Boats

The submarine Serpente was Argonauta-class coastal submarine (650 tons displacement on the surface and 800 tons submerged). The boat completed 29 war missions (17 patrols and 12 transfers), covering 11,731 miles on the surface and 2,708 submerged, and 105 training sorties.

The submarine Serpente with the camouflage used later in the conflict and the modified conning tower

Brief and Partial Chronology

April 23rd, 1930

Setting up started at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto. Initially, the name chosen was Nautilus, but in 1931 it was changed to Serpente.

February 28th, 1932

Serpente  was launched at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto.

July 1932

During exercises and sea trials, a crew member is “forgotten” outside during the diving manoeuvre. He ended up in the water and was rescued several hours later by the submarine Luigi Settembrini. A few days later, Serpente will also hit a quay in Tarant. A few days later, its commander, Cordero di Montezemolo, was replaced.

November 12th, 1932

Entry into active service. Followed by assignment to the VIII Submarine Squadron, which the boat formed together with the submarines of the same class Salpa and the larger Luigi Settembrini and Ruggiero Settimo, also newly built.

April 25th, 1933

An explosion which occurred in a battery room while the Serpent was being repaired in Taranto, killed a civilian worker, and injured seven others.

Serpente in Taranto. In the drydock also the Destroyer Carducci

1934

Serpente made a cruise to the Balearic Islands and to some ports in Spain.

January 21st, 1935

The boat was sent from Brindisi to go to the rescue, with other units, of the French seaplane “Normandie”, ditched in the Otranto Channel due to engine failure and in prohibitive sea conditions, The plane was flying from Saigon to Marseille via Corfu and Naples. However, the intervention of the Serpent would be superfluous, as the motor ship Paganini, was closest to the scene of the accident and therefore diverted to the spot and was able to save the six occupants of the seaplane and also recover luggage and mail bags before the aircraft sank in rough seas.

1936

Deployed in Taranto, then in the Red Sea for a few months, together with her sister submarine Salpa, to verify the suitability of the Argonauta class boats to operate in those waters.

Subsequently, together with the Salpa, it was first deployed in the Aegean Sea and later in Tobruk. During this period, Lieutenant Aldo Enrici was the commander of the Serpente. Serpentyed participated, as part of a “special mission” under the command of Emilio Francardi, to the Spanish Civil War.

1938

Moved to Leros, then to Rhodes.

1939

Relocated in Tobruk.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into the World War II, Serpente and her twin boat Salpa formed the XLV Submarine Squadron of the IV Grupsom, based in Taranto (according to another source, however, at the outbreak of the war the two boats were part of the Tobruk Submarine Group). Later, the Serpent was transferred to Augusta.

July 22^nd, 1940

Serpente departs Taranto for a patrol in the Gulf of Solum which is aborted due to a severe breakdown with an electric motor, returning to base on the 28^th.

September 19th, 1940

At 8:34 PM, 59 miles south of Morciano di Leuca, Serpente (Lieutenant Vittorio Emanuele Tognelli) launched three torpedoes against a submarine, believed to be enemy. Actually, it was an Italian boat, the Marcantonio Colonna: fortunately, it managed to avoid the torpedoes.

September 23rd, 1940

The boat went south of Crete together with the submarines Ambra and Goffredo Mameli.

October 1st, 1940

Spotted by a British formation off the coast of Crete, Serpente was damaged by destroyers with depth charges, being forced to return to base due to the damage suffered.

December 16^th – 25th, 1940

The boat went to patrol, together with the submarines Dessiè and Fratelli Bandiera, in the waters around Malta.

December 20th, 1940

At 1:02 AM, Serpente (Lieutenant Commander Antonio Dotta), while on the surface (in position 35°30′ N and 16°20′ E), launched two torpedoes from less than 2,000 meters against the penultimate unit (estimated to be a light cruiser) of a formation that Dotta believed to be composed of three cruisers and a thin unit, perhaps a destroyer (these were the three cruisers that formed the protection force of the British convoy “M.W. 5” bound for Malta,  located a few miles further south), 85 miles southeast of Malta.

