted by German airplanes, the EMO was attacked by a British aircraft which launched two bombs while the boat was submerged at about 60 feet. The diving planes go stuck and the boat first came to the surface and then plunged down to 330 feet. Later, the EMO began chasing the convoy even thought it had to break away due to the presence of an enemy destroyer.
On the 14th, in the early afternoon, perseverance was rewarded when the EMO attacked the British (indeed an American ship sailing under the Union jack and the authority of the Ministry of War Transport) steamship Western Chief (5759 t.) sinking it at 13:07 (Italian reports indicate the sinking late at night). This ship was a straggler part of convoy SC 24 which had left Halifax on February 28th and scheduled to arrive in Liverpool on the 19th of March and carried 7000 tons of steel. Of the43 crewmembers, 22 lost their lives.
On the 18th, the EMO sighted the Clan Maciver, a 4500 t. merchant ship which attempted to ram it and later hit it with the deck gun, but the submarine averted the peril, despite the proximity of the two vessels during the engagement, seeking refuge in the depths. The 19th of March, completed its patrol, the EMO was once again back in Bordeaux where it underwent regular refitting.
On May 5th, the submarine left base for a new patrol. With the general change of theater of operations for the Italian units from the North Atlantic to Gibraltar and the Azores, the EMO was assigned a patrol area west of Gibraltar lasting from the 22nd of the same month to June 6th. The same patrol included the Marconi, Argo, Mocenigo, Veniero, Brin, and Velella. In the morning of the 7th, the EMO attacked two different ships launching two torpedoes from a distance of 1500 meters and assuming success, but there is no record of these sinking. The two vessels were estimated to be around 1900 t. and 3000 t. After the attack, the submarine was hunted for hours by escort units, but eventually it made it back to base arriving in France on June 20th.
Italy’s adventurous entry into the war along with the Germans began having its catastrophic effects and, in early 1941, the situation in the Mediterranean was nearly desperate. The Italian High Command, following a personal intervention by Benito Mussolini, informed the Germans that the base in Bordeaux would be closed and all boats would return to Italy. Discussion took place at a very high level and eventually Adm. Dönitz was able to convince the Italians to maintain their base and only return a smaller number of submarines to the Mediterranean; the EMO was one of the boats selected for repatriation.
The EMO left La Pallice on August 20th soon after the Brin, completed a patrol off Gibraltar and later reached Naples on September 1st having crossed the Strait of Gibraltar first on the surface, and then submerged. From the Partenpean base it was then transferred to the submarine school in Pula (upper Adriatic, today part of Croatia). At the school, the EMO completed 24 training missions lasting until the end of the year. Between the 8th and 10th of November, the EMO was called back to active duty along with the Mameli for antisubmarine patrol in the upper Adriatic in support of the transfer of a large naval formation from Trieste to Venice.
Subsequently, it was ordered back to Taranto where it arrived on December 16th, 1941. From Taranto, the EMO began it new life as transport submarine ferrying much needed war material to the struggling armies in North Africa. On December 20th, the EMO carried 20 t. of aviation fuel, 32 t. of foodstuff, and 15 t. of ammunitions to Bardia (Bardiya) arriving there on the 25th. From there it returns to Suda for a new load, but upon its return to North Africa it could not enter the small port due to enemy fire from land-based artillery units which, in the meantime, had overtaken the Italian stronghold. Both the captain and helmsman Campisi were wounded in the action. After the failed mission, the EMO returned to Suda and from there to Taranto from which it was then reassigned to Cagliari.
From the Sardinian base, it completed several patrols. From April 17th through May 3rd off Cape Caxine. From May 13th through June 18th off the Algerian coast, and from June 23rd through July 16th south of Ibiza. None of the patrols produced any result. At the end of the last patrol, Lt. Cmdr. Roselli Lorenzini was transferred to the CAGNI, while Lt. Giuseppe Franco assumed command.
The EMO in Taranto in 1942 (Photo Beltrame)
From August 11th to the 17th, the EMO was assigned to a patrol area off Galite. During this mission, on the 12th, it attacked a warship firing 4 torpedoes and detecting explosions (after 1min 47sec, 2min 20 sec and 2 min 30 sec). Soon after, it was made object an intense pursuit. There is no record of any success in that area and on that date, but it was later ascertained that the unit attacked was the British destroyer H.M.S. Tartar. From the 18th through the 29th of October, the EMO was again on patrol off the Algerian coast. With the Allied landing in North Africa in full swing, the EMO was thrown into the fray. On November 7th, it left Cagliari for its last patrol. On the 11th, at around 13:00, off Algiers, it was attacked and hit by ASW Trawler HMS Lord Nuffield (FY 221) in position 36̊̊̊ 50 N, 02̊ 50 E. The captain took the boat to the surface and began fighting with the deck gun. With both diesel engines out of service, the boat was ordered scuttled. Fourteen of the crewmembers were lost in the action, including Ensign Mario Giacchelli, while the remaining crewmembers were rescued and captured by the enemy.
The EMO, built for the ‘guerre de course’ in the oceans performed well in those conditions, but was poorly suited for transport missions or for patrols in the shallow Mediterranean waters where targets were few and perils many.
The submarine DELFINO (the same name was assigned to the first Italian submarine designed and build by Gen. Pullino at the beginning of the last decade of the 18th century) belonged to the class “SQUALO”. This class derived from and was an improvement on the preceding classes “PISANI” and “BANDIERA”, and was efficient and reliable and, as a matter of fact, brought to an end the experimental period of Italian submarine naval constructions.
Monfalcone April 27th, 1930 the launch of the Delfino (Istituto Luce A057101 – no sound)
The “SQUALO” class included four boats: SQUALO (2), NARVALO (2), DELFINO (2) and TRICHECO (2), all built by the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone (Gorizia), between 1928 and 1931. The DELFINO was laid down on October 27th, 1928, launched on April 27th, 1930 and delivered to the Navy on June 19th, 1931.
Operational Life
Upon entering service, the DELFINO, along with the three other boats of the same class, was assigned to the 2nd Squadron based in La Spezia. In 1933, along with the TRICHECO, the boat completed a long cruise in the Black Sea. The following year, the four boats of the “SQUALO” class were transferred to Naples where they made up the 4th Submarine Squadron. From Naples, the DELFINO and TRICHECO completed a second cruise in the eastern Mediterranean. Toward the end of 1936, the boat began participating in the Spanish Civil War under the command of Lieutenant Folco Buonamici, completing a special mission from the 9th to the 24th of December. On patrol in the waters off Barcelona and Terragon, it attempted a single attack against a merchant ship, but failed to succeed.
In 1937, the DELFINO was assigned to the Red Sea. Later on, the four boats of the same class were reunited, first in 1938 as part of the 33rd Squadron of the 3rd Submarine Group based in Messina; later, in 1940, as part of the 51st Squadron of the 5th Submarine Group based in Leros (Greece).
Upon Italy’s entry into the war (June 10th 1940), the DELFINO was under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Aicardi and already on patrol off the Strait of Khesos (Greece). Other missions quickly followed, one after another. On July 18th, while on patrol in the Doros Channel, the DELFINO was attacked by a British submarine, but was able to avoid the torpedo. A few hours later, the boat again sighted the enemy vessel, this time launching a torpedo. A strong explosion and a tall column of water made the crew believe that the torpedo had reached its target, but there is no reference to this action in any British documentation.
A rare photo showing the explosion aboard the Greek Cruiser HELLI (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On August 15th, while on patrol off the Cyclades Islands, the DELFINO was the protagonist of a very sad episode, such as for a long time it was not mentioned in the official historical annals: the sinking of the old Greek light cruiser HELLI in the harbor of the Island of Tino, during the celebrations of Assumption. During the attack a merchant ship was also hit and sank into the shallow waters, while a third weapons hit the docks.
The attack, planned and executed in total secrecy (not even Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister knew about it), was ordered by the Italian Governor for the Aegean, the zealous and bellicose De Vecchi (he was part of the Fascist “quadrumvirato”), under instructions from his superiors (it appears that the order was issued by Mussolini himself, via Supermarina). De Vecchi augmented these orders when he gave instructions (verbally) to Captain Aicardi. The intention was to intimidate Greece, not yet involved in the conflict but under suspicion, and rightly so, of favoring British operations in the Aegean.
To Greek protests, the Italian government replied by rejecting all accusations, but was refuted by the recovery of debris of a torpedo of Italian manufacturing. To this, it was pathetically replied, attempting to shift the blame to England, that in the past some weapons from the Italian torpedo factory in Fiume had been sold to the British who had used them to inculpate the Italians.
After the war, Captain Aicardi reported that he had entered the bay to hit two small merchant ships when the Helli caught up with him and looked like it was moving against the submarine: the attack was inevitable. This was an ugly episode, useless and ignoble, which only achieved the result of provoking great resentment toward Italy. At the end of the conflict, within the peace treaty negotiations, Greece requested and obtained the assignment of the Italian cruiser Eugenio di Savoia as part of war reparations; it would be renamed Helli.
In November 1940, Lieutenant Aicardi passed the command of the DELFINO to Lieutenant Commander Alberto Avogadro di Cerrione. In the next mission, from November 25th to the 30th in the northern Aegean Sea, on the 29th he sighted a convoy against which two torpedoes were launched. Explosions were clearly heard and it was believed that, perhaps, the Greek destroyer PSARA might have been hit, but this was never confirmed.
On August 1st, 1941, during a patrol off Tobruk, the DELFINO was attacked by a British airplane type “Sunderland”, but it defended itself with the machine guns and was able to shoot it down, rescuing four members of the crew. The following missions, until February 1942, took place in the Sicilian Channel and in the waters of Malta. In February 1942, Captain Avogadro relinquished command to Lieutenant Mario Violante who held command until the loss of the boat. With the new captain, the DELFINO was assigned to the Submarine School in Pola where it completed 67 training sorties.
On November 10th, 1942 the boat was sent back to the frontline in Taranto, with the onerous task of transporting materiel to North Africa. During three missions, from November 13th 1942 to January 6th, 1943, the DELFINO transported over 200 tons of ammunitions and fuel. Thereafter, it entered the shipyard in Taranto for a period of refitting lasting until March 20th. After, it relocated to Augusta.
The DELFINO in 1942. Note the new conning tower modelled after the German U-Boats (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On March 23th at 12:15, the DELFINO left Taranto, followed by a pilot boat which was to escort it outside the harbor. Precisely an hour later, six and one half miles for 205° from the S. Vito lighthouse, a sudden failure of the rudder abruptly veered the submarine: collision with the pilot boat was inevitable. The gash produced by the collision aft was large. Any counteraction was inevitable: the boat sank rapidly taking with it 28 crew members. Up to that moment, the DELFINO had completed 29 missions for a total of 17,429 miles, 1,756 of which were underwater.
The Submarine Dandolo was laid down on June 14th, 1937 in the Monfalcone shipyard (Gulf of Trieste). It was one of the six boats of the Marconi class. Construction was completed on November 20th, 1938 with the official launch, and on March 25th, 1938 the boat was delivered to the Regia Marina. Assigned to the XXI Squadron along with the Marcello and Provana, the boat’s home base was Naples. This boat had one of the most intense operational lives in the Italian submarine fleet with 322 days at sea, 44,486 miles of navigation on the surface and 5,290 submerged for a total of 39 patrols.
R.Smg. Dandolo in Monfalcone
War activity for the Dandolo began with Italy’s the declaration of war on June 10th, 1940. The boat, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Riccardo Boris, was assigned to a patrol area about 25 miles SE of Cabo Palos (Cartagena) along with the Provana, Morosini and Faà di Bruno. On June 13th, the boat sighted a French naval formation of light cruisers and escort. It was the 3rd Cruiser Division, based in Toulon, which included the La Galissonière (which eventually became the Regia Marina’s FR 12), the Jean De Vienne (to become FR 11), and the Marseillaise – units of the same class – along with the escort of the destroyers Le Brestois and Boulonnais.
This French naval force, deployed to intercept a phantom German force which supposedly was in the process of reaching the Mediterranean to join the Italian Navy, became the target of the Dandolo’s rapid, but unlucky attack. The boat’s profile, at the time navigating at periscope depth, was easily detected by reconnaissance airplanes launched by the French units. Thus, the cruisers were fortuitously able to avoid the torpedoes, even if only by a few meters.
R.Smg. Dandolo in Palermo
In July 1940, a few weeks after Italy’s declaration of war, the Italian Submarine Command organized a large and continuous patrol line east of the Strait of Gibraltar. The area in question was patrolled by a total of 11 boats divided into 3 groups. The Dandolo, along with the Emo, Marcello and Barbarigo, was assigned to the first group. This patrol started on July 1st and lasted for almost two weeks. The Emo and Marconi were assigned to the westernmost area. The Emo patrolled south of the meridian of Alboran (about halfway between the Moroccan and Spanish coast), while the Marconi was assigned north of this meridian and closer to the Spanish coast. The Dandolo and the Barbarigo were instead placed along the line between Cabo the Gata and Cabo Falcon, near Almeria.
