In August 1939, Germany, because of its failure to provide a precautionary warning to its merchant ships steaming in faraway oceans, had lost over half of them, as they were stranded in neutral ports, captured by the enemy or self-destroyed to avoid capture.
In spite of this precedent, in June 1940 the Italian Government avoided giving accurate instructions to its merchant ships, probably harboring the illusion that the conflict would end quickly. Shipping owners and captains, for their part, in their desire to take advantage of extremely favorable market conditions, failed to take any precautions even after March 1940, when everyone was convinced that Italy’s decision to enter the fray was imminent.
This situation led as many as 256 ships to be stranded outside the Straits of Gibraltar or in enemy waters when war broke out.
The overall situation was as follows: 33 ships were in Italian Eastern Africa 11 in Northern and Eastern Europe 22 in Spain and its territories, 3 in Portuguese territories 26 in the USA 10 in Central America 8 in Colombia and Venezuela 19 in Brazil, 2 in Uruguay 15 in Argentina, 3 in Iran 2 in Thailand 5 in China and Japan 34 in British or Allied ports 3 in French ports.
Among the most heavily hit shipping companies were two Finmare firms, i.e. State-owned: 16 ships were lost by the Italia company and as many as 37 by Lloyd Triestino, i.e. almost half the company’s fleet.
Some of these ships had considerable military interest and importance; in particular: – the Conte Grande transatlantic steamer, interned in Santos, Brazil, in June 1940, was later transferred to the USA, where it was transformed into the troop transport “Monticello”; – the Principessa Maria steamer, stranded in Argentina; – many ships of considerable value, such as the Leme, Belvedere, Cellina, and Fella; – the passenger ships Colombo, Nazario Sauro, Tripolitania, Conte Verde, Leonardo da Vinci, Conte Biancamano, Giuseppe Mazzini, Rodi and Gerusalemme; – the motor vessels Remo, Romolo, Volpi, Sumatra, Ramb I, Ramb II and Ramb IV; – many tankers, left stranded in Venezuelan and Mexican harbors. To stress the importance of these units, suffice it to recall that the Volpi and Sumatra, stranded in Puket Harbor (Thailand), were destined to become, in case of requisition, auxiliary cruisers.
The transatlantic Conte Grande
Of course, in addition to the ships, thousands of officers and men were also left stranded: those captured in warring nations were immediately interned, while others were free until the nations they were in joined the war; they were then interned – this was the case in the United States.
The ships stranded in the USA had initially been taken into the custody of the Coast Guard, based on the Espionage Act of 1917. On 28 August 1941 they were requisitioned by an appropriate act of 6 June 1941, and refitted in December 1941.
The crews that came off the various requisitioned vessels were temporarily detained in the immigration stations of New York, Philadelphia, Portland, or, where these stations were not available, in the local jails. Subsequently, most of them were interned in the camps of Fort Missoula (Montana) or Petersburg (Virginia).
Personnel found – by US authorities – guilty of violating the law by sabotaging the power plant or navigation instruments were tried by a Federal Court, which found everyone guilty and issued sentences varying between one and three years, to be spent in a reformatory. About 300 seamen were convicted, but the constant involvement of the papal delegation in Washington, in the person of Monsignor Edigio Vagnozzi, got the authorities to relent and allow the convicted Italians to join the Missoula camp, between July 1942 and January 1943.
The crews of some merchant ships did not resign themselves to be passively subjected to internment or capture and, loaded with useful goods for the Country’s war needs, they forced the naval blockade and were able to reach German-occupied French ports on the Atlantic.
There were quite a few of these units: the motor vessel Pietro Orseolo of SIDARMA and the motor vessels Cortellazzo, Himalaya and Fusijama of Lloyd Triestino were the most famous ones, reaching Bordeaux from Japan or sailing through British patrols as many as three times, as the Pietro Orseolo did.
Other units that successfully made their escape were the steam ships Clizia and Capo Lena from Spanish ports on the Atlantic, the steam ships Capo Alga, Burano, Todaro, Atlanta, Eugenio C. and Ida from the Canary Islands, the steam ships Prisco, Mombaldo, XXIV Maggio, Butterfly and Africana from Brazil.
Tanker Franco Martelli was torpedoed and sunk by the British submarine H.M.S. Urge
Other ships were not as lucky in their attempt and were sunk: this was the fate of the steam ships Sangro and Emani, of the tanker Franco Martelli, while the steam ship Stella was captured. All these ships ended up being lost during the conflict, either sunk in other attempts to force the blockade, or captured by the Germans after the armistice.