Dotta believed that he had hit a cruiser with one or two torpedoes (having heard an explosion two minutes after launch, having dived deep to avoid the reaction). The action and the optimistic assessment of its outcome would also be reported in the war bulletin number of December 26th: “The submarine Serpente, under the command of Lieutenant Antonio Dotta, on the night between the 20th and the 21st attacked an enemy naval formation in the central Mediterranean, launching two torpedoes against a light cruiser and sinking it as was ascertained by aerial reconnaissance“.

In reality, no ships were hit (the British ships did not even realize that they have been attacked). Some sources would initially attribute (and still attribute) the sinking of the British destroyer H.M.S. Hyperion to the action of Serpente, but this unit sank due to a collision with an Italian mine (belonging to the 4 AN barrage) only two days later and at a distance of 300 miles (in position 37°40′ N and 11°31′ E).

1941

Serpente operated mainly in the western Mediterranean, in particular off Algiers and Oran.

Serpente in Cagliari with an initial attempt to a camouflage with small spots painting on the conning tower
(From “Storia Militare”)

January 12th, 1941

The boat was sent on patrol off the coast of Derna.

March 2, 1941

The boat was sent on patrol in the waters of Cyrenaica.

August 24th, 1941

Serpente was sent to lie in wait, with three other submarines, southwest of Sardinia, in opposition to the British operation “Style” (sending a convoy of supplies to Malta), forming a barrage along with Alagi, Aradam and Diaspro, but failed to detect any enemy units.

September 26th, 1941

Serpente (Lieutenant Renato Ferrini) was sent, with three other submarines (Axum, Aradam and Diaspro), to lie in a defensive ambush east of the Balearic Islands and north of Cape Bougaroni during the British operation “Halberd”, consisting of sending a convoy to Malta (military tanker Breconshire and cargo ships Ajax, City of Lincoln, City of Calcutta, Clan MacDonald,  Clan Ferguson, Rowallan Castle, Imperial Star and Dunedin Star with a total cargo of 81,000 tons of supplies), but which the Italian command believed to be an attempt at a naval bombardment against the Italian coast. However, the British squadron at sea did not pass through this area, so the boat was moved further south.

September 29th, 1941

Serpent sighted, off the coast of Spain, an enemy formation consisting of a battleship escorted by four destroyers (part of Force H – battleships H.M.S. Rodney, H.M.S. Nelson and H.M.S. Prince of Wales, aircraft carriers H.M.S. Ark Royal, light cruisers H.M.S. Kenya, H.M.S. Edinburgh, H.M.S. Sheffield, H.M.S. Euryalus and H.M.S. Hermione, British destroyers H.M.S. Cossack, H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Farndale, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S.  Forestr, H.M.S. Fury, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Heythrop, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lance, H.M.S. Legion, H.M.S. Lightning, H.M.S.  Lively, H.M.S. Oribi and H.M.S. Zulu, as well as the Polish Garland and Piorun and the Dutch Isaac Sweers – at sea for “Halberd” and precisely to cover, at a distance, convoys GM 2 and MG. 2) sailing west at 16 knots, 25 miles north-northwest of Cape Bougaroni.

Serpente in Cagliari, October 1st, 1942. On the foreground Lieutenant Renato Ferrini>
(From “Storia Militare)

Initially, the submarine maneuvers to attack the battleships, but fails due to the obstacle posed by the escort, as well as the fact that the ships proceed zigzagging. Subsequently, at 4:45 PM, Serpente launched two torpedoes from the aft tubes against one of the four destroyers (in position 37°22′ N and 06°16′ E), wrongly believing to have scored a hit (having heard a bang 50 seconds after launch, while disengaging, but this was probably due to the depth charges launched in reaction). Two of the British destroyers, H.M.S. Legion and H.M.S. Lively, spotted torpedo trails and immediately counterattacked with depth charges, but the submarine emerged unscathed from the counterattack.

October 17th, 1941

Serpente was sent on patrol north of Cap de Fer (Algeria) together with the submarines Turchese, Alagi and Diaspro.

May 4th, 1942

The boat was assigned to the Submarine School in Pula (Mariscuolasom), on behalf of which it carried out 105 training sorties, as well as some ambush missions in the Upper Adriatic. (According to another source, it was assigned to Mariscuolasom, along with the twin boats Medusa and Jalea, in 1941.)