Later, the Dandolo was selected as one of the boats to be reassigned to the newly established Atlantic base in Bordeaux, codenamed Betasom. Around August 2nd, taking advantage of the new moon, Maricosom (Italian Submarine Command) ordered the boats Malaspina, Tazzoli, Cappellini and Glauco across the Strait of Gibraltar. About 10 days before departure day, due to breakdowns on some of the boats, the Barbarigo and the Dandolo were sent as replacements. After having left base on the 13th, the Dandolo began crossing the strait on the 16th. Following instructions received before departure, the captain navigated submerged up to the point between Point Europe (Gibraltar) and Point Almina (Ceuta), and on the surface passed Tangier. During navigation, the boat’s hydrophones picked up light units on patrol.
On the 17th, once reached the patrol area between Spain and the Azores Island, the Dandolo patrolled for almost three weeks. During this period it intercepted six isolated merchant ships, two of which from neutral countries. Of the other four, only two could be pursued. The first, the motor tanker Hermes of 3,768 t. was attacked on the 21st by torpedoes but only damaged. The second was the British merchantman Ilvington Court of 5,187 t. attacked on the 26th at around 18:00 in position 38º 57N, 13º 50 W and resulting in the sinking of the cargo ship. All 39 crewmembers were eventually rescued. Belonging to the Court Line Ltd, this merchantman was built in 1919 and had changed ownership four times.
The first attack demonstrated the Italian submarine’s struggle in sinking tankers, ships of great structural integrity and excellent buoyancy which required strikes to the last blow and great aggressiveness, skills these in which the Germans would demonstrate their mastery. Completed the patrol, the Dandolo reached Bordeaux for the first time on September 10th. Soon after its arrival, the boat entered the shipyard for alterations similarly completed on other boats. Although the base was not fully equipped, the submarines were refurbished, tested, and readied for action in less than 30 days. Eventually, this shipyard, in addition to regular maintenance work, completed various modifications, especially after the Germans and war experiences suggested some improvements.
In early October the first four Italian submarines left Bordeaux to participate in a joint operation with the U-Boats. The Dandolo, Malspina , Otaria and Barbarigo joined 11 German submarines in an operation against several British convoys. Other patrols involving more Italian submarines took place until early December. In all, 42 German U-Boats and 8 Italian “sommergibili” sank 74 ships. Unfortunately, the 310,565 tons sunk by the Germans dwarf the 25,600 tons sunk by the Italians. Thus, early German excitement waned and some recrimination surfaced, despite the Italians having lost two submarines, the Faà di Bruno and Tarantini, with all hands on board. During this patrol, the Dandolo made a single sighting on the 22nd, and return to base on the 15th of November.
After the necessary refitting, the Dandolo was again at sea. In the new mission, the boat would part of a group led by the Baracca and which included the Morosini, and the Otaria. The assignment was similar to the previous missions; the Italian boats, larger and with better endurance than the ones employed by the Germans, would patrol an area further west from the British Isles, while the U-boats and surface vessels would cover the area closer to the continent. Still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Riccardo Boris, the Dandolo left Bordeaux on January 24th, 1941. In the afternoon of the 31st, after having sighted the British tanker Pizarro, began an attack maneuver which was completed at night with the sinking of this ship of 1367 t. The sinking, reported in position 49º 30N, 19º 40W was achieved with the launch of torpedoes and caused the loss of 23 of the 29 crewmembers aboard the ship.
On February 2nd, the boat reached its patrol area where it began chasing the Dutch merchantman Prins Frederik Hendrik, but realizing that the Morosini was also un pursue, Captain Boris left the area. Lacking communication between boats, having two vessels in the same area was considered very dangerous. On the 18th, completed its patrol, the boat began the return voyage arriving around the Gironde on the 22nd. Here, while approaching the coast, the boat was attacked by was presumably a British submarine, but with a skilled maneuver the enemy’s torpedoes were avoided. Two days later, on the 24th, the boat returned to base and entered the shipyard for maintenance.
After the mediocre if not very limited results in the northern Atlantic, the new areas of operations for the “sharks of steel” of Betasom were the more temperate waters of the central Atlantic and the coast of Africa. The design of the Italian boats did not make them very suitable for the rough sea. The deck gun was practically unusable, and torpedoes were easily diverted by the heavy swell. The engine air intake and the design of the Italian conning towers made things even worse by making life aboard these vessels very difficult. On April 9th, a day before the Baracca, the Dandolo left for a patrol in the more temperate waters off the Strait of Gibraltar. The patrol area, split with the other boat by the 36th parallel, extended to the area west of Gibraltar. Having reached the patrol area on the 14th, two days later the Dandolo sighted in position 35º 26N, 7º 14W a battleship escorted by two destroyers. Considering the size of this force, probably it was a cruiser rather than a battleship. Despite the “full force ahead”, the boat failed to get close enough to the targets. Between the 16th and the 19th, the Dandolo joined the Baracca and Tazzoli in the pursue of a convoy, but on the 22nd the boat experienced serious breakdowns which left Captain Boris with no choice but return to base. At the end of the patrol, Captain Boris was replaced by Lieutenant Walter Auconi.
R.Smg. Dandolo in Cagliari
During this period, the Italian government wanted to return all submarines located in Bordeaux back to Italy. The issue was discussed at the highest levels, especially because Germany had only 30 submarines operational and needed the presence of the Italian boats. The German submarines were smaller and better suited for the Mediterranean, the Italian boats larger and more useful in the Atlantic. Still, Mussolini received permission from Hitler to withdraw the Italian submarines and on June 8th an order was issued in accordance. Soon after, on the 14th, Admiral Doenitz went to Berlin to request the reversal of this order. Admirals Reader, Weicholz, Riccardi and Parona were called to resolve a very difficult diplomatic and military situation. Finally, a compromise was reached; of the 27 Italian submarines still operating in the Atlantic, only 14 would be sent back. Eventually, due to war losses, only 10 submarines made the journey back, among them the Dandolo (the other boats were the Argo, Veniero, Brin, Mocenigo, Velella, Emo, Otaria, Perla, and the Guglielmotti).
The Dandolo left Bordeaux on June 19th, a day after the Glauco, but even before attempting the crossing of the strait it had to return to base due to a malfunction. The Glauco had the same fate. Repairs did not last long and on the 26th the boat was again at sea. On July 2nd, soon after midnight, the Dandolo crossed the Strait of Gibraltar on the surface taking advantage of a quarter moon and cloud coverage. The Glauco was less fortunate and was lost along with part of the crew. Having completed its first Atlantic experience, the Dandolo returned to Naples arriving on July 7th.
Here began a long and arduous period which will end with Italy’s surrender to then continue with Italy’s participation along the Allies.
This is a summary of the Dandolo’s activity in the Mediterranean.
From September 16th through October 1st, 1941: patrol of Cape Tenes, Spain. From November 2nd, through 11th: patrol off Tangier. On the 4th, the boat attacked and damaged the French tanker Tarn of 4,220 t. in position 36 49N, 2 20E, even though it belonged to the Vichy Government and thus neutral. On the 8th, the boat sank the Spanish merchantman Castillo Oropesa of 6600 t., another neutral ship, belonging to the “Cerencia De Burques Mercantes Para Servicio Oficiales”. From December 10th, patrol off Malia (Greece) interrupted due to a new assignment. From December 12th through the 21st: transport mission to Bardia (Lybia) with arrival on the 18th with a load of 12 t. Then, it continued on to Suda (Greece) arriving the 20th and Taranto, arriving the 23rd. From February 12 through 23rd: patrol of off Cyrenaica (Libya). From March 1st through April 1st: Patrol off Cabo Ténès. At the end of the patrol, Lieutenant Commander Alberto Campanella assumed command of the boat. From July 15th through 22nd: after repositioning to Cagliari, patrol off the Balearic Islands where the Dandolo launched 4 torpedoes against the British aircraft carrier Eagle missing the target. At the ned of this patrol, new change in command with the arrival of Lieutenant Giovanni Febbraio. From August 11tth through 14th: patrol off the Tunisian coast interrupted due to enemy attack which caused damages. From October 12th trhough16th: patrol off the Algerian coast also interrupted due to breakdowns. At the end of the patrol, another change in command with Lieutenant Giacomo Scano assuming the helm. From November 20th through December 4th: patrol off Philippeville including a failed attack egaist enemy vessel on the 27th. From December 29th through January 1st, 1943: patrol off Cape Bon and attack against a merchantman. From January 4th through 5th: patrol off La Galite. From January 22nd: patrol off Cape Bougaroni and Cape Carebon. On the morning of the 23rd, attack against an enemy convoy which returned fire causing damage. From April 18th through May 4th: patrol off Cape de Fer. From July 15th through 18th: patrol off the Sicilian coast where on the 16th the Dandolo attacked and seriously damaged the British light cruiser Cleopatra of 5,450 t. The following day it was attacked by enemy aircrafts and two bombs lodged themselves in the outer hull without exploding. After the attack, the boat made it to Crotone (Calabria) and then Taranto.
On Armistice Day (September 8th, 1943), the boat was in dry dock. After a period of activity along the Allies in Mediterranean, the Dandolo was transferred to America where in completed 113 patrols covering 16000 miles. In November 144 it was in the Bermudas, in 1945 in New London and then Guantanamo (Cuba). At the end of the conflict, the submarine was allowed back to Taranto.
After the peace treaty, which barred Italy from owning any submarines, the boat was assigned to the United States which, due to the minimal strategic value, ordered its demolition which took place after the boat was stricken off on February 1st, 1948. This was the Dandolo inglorious end after 10 years of intense activity.
After a regular shakedown period, the submarine Leonardo Da Vinci, under the command of C.C. Ferdinando Calda, left Naples on September 22nd 1940 for newly established submarine base of Bordeaux. After the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar, which took place on the 27th – a few days before the new moon of September 30th – the boat was sighted by two British destroyers, forcing a crash dive.
The Leonardo Da Vinci arriving in Bordeaux (Photo Bundersarchiv)
On October 2nd, after having reached the Atlantic Ocean, the Da Vinci attacked an armed ship (auxiliary cruiser) of notable dimensions (the name is unknown). While on the surface, the Da Vinci found itself in the proximity of the old aircraft carrier Argus and, under artillery attack, dived very quickly. October 8th saw another fruitless attack; this time against an armed ship, possibly a passenger liner. From the 16th to the 21st of October, the Da Vinci remained north of the Azores Islands where it conducted two chases which failed due to the superior speed of the enemy. Later, the boat moved to the area just off Lisbon from the 21st to the 27th of October. Finally, on October 31st, the boat reached BETASOM. The Da Vinci was one of the twelve boats that would reach Bordeaux during the month of October (Emo, Tarantini, Torelli, Faà di Bruno, Otaria, Baracca, Giuliani, Glauco, Calvi, Tazzoli, Argo).
After less than two months of waiting at the base, the Da Vinci departed for her second Atlantic mission on December 21st, 1940. A week later, on the 28th, it was already off the Irish coast. On the 30th, Captain Calda received a signal with the position of a British convoy, but due to a navigational error, he failed to intercept it. Here the boat continued her patrol without intercepting any enemy shipping. On the 16th, while en route for the base, it attacked without success an identified enemy destroyer. On the evening of January 20th, the submarine reentered the submarine base in Bordeaux.
1941
The Da Vinci would leave again from the Aquitaine ‘s base on March 26th, but two days later it had to abandon mission because of a failure to one of the ball bearings of the primary electric motor. In a few days the breakdown was mended and the Da Vinci went back to sea on April 4th. From the 11th to the 27th of the same month, the boat remained in an area west of Ireland but, due to lack of enemy shipping, it abandoned the ineffective mission to reenter BETASOM on May 4th.
The Leonardo Da Vinci returning to Bordeaux after its first patrol. Men from the S. Marco regiment are presenting arms. (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On June 18th, the Da Vinci left Bordeaux for a mission west of the Strait of Gibraltar. On the 24th, it detected an aircraft carrier escorted by destroyers but did not succeed in reaching an acceptable position of attack due to the reaction of the escort. Four days later, on June 28th, it found and sank the British oil-tanker AURIS of 8.030 t. striking the ship with four of the eight launched torpedoes. This oil tanker of Italian construction (Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico) had been built in 1935 for the oil company Shell. The position of the sinking is given at 34°27’N 11°57’W from British sources and 34°28’N, 11°59’W from Italian sources. There were 32 casualties, and 27 survivors. On July 18, having reached the limit of its range, the Da Vinci left the area and returned to Bordeaux.
On August 15th, the Da Vinci was again at sea for a hunting mission off the Azores Islands. On the 19th, at 11.57 o’clock, the boat was attacked in position 35°17’N, 10°37’W by an airplane type Consolidated Catalina. In the same area, the crew made various sightings, but failed to make contact with the enemy shipping due to the prompt action of the escort units, which did not cause any damage. On September 24th, the boat was again returning to base where it would remain in the shipyard until the end of October for refurbishing. During this pause, C.C. Caldo was replaced by C.C. Luigi Longanesi Cattani. The just concluded action against convoy HG.73 had been organized in collaboration with B.d.U, and Donitz complimented the Italian allies for the collaboration provided.
At the end of the repair work, and after some testing, on November 19th the Da Vinci left again for a new mission, this time south of the Azores islands. The departure, as it would happen various times, did not take place from Bordeaux but from the auxiliary base at La Pallice, near La Rochelle. On December 2nd, the commander was forced to abort the mission because of serious damage to the horizontal rudders, and the boat reentered Bordeaux on December 2nd.