The causes for the losses of merchant ships during the conflict were multifold. The main ones were unquestionably submarine and aircraft attacks. The latter were deadly, both during convoy sailing and when the ships were in port. At sea, the attacks, brought for the most part by Beaufort or Wellington torpedo bombers, took place at dusk or during the evening, under the light provided by flares and when the British flyers were sure they would not meet any opposition from any escorting planes provided by the Regia Aeronautica or Luftwaffe.
Equal ruinous were the attacks brought by Anglo-American bombers on the harbors of Italian cities, especially Naples, Palermo, Cagliari, and Messina, which from 1940 to 1943 were subjected to constant day and night air raids. Aerial bombings on Northern Italian ports, above all Genova, La Spezia and Trieste, took place during the second period of the war, between 1943 and 1945.
Italian convoy at sea (Photo U.S.M.M.)
Particularly severe was the December 1943 attack unleashed on Bari by the Luftwaffe, which succeeded in destroying almost twenty Italian and Allied merchant ships. The attack had grave consequences, with hundreds of deaths among seamen and harbor workers, also because a US ship was loaded with mustard gas bombs which exploded, wreaking havoc.
Surface ship attacks had lesser consequences, though the effects thus obtained were more dramatic, because, in some cases (“Duisburg” and “Tarigo” convoys) they ended with the complete destruction of the convoy. Less numerous were losses due to mines or sailing accidents, while the single most important cause of shipping loss, for operational purposes was – without a doubt – the failure to provide sufficient advance warning of the upcoming declaration of war to ships left outside the Straits.
Even in peacetime, mobilization plans called for the use of certain ships for specific purposes. In particular, the following were contemplated:
– ships for escorting traffic, or auxiliary cruisers – hospital ships – coastal and harbor services patrol boats – troop transports – ships for transporting materiel and fuel – minelayers – minesweepers – amphibious landing ships
For each of these tasks, the most suitable ships were determined (small, fast motor vessels as escorts, Railroad ferries as minelayers, and so on). When war broke out, however, mobilization plans were disrupted by the vast number of ships stranded out of the Mediterranean. This complete loss was partially offset by the commissioning of about fifty new motor vessels, but they too took severe losses because of their intense utilization. In 1941, the Italian Merchant Marine received many units of the former Yugoslavian merchant marine, but nearly all of them were small, old, and suitable only for coastal traffic.
Italian ships loading in the Sicilian port of Palermo. (Photo U.S.M.M.)
A shot of oxygen for war transport was provided by the capture, in November 1942, of several French merchant ships, but this replenishment was also nullified by the fact that the war had entered its most arduous period, with convoys concentrated on the Tunisia route, where losses were very heavy.
Throughout all this hardships, due to war hazards and requisitions, the Merchant Marine also did its utmost to maintain some essential civilian services, such as connections with the islands and some coastal services. However, these were destined to rarify as the war ground on: for instance, around the summer of 1943 connections with Sardinia were almost completely broken off.
On 10 June 1940, Italy went to war, and the sailors of the merchant ships left out of the Mediterranean were among the first Italians to suffer the consequences. In terms of the cargo-carrying Marine, another important event took place: nearly all ships, while formally remaining their companies’ property, were in fact run by the Government, either through requisitions for actual war aims (escorts, patrol vessels, minesweepers, etc.), or through leases for convoys and war supply work.
Besides, in all of Italy’s history there has never been a naval operation that did not require merchant ships: this need has always been met in various ways, such as time-limited leases, compulsory transportation, requisition, or requisition with purchase. For Italy, naval warfare during the last conflict essentially involved convoys, needed to re-supply troops fighting in Africa and in the Balkans, to keep connections with the islands and to protect coastal traffic.
The Battle Fleet’s major operations were conducted to protect Italy’s own convoys or attack the enemy’s – headed for Malta, ever-present thorn in the side throughout the war. The consequence of this type of warfare was that an enormous toll of lives and materiel was paid not only by Italy’s combatant ships, but also by its Merchant Marine; the numbers speak for themselves.
As of June 1940, the Italian merchant fleet comprised 786 ships with a gross tonnage exceeding 500 tons, for a total of 3,318,129 tons, and about 200 ships between 100 and 500 tons. As many as 212 ships, amounting to 1,216,637 tons, were stranded out of the Mediterranean when Italy declared war, and almost all of them were consequently captured or sunk by the enemy.