(From ‘Storia Militare”)Serpente during a training patrol in the Upper Adriatic photographed from a corvette.
Serpente during a training patrol in the Upper Adriatic photographed from a corvette.

The armistice and the end

The armistice of September 8^th, 1943, caught Serpent still in Pula, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Raffaele Allegri. The submarine was in dry dock in the Scoglio Olivi shipyard, but, unlike many other ships caught at work and sabotaged or captured due to the impossibility of being able to leave, it could be immediately put back into the water and prepared for departure.

It left Pula on September 9^th. The submarine Serpent set course first for Lošinj, then Ancona, where the boat arrived at 7.39 AM on the 11th. The submarine Ametista, which had arrived a few hours earlier from Rijeka, and the pocket submarines CB 11 and CB 12 were already present in the Doric port. Serpente and Ametista were both plagued by breakdowns, which had forced them to stop in Ancona.

At 03:00 PM on September 12th, all four boats left Ancona bound for Puglia with Serpente towing CB 12, the Ametista towing CB 11. The voyage of the two larger submarines, however, ended a little further on, seven miles northeast of Numana, off Monte Conero. The commanding officers of Ametista and Serpente dropped the towlines and scuttled their boats, respectively at 5:00 PM and 5.30 PM on September 12^th, 1943. The two CBs continued alone to the Tremiti, Islands from where they then reached Brindisi and Taranto.

The crew of Serpente was rescued by a fishing boat passing nearby and disembarked in Civitanova Marche. The population of Numana and Sirolo provided the survivors with dry civilian clothing.

The men who made up the crews of the two submarines, like hundreds of thousands of other soldiers in Italy and in the occupied territories, had to split up, making opposing choices. Some of them went to the North, where they enlisted in the ranks of the X Flotilla MAS of the Italian Social Republic. Others headed south, where they managed to rejoin the ranks of the Regia Marina (according to an unverifiable source of dubious reliability, the entire crew of Serpente headed north and then entered the X MAS).

Not a single man died on Serpent during three years of war, but one of its crew members did not see the end of the conflict either. Stoker sailor Antonio Giuffrida, twenty-one years old from Milan, was among the men of Serpent who became part of the X MAS of the RSI, convinced like many, that he would continue to fight against the Allies. Instead, he found himself assigned to Arona in a unit assigned to anti-partisan repression. Not intending to fight against other Italians, Giuffrida deserted and returned to Milan, but was captured by his former comrades on the tip of a spy, brought back to Arona (Novara) and shot in the courtyard of the De Filippi high school at 7:40 PM of December 5th, 1944.

At the end of the war, Commander Allegri, like the commander of Ametista Lieutenant Luigi Ginocchio, was arrested and tried by the Military Court of Genoa on charges of disobeying orders and for “loss of ship”. The sentence in the first trial, in February 1949, was six years in prison for both. In 1950 the appeal process took place, in which the lawyers highlighted the ability and valor demonstrated in war by the two commanders, and pointed out that the orders were to deliver the ships to the Allies, but also to scuttle the obsolete and inefficient ones. Disorientation caused by the confused situation of the armistice was also highlighted, which had prevented Commander Allegri from calmly evaluating what to do despite the clear orders of the Naval Command of Ancona. This led, on January 19th, 1950, to a reduction in sentence, with a suspended sentence.

While the judicial aftermath of the affair was concluded, the material existence of the two submarines in the waters of Ancona also came to a definitive end. A diver from Ancona, perhaps Elso Tonnarelli, found the wrecks at a depth of 20-25 meters, on the muddy seabed off the Conero, in an area where strong currents made diving difficult. This did not stop the recovery proposals: for Serpente, the Dorica Company for Maritime Works and Recoveries srl and the Cesare Davanzali Company joined forces. The Ancona divers Alessandro Savini and Mariano Rinaldi worked on the recovery, and later Antonio Moroni of the «Davanzali».