1942
After some alteration to increase its range, the Da Vinci left again on the 28th of January 1942; this time it would be for the first mission along the Brazilian coasts, which would be reached after a navigation of one month. After these structural alterations, the buoyancy of the boat had been reduced to only 10%. After reaching the pre-assigned area just off the Antilles, the crew ascertained the absence of enemy shipping and moved closer to the New York – Brazil trade route.
The Leonardo Da Vinci returning to Bordeaux after its seventh patrol. March 1942. (Photo courtesy Paolo Hoffmann)
On February 25th, the Da Vinci sank the Brazilian SS CADEBELO of 3.557 t. which had left Philadelphia on the 14th, and which was followed on the 27th of the same month by the Latvian SS EVERASMA of 3.644 t. The “Cadebello” was an old ship (1917) of German construction and belonging to the “Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasilero”; there were no survivors. The position of this sinking is approximately given at 16°N 49°W. The “Everasma” belonged to the “Francis Grauds Company” and had been built by the British shipyard Duncans in 1920. The position of the second sinking is approximately given at 17°N 48°W. This ship was part of convoy TAW12 and there were 15 survivors. The 11th of March, the Da Vinci left the sector to reenter Bordeaux.
On May 9th, the Da Vinci was once again on a mission; this time between Porto Natal and Bahia. On June 2nd, near the Liberian coast, just off Cape Las Palmas, it sank with torpedoes the Panamanian schooner REINE MARIE STEWART of 1.087 t. The position of this sinking is given at 7°16’N, 13°20’W and there is no information regarding the sunken boat or possible survivors.
On the 7th, the Da Vinci intercepted and sank the Danish M/v CHILE of 6.956 t., in service to the British, and on the 10th the Dutch M/n ALIOTH of 5.483 t. The “Chile” was built by the Burmeister & Wain’s Maskin of Copenhagen in 1915 and belonged to the shipping company “Ostasiatiske Compagni”. Five crewmembers perished and the remaining 39 were rescued. The “Alioth”, a ship of recent construction (1937), belonged to “Van Nievelt, Goudriaan & Co’s” and was built by the shipyard Deusche Werft AG of Hamburg. Eight crewmembers were rescued, while the remaining 28 perished. The position of this sinking is given at 0.08°N, 18°52W by British sources and 4°17’N, 13°17W by the Italian authorities; a notable difference.
The series of successes continued on the 13th with the sinking of the English SS CLAN MACQUARRIE of 6.471 t. in position 5°35’N, 25°45’W (5°30’N, 23°30’W according to British fonts). Only one crewmember was lost, while the remaining 89 were rescued. This collier, built in 1913, belonged to the shipping company “Clan Line Steamers Ltd” of Liverpool. On the 20th, the Da Vinci rendezvoused with the Tazzoli to which it transferred 11 t. of diesel fuel (which the Tazzoli, in turn, transferred to the Morosini), and then returned to the base arriving on July 1, 1942 to celebrate a loot of around 20.000 t.
During the summer period, the Da Vinci was at the shipyard for structural change to allow for the installation of a pocket submarine lodged on the forward bridge. About this mission, Commander Borghese wrote: “After a year of tests and experiments conducted on the Lake of Iseo by Sub-Lieutenant Massano, in some of which I had myself taken part, the midget assault submarine ‘CA’ had been adapted to her new functions and was ready for action. Simultaneously, at Bordeaux, where in the meantime command of the base of our Atlantic submarines had been assumed by Captain Enzo Grossi, the possibilities I had formerly tested of using an ocean-going submarine for transporting the ‘CA’ to an enemy base had been realized. Two missions were in preparation with this craft, one being an attack on New York, taking the ‘CA’ up the Hudson into the very heart of the city; the psychological effect on the Americans, who had not yet undergone any war offensive on their own soil, would in our opinion far outweigh the material damage which might be inflicted (and ours was the only practicable plan, so far as I am aware, ever made to carry the war into the United States). The other operation provided for an attack against the important British stronghold of Freetown (Sierra Leone) where the British South Atlantic Squadron was stationed. The undoubted difficulties that such operations of very wide range involved were to a large extent neutralized by the factor of complete surprise; the appearance of assault craft of the Italian Navy, which had so far limited their efforts to the Mediterranean area, would certainly not be foreseen: defensive measures against so unexpected a type of attack were presumably not in being. The action against New York was in an advanced stage of preparation and had been fixed to take place in December.”
On August 10th, C.C. Longanesi Cattani left the command of the submarine to T.V. Gianfranco Gazzana Priaroggia which would contribute enormously to the fame of this boat.
On October 7th, the Da Vinci left Le Verdon for another mission. Between the 25th and 30th, it conducted patrol off Capo Verde, but having failed to locate any traffic it moved off Cape San Rocco. On November 2nd, it sank the British SS EMPIRE ZEAL of 7.009 t. On the 3rd, it fired 5 torpedoes against the Dutch SS Frans Hals missing the target, and receiving some damage from the fire returned by the merchant ship. On the 5th, it sank the Greek SS ANDREAS of 6.566 t. in position 2°00’S, 30°30’W, follow the on the 10th by the American Liberty ship SS MARCUS WHITMAN of 7.176 t. in position 5°44’S, 32°41’W (5°40’S, 32°41’W according to British fonts). The Andreas was an old ship built in 1919 by Harland & Wolff in Belfast, Ireland, and it belonged to the Greek company “Ionian Steamship Co Ltd”. Previously she had been known as the Philadelphia in 1919 and the New Mexico in 1933. The Liberty ship was steaming from Capetown to Dutch Guiana without a load. The 41 members of the crew and the 11 militiamen of the “Naval Armed Guard” survived, eventually reaching the Brazilian coasts in four lances, one of which was motorized.
This series of successes continued on the 11th with the sinking (with the cannon, the Da Vinci had exhausted all torpedoes) of the Dutch SS VEERHAVEN of 5.291 t. in position 3°51S, 29°22W. This ship was built in 1930 by NV Scheepvaart Maatschappij Noorze, and all 45 crewmembers were eventually rescued. Again, on the 28th, it rendezvoused with the Tazzoli to which it surrendered 30 t. of diesel fuel, to then reenter Bordeaux after 60 days of navigation and the sinking of 4 ships for a total of 26.042 t.
1943
On February 9th 1943, the boat was again at sea, but it had to abort mission because of a breakdown. A few days later, on the 20th, it was again at sea. The Da Vinci, still under the command of Priaroggia, but with a new Chief Engineer (C.G.N. Giuseppe Battisti disembarked and C.G.N. Battaglini replaced him) started a long mission in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. This mission would be conducted in collaboration with the Finzi, a boat under the command of T.V. Mario Rossetto.
On March 14th, the Da Vinci sunk with two torpedoes the British transatlantic EMPRESS OF CANADA of 21.517 t. This is a sad episode since along with 3000 British soldiers there were 500 Italian prisoners of war . The submarine succeeded only in recovering S.T. physician Vittorio Del Vecchio. The position of the sinking is given at 1°13’S, 9°57’W. This elegant transatlantic was built by the shipyards Fairfield in Glasgow in 1922, and it belonged to the Canadian Pacific Railway Co.
On the 18th, the LULWORTH HILL of 7.628 t., ship previously signaled by the Finzi, was sunk with the torpedo while the Da Vinci was submerged in position 11°00’S, 0°35’E (10°10’S-1°00’E according to the British authorities). The “Lulworth Hill” was built in 1941 by Dorset Steamship Co Ltd. The Finzi eventually transferred to the Da Vinci 9 t. of diesel fuel, 6 t. of lubricants, 10 t. of water, three 450mm torpedoes, and provisions in order to continue the mission in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the Da Vinci transferred to the Finzi the Italian lieutenant rescued at sea and the prisoner of war (sailor gunner) James Leslie Hull.
The Da Vinci, by now in the Indian Ocean, continued hunting off the port of Durban, in South Africa. On April 17th, it sank the Dutch SS SEMBILAN of 6.566 t. in position 31°30’S, 33°30’E, followed on the 18th by the British MANAAR of 8.007 t. in position 30°59’S, 33°00’E and on the 21st by the Liberty ship JOHN DRAYTON of 7.177 t. in position 32°03’S, 34°04’E. The John Drayton was a typical Liberty launched in 1942 from a shipyard in North Carolina.
HMS Active (H14)
On the 25th the victim is the DORYESSA, a British oil-tanker of 8.078 t. and last victim of the series. The “Doryessa” belonged to the oil company Shell and had been built in 1938 by the shipyard Lesile. Eleven crewmembers were saved, while the remaining 53 perished. The sinking was given in position 32°03’S, 34°04’E, very close to the one of the John Drayton. On May 6th, T.V. Gazzana Priaroggia was promoted “for service in war” to the rank of C.C. and few days later, on May 22nd, the Da Vinci launched the last radio signal informing the base that the following day it would begin “hidden” navigation. The boat was expected to arrive in Bordeaux within a week, but it would never arrive. In 1945, the English Admiralty confirmed that on May 23rd 1943 at 11.35 (T.M.G.) the destroyer “Active” and the frigate “Ness ” conducted an attack just off Cape Finestrelle. There were no survivors. (The two units were part of the escort for convoy WS-30 and KMF-15.)
The Cappellini was one of the two Marcellos of more recent construction and it differed from the previous series simply for the substitution of the diesel engines produced by CRDA with similar ones produced by FIAT. The Cappellini was one of the boats selected for the new Atlantic base of Bordeaux. It was considered, along with the Faa di Bruno, one of the vessels in better mechanical conditions since it was of more recent construction. At the same time, the Cappellini was one of the first vessels which, at the beginning of 1941 and following damage inflicted after a patrol, utilized the new naval shipyard established in Bordeaux.
The launching of the Cappellini (Photo U.S.M.M.)
The Cappellini left Cagliari (Sardinia) on June 6th, 1940 a day after the Finzi and under the command of C.C. Cristiano Masi and moved off the Island of Madera. The night of the 14th, near Cape Negro (Point Almina), the vessel was sighted by the British trawler “Atlantic Ranger”, but, following a crash dive, it was able to run away. Around 00:30 AM on the 15th, while it was near Point Alpina, the vessel was once again sighted by enemy units. One of them, the destroyer “Vidette”, was targeted with the launch of a torpedo which failed to reach the ship. Once again, following quick maneuvering, the vessel was able to elude the enemy ships, but sighted by yet another unit, the Cappellini had to seek refuge in the Spanish port of Ceuta, from which, at a later day, was able to escape reaching a Spezia. These first attempts to cross the Strait of Gibraltar gave proof that the security measures implemented by the British were quite effective. Thanks to the Cappellini’s visit in Ceuta, it was possible to document the organization of the British screen which, effectively, were divided into six areas each patrolled by light units.
Furthermore, the Cappellini help testing Spanish flexibility in regards to Article XII of the 13th Convention of the Hague (1907). The articles of this treaty limited the stay of a military vessel in a neutral port to only 24 hours, unless breakdowns would not allow it to leave. Thanks to Spanish compliancy, the Cappellini falsified the various breakdowns, thus allowing for the tight British surveillance to be relaxed, and at the same time rising support within Franco’s government. Finally, it should be mentioned that not a single Italian submarine was lost during the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar, while the German allies considered this forced route a near suicide, especially after the tragic experiences of WW I with the loss of U.104 (April 11th, 1918), and U.61 (May 11th, 1918).
At the end of the first war patrol, C.C. Salvatore Todaro, one of the more shining heroes of the Italian Navy, replaced C.C. Masi. The submarine left La Spezia on September 29th, 1940 to complete the crossing of the strait (Gibraltar) on the 5th of October, but this time submerged. As it happened with other vessels, the Cappellini also experienced a sudden loss of depth which brought the boat down to 140 meters, far exceeding the maximum certified depth.
After the crossing, the Cappellini moved on to its previously assigned area of patrol where, the night of October 15th, it intercepted the armed steamship Kabalo, part of convoy OB.223. The ship was sunk with the deck gun since the three torpedoes launched failed to reach the target, probably due to the rough sea. After the sinking, Captain Todaro decided to take the ship’s life boat in tow to bring it closer to land, but when the boat began to sink, he transferred the ship’s crew aboard the submarine. The 26 shipwrecked sailors were housed in the conning tower and, after three days at sea, were disembarked on the Island of Santa Maria in the Azores. This is an interesting episode because it generated the admiration of the international press, but surely not that of the Germans and the Italian high command; as it will be soon discovered, this war could not be fought by heroes and gentlemen.
Salvatore Todaro with some of the crewmembers of the Kabalo on the forward deck of the Cappellini (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
The Kabalo was a Belgian steamship built in 1917 by the Cammel Laird & Co. of Birkenhead and was previously known as the “War Myrtle” (1919) and Caledonier (1927). The displacement listed by the Italian authorities (5,186 t.) is slightly higher than the one indicated by the “Lloyd’s Register of Shipping” which lists 5,051 t. The ship belonged to the “Compagnie Maritime Belge” of Antwerp. The sinking took place in position 31° 59’N 31° 21’W, one crewmember was lost and the remaining 42 were rescued. Completed its patron, the vessel began the return voyage to Bordeaux which was reached on November 5th, 1940.
After a period of repairs and maintenance, the Cappellini left Le Verdon on December 22nd 1940. The boat had been chosen for a mission in the eastern Atlantic after radical transformations that had included the reduction of the casings of the periscopes and the increase of the ammunitions for the guns. Moreover, the range of the boat had been increased with the stowage of provisions for approximately two months, and the transformation of a double hull into an additional diesel fuel tank.