Between 10 June 1940 and 8 September 1943, the fleet gained 204 ships – newly constructed or captured – amounting to 818,619 tons; but 460 ships, amounting to 1,700,096 tons, were lost.
Left: number of ships over 500 t. Right: total tons
As of 8 September, 324 ships for 1,247,092 tons were still serving; after the armistice, they were mostly captured by the Germans (and then sunk) or self-destroyed to avoid capture.
At the end, in May 1945, the Italian merchant ships exceeding 500 tons were only 95, for 336,810 tons: 10% of the gross tonnage available at the outset of the conflict.
Left: personnel transported and lost Right: goods transported and lost
The amount of capital lost was immense, not only in terms of quantity but also quality: many ships were new and excellent vessels along with thousands of brave sailors were lost at sea. 3,100 seamen died on merchant ships registered as auxiliary naval vessels, 3,257 men belonging to the crews of requisitioned and non requisitioned ships lost their lives, 537 perished as POW’s; a total of 7,164 were lost out of 25,000 registered sea-going personnel.
Italian ports were destroyed, and it took years to remove the wrecks and rebuild them; even coastal shipping, once flourishing, had to restart from scratch. This notwithstanding, it is fair to recall that merchant ships in wartime performed their tasks in exemplary fashion, delivering nearly all their war cargoes to their proper destination: out of 4,199,375 tons of goods embarked, only 449,225 tons failed to reach their destination, i.e. about 10.5%.
The number of embarked soldiers was 1,266,172, and 23,443 were lost at sea, i.e. 2%: many in absolute terms, of course, but few in relation to the efforts expended. In light of these numbers, one can unquestionably state that the Merchant Marine amply deserved the Gold Medal for Military Valor awarded to its flag by the President of the Republic, Luigi Einaudi, with his decree of 11 April 1951.
Captain (Deep Sea Master) Cesare Rosasco Gold Medal for Valor for an action against a British submarine in the Western Mediterranean. (Photo USMM.)
The Medal was bestowed on 16 September 1951 in Genoa by Luigi Einaudi himself: the motor vessels Saturnia, Conte Grande and Italia, the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi and the corvettes Ibis and Chimera were in the harbor to render homage. The flag, carried by Gold Medal winner Captain Cesaro Rosasco (Merchant Marine), was decorated by the President as a solemn act of recognition by the Nation to the bravery and sacrifice of its merchant seamen.
Chronicle of the journey of an Italian merchant ship, which from November 1941 to January 1942, was the first to complete a non-stop journey between Japan and France, violating the Anglo-American naval blockade. Just before Italy’s foray into World War II, 212 Italian ships for a total of 1,209,090 tons were docked in ports far away from the motherland. Many of these units, as we shall see, were even docked in enemy ports. A few days before the declaration of war against France and Great Britain, the position of the Italian merchant ships and tankers was as follows:
Italian East Africa (Eritrea and Somalia) 33 units.
Northern and Eastern Europe 11 units
Spain and Spanish possessions 32 units
Portugal and Portuguese possessions 3 units
United States 26 units
Central America 14 units
Colombia and Venezuela 8 units
Brazil 18 units
Uruguay 2 units
Argentina 16 units
Iran 4 units
Thailand 4 units
China and Japan 5 units
British and Commonwealth ports, 33 units
French Atlantic ports, 3 units
The Ministry of the Navy advised all captains to bring their vessels into friendly (or believed friendly) ports, but this order, issued only five days before the declaration of war, was released with too much delay, causing one third of the merchant fleet to be lost. This was to be the first of a succession of serious disasters. Of the 212 units forced into exile or, as it happened to the ones in Great Britain, captured, the vast majority belonged to a class of fairly modern ships of large tonnage. Six of these ships were over 10,000 tons, 64 ranged from 6,000 to 10,000 tons would have been very valuable during the conflict. The loss of 136 ships between 2,000 and 6,000 tons was very serious; these units would have been very useful for the traffic between Libya and Italy. Also important was the loss of 46 tankers, units always in short supply in the Regia Marina. In 1940, at a total of 3,400,000 tons, tankers represented less than 0.4%. Beginning in July 1940, after the commencement of the hostilities, Supermarina devised a plan to attempt to move a certain number of ships located in Spain, the Canary Islands and even Brazil to the German occupied ports of France. This operation was partially successful thanks to the courage demonstrated by the Italian crews. In time, Supermarina, under pressure from high-ranking officers of the Kriegsmarine, who had developed a certain interest after having seen half a dozen Italian ships arriving in Bordeaux, designed a second and more challenging plan. The project was intended for the transfer of some of the better Italian units, some of which had already violated the British blockade, between Bordeaux and Japan with the intent to furnish the Axis powers with much needed, and rare, rough material.