In the six years it had spent underwater, Serpent had progressively sunk into the muddy seabed, which had covered it for two-thirds, leaving only the bow and conning tower sticking out. The interior had also filled with mud, due to the hatches left open for scuttling, so that it had to be emptied to lighten it so that it could be lifted again. The difficulties were not few, divers, given the modest depth, began to spend long periods of time diving without adhering to the prescribed times for decompression. The Naval Command provided some lifting cylinders, but the strong storms forced the work to be postponed for month, A narrow tunnel was dug in the seabed, under the hull of the wreck, through which large chains were then passed which were then hooked to the lifting cylinders. At that point, all that remained was to fill the cylinders with air. The submarine detached from the seabed that had housed it for six years, and returned, in July 1949, to see daylight.

However, only for a short time: once recovered, the submarine was towed to the nearby port of Ancona and scrapped in 1950.

The relict of Serpente in Ancona, 1950
 (From “Palombari dorici” by Luigi Borsini))

The 102/35 mm gun was returned to the Navy (which had already removed Serpent from its roster on February 27^th, 1947). The sale of the lead contained in the boat’s batteries, over nine tons, yielded 8,000,000 lire (TN 624.61 ITL = $1 in 1950, equivalent to $ 165,000 in 2024) to the salvagers. Part of the steel of the hull, with a high nickel content (and whose value had risen with the outbreak of the crisis that would later lead to the Korean War), was sold to the Pieralisi Workshops in Jesi.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	29		11731	2708	123	117.39	4.89

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
9/19/1940	20.34	C.C. Antonio Dotta	Mediterranean	Santa Maria di Leuca		Torpedo	Failed	Colonna	Submarine	880	Italy
12/20/1940	01.02	C.C. Antonio Dotta	Mediterranean	35°30’N-16°20’E		Torpedo	Failed	H.M.S. Hyperion	Destroyer		Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name

First Name

Rank

Italian Rank

Date

Fisalia was a coastal submarine of the Argonaut-class (650 tons displacement on the surface and 800 tons submerged). The boat completed 7 patrols and 8 transfer missions during the war, covering a total of 6,181 miles on the surface and 2,190 miles submerged, as well as 46 training sorties.

Brief and Partial Chronology

November 20th, 1929

Setting up in the Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico in Monfalcone (construction number 226).

May 2nd, 1931

Fisalia was launch at the Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico in Monfalcone.

Fisalia ready for launch
 (From “I sommergibili di Monfalcone” by Alessandro Turrini, Rivista Marittima n. 11 – November 1998)

June 4th, 1932

Entry into service. For a few months he remained in the Upper Adriatic, especially in Pula.

Fisalia in Taranto, October 31st, 1932
(Giorgio Parodi Collection)

1933

Fisalia completed a long training cruise in the Eastern Mediterranean together with the boat of the same class Salpa and Argonauta (in the Dodecanese, with stops in Libya on the way back), then, under the command of Lieutenant Giorgio Bernabò, it was deployed to Messina (III Submarine Group) and assigned to training tasks in the metropolitan ports for the next four years, carrying out several training cruises.

February 1937

The command of Fisalia was assumed by the Lieutenant Commander Francesco Dell’Anno.

August 17^th through 29^th, 1937

Fisalia clandestinely participated to the Spanish Civil War with an unsuccessful 12-day mission. Setting sail from Messina on August 17th, Fisalia (still under the command of Lieutenant Bernabò) patrolled a sector north of Pantelleria, between Cape Lilybaeum and Cape Bon. During the mission, the boat began 22 attack maneuvers, but did not complete any of them, due to uncertainty about the identity of the targets. Fisalia returned to Messina on the 29th. At the end of this mission, it was deployed to Tobruk.

Fisalia in Messina
(Maurizio Brescia Collection)

December 26th, 1937

Lieutenant Carlo Todaro (29 years old, from Trapani) took command of Fisalia.

October 18th, 1938

Lieutenant Todaro handed over command of Fisalia to Lieutenant Girolamo Acunto.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into the World War II, Fisalia was part of the LXI Submarine Squadron (VI Grupsom, based in Tobruk), along with the class leader Argonauta and the submarines Naiade, Sirena and Smeraldo.

June 12th, 1940

Fisalia (Lieutenant Girolamo Acunto) was sent off the coast of Alexandria for offensive patrol. He remained in the area for only two days, during which time he sighted a merchant ship, which he attacked but failed to hit.