The Cappellini reached the area off Oporto around Christmas, and having failed to detect any traffic, it continued southward reaching Funchal on January 1st, 1941.
1941
On the 5th, in the area between the Canaries Islands and the African coast, it intercepted the British steamboat “Shakespeare of 5.029 t., an isolated ship from convoy OB.262. The steamboat was sunk after a duel with the gun in which the artillerymen of the Shakespeare hit the forward gun of the Cappellini causing the death of sergeant Ferruccio Azzolin.
The Shakespeare was built in the 1926 by the R Duncan & Co. shipyard of Port Glasgow and it belonged to the “Shakespeare Shipping Co. Ltd.” The position of the sinking was 18° 05′ N 21° 11′ W; 20 crewmembers died, and the remaining 22, in great part hurt, were rescued by the Cappellini and then left on one of the Islands of Cabo Verde. This was another example of the humanitarian spirit of commander Todaro and of his sense of chevaliery.
C.C. Salvatore Todaro (Photo Elio Ando’)
The Cappellini continued the cruise in the zone of Cabo Verde, and then moved off Freetown, where the morning of January 14th attacked with two torpedoes the troop transport ship Eumaeus of 7,472 t. which was eventually sunk with the gun. This was an auxiliary cruiser (armed ship) in service to the British. Built in the 1921 by the “Calendon Shipbuilding & Engineering” of Dundee (Scotland), the ship belonged to the “Ocean Shipping Co.” The sinking was given in position 08° 55′ N 15° 03′ W (118 miles for 285° from Cape Sierra Leon). During the battle, which lasted more than two hours, the Cappellini experienced several breakdowns. First the ammunition lifts stopped, forcing the movement of projectiles by hand, then the aft gun lost the brakes recoils. During the battle lost their lives sergeant Francisco Moccia and common Giuseppe Bastino, and also the T.G.N. Danilo Stiepovich to whom was awarded the Gold Medal (M.O.M.). The records of the Lloyds list 23 British fallen and 63 survivors, but the war log of the Cappellini clearly describes a “swarming” of troops getting away from the ship. In facts, this was a troop transport ship directed to Egypt.
At the end of the engagement, and probably called by the S.O.S. launched by the ship, and airplane appeared in the area launching two bombs against the Cappellini. Because of a fault with the flooding valves, the boat submerged very slowly, thus offering an optimal target; the damage was extensive. The trim tanks were damaged, so were the main electric motors, the batteries, and other systems, forcing Commander Todaro to seek shelter in the nearby Spanish port of the Luz, in Gran Canaria. The Cappellini moored the night of January 20th, and with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities, the boat received the necessary repairs and disembarked a wounded. The vessel left the 23rd, and after a week the Cappellini was again in Bordeaux (to be accurate in Pauillac), after 39 days at sea and over 7,600 miles of patrol.
The Cappellini at sea while it appears the crew are installing or removing a torpedo. (Photo USMM)
The forth mission began April 16, 1941 with destination the northern Atlantic as part of the group Da Vinci which included the submarines Da Vinci, Cappellini, Torelli and Malaspina. On the 21st, commander Todaro, in spite of the failure of one of the two thermal engines, lead an attack against two large passengers ships of the type “ACCRA”. After having launched the torpedoes, the boat had to submerge and then endure the hunt of the escort vessels, including an attempted ramming, artillery fire, and the launch of depth charges.
The Accra type was of British production and built by the “Harland & Wolff”, company with shipyards in Belfast, Greenock, Glasgow, and Irvine. In addition to the Accra there was the Apapa. The first was sunk by U 34 on July 26th, 1940 while the second one was sunk by a German Kondor on November 15th, 1940. Belonging to the same company there was the Adda, similar but much smaller, also lost during the war, and more precisely on June 8th, 1941 victim of U 107. The Cappellini continued in vain the search for enemy traffic and eventually it left the area of operations the 11th, returning to base on May 20th.
The fifth mission was to some extent short: the Cappellini left Bordeaux June 29th, 1941 with destination a sector to the West of the Strait of Gibraltar, but due to serious breakdowns, it had to abandon mission and re-enter to base on July 6th. At the end of this short mission, while the boat entered the shipyard, Commander Todaro departed leaving the command to T.V. Aldo Lenzi. Todaro would join the famous Xa MAS dying, as a gentleman and hero, during a mission in the small port of La Galite (December 14th, 1942) killed by airplane straifing while a group under his commando was preparing to force the port of Bona. In should be mentioned that, due to the change of commanders, several boats had delays in being deployed their area of operations while the officers and the crews were becoming familiar which each other in short practice missions. The Cappellini was not immune; in fact it seems that although ready well before May 1942, if had not been for the change of commander.
The sixth mission took the boat in waters south and southeast off the Azores Islands along with the submarines Morosini and of Da Vinci. Commander Polacchini (Commanding Officer of Betasom) , for the occasion, wanted to experience a new system of patrol that called for the positioning of the boats at approximately 40 miles from one another. The three boats, therefore, assumed a wedge-like formation, with the central unit proceeding approximately 120 miles ahead to the others two. The idea was to act in close collaboration and have the boat closer to the contact take action. After departure, on November 17, 1941 the boats continued the patrol operation until the 29th, when B.d.U. requested the transfer of the boats to another sector. December 2nd, the Da Vinci, experiencing mechanical failures, had to abandon mission while the Cappellini intercepted the British steamboat Miguel de Larringa of 5.230 t. The submarine war logs lists the torpedoing in position 35° 34′ W 29° 52′ W, but the documents of the Lloyds do not confirm this sinking, therefore it must be assumed that, perhaps, the ship was only damaged. Completed the mission, the Cappellini returned to Bordeaux on December 29th, 1941 to remain at the shipyard for several months due to the precarious conditions of the boat. At this time, and after only a single war mission, T.V. Aldo Lenzi relinquished the command of the submarine to T.V. Marco Revedin. In spite of the continuous damages, in many cases due to enemy attacks, the Italian submarines’ armaments worked well, with the torpedoes functioning 60% of the time (the analysis reflect the total launch of 109 weapons).
1942
The official Italian documentation does not specify the departure date of the seventh mission, but what is known is that on May 11th, the Cappellini, while on patrol in position 19 33N 26 48W, intercepted a convoy of 9 ships. Two of the escort units subjected the boat to an intense hunt, but in spite of the damages inflicted, the boat was able to continue on.
On the 19th, the Cappellini located an isolated unit of convoy OS.27 (England – Western Africa) and sank it. It was the Swedish motor-ship Tisnaren of 5.747 t. Constructed by the shipyards “Götaverken A/B of Gothenburg” in Sweden in 1918, the Tisnaren belonged to the shipping company “Transatlantic Rederiaktiebolaget”. The position of the attack was given at 03° 38′ to N 32° 01′ W, while the ship sank in position 03 N 33 W; there were no casualties and the 40 crewmembers were later rescued. At daybreak of May 24th, the boat, then in position 03° 59′ S 35° 01′ W, located a naval formation which, due to distance, could not be attacked. This formation, for sure, was the same one met from the Barbarigo in the famous action against the Milwaukee and the Moffett.
Two days later, while it was searching for a steamship previously signaled by the Archimede, the Cappellini was attacked by an American Catalina based in Natal. At this point, having exhausted the fuel reserve, the boat began the along journey back to base.
The night of May 31st, in position 00° 45′ S 29° 45′ W the Cappellini hit with four of the six torpedo launched the British fleet tanker Dinsdale of 8.250 t. The captain gave a vivid report of this action. The combat was along, in fact, although it had begun in the late evening the 31st, the oil tanker did not sink until 06:12 of the following morning. The Dinsdale , previously named Empire Norseman, was launched on April 11th, 1942 and was completing its maiden voyage. The tanker was built by Harland & Wolff, Govan, and there is no information regarding casualties. The Cappellini continued on, reaching Bordeaux (actually Le Verdon) on June 19th, 1942.
The experience of the summer of 1942, especially in the waters off Brazil, had convinced the Italian command that, because of the considerable increase of antisubmarine activity, it was no longer opportune to send submarines in the Antilles and in Brazil. Instead, it was thought that traffic off Guinea and Congo would be an easier prey.
In this period, the availability of Italian submarines was much limited, and the arrival of new units could not be expected. In fact, the situation was deteriorated to such point that, for the August mission off Congo, only four boats were available: Cappellini, Barbarigo, Archimedes and Bagnolini.
The Cappellini, at the commando of the T.V. Mark Revedin, left base on August 21st, 1942. After approximately twenty days into the mission, the boat reached the assigned zone just off Freetown. After only three days, on September 13th, the boat received orders to move at maximum speed to approximately 240 miles for NNE of the Island of Ascension in position 05° 05′ S 11° 28′ W where, the previous day, a U-Boot had sunk the passenger ship Laconia. After the sinking, the German commander realized that the British ship had on board a large number of Italian prisoners of war. The U-Boot, U.156, recovered some of the shipwrecked P.O.W. and also called in other boats (U.506 and U.507) for help. The Cappellini arrived in the area on September 16th after a fast run of approximately 700 miles. The episode of the Laconia is not only sad, but also tragic and therefore we will leave the historical narration of it to another time.
With the aid of French units just arrived in the area, nearly all the shipwrecked were transferred aboard the neutral ships, but 6 Italians and 2 prisoners of war remained aboard the Cappellini. Because of excessive use of diesel fuel, the original operational plan had to be abandoned and the boat began the return trip to base. During this phase, the submarine sighted a British steamboat that was not attacked because of a breakdown with to one of the two thermal engines. The boat arrived at the base, without further incidents, on October 17th, 1942.
The Cappellini, after the necessary maintenance work and still under the command of T.V. Mark Revedin, took again to the sea from La Pallice on December 26th, 1942. Before this mission, the boat was equipped with a Metrox of German construction. This device, nicknamed “beaver”, allowed for the detection of radio waves emanated from enemy radars. Initially, the device allowed the German and Italian boats to avoid sudden aerial attacks, often carried out in the middle of the night by special Allied airplanes. Subsequently, it was discover that the radio waves released by the Metox helped the Allied located with precision the boats, therefore it was immediately ordered to disable them. Two days after departure, the Cappellini succeeded in avoiding a submarine, probably one of the British boats always in ambush off the French ports.
1943
On January 10th, 1943 the boat arrived in the area of operations NW of the Islands of Cabo Verde. Having failed to locate enemy traffic, the boat headed towards the northern coasts of Brazil where, in the previous days, the Tazzoli had scored several successes. Unfortunately, the hunt off the coast of Brazil first, and the French Antilles later, did not reveal any traffic, and on the February 8th the boat begun the long journey back to base. The 24th, while on the surface, the Cappellini was attacked of the Azores Islands by a Catalina which launch a cluster of bombs while the boat was performing a crash dive. On March 4th, the Cappellini arrived in Bordeaux after the unfruitful mission, which had added further wear and tear to the already aging vessel
Following negations with the Germans, the Torelli was one of the seven submarines designated to be transformed into transports. Supposedly, the idea of transforming these vessels originated with C.V. Enzo Grossi, then commander of the base, who had realized that these submarines were no longer fit for offensive operations. Grossi made a proposal to Adm. Donitz: in exchange for the 7 Italian submarines, the German would transfer 7 newly constructed U-boat to the Italian Navy. Although it could appear that the proposal was preposterous, it was actually warmly welcomed especially because the Germans were producing a boat a day, but did not have enough personnel to man them.
As part of the final agreement reached between the two navies, the Krisgmarine transferred seven U-boats of the class VII-c (designated by the Italians as class S) in exchange of an equivalent number of Italian boats which, due to their dimensions, were better suited for the long voyage to Japan. Of the seven vessels, only five began the journey. This operation was completely under German control, and the boats were assigned a German name, but retained their Italian crew. Of the five boats, the Tazzoli was lost son after its departure, while the Barbarigo was lost probably soon after. Both losses were never documented and remain a mystery to these days.
The Cappellini, under the command of C.C. Walter Auconi sailed for Japan on May 11th, 1943. The cargo, of approximately 95 tons, consisted of ammunition, aluminum in bars, steel, replacement parts, and others. Because of the overload of the Lange quantity of diesel fuel aboard, the boat left the base with a buoyancy factor of approximately 3,5% and therefore extremely low. In fact, the boat was so overload that it left port with only the bow and the conning tower outside of the water.
The various submarines assign to these transport missions receive new names; the Cappellini was called “Aquila III”. In spite of several aerial attacks, always readily avoided, the boat reached Saipang on July 9th, 1943. According to the official report, the boat reached port with the fuel tanks completely empty.
The following day, the 10th, the boat moved to Singapore under the escort of the colonial sloop Eritrea (C.F. Mario Jannucci). This last mission is meticulously described by C.C. Auconi in a memorandum presented in July 1948. On August 25th, the boat was ready for the return voyage, but the German command decided to withhold it in order to make it travel in tandem with the Giuliani. On September 8th, (actually the morning of the 9th), having received news of the armistice signed by the Italian government, the Japanese immediately took control of the boat, thus concluding its operating life in the Regia Marina.