Towards the end of September 1941, Supermarina in concert with the Italian attaché in Tokyo, Admiral Carlo Balsamo, selected a first group of ships adapted to the task. After some scrutiny, the selection fell to the Himalaya, Orseolo, Galitea (ex Ramb II), Fujijama, Cortellazzo and the tanker Carignano (1). These units, which were located in Asian ports under Japanese control, were selected because of their seafaring qualities and favorable technical characteristics, such as endurance, speed and cargo capacity. As part of a secret agreement between the Regia Marina and the German Seekriegsleitung, part of the cargo loaded on Italian ships in the Orient, and destined to violate the British blockade, would be given to Germany in exchange for military equipment.
M/V Fujiama
Between the end of October and the beginning of November 1941, Supermarina gave the Italian Naval attaché in Tokyo orders to send the first ship to Bordeaux. The Cortellazzo would be taking advantage of the shorter daylight in fall, an expedient useful to protect the ship during the approach to the central Atlantic and the Gulf of Biscay. As proof of the great interest that had developed amongst the Germans for the success of the mission, of the over 6,000 tons loaded in Kobe and later in Dairen, 4,309 were destined for Germany. In the large holds of the Cortellazzo, amongst the various goods, the Japanese loaded 496 tons of tires, 159 tons of canvas, 100 tons of tin, 36 tons of copper, 61 tons of nickel, 10 tons of wolfram, 1,400 tons of vegetable oil, 285 tons of cannabis, 1,140 tons of peanuts, 285 tons of tea, and 275 tons of varnish. According to the plan, the Cortellazzo, and the other units which would have followed soon after, the Orseolo and the Fusijiana, would have followed the route of the Cape of Good Hope. Before Japan’s entry into the war, the north-south route across the Pacific, the crossing of Cape Horn, and the transit from south to north along the Atlantic were much safer than a westward route. This route allowed the Italians and the Germans alike to stay away from areas patrolled by British units.
M/V Cortellazzo’s journey
Later on, with the United States’ entry into the war, this strategy was changed and the ships were sent across the Indian Ocean, which at that time was not patrolled by enemy ships as much. Before the departure of the Cortellazzo, nine German ships loaded with rare goods had already left Japan and Korea directed to Bordeaux along the Cape Horn route. Of these ships, five had reached the Atlantic port of Bordeaux. Statistically speaking, the chances of the Cortellazzo were almost fifty-fifty. The possibility of being intercepted was so high that, just before departure, the ship was fitted with a 50 Kg. charge near the propeller shaft and destined to be exploded, thus causing the immediate sinking of the ship. On November 6th the Cortellazzo under the command of C.L.C. Luigi Mancusi set sail from Kobe and, after a brief and uneventful three-day trip, the ship reached Dairen, in Korea. During this segment, the ship sailed under the false identity of the Japanese merchantman Dai Ichi Choyu Maru. On November 16, 1941, at 9:15 PM the Cortellazzo left the harbor of Dairen, beginning an adventurous and perilous journey. Crossing the Yellow Sea, the ship reached the Island of Quelpart where it entered the Pacific Ocean and assumed a different false identity. Exiting the Strait of Van Diemen, the Cortellazzo assumed the identity of the Japanese ship Kingfa-Maru and Japanese flags were painted along the sides while the funnel changed colors. On November 27th , while the Italian blockade-runner was between the Caroline Islands and the Marshall Islands, Mancusi spotted three Japanese oceanic submarines navigating in line and he altered course to avoid contact. On December 8th, after having left Gilbert Island to starboard and Ellice Island to port, the radio operator of the Cortellazzo intercepted signals from the American base of Pearl Harbor announcing the Japanese attack and the American declaration of war. This new event made the Italian mission even more dangerous.