June 15th, 1940

On his way back to Tobruk, Fisalia was attacked by a submarine with a torpedo, but avoided it with a quick maneuver. (TN The submarine in question was H.M.S. Rosqual, Lieutenant Commander Ronald Hugh Dewhurst)

July 12th, 1940

Still under the command of Lieutenant Acunto, Fisalia sailed for a mission north of the Gulf of Sollum, but on reaching the assigned sector it was located by three escort ships and subjected to violent anti-submarine attacks. With various apparatuses seriously damaged, it has to go back to base.

July 13th, 1940

Fisalia arrived in Tobruk. Once repaired, it carries out new offensive patrols, all of which were unsuccessful.

October 14th, 1940

The boat was reassigned to the Submarine School in Pula.

October 14^th,1940 through March 10^th, 1941

Fisalia completed 46 training sorties for the Submarine School in Pula.

After 10 March, the boat carried out various offensive missions in Egyptian waters.

March 15^th through 26th, 1941

Fisalia was sent to patrol the waters of the Otranto Channel to protect traffic between Italy and Albania.

April 22nd, 1941

Fisalia was sent on patrol in the waters of Cyrenaica, where it sighted a large cruiser off the Egyptian coast, but was unable to get into a favorable position to launch torpedoes (i.e., to reduce the distances sufficiently).

May 20th, 1941

Fisalia was sent to lie in wait in the waters between Crete, Alexandria and Sollum, along with the submarines Uarsciek, Topazio, Adua, Tricheco, Malachite, Squalo, Smeraldo, Dessiè, and Sirena, in support of the German invasion of Crete.

According to an unverifiable source, twice during this mission Fisalia was spotted by several enemy destroyers and subjected to heavy hunts with depth charges (hundreds) that lasted for several hours.

The Sinking

On the morning of September 23^rd, 1941, Fisalia, still under the command of Girolamo Acunto (who had just been promoted to Lieutenant Commander), sailed from Leros for a patrol between Jaffa and Haifa. After the departure, however, Fisalia was never heard from again.

It was later learned, from British sources, that on September 28th the British corvette H.M.S. Hyacinth (Lieutenant Commander Frank Clifford Hopkins; according to one version the ship was conducting an anti-submarine patrol off Jaffa, according to another it acted instead in defense of a convoy) had located Fisalia submerged 25 miles northwest of Jaffa and had sunk it with a precise and lethal launch of depth charges in position 32°19′ N and 34°17′ E . All crewmembers – 5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 27 non-commissioned officers and sailors – still rest in their “iron coffin”.

H.M.S. Hyacinth was a Flower-class corvette. In 1943 it was transferred to Greece

According to an unverifiable source, the wreck of Fisalia was located 27 miles off the Israeli coast, at a great depth.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	2	2	6955	1149	73	111.01	4.63

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
06/12/1940		T.V. Girolamo Acunto	Mediterranean	Off Alexandria		Torpedo	Failed	Unknown	Ship		Unknown

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Acunto	Girolamo	Lieutenant Commander	Capitano di Corvetta	9/28/1941
Antonante	Michele	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	9/28/1941
Ardetti	Antonio	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Baggi	Luigi	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Barbieri	Osvaldo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Basile	Bartolo	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Battain	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Bobbio	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Bossio	Alberto	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	9/28/1941
Bozzotta	Salvatore	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Briga	Antonio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Brunetti	Raffaello	Ensign	Guardiamarina	9/28/1941
Bruno	Vinicio	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Bruzzo	Renato	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Cum	Giovanni	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
De Palma	Alfredo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Dell’Angelo	Albino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Di Pasquale	Vittorio	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Esposito	Simone	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Faggion	Guido	Sergeant	Sergente	9/28/1941
Ferraro	Valerio	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	9/28/1941
Fiorentino	Antonio	Sergeant	Sergente	9/28/1941
Furlan	Ferdinando	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Gragnani	Rodolfo	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.	9/28/1941
Lampani	Renato	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe	9/28/1941
Lerici	Federico	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Lo Forti	Rosario	Sergeant	Sergente	9/28/1941
Lotti	Vasco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Manta	Oronzo	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Marconi	Rodolfo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Marino	Antonino	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Mattera	Luigi	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Miceli	Antonino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Molfino	Giacomo	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Morgera	Francesco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Piscelli	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Provera	Adriano	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Puce	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Ruccia	Vito	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe	9/28/1941
Sirletti	Emilio	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Spina	Carlo	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Staiano	Alberto	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Tanfani	Ezio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	9/28/1941
Tosini	Livio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941
Zacchini	Alceo	Naval Rating	Comune	9/28/1941
Zanello	Gildo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	9/28/1941

The submarine Tembien was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). During the war the boat completed a total of 10 patrols and 6 training and transfer missions, covering 9,806 miles on the surface and 1,881 submerged.