July 12th, 1943 – The Cappellini photographed from the Eritrea (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
Eventually, the crew was captured and interned in a Japanese P.O.W. camp. Later on, a good part of the crew (not the offices) decided to continue fighting along the German, and the submarine was manned by a mix crew of German and Italian sailors. On September 10th, the boat was incorporated in the Krigsmarine and assigned the nominative UIT.24. The command of the boat was assigned to Oberleutnant-zur-See Heinrich Pahls, who kept it until May 1945. During this period, the boat conducted six missions as part of 12th flotilla (Bordeaux), and later the 33rd Flotilla (Flensburg).
At the surrender of Germany, May 10th 1945, the boat was incorporated into the Japanese navy with the nominative I-503 where it continued to operate until the end of the conflict. The Cappellini, eventually, was captured by the United States and sank in the deep waters off Kobe (Kii Suido) on April 16th, 1946.
At the beginning of the conflict (June 10th, 1940), the submarine Calvi was assigned to the 11th Squadriglia of the 1st Group based in La Spezia. The boat was under the command of C.C. Giuseppe Caridi since 1939, and the second in command was T.V. Antonio De Giacomo, who would eventually skipper the submarine Tazzoli.
The submarine left the base (in the region of Liguria, in Northern Italy) for the first war patrol on July 3rd, 1940, a day after the smg. Veniero. The boat was assigned an area in the Atlantic off Madera. These two boats were the first to receive orders from MARICOM (The Italian submarine command) to begin unrestricted warfare, thus foregoing the rules dictated by the International Maritime Law during a state of war. The Calvi successfully completed a patrol of the port of Funchal (Portugal) where it detected 12 cargo ships and one destroyer, all from neutral countries.
The Calvi in Bordeaux
During the return trip, the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar took place on the surface, as it had happen during the initial crossing, but this time the boat was forced, for a brief period, to seek refuge under the ocean after the sighting of patrol units off Punta Almina. The mission wrapped up on August 6th, with the boat’s return to base, but without having achieved any result.
After the return to base, the boat entered the naval arsenal for the work necessary to fit it for missions in the Atlantic from the newly established Italian submarine base of Bordeaux. The Calvi, still under the command of C.C. Caridi, left La Spezia in the early hours of October 6th. Upon reaching the Strait of Gibraltar, in foul weather and light wind, the boat continued on submerged, picking up from the hydrophones sounds from patrol units. During this phase, the submarine encroached unfavorable sea currents which plummeted the vessel 143 meters toward the bottom, but without causing any damage. This depth was far greater than the maximum allowed by the boat’s specifications. Completing the crossing, the boat moved on toward Cape Finesterre where it began its patrol. On the 8th, following receipt of a radio signal from the smg. Glauco, the boat moved full speed toward the point indicated where it remained in ambush until the 10th. Having failed to sight any traffic, the boat continued on to Bordeaux, reaching the Atlantic base for the first time on October 23rd, 1940.
After some maintenance work, the Calvi took again to the sea on December 3rd as part of a group of submarines which included the Veniero, Emo, Bagnolini, Tazzoli and Nani. This operation, organized in concert with B.d.U. (German submarine command), brought the Italian boats off the Irish coast. The Calvi reached the area of operations on the 11th after having encountered a violent winter storm, typical of this part of the Atlantic. The fury of the sea was such that the boat had part of the forward superstructure ripped off, and part of the conning tower deformed. Due to the construction not particularly adapted to these weather conditions, the boat took on several tons of water from the conning tower’s hatch, risking several times to lose buoyancy. On the 12th, the Calvi made its first sighting, a steamship of unknown origins which was proceeding on a zigzag course at about 7 or 8 knots. During daylight, and despite the loss of one of the two thermal engines, the possible target was followed at a distance, but eventually, in the afternoon, the hunt was abandoned following the loss of a great quantity of diesel fuel from one of the double hulls.
On the 17th, the Calvi made a second sighting, but the pursuit was abandoned due to another failure of one of the diesel engines. On the 18th, the Calvi launched two torpedoes following the sighting of a steamship proceeding without lights, but failed to hit the target. Thereafter, the boat opened fire with the aft gun, but the superior speed of the ship brought about the end of the chase. Further attacks followed: all in unfavorable weather conditions.
On the 20th of December, the Calvi was attacked by the British ship CARLTON which opened fire with a large caliber machine gun. The boat, quick to submerge, was brought into launch position and around 14:00 sank the steamship. The Carlston was one of the units lost from convoy OB.260. Displacing 5,162 t., it was built by the shipyards Short Bros. Ltd in Sunderland and belonged to Chapman & Co. So., R. The sinking was given in position 55°18’N, 18°49’W and of the 35 members of the crew only 4 were later rescued.
On the 26th, the Calvi sighted other units, one of which, in position 55° N 19°W, was the object of a torpedo launched. Despite the fact that the crew clearly heard an explosion, there is no confirmation that the torpedo actually hit the target. On the 27th of December, having exhausted all diesel fuel reserves, the boat began the return voyage to base reaching Bordeaux on December 31st, just in time for the New Year’s Eve celebrations. After the return to base, the boat spent three months in the shipyard for repair and maintenance work.
1941
On March 31, 1941 the boat took again to the sea for a mission in the central Atlantic along with the submarines Marconi, Finzi and Tazzoli. The Calvi was assigned to an area between the Canary Islands and the Azores Islands where it operated with the Finzi. On the 22nd of April, the boat launched two torpedoes against an armed ship off Freetown, and on the 28th against the steamship Caperby; in both cases the weapons missed the target. During the first incident, after having failed the target, the boat attempted to chase it on the surface, but lost it in heavy rain. During the second incident, this time off the Bijousa Islands, the chase had to be abandoned due to the incoming fog.
On the 5th of May, after having begun the return trip to base, the Calvi intercepted a ship of large displacement with three funnels and escorted by light units. Due to the high speed of the target, the Calvi failed to reach a good launching position and therefore ceased the attack. Eventually, the boat reached Bordeaux on May 13th. During the R.R. period, C.C. Caridi left the command of the boat to C.C. Emilio Olivieri to be promoted to C.F. and assume the role of Chief of Staff from October 1st, 1941 until the end of the conflict (September 8th, 1943).
The Calvi left base again on August 1st, 1941 for an ambush mission off the Canaries and Azores Islands. This mission did not produce any result, and on the 10th that submarine was again back to base. During this mission, the boat was initially used west of the Canary islands, and after the 21st it was moved off Gibraltar where it operated in concert with other German and Italian submarines.
The Calvi during the transfer of the crew of Atlantis from U-68 (Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)
On December 7th, the Calvi was again in action, this time to participate, between the 7th and the 29th, in the rescue of the crewmembers of the German raider “Atlantis”. Due to special circumstances, the Italian boat brought the rescued sailors back to Saint-Nazaire instead of Le Verdon. The Torelli, Finzi, Tazzoli and Calvi transferred from the U-Boot 254 sailors utilizing rubber dinghy with which the German boats were equipped.
1943
In early March 1942, the Calvi was once again ready for action, but Betasom did not have enough boats to send along the American coast. Of the 11 submarines assigned to this sector, one was in Germany (Giuliani), five were at sea (Group Da Vinci) and the remaining were not in condition to take to the sea. Since the Germans were only interested in conducting group actions, the departure of the Calvi was assured after strong pressure from Betasom. The boat left Le Verdon on March 7th with destination Cape Orange, off the Brazilian coast. On the 28th, the Calvi discovered a convoy at about 700 miles from the Brazilian Coast, but one of the aircraft from the aircraft carrier in the convoy sighted the submarines, forcing its immediate submersion. On the 29th, the Calvi intercepted a steamship of the type “Huntington”, which was attacked with torpedoes e then seen to sink bow first. This sinking is not confirmed; the Huntington (ex Munsterland 20) had already been sunk by the U-96 on February 2nd. The other ships belonging to the same shipping company and similar to the Huntington (Schffbau & Maschinefabrik Bremen Vulkan di Vegesack, Germany) were lost in 1940 and the last one, the Hertford, in 1942.
On March 25th (according to some sources the 29th), the Calvi intercepted and sank the British cargo ship TREDINNICK of 4,589 T.S.L. This ship was built in 1921 by the shipyard “J Readhead & Son Ltd” of South Shields and belonged to the “J Readhead & Son Ltd” with offices in London and Cardiff. The sinking took place in position 27°15’N 49°15’W and none of the 46 crewmembers were rescued. On the 31st of March, the boat intercepted the American tanker T.C. MCCOBB which was sunk in the early hours of April 1st with 5 torpedoes and numerous 120 mm shells. This was the first American ship sunk by an Italian submarine.
T.C. MCCOBB which was sunk in the early hours of April 1st with 5 torpedoes and numerous 120 mm shells
This 7,452 T. tanker was built in 1936 by the Federal Shipbuilding, in New Jersey and belonged to the gigantic Standard Oil Company of New York. Of the crewmembers, 24 lost their lives, while the remaining 15 were later rescued. The position of the sinking was given at 7°10’N, 45°20’W. The crewmembers reported that the attack began at 16:25 when the Calvi, at a certain distance, opened fire with the deck gun. The tanker stopped zigzagging and proceeded in a straight course until dusk. The top speed of the McCobb was only 12.7 knots, and at 17 knots (probably quite less) the boat was able to catch up and open fire, once again hitting the target with most of the shells. After 20 minutes, the captain of the ship, Robert W. Overbeck, ordered the engines stopped and the “abandon ship”. Three life boats were lowered into the sea and seen to move away from the hull; the survivors were later rescued while en route to the Brazilian coast.
The Calvi’s journal recorded: March 31st, 1942
15:00 – Latitude 06°29’N, longitude 44°58’W I sight a tanker sailing in due course 340 on 120 polar.
15:12 – I start the other engine (diesel), and maneuver to acquire on the Beta. The tanker proceeds at a zigzag changing course from 270 to 20. Speed 12 knots. I do not believe that we were sighted. To gain over the tanker I increase speed up to 300 r.p.m. on the right axel and 280-290 on the left one. I cannot push too much because I have a fracture on cylinder N. 3 of the starboard engine. At high speed, we leave behind a noticeable oil streak.
15:14 – Dive. I assume course 140 opposite to the direction of the target. I must conduct the attack with the sight scope because the attack one is out of service. Due to the conditions at sea (force 5), it is very difficult to keep the submarine leveled.
18:45 I sight on alpha 10, beta 20, to the left of the enemy. I approach to a distance of 3,000 meters to the left to then go on the attack and I come out of the water with the conning tower and the bow. I quick dive down to 20 meters, giving up the attack while submerged. The hydrophones pick up something on the right.
20:52 – The hydrophones are losing signal to the stern.
21:05 Surface – I order the deck guns manned. I start firing on the tanker which is running away at full speed in direction 290. Sea conditions do not allow me to continue firing with the aft gun. Due to the high pitch, the fire with the forward gun is not very accurate.
21:16 – I cease fire and continue the chase, bringing the engines to the maximum r.p.m.. We gain little.
22:52 at a distance of 6,800 meters I open fire with the forward gun on the tanker. I cannot wait any longer because it is past sunset and the beginning of the twilight. The tanker has sent the S.O.S.. From the radio it appears that I have attacked the American T.C. McCobb of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, New York. The calling name is WOGU.
23:15 – I slow down the rate of fire because the tanker, hit by 10 shells and with the engine stopped, proceeds at a very slow speed on course 350 and lowers 4 life boats. A few people have taken seats aboard the boats.
23:33 – I launch a torpedo from the forward tubes and after a “cold run” it hits the tanker under the bridge.
23:47 I launch a torpedo from the aft tubes and hit the tanker under the funnel. The ship does not sink.
23:59 I launch a torpedo from the aft tubes and hit the tanker between the deck and the funnel. The ship does not sink. The sea is in good conditions with wind from NE. 1st April,1942
00:07 I launch I torpedo from the forward tubes, hitting the tanker between the deck and the funnel. The ship, despite the side completely ripped open and the stern lower on the water does not sink.
00:16 – I launch from the aft tubes a torpedo, which hits the ships between the bridge and the funnel. The ship does not sink.
00:28 I launch a torpedo from the forward tubes, but it does not explode.
01:00 I move away in direction 120 while the tanker goes down by the stern.
01:15 The tanker is seen sinking with the bow point upward.
( 07°19’N, 45°44’W)
On the 5th, the boat reaches the Brazilian coast and, in the following days, it makes contact with two ships, but loses them in foul weather.
After the failed chases of the previous days, on the 9th the Calvi catches up with the American tanker EUGENE V.R. THAYER of 7,138 t. sailing by itself. The tanker was sunk with the torpedo and over 120 120 mm shells. This tanker belonged to Sinclair Navigation of New York and was built in 1920 by the Bethlehem Shipbuilding .The position of the attack was given at 02° 35’S, 39° 58’W, off the Gulf of Patos, but the ship sank in position 02°36’S, 39°43’W; there is no information regarding the fate of the crewmembers, but the U.S. Merchant Marine cites 11 casualties.
Later on, the Calvi intercepted and sank the Norwegian ship BALKIS of 2,161 t., followed soon after by the Panamanian tanker BEN BRUSH of 7,691 t. The Balkis was built by the shipyard Akers Mekaniske of Oslo and belonged to the shipping company Den Norske Middelhavslinje. The motor tanker Ben Brush, previously known as the Caroline Mærsk (Danish) was built in 1928 by the shipyard Odense Staalskibsærft of Odense, Denmark and was in the service of the USMC (U.S. Maritime Commission). The sinking is in position 04°32’S, 35°03’W; one member of the crew was lost and the remaining 34 were rescued.