Fortunately, commander Mancusi, the right man for the job, without waiting for orders from Supermarina immediately changed the ship’s camouflage (keeping the Japanese colors would have meant disaster). The evening of December 8th, Mancusi informed Navitalia-Tokyo, Betasom (the Italian base in Bordeaux), Maricolleg-Berlin and Navitalia-Berlino of the possibility of transforming the Cortellazzo into the neutral Swedish ship Delhi. For two days, Mancusi’s sailors wiped out the Japanese flags and signs and repainted the funnel. On the 10th, the Cortellazzo displayed her new coat and a new false identity. The funnel was painted yellow to represent the shipping company “Svenska Ostasiasche Kampt.Det.” with a large light blue circle with the three crowns of the Swedish Royal house, while the broadsides had two Scandinavian flags and the name Delhi – Sweden.
M/V Himalaya
Thanks to this masquerade, the Italian ship was able to continue on this route past the Samoa Islands and crossing the dangerous waters between the Tuamotu Islands (under the control of French forces in Papeete loyal to De Gaulle). After passing the Tuamotu, the Cortellazzo-Delhi continued on a south-south-west course, reaching the troubled waters of Cape Horn. On December 24th, in the middle of a violent storm, Mancusi confirmed his fame as a talented sailor and, after a titanic fight, was able to cross the perilous cape, reaching the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. After navigating east of the Falkland Island and west of Austral Georgia, the Italian vessel pointed north, keeping itself safely in the middle of the Atlantic. Passing the strait of Natal and Freetown, the narrowest point between the African and American continents, the Cortellazzo navigated along the Brazilian coast near the Island of Fernando de Noronha and the smaller island of San Paolo, reaching on the 10th of January the Atlantic area most patrolled by the Anglo-American naval forces. It was at this point that, following orders received from the Kriegsmarine, Captain Mancusi turned est and reached Spanish territorial waters. This maneuver was fully successful despite the fact that on the 16th the course was changed after the sighting of a large British tanker.
M/V Orseolo
Passing Cape Ortegal, the Corterlazzo moved on a course parallel to the northern Iberian coast to avoid detection by the long-range flying boat Sunderland and the British submarines patrolling the Gulf of Biscay in the hunt for the U-Boots. On the 25th, the Cortellazzo crossed Cape Higuer where it met four German minesweepers which had sailed from Bordeaux and were going to protect the ship and its precious cargo against British attacks. On January 27th, after having navigated 21,163 miles in 1,730 hours at an average speed of 12.23 knots, the Italian merchantmen entered the river Girond and docked at 12:23 at the Le Verdun dock. After the habitual and much deserved celebrations attended by high ranking German Naval officers, representatives of the Regia Marina honored Captain Mancusi and the Chief engineer with a Silver Medal, while all other officers received the Bronze Medal and the crew the “croce di guerra”. The precious cargo transported by the Cortellazzo was immediately sent to Germany and Italy. On the 29th of January, the Cortellazzo, after having received some alterations similar to the other units designated for the traffic with Japan, was transferred to the command of C.L.C. Augusto Paladini with the order to transfer 6,000 tons of goods to Japan. Amongst the cargo was mercury, special steel, minerals, war material (airplane engines, submarine equipment, special weapons) and medicine. The ship would return to Bordeaux with a similar cargo of goods hard to find in Europe and much needed by the Axis war industry. Unfortunately, this time the Italian ship was not so lucky. In addition to the Italian crew, the ship embarked seven German officers, petty officers and sailors destined to reach Kobe. The ship left the Girond the evening of November 29th and was escorted to Cape Finestrerre by the German torpedo boats Kondar, Falke and T22. Immediately after the departure of the escort, the ship was sighted by a British Suderland which led a destroyer squadron to the easy prey. The morning of December 1st, after only two days of navigation, the Cortellazzo was attacked by the destroyer Reboudt and other light units. Realizing that fighting was out of the question (the ship did not have armament), Captain Paladini ordered the scuttling of the ship by arming the prearranged mine. In a few minutes, at around 8:00 AM in a position 44’ north, 20′ west the Cortellazzo disappeared into the water.
Notes: The 7th of July a large group of technicians, workers and specialists of the Regia Marina left La Spezia bound for Bordeaux to begin modifying and arming the ships Himalaya, Cortellazzo, Orseolo e Fusijama. This work was ordered by Rome with the intent to provide these ships with adequate protection during their missions to Japan. Unfortunately, due to lack of equipment and time, only the Orseolo was completely adapted to the new use. The armament to be installed on the Italian ships (based on directives from the German command in Bordeaux) would have included a 105mm gun (1) to be used against naval or aerial attacks, two German 20mm antiaircraft machine guns, two French 9mm machine guns, and two smoke-laying apparatuses.
(1) Or an older 75″ mm one captured from the Polish