Brief and partial chronology

February 6th, 1937

Setting up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

February 6th, 1938

Tembien was launched in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

The launch of Tembien in Muggiano, La Spezia

July 1st, 1938

The boat entered service.

August 10th, 1938

Placed under Maricosom (the Command of the Italian submarine fleet), Tembien was assigned to the V Submarine Group of Leros and deployed on that island. There it carried out training and endurance cruises.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into World War II, Tembien was stationed in Messina, part of the XXXV Submarine Squadron (III Submarine Group), along with the boat of the same class Durbo and Beilul. The commander of the submarine was Commander Primo Longobardo, who, however, would leave after a few days, having been assigned to a new post.

July 1st, 1940

The boat was sent to lie in wait off the coast of Malta.

July 5th, 1940

Tembien returned to base.

July 1940

The boat took to the sea for the second war patrol but had to interrupt it before reaching the ambush area and returned to base due to a breakdown.

August 1st, 1940

Tambien was sent off the coast of Crete for an ambush.

August 6th, 1940

The boat returned to base, after patrolling the waters of Sollum as well.

September 23rd, 1940

Tembien was sent to lie in wait off the coast of Tobruk.

September 28th, 1940

Tembien participated, unsuccessfully, in the fight against the British operation “MB. 5”, consisting of sending to Malta 1,200 men and a cargo of supplies by means of the light cruisers H.M.S. Liverpool and H.M.S. Gloucester, with the support of two battleships (H.M.S. Valiant and H.M.S. Warspite), an aircraft carrier (H.M.S. Illustrious), two light cruisers (H.M.S. Orion and H.M.A.S. Sydney), a heavy cruiser (H.M.S. York) and eleven destroyers.

October 6th, 1940

The boat returned to base. Thereafter, Lieutenant Guido Gozzi assumed command.

November 21st, 1940

Short night ambush mission off Malta.

November 22nd, 1940

Another short night ambush to the west of Malta.

November 26th, 1940

Return was sent to ambush west of Malta, 26 miles west of Comino (islet located between Malta and Gozo), to participate in the fight against the British operation “Collar” (transfer of ships from Alexandria to Gibraltar, dispatch of convoys with supplies from Gibraltar to Malta and the ports of the Levant, all with the help of Force H and the Mediterranean Fleet:  the outcome would be the inconclusive Battle of Cape Teulada).

November 27th, 1940

At 11:24 PM, Tembien (Lieutenant Guido Gozzi) sighted three large warships to the south, advancing at an estimated speed of 9 knots and on an estimated course of 320° (to the northwest). This was the British 3rd Cruiser Squadron (heavy cruiser H.M.S. York, light cruisers H.M.S. Glasgow and H.M.S. Gloucester), at sea as part of the British convoy traffic connected with Operation Collar. At 11:28 PM (another source 10:26 PM), in position 36°00′ N and 14°47′ E (or 13°47′ E), the submarine launched two torpedoes from 1,500 meters (other sources speak of 500 meters).

Since the weapons miss the target, Tembien further reduces the distance, down to less than 1,000 meters. Then, at 11:33 PM (or 11:34 PM the boat launched two more torpedoes. This time a loud bang was heard after 45 seconds, but the torpedoes had misfired again. Tembien, which had disengaged with rapid immersion, was briefly hunted with depth charges (according to another source, the British units did not realize that they had been attacked).

November 30th, 1940

Tembien returned to base.

January 1st, 1941

The boat was sent off Sollum.

January 8th, 1941

At 00.45 Tembien (Lieutenant Guido Gozzi) sighted a large steamer off Bardia and attacked it with the launch torpedoes in rapid succession: these, however, had an irregular course and did not hit the target.