Having exhausted all torpedoes, the boat began the return voyage from Cape San Rocco, reaching Le Verdon on April 29th. Considering the brevity of the mission, the results obtained were excellent and would have been better if the boat had had a larger number of torpedoes. This mission had some peculiar aspects: the total tonnage sunk was undoubtedly remarkable, and furthermore it validated Betasom’s decision, despite the opposition of the Germans, to send a submarine by itself. Moreover, this mission had a particular importance because by operating in various areas, the Axis submarines were able to disperse the concentration of the Allied antisubmarine operations. With the return of the Calvi ended the first phase of the Italian presence in American waters and the results were encouraging, but as we shall see, misled Betasom’s future expectations.
After the return to the base, the Calvi entered the shipyard for the usual maintenance work. During this period, commander Olivieri left the submarine and was replaced by C.F. Primo Longobardo; he would be the highest-ranking Italian officer lost aboard a submarine. At the end of the conflict, C.C. Olivieri was the Italian officer with the 5th best record. C.F. Longobardi had already distinguished himself aboard the Torelli, and he had already experienced four sinkings for a total of 17,489 t.
C.F. Primo Longobardo, ‘Medaglia d’Oro al Valor Militare’ – Gold Medal for Bravery (Photo U.S.M.M.)
Despite his advanced age (for a submariner), C.F. Longobardi was able to secure this command, leaving Bordeaux on July 2nd, 1942 for a mission off the Antilles. On July 13th, the Calvi received orders to seek a ship proceeding by itself and of the type “Andalusia Start”; the ship was not found. The day after, the boat received orders to attack, if conditions were favorable, convoy S.4. 115 from Freetown to Great Britain escorted by H.M.S. Londonderry, H.M.S. Lulworth, H.M.S. Bideford and H.M.S. Hastings. This convoy had been sighted by U.130 which, later on, had made visual contact with the Calvi.
At 22:30 the Calvi sighted one of the escort vessels, probably the Lulworth, and Captain Longobardo ordered a crash dive. Immediately after, in position 30° 07’N, 26° 07W the Calvi was targeted with the launch of depth charges which did not cause serious damage. After a pinpointing maneuver, the Lulworth dropped a cluster of bombs, this time hitting the submarine. It should be noted that according to American war documents, depth charges were only effective if they exploded at least 5 meters from the hull. The boat began taking water in the forward compartment and the captain was forced to accept the inevitable duel with the surface units. Once surfaced, the Calvi received concentrated fire which it tried to avoid by running away at full speed. The Lulworth continued keeping the Calvi under fire, mowing down all the personnel on deck.
H.M.S. Lulworth (Photo Imperial War Museum)
The last desperate act of the boat, a couple of torpedoes, was easily avoided while the British machine guns kept hitting the deck. Captain Longobardo, realizing the unevenness of the fight, ordered the crew to abandon ship and scuttle the vessel. Meantime, various officers and sailors, including Captain Longobardo, were killed by the enemy bullets and at the end the burden of sinking the boat rested with Captain E. Aristede Russo.
Meantime, a boat from the Lulworth had approached the boat and a member of the British crew, T.V. North, came aboard and would be lost with the submarine. The U.130 arrived on the scene launching a torpedo at the Lulworth, but failing its target. Meantime, the Calvi went down and was followed, soon after, by a violent explosion. It is not believed that the German torpedoes caused this explosion; perhaps it was one of the depth charges, which had been trapped on some part of the superstructure. Eventually, after about 4 hours, the British came back to the site of the sinking and picked up three officers and 32 sailors.
The Lulworth was one of the units of the U.S. Coast Guard transferred by the United States to Great Britain. The crew included personnel from the battleship Resolution that was under repair in Philadelphia. The unit was classified as a “sloop” similar to the Italian Eritrea; 1,700 t., 16 knots, 5.5” guns. Originally, the Lulworth was the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Chelan (CGC-45).
At the beginning of the hostilities (June 10th, 1940), the submarine Michele Bianchi was assigned to the naval base of La Spezia where it completed a period of training, which protracted until August 15th, date of the first war mission. Two days after its departure, after having reached the Strait of Gibraltar, the boat remained on patrol until September 3rd. On the 25th, it sank a small vessel whose name and characteristics are unknown. After returning to base, the boat was transferred to the shipyard for special refitting work in preparation for an assignment to the newly established submarine base of Bordeaux, in France.
The Bianchi, at the command of C.C. Adalberto Giovannini, left La Spezia on October 27th directed to Bordeaux. The boat was part of a transfer group that included the Morosini, Brin and the Marcello, while the Mocenigo and Velella had to be delayed. Reached Punta Almina (Punta Europa) at 01:05 of the 3rd of November, Giovannini began the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar submerged. Between 2:20 and 4:27, the boat was detected by British units and hunted with towed torpedoes and depth charges (1). At 8:00, the boat began experiencing serious control issues due to the strong currents that dragged it down to a depth of 118 meters. This phenomenon took place aboard several Italian vessels and was probably caused by the strong opposing currents coming into the Mediterranean and going into the Atlantic (in general, due to high evaporation, currents tend to enter the Mediterranean, but others do exit it).
The Bianchi arriving in Bordeaux (Photo U.S.M.M.)
With the depth of the water becoming shallower, the hydrophones began to pick up sound from surface units, and the captain thought best to rest the boat on the bottom of the ocean and wait. The wait lasted from 11:50 until 13:00, but then it had to be abandoned because the strong current was dragging the hull against the rocky bottom, possibly causing damages. At 15:45, a new loss of depth plunged the vessel to 142 meters, well over the maximum allowed depth. The situation was worrisome; the air reserve was getting low and batteries were running dry. It was time to get back to the top. Surface was reached at 15:55 at about 6 miles from Tangier. After only five minutes, a flying boat of the 202nd Squadron from Gibraltar identified the Bianchi, but it did not attack it. After 90 minutes, with the air supply partially replenished, the boat sought again refuge into the abyss at about two miles from Cape Spartel (Marocco). What follows is copy of the report compiled by Commander Giovannini:
November 3rd, 1940 Controlling depth is very difficult. At 18:20 I stop the engines and begin to rest on the bottom by taking an easterly course, parallel to the coastline. Suddenly, the bottom jumps from 70 to 40 meters and at 38 meters a drag with the external appendices (barchette) on the sandy bottom. The boat is pushed up and quickly gains depth, as if we were following a rapidly raising bottom. I attempt to anchor the boat by flooding the quick dive tank; at 18:24, when I am at 10 meters, I stop due to a strong collision aft. I’m pushed up even further, and the periscope sleeves end up out of the water. From the periscope I see the bow out of the water and stuck through reefs and rocks of the steep coastline. Since I consider having run aground dangerous, I order the boat up by blowing the tanks using high-pressure air. I’m precisely at Punta de los Pichones. Off shore, I see three enemy destroyers align to the coast, spaced about 3000 to 4000 meters from each other, and moving slowly. Two aircraft provide support. I raise the flag and arm the deck gun and the machine guns. I have not been sighted and I free myself from the reefs maneuvering with the electric motors. Soon after, an airplane sees me and signals with green flares. The destroyer in the middle, at about 6000 meters, turn rapidly to port increasing speed and pointing toward me. A forth destroyer appears at the opening of the strait and moving fast. I cannot submerge and cannot use the forward torpedo tubes. I must accept combat in such conditions of inferiority, which would surely guarantee the loss of the vessel before I could inflict any damage to the enemy. Therefore, I give order not to open fire, unless attacked, and I move to enter the neutral port of Tangier. I also give orders to destroy all secret publications, and the secret operational orders I have aboard. The destroyer H.05 approaches us at high speed, attempting to gain over us. It does not open fire and does not aim its guns at us. When, at the entrance of the port I slow down, the destroyers gets to about 600 meters, turns to port, and returns outside the territorial waters. The four units remain on watch until night. I enter port at 19:00 and, following instruction from a Spanish motorboat, which had come from a dock, and moor to the Eastern buoy.
After having repaired some damage, the Bianchi departed on the 12th, and the day after, along with the Brin, eluded the careful British watch to then reach the Atlantic. This delay, along with the damage suffered, recommended the abandonment of the patrol outside of the Strait of Gibraltar, and the boat sailed directly to Bordeaux. On the 18th of December at 5:40, the Bianchi witnessed the exchange of fire between the Brin and the British submarine Tuna. Eventually, the boat reached the estuary of the River Gironde from which it then continued on, reaching the base of Bordeaux the same afternoon.
The Bianchi in Bordeaux. The smaller submarine on the right is the Perla (Photo U.S.M.M.)
1941
After a pause of about a month in Bordeaux, the Bianchi was assigned, along with the Otaria, Marcello and Barbarigo, to a mission off the coast of Ireland to be conducted in concert with the German allied and under the directives of B.d.U. The boat was part of a deployment group which included U-boats and aerial reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe.
On the 14 of February, soon after his arrival in the area of operations, Commander Giovannini sighted in the darkness of the night the British ship BELCREST of 4,517 t. which was sunk with two torpedoes. This steamship, built in 1925 by the shipyard “ Northcumberland Shipping Co.” of Howden-on-Tyne was previously known as the Treherbert (1939) and Gardèpèe and belonged to “Crest Shipping” of London. The location of the sinking was given at 54° N, 21° W and all 36 crewmembers lost their lives. This was one of the dispersed units of convoy SC.21 from Halifax to Great Britain. During this period, on February 19th, the Luftwaffe signaled the presence of a convoy of about 30 ships, probably OB.288. During the events that followed, Italian and German submarines alike attacked the convoy, thus creating great confusion in regards to credits for the sinking. Confirmation of the fact that this area was full of submarines is given by the sighting of a periscope made on the 22nd of February by the Bianchi (57° 55’N, 17° 40’W). It is assumed that this could have been the periscope of the Marcello which, faced with intense antisubmarine activity, was lost in circumstances to this day unclear.
The Bianchi loading torpedoes in Bordeaux (Photo U.S.M.M.)
Continuing to follow orders issued by B.d.U., the Bianchi moved to an area westerly of the one originally assigned, making contact with enemy units on both the night of the 23rd and 24th of February. The first attack was carried out against the British cargo Manistree of 5,360 t., later sunk by U.107. The night of the 24th, the Bianchi conducted another attack against a cargo ship whose identity has long been matter of debate. Commander Giovannini wrote about the action:
February 24th, 1941 11:54 Signal informing us of a convoy. Since it is to our stern, we turn around. 16:45 I begin the approach. New signal giving a new position for the convoy. I move full force to close contact. 17:45 Sighting of a ship at the horizon. We maneuver to keep ourselves out of sight waiting for a favorable position from which to attack. We identify zigzagging [of the convoy]. 17:50 Sighting of a German 750 t. submarine [Type VII] at about 1,500 meters. 21:22 We slow down to decrease distance. Second sighting of the allied submarine which is evidently maneuvering to attack the same target. 22:20 Sighting of the target a distance of 3000 to 4000 meters. I attack from the bow. 22:34 Sighting of the allied submarine which is attacking from the bow the same target. 22:38 The allied submarine rapidly change course to starboard to attack from the stern. I turn around to port not to impede his maneuver. I attack from the stern. 22:45 The allied submarine has launched and hit the target which is not sinking, but begins to list and moves very slowly with the rudder fixed. [alla banda] 22:45 We maker full turn to starboard. A get closer to attack from the bow, at the minimum [distance]. From 600 meters, I launched a 533 mm torpedo which hits the stern. The ship lists even more while the crew gets into the lifeboats. 23:05 I leave the area to free up the allied submarine. We resume looking for other units of the convoy.
Originally, the ship described in this action was identified as the Waymegate of 4,260 t. This cargo ship was given by the Lloyds of London lost in position 58° 50’N, 21° 47’W with the complete rescue of all 44 crewmembers. This sinking is credited to U.73 of Commander Rosenbaum. The “Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Marinearchiv” of Stuttgart, Germany confirms this information. In an historical revision completed by Mattesini, the boat in question was later identified as the Linaria, but this was sunk by U.96 of Commander Lehmann-Willenbrock in position 61°N, 25°W at 1:16 AM (GST).
The attack of the Bianchi was conducted at 23:05 of February 23rd (Rome time). According to the above-mentioned “Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Marinearchiv” (the author in question is the famous “Jürgen Rohwer”), the ship sunk by the Bianchi with the aid of U.96 was the HUNTINGDON, of 10,946 t. This assumption cannot be fully confirmed, but it is quite credible, especially because it was made by one of the most respected German naval historian.
L’Huntingdon was a steamship of German construction (1920) previously known as the Munsterland and belonged to the “Federal Steam Navigtion Co.” of London. The ship is given lost in position 58° 25’N, 20° 23’W and all 66 crewmembers were rescued.
The good hunt of the Bianchi was not over. During the twilight of the 27th, Giovannini intercepted three ships belonging to the same convoy. The first ship, probably the Empire Ability, avoided the torpedoes, while the second one, the BALTISTRAN, was hit right on. The Baltistran was a British steamship of 6,803 t. built in 1937 by “insert” of South Shields and belonged to the “Strick Line”. The sinking was given in position 51° 52’N, 19° 55’W and 51 crewmembers were lost, while the remaining 18 were rescued.