Lieutenant Guido Gozzi was born in Bologna on October 25th, 1910

It was the first case in which there was an irregular torpedo race in the Regia Marina. An investigation by the General Directorate of Naval Weapons and Armaments would follow and discovered that some components of the torpedo guidance devices, in a batch produced by the torpedo factory of Rijeka, were stressed at the time when the torpedoes were launched, thus preventing the weapon from maintaining it course.

January 12th, 1941

The boat returned to base.

February 3rd, 1941

Ambush off the coast of Malta.

February 12th, 1941

Tembien returned to base and entered the shipyard for routine maintenance work.

February-June 1941

At the shipyard undergoing repairs and maintenance.

Tembien in 1941 after a period in the shipyard. Note the ‘German’ style conning tower and the mimetic painting.
(From “Sommergibili italiani” by Alessandro Turrini andOttorino Ottone Miozzi, USMM)

June 12th, 1941

Sailor Gennaro Ietro, 30, from Caserta, died aboard Tembien in the central Mediterranean.

June 26th, 1941

Sent off the coast of Cyrenaica.

June 29th, 1941

At 08:41 PM Tembien sighted a formation of British ships off Ras Azzaz, 100 miles east of Tobruk: they were the destroyers H.M.S. Defender (Lieutenant Commander Gilbert Lescombie Farnfield) and H.M.S Waterhen (Lieutenant Commander James Hamilton Swain), sailing from Tobruk (besieged by Axis forces) to Alexandria with troops of the 6th Australian Division.

Just as Tembien was observing them, the two destroyers were attacked, off Sollum, by 19 Junkers Ju 87 “Stuka” dive bombers, 12 Germans (Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 of the Luftwaffe) and 7 Italians (239th Dive Bombing Squadron of the Regia Aeronautica, Captain Giuseppe Cenni). One of the latter, piloted by Master Sergeant Ennio Tarantola, hit H.M.S. Waterhen at the stern with a 500 kg bomb. The damage was immediately very serious; the engine and boiler rooms were immediately flooded, and the crew began to abandon ship.

Tembien tried to approach to deliver the coup de grace to the damaged destroyer, but H.M.S. Defender – which was also approaching, to take H.M.S.  Waterhen in tow – sighted it (not far away, forward) and opened fire on it, forcing it to launch two torpedoes blindly (from the aft tubes, from less than 600 meters) and then quickly dove.

On the other hand, according to another source, Tembien arrived and sighted a destroyer that seems to be proceeding at low speed, 600 meters away (H.M.S. Waterhen, already damaged by the attack), launched torpedoes against it and only after the launch was sighted and forced to disengage from a second destroyer (H.M.S. Defender), which tried unsuccessfully to ram it.

In any case, the torpedoes failed to hit the target and Tembien disengaged diving, evading the hunt with depth charges without taking damage. H.M.S. Waterhen, irreparably damaged by the bomb, sank on its own at 1.50 AM the following day, capsizing in position 32°15′ N and 25°20′ E (seven miles north of Sidi el Barrani), after a vain attempt to tow it by H.M.S. Defender.

July 3rd, 1941

Tembien returned to base.

Ramming

On July 31^st, 1941, Tembien, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Guido Gozzi, sailed from Augusta (according to other sources, Messina) bound west of Malta, where it was to form, along with three other units (Fratelli Bandiera, Luciano Manara and Zaffiro), a barrage of submarines in order to intercept British naval forces that had been reported as being in transit in the Strait of Sicily.

In fact, the British operation “Style” was in progress, which consisted of sending to Malta the minelayer cruiser H.M.S. Manxman and the light cruisers H.M.S. Hermione and H.M.S. Arethusa (Force X), on a mission of fast transport of 1,746 men (70 officers and 1,676 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, some of whom remained in Gibraltar when the steamer Leinster, part of the former convoy “Substance” bound for Malta, had run aground.  As a diversionary action, the British would also carry out a bombardment of Porto Conte and Alghero by the destroyers H.M.S. Maori and H.M.S. Cossack and aircrafts from the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal (which took place between 2.15 Am and 4.45 Am on 1 August, with negligible damage).