Immediately after the attack, the Bianchi avoided an auxiliary cruiser seeking shelter into the abyss. Completed the patrol, the Bianchi began the return voyage reaching Bordeaux on March 4th, 1941. During the usual period of refitting, C.C. Giovannini disembarked leaving the command to C.C. Franco Tosoni Pittoni. The next mission was not very successful. As part of the Marconi group and with four other boats, the Bianchi left the Aquitane capital on April 30th, 1941 to move again off the British Islands. On the 12th, the Bianchi intercepted in a small convoy position 56° 40’N, 24° 40’W escorted by various light units. This fast convoy, estimated at 14 knots, did not allow the Italian boat to keep up with it, thus Commander Tosoni Pittoni limited his actions to sending a discovery signal. Again, the Bianchi found a convoy on the 15th of May, but this time it had to give up due to the intense fight put up by the escort units. What follows is part of the war diary and it documents the intensity of the activity of the escort units:
May 15th, 1941 9:15 I sight smoke in the direction from which I expect the convoy to appear. I move up and a few minutes later I quickly sight ten more, then fifteen, and twenty. 9:21 I send without hesitation the first discovery signal without specifying anything about the convoy because I believe the communication to be urgent, important for the moment and accurate enough even though missing course and speed. I get closed to identify the formation, but before I could identify its course, the rear escort unit approaches me. I cannot run away on the surface because I quickly see the top of the mast and the funnel; at 10:00 I get away by diving and without getting spotted. I take the best course to get close to the convoy. Brief and sporadic use of the periscope, and rapid dives to avoid being sighted by aerial reconnaissance; I prepare a more thorough discovery signal and go up to periscope depth at 10:30, 11:00 and 11:50 to verify if it possible to submerge to send the signal (radio communication). At each visual verification I note that the convoy makes turns to port 240, 270 and 300. Since I reached submerged up to a distance of about 10 to 12 meters where I could see the bridges of the ships, I verified the presence of about 30 ships into two lines or maybe three, with a large escort ahead, to the sides and to the rear. 12:10 Due to the starboard turns of the convoy, the line of ships appears very slowly and since of the long wave radio I only heard a repetition of by earlier message, I found necessary to give further information. I dive to a depth of 60 meters, and move away from the enemy by turning to port,; engine half speed, course due north. During this phase, the hydrophones do not pick up any sound, not even when I could make visual contacts with the periscope. 13:00 The convoy is passed us enough; I wait a few more minutes so that the rear escort units can get further away and at 13:05 I emerge. I send the discovery message with the average courses observed and I return to make contact on the left of the convoy to keep myself away from the rear escort units. 14:25 Due to a round made by the external screen I dive gain to avoid being sighted. 15:25 The convoy, after it had returned on due course 270, continue turning to port on a 240 course and may be for an even more southerly course moving away from me. The head of the convoy as almost reached the 19th parallel and I think that course is 300 was taken, as a fake, before turning south. I decide to reach the surface to conduct a better observation. 15:35 I emerge. While I attempt to signal again and while I am exhausting the central ballast tank I sight, on my left and very close an camouflaged airplane coming out of the sun beam. 15:45 I order a crash dive, even though I am not safe from an eventual aerial attack, because I am forced to do so due to the presence of nearby surface escort units. 16:20 35 minutes after diving I hear the first explosion of depth charges which shake the hull. I stop all notice making equipment. The hydrophones do not pick up any sound by I cannot trust them since all morning they have not been able to detect any sound, not even the nearby convoy. 16:47 The dropping begins following intervals ever closer until I hear from the hull noise of the bubbling of gases following the explosions. 17:57 A lone explosion make me believe that the enemy unit is moving away after having dropped 29 depth charges. I restart the Calzoni (pump) to reach periscope depth but at 18:36 I give up and return down due to the explosion of other charges. I am much impeded by the fact the I cannot trust the hydrophones. The explosions continue weaker and then stronger, with bubbling noises and vibrations to the hull. They start again, but weaker, around 23:10. We detected a total of 80 explosions. During the long waits I attempted to come up to periscope depth I I always had to give due to the explosions. 23:30 I restart all services and the Calzoni pump and begin the ascent. I listen to the radio on the midnight long wave channel, then I emerge and move to a new point assigned to me by Betasom (50 05’N, 21 25’W); the leftmost point of a group pf 5 submarines moving in parallel.
On the 19th, the Bianchi intercepts a discovery signal from the Otaria, but it is too far to intervene. A few days later, on May 2nd, having reached the end of the fuel reserve it began the return voyage to base arriving between the 25th and the 30th of May.
After the mediocre, if not limited success in the northern Atlantic (excluding the Bianchi) Betasom’s shark of steel were assigned to the more temperate waters of the central Atlantic and the coast of Africa.
After a routine maintenance period, the Bianchi took again to the sea on July 4th, 1941 assigned to an area west of the Strait of Gibraltar as part of a group of nine boats. After a single day at sea, a British submarine sank the Bianchi. For many years, the fate of this vessel was unsure; the first British reports credited the sinking to the submarine Severn, but later the sinking was credited to the Tigris. It should also be noted that the original date of the sinking communicated by the Royal Navy (July 8th) was later corrected to more probable one of July 5th. The entire crew was lost.
(1) The leader, according o the British version of the facts was the destroyer Grayhound. These units called by the airplane reached the area when the Brin had already dived. The British naval command received news of the arrival in Tangiers of the Italian submarine from the local consulate.
The submarine Barbarigo, in the period between the outbreak of hostilities and its loss in June 1943 for unknown reasons, completed 14 missions under the command of five different captains, sinking 7 merchant ships for a total of 39,299 t. This was the 5th best result achieved by an Italian submarine in WW II, but the fame of this boat, both in Italy and overseas, is undoubtedly more associated with the tumultuous and controversial vicissitudes of commander Grossi, a complex character representing the apogee of one of the least explored aspects of the Italian Royal Navy: Fascist propaganda.
R.Smg Barbarigo (Foto U.S.M.M.)
The Barbarigo was one of the 11 boats of the “Marcello” class, one of the best produced by the Italian shipyards. Despite the fact that the boat had entered service only in 1938, by 1943 it was already worn out, proof of the intense efforts the Italian oceangoing boats had to endure, and to which corresponded the extreme sacrifices of the crews.
At the beginning of the hostilities (June 10th, 1940 for Italy), the Barbarigo was part of the 22nd formation of the 2nd group based in Naples, and in preparation for the conflict it was on patrol off Cape Bengut, later returning to base on June 13th. In July, between the 1st and the 7th, the boat conducted a patrol between Cape de Gata and Cape Falcon. During this mission, between the 3rd and the 4th, the commanding officer C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri had to avoid intense anti-submarine activity, which produced some damage forcing an early return to base.
Later, the Barbarigo was selected as one of the boats to be reassigned to the newly established Atlantic base in Bordeaux, codenamed Betasom. Taking advantage of the new moon, Maricosom (Italian Submarine Command) ordered the boats Malaspina, Tazzoli, Cappellini and Glauco across the Strait of Gibraltar around the 2nd of August. About 10 days before departure day, due to breakdowns on some of the boats, the Barbarigo and the Dandolo were sent as replacements. After having left base on the 13th of August, the Barbarigo began crossing the strait around the 14th. Following instructions received before his departure, Captain Ghiglieri navigated submerged up to Tarife, noticing a strong current of which he had not been informed, thus causing a considerable delay. Once it reached the area of operations west of the strait, on the 18th the submarine attacked with the deck gun the British merchantman “Aquila”, which despite the damage was able to run away. The Aquila, an older passenger and general ship (1917) would eventually fall victim to U 201 in summer 1941. A few days later, the captain conducted another attack, this time with the torpedo, but the target, an armed ship, was able to detect the boat; the Barbarigo was subsequently attacked with 20 depth charges which exploded far off the –90 meter depth the boat had meantime reached. At this point, with Bordeaux ready to welcome the new boats, the Barbarigo was ordered to reach Betasom instead of returning to Naples, reaching the French port on September 8th, 1940. Two days after its arrival, the boat entered the shipyard for alterations similarly completed on the Malaspina and the Dandolo. Although the base was not fully equipped, the submarines were refurbished, tested, and readied for action in less than 30 days. Eventually, this shipyard, in addition to regular maintenance work, completed various modifications, especially after the Germans and war experiences suggested some improvements.
The conning tower with the slogan ‘Who fears death does not deserve to live’ (Foto Bundesarchiv)
The Barbarigo, still under the command of C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri, left port on October 14th for a mission in the northwestern Atlantic. On the 17th, a large airplane, surely a British Sunderland, which dropping a few bombs and missing the target by some distance, attacked the boat. On the 23rd, the boat reached the area of operations west of Ireland, and a week later completed the first sighting, but could not reach the target due to the foul weather conditions, which limited surface speed to only 12 knots. Later, the boat was assigned to a new area further north from which it began the return voyage on the 9th of November. On the 10th, it received a signal from the Otaria informing it of the presence of an aircraft carrier and escort. At 6:18 AM on the 11th, in position 53° 37’ N 17° 40’ W, with strong wind and poor visibility, the Barbarigo launched a torpedo against a smaller naval unit, probably a destroyer. After 58 seconds, the crew heard an explosion but could not verify the result of the attack; there is no documentation of such attack in the British records. After 33 days at sea in terrible weather conditions, the submarine returned to Bordeaux on November 13th.
1941
On February 10th, 1941 the Barbarigo left base for a new mission west of Ireland in coordination with the Bianchi, Otaria and Marcello. The boat arrived in the area on the 16th, but after a few days without sightings, was reassigned to a more northerly sector. The boat was part of a force which included German U-boots and aerial reconnaissance by the Lufwaffe. It was indeed the German Air Force which, on February 19th, signaled the presence of a convoy of over 30 ships, probably OB.288. During the various phases that followed, both German and Italian units attacked the convoy, but the Barbarigo was not able to make contact. The boat remained in the area until March 1st, but most of the time it had put the bow to the wind due to the horrendous weather conditions, which included snow and hail. On March 8th, the boat concluded the operation reaching port; during this mission the Marcello had been lost.
After the necessary maintenance work, the Barbarigo was again in action starting from April 30th and still under the command of C.C. Giulio Ghiglieri. On May 10th, the boat sighted a convoy which was kept under constant watch, until the reaction of the escort forced the captain to submerge, thus losing contact, and without being able to reestablish it. On the 15th, the Barbarigo made contact with the British merchantman “Manchester Port” of 5,469 t. which, the day before, had eluded an attack by the Morosini. Despite having hit the ship with a torpedo, the Barbarigo was not able to complete the sinking due to a breakdown to one of the two main diesel engines. The ship, able to keep good speed, once again ran away, eluding sure sinking. On the 20th, the submarine sighted another ship, but yet again the weather conditions did not allow for an attack. The same situation repeated itself on the 22nd and the 24th when, Captain Ghiglieri was again forced to put the bow to the wind.
On the 25th, Betasom informed the Barbarigo of the position of the German battleship Bismark (47° 30’ N 16° 30’ W), immobilized and under attack by enemy ships. Barbarigo, the only boat in the area, moved at full force intercepting two cruisers which, due to the weather conditions, could not be attacked. On the 27th, having received news of the sinking of the Bismark, and having burned most of the fuel reserve, the boat could not participate in the rescue operations and had to return to base. The boat reached Bordeaux on May 30th, and almost immediately entered the shipyard. During this pause, C.C. Ghiglieri was transferred to the submarine Bandiera, and C.C. Francesco Murzi took over command. With the return of the Barbarigo, the Italian submarine activity in the northern Atlantic had ended; all future operations would take place in areas with climates more suited for the Italian boats and crews.
After the mediocre if not limited results in the northern Atlantic, the new areas of operations for the “shark of steel” of Betasom were the more temperate waters of the central Atlantic and the coast of Africa. For the upcoming mission, the Barbarigo was assigned to an area west of the Strait of Gibraltar as part of a force, which included 9 submarines. After having left Bordeaux on the 13th of July, the boat intercepted a convoy the evening of the 22nd in position 34° 55’ N 18° 35’ W, but soon after lost contact in a rainstorm. A few days later, on the 25th, the Barbarigo sank the British merchant ship Macon of 5,135 t. utilizing both torpedoes and the deck gun The Macon, formerly Point Ancha (1940) and Delight (1931), originally belonged to the American shipping company Gulf Pacific Mail Line, and was built in 1919 by Tood Drydock & Construction, of Tacoma, Washington. It is assumed that it had just been sold to Great Britain. The original displacement was given at 4,727 t., but the Italian documentations list 5,135 t. The ship was attacked on the 24th and sank on the 25th in position 32° 48’ N 26° 12’ W; there were 29 casualties and 21 survivors.
The night of the 26th was the time of the 8,272 t. British motor tanker Horn Shell, which was sunk with torpedoes. The Horn Shell belonged to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co, also known as Shell Oil, and was built in 1931 by Deutsche Werft of Hamburg, Germany. The position of the sinking was 33° 23’ N 22° 18’ W; 17 crewmembers perished and 40 were rescued.
After the fruitful mission, the boat returned to base where once again there was a change of command; C.C. Murzi left the boat and was replaced by C.C. Enzo Grossi. The two officers would have very different futures: Murzi, after the Italian armistice, would command the Naval group of Augusta (Sicily), while Grossi would retain the command of Betasom under the auspices of the Salo’s Republic (Mussolini’s pro-German government in Northern Italy).
Grossi after his promotion. Note the German iron cross
The 7th mission was relatively short; it started on the 22 of October and ended on November 12th; it did not produce anything. On October 24th, the boat after the departure from La Pallice, the boat chased a passenger ship of considerable dimensions but could not reach it. On the 31st, following orders from Betasom, the boat moved to an area south-west of Ireland where it patrolled from the 3rd to the 6th of November. During this period, the wear and tear of the material began to cause more frequent breakdowns. 15% of the missions had to be abandoned due to serious breakdowns, and 85% of the missions experienced breakdowns of one sort or another. Meantime, antisubmarine activity by escort units and armed ships had increased considerably, and the Italian forces suffered the painful losses of the Bianchi, Malaspina, Marconi, Glauco, Baracca, and Ferraris.
1942
The 9th mission, like the previous one, was of little importance. The Barbarigo left Bordeaux on January 14th, 1942 and returned on February 15th.
On the 23rd of January something quite unusual took place; the Barbarigo sank the neutral ship Navemar of 5,473 t. The Navemar, previously Frogner (1927) and Cabo Mayor (1932) was built in 1921 by W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co, of Newcastle upon Tyne and belonged to the Compañia Española de Navegacion Maritima of Barcellona. Supposedly, it had been remodeled in 1939. The position of the sinking was 36° 48’ N 15° 26’ W; two crewmembers perished and 34 survived. The ship was returning from Cuba where it had delivered a large group of Jewish refugees.
On April 25th, 1942 the Barbarigo left La Pallice (Bordeaux) for a mission in the far away waters of Brazil. The operational orders, issued by Betasom in coordination with B.d.U., called for patrol off Cape San Rocco (Brazil) where it was assumed there would be intense traffic and minimal antisubmarine activity. The boat reached the area of operations on May 17th, and the following day it attacked with torpedoes and the deck gun the Brazilian merchant ship Comandante Lyra of 5,052 t. Commander Grossi, sure that the ship was near sinking, left it in position 02° 30’ S 34° 20’ W without realizing that the crew had sent an emergency signal which had been picked up by Task Force 23. This was a group of American military ships which included the cruisers Milwaukee and Omaha and the destroyers Moffet and Mc Dougal. The Lyra, erroneously estimated at 11,000 t. by the Italian submarine commander, did not sink and was later towed to port by a Brazilian tugboat. On the 19th the submarine’s lookouts spotted an aircraft which failed to detect the boat; this was one of the airplanes launched by Task Force 23, more precisely the one from the Omaha. At 00.45 on the 20th (Rome Daylight Saving Time), the Barbarigo, then in position 04° 19’ S 34° 32’ W, 52 miles 239 degrees from the Island of Rocas and proceeding on a northerly course, sighted warships moving south. The boat moved into attack position launching two torpedoes from the aft tubes. This is a copy of part of the official war diary:
Day: May 20th, 1942
02:45
In position 04 19S 34 32W, course 20, I am called on deck by the second officer who at the same time steers to starboard, fires up the left diesel engine, and I order two tubes aft and two forward loaded. Since I was in the control room, I go on deck and I sight a large destroyer passing by the bow at about 600 meters. While I alter course to use the forward tube, the lookout to the left (Sergeant Cammarata) informs me of the outline of a large ship to the left. After a quick glance, I made myself cognizant of the situation; I’m facing an American battleship (easily recognizable by the lattice masts) escorted by a destroyer.
I decide to attack by the stern because, in addition to the already mentioned destroyer, another one is getting closer to the bow of the battleship. I place midshipmen Tendi and Del Santo to keep an eye on the first destroyer, while the second officer keeps an eye on the other one; the lookouts guarantee surveillance on all other quadrants. After the second destroyer turns left, I found myself inside the escort. I stop the right engine, and with the left one I slowly turn right. The second officer demands the launch of the torpedoes because the second destroyer turned once again right and it is at about 1,000 meters at 0 degree inclination. They haven’t sighted us thanks to the sea Force 3 and the low profile of the boat. Near launching position, which cannot fail due to the short distance (about 650 meters), I decide to carry on with the attack even though we could be rammed. The target warrants any kind of risk.
02:50
I order “Fire” torpedo 5 and 6; 5 is regulated for 4 meters and a run of 8,000 meters and it is equipped with a “cappuccio” (small hood, a device intended to guarantee detonation upon impact); 6 is set to 2 meters with a run of 2,000 meters and it is of type A 115 (only 115 Kg of explosive versus 200, both torpedoes of only 450mm). After having expelled the torpedoes, I increase speed and turn in direction 10, the only one where I have a possibility of running away while on the surface. I decide not to submerge because the aft accumulators are completely insufficient and the forward one can only give me 4,000 amps. All firearms are ready for action to the bitter end. After 35 seconds two concurrent explosions confirm to me that I have hit the target with both torpedoes. While of torpedo number 5 we only hear the explosion, of number 6 the second officer, who had moved to cover the rear quadrant, sees the flare underwater. I’m informed by midshipman Tendi that he has the battleship in sight in his binoculars and it is sinking; I also had sure sense of the sinking. I see the destroyers moving fast toward the stricken ship. From about 800 meters I see the bow of the colossus almost completely submerged up to the wheelhouse; she is down by the bow and with a strong list.
02:57
I prepare tubes 7 and 8 to be used against destroyers possibly in our pursuit. The escort, with my astonishment, does not react. Gradually, I increase speed up to 380 revolutions. The battleship, which I easily recognized as of the “Maryland-California” class, was proceeding on a 200° degree course at a speed of 15 knots.
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After the attack, Commander Grossi informed Betasom of the sinking of an American battleship, possibly a Maryland or a California. Betasom immediately requested further details and the Barbarigo assured that the “sunk” ship was a battleship of the California class. The California class was similar to the Maryland, but with smaller guns, 356 mm versus 406 mm. Following the absolute and categorical confirmation by the Barbarigo, Betasom’s commanding officer (Polacchini) informed Maricosom. Assuming a mistake, common at sea where optical illusions, uncertainty, and kinematical elements induce misinterpretation, Maricosom requested additional details. Meantime, Comando Supremo published the news in an official war bulletin; the Americans promptly rebutted it. It is said that Mussolini himself, a journalist by profession, edited the announcement himself.
After the attack, the Barbarigo did not receive the attentions of any of the escort units and only at 18:30 on May 22nd was victim of an aerial attack with the launch of 8 bombs, which, despite having fallen near the boat, did not cause any damage. Assuming that this sector was under strict surveillance, Betasom transferred the Barbarigo to a new area 300 miles NE of Cape S. Rocco.
Once again reassigned, the Barbarigo intercepted the British merchant ship Chalbury of 4,835 t., immediately requesting clearance for the attack since it was in a zone previously interdicted by orders from B.d.U. After receiving proper authorization, Commander Grossi sank this ship in position 6° 35’ N 29° 25’ W during the night of the 28th of May. The Chalbury belonged to Alexander Shipping, and was listed under construction as of 1939, therefore one should assume that it was completed in 1940 or 1941. It was built by Burtisland Shipbuilding, of Burntisland (Scotland). The sinking took place, according to British records, in position 06° 22’ S 29° 44’ W; 2 crewmembers perished and 40 were rescued.
On the 30th, having burned most of the diesel fuel, the Barbarigo began the long return voyage reaching Bordeaux, in triumph, on June 16th. Only after the war, it would be discovered that the mysterious battleship was instead the cruiser Milwaukee, which didn’t even detect the presence of the Italian submarine. Probably, the torpedoes missed the target due to the miscalculated speed (15 knots), which was much less than the actual speed (25 knots). Unfortunately, the first inquiry hurriedly conducted after the war accused Grossi of being a charlatan, and only a later inquiry reconciled the war diaries of the American war units (in local time) with the one of the Barbarigo (in Rome Daylight Saving Time). Certainly, the attack took place, but the subsequent sinking “witnessed” by the crew must have been one of those rare cases of collective illusion.
On August 29th 1942, the Barbarigo left for a new mission still under the command of Grossi, who had been promoted to C.F. and awarded the M.O.V.M., Gold Medal for Bravery; eventually, both would be revoked. At noon on October 1st, the boat was attacked by an airplane which had appeared from behind a cloud, dropping a cluster of bombs at a very low altitude, but failing to hit the target. At 17:30, a second aerial attack, but this time the crew shot down the aircraft, which was seen plunging into the ocean. Despite the danger avoided, during the action the aft gunner Carlo Marcheselli was mortally wounded and dragged overboard, disappearing into the wake. On October 2nd, still on route to Brazil, the Barbarigo was rerouted to Freetown where there were reports of intense traffic. The boat reached the area on October 4th, and on the 6th between 2:20 and 2:43 (Rome Standard Time), in position 02° 05’ N 14° 23’ W and proceeding on the surface, the lookouts sighted at about 4,000 meters an enemy warship. Similar to the controversial action against the Milwaukee, Commander Grossi was not on the bridge. As it had happened before, the Barbarigo informed Betasom of the sinking of an American battleship. The radio message read:
” Times 05.40 of the day 6 – Stq. 23 of the q.d.p. n. 6718 (lat. 02’10/20’N, long. 14°10/20’W) time 02.34 I have sunk an unit type Nb (battleship) Cl. (class) ” Mississippi ” (U.S.A.) course 150° speeds 13knots four forward torpedoes hit 6 meters seen the ship sink avoided reaction I direct zone – 043106″
In reality, the unit under attack was the British corvette Petunia, and since the draught of this unit had been mistakenly computed, the torpedoes probably passed well under the hull of the enemy vessel. On October 8th, the Barbarigo reached a new area, and later was relocated off Capo Verde. On the 17th, it began the return voyage, reaching Bordeaux during the night of the 29th after having sighted enemy airplanes and smaller naval units. The welcoming, of course, was triumphal. At the end of the mission, Commander Grossi left the Barbarigo to assume the command of Betasom, and was replaced by T.V. Alberto Rigoli.
The 12th mission began on January 24th, 1943 with departure from La Pallice. During the refitting in preparation for the new mission, the Barbarigo had been fitted with a German “Matrox” which allowed the boat to elude repeated aerial sightings. On the 24th, while en route to the assigned area off Brazil, the crew sighted a lone merchant ship which was damaged with a torpedo, and while the submarine was surfacing to finish off the job with the deck gun, it was attacked by an American Consolidated (PBY or Catalina) which dropped three bombs, missing the target.
The Spanish merchant ship, Monte Igueldo of 3,453 t. eventually sank. The Monte Igueldo, previously known as the Arinda-Mendi (1939) was built in 1921 by Ropner and Son, of Stockton-on-Tees and it belonged to the Aznat SA, Naviera of Bilbao. The position of the sinking is given in position 04° 46’ S 31° 55’ W; 1 crewmember perished and the remaining 34 were rescued. It is not known if this was a neutral ship, or if it was in service to the Allied.
On March 2nd, the Barbarigo intercepted and sank with torpedoes the Brazilian passenger ship Alfonso Penna of 3,540 t. There is no information regarding this vessel, but Jurgen Rohwer lists it as the “Alonso Pena”. It is credible to assume that this was the Alfonso Penna of the Lloyd Brasileiro.
The following day, March 4th, the victim was the American motor ship Stag Hound of 8,591 t., which, despite its high speed, was reached in the middle of the night and sank with torpedoes. The Stag Hound is a bit of a mystery; the S/S “Stag Hound” built by the Newport shipyard in 1939 had a displacement of 6,085 t. The “Stag Hound” supposedly sunk by the Barbarigo is given at 8,591 t. Also, this ship is described by the Italian documentation as being a motor vessel. Furthermore, the S/S Stag Hound, originally built for the U.S. Maritime Commission, was later renamed Aldebaran (AF 10) and become an auxiliary Navy store ship. It is possible that the ship in question was of new construction and named after the previous vessel. (It appears that the US built three ships named Stag Hound, and some are listed as staghound)
On March 4th, the submarine received orders to leave the area of operations and on March 11th transferred 25 t. of diesel fuel to the submarine Torelli. Despite the partial breakdown of the rudder, the boat happily reached Le Verdon on April 3rd. At the end of the mission, Captain Rigoli disembarked, turning over the command to T.V. Umberto De Julio, who would eventually perish aboard the boat.
In preparation for the 13th mission, the Barbarigo was transformed into a transport submarine for commercial exchange of goods between Germany and the Japanese ally. The changes made to the various submarines varied; in the case of the Barbarigo, the deck guns were removed, the ammunition magazines turned into additional fuel depots, the attack periscope removed, and a great part of the on board comforts, including one of the toilets, removed to give space to cargo.
The Barbarigo was part of a second group of submarines destined to reach Japan, along with the Torelli and the Cagni. The boat left port on June 16th, 1943 with three Italian military personnel aboard assigned to a base in the Fareast, and 130 t. of war materiel. On the return voyage, the cargo would have included 110 t. of rubber and 35 t. of tin, thus forcing the boat to refuel at sea. After departure, and at the end of navigation along the security route off Bordeaux, the Barbarigo and the Torelli parted. The Barbarigo failed to make any further contact and it is assumed that it was lost due to a breakdown, collision with a mine, or perhaps enemy activity, even though this last hypothesis could not be confirmed by Allied records. This was the end of the operational life of one of the most famous, though controversial, submarines of the Italian Atlantic fleet.