The ships bound for Malta had left Gibraltar at six o’clock in the morning of July 30th, and at 5.30 PM news (that Force H had left Gibraltar at 7:00 AM heading east) had reached Supermarina, which had immediately ordered the dispatch of various submarines (in addition to Tembien, Zaffiro, Bandiera and Manara between Malta and Pantelleria,  four other boats were deployed to the southwest of Sardinia: Alagi, Aradam, Diaspro and Serpente), as well as various other measures (suspension of traffic in the Central Mediterranean, concentration of 13 MAS in Pantelleria, preparation of the 6 torpedo boats available in Sicily, aerial reconnaissance over large areas of both Mediterranean basins).

Supermarina had already been alarmed by the intensification, in the previous days, of enemy radio traffic of an operational nature and air attacks against maritime reconnaissance air bases in Sicily and Sardinia, as well as by the appearance of British reconnaissance in Taranto and in the bases of the southern Tyrrhenian Sea.

On August 1st, Tembien reached the ambush area, located in the southern area of the submarine barrage. In the early hours of August 2nd, Tembien was on the surface – it will never be known whether to recharge its batteries, or to approach the British formation (which was crossing its ambush zone) and attack, or for different reasons – when it was spotted by an aircraft from H.M.S. Ark Royal. Shortly afterwards – at three o’clock in the morning – the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione (Captain Geoffrey Nigel Oliver), which was sailing at 28 knots towards Malta, sighted it in turn and maneuvered to ram it. The bow of H.M.S. Hermione, launched at high speed, cut the Italian submarine in two, sinking it in position 36°21′ N and 12°40′ E (halfway between Pantelleria and Malta, southeast of Pantelleria), off the coast of Tunis and southwest of Sicily. H.M.S. Arethusa and H.M.S. Manxman, which were following H.M.S. Hermione, collided with the already half-submerged wreck of the Italian boat when they passed over the spot where it had sunk.

Commander Gozzi, 4 other officers and 37 non-commissioned officers and sailors died. There were no survivors. It was not entirely clear whether the entire crew sank with the submarine, or whether some men (perhaps being on deck or on the conning tower) ended up in the sea but were not recovered by the British ships, which continued at full force towards Malta. Albert Pettman, chief stoker of H.M.S. Manxman, noted in his diary that ” H.M.S. Hermione rams a U-Boat [a term often misused by the British sailors of the time, to indicate Axis submarines in general] and cuts it in two, none of the crew were saved as we must be well away before day break”)”.

A painting by Marc Stone portraying the sinking of Tambien
(UK National Archives)

H.M.S. Hermione suffered only minor damage in the ramming (a six-meter waterway in the bow, which, however, did not prevent it from continuing at full speed towards its destination). On arrival in Malta three hours later, a “piece” of Tembien was found crumpled around the bow of the cruiser. Some of the wreckage of the submarine was recovered and turned into “souvenirs” or good luck charms, such as a piece of iron that was forged into a horseshoe shape. After returning to Gibraltar (August 4th), the cruiser spent a few days repairing the damage to the bow. Commander Oliver later received the Distinguished Service Order for the sinking of Tembien.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	16		9806	1881	102	114.58	4.77

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
11/26/1940	22.26	T.V. Guido Gozzi	Mediterranean	36°00’N-14°47’E		Torpedo	Failed	York	Heavy Cruiser		Great Britain
11/26/1940	22.33	T.V. Guido Gozzi	Mediterranean	36°00’N-13°47’E		Torpedo	Failed	Glocester	Light Cruiser		Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Appaia	Luigi	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Argentini	Egidio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Bottazzi	Carlo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Bozzo	Vincenzo	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	8/2/1941
Buscemi	Salvatore	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Conte	Enrico	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.	8/2/1941
Cornia	Camillo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Della Valle	Gaspare	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Di Gelido	Vincenzo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Di Giulio	Venanzio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Esposito	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Fabbri	Adolfo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Fanzini	Onorio	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	8/2/1941
Ferrari	Eugenio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Gala	Paolino	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Gambi	Franco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Giagnacovo	Emilio	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Giannini	Giannino	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Gozzi	Guido	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	8/2/1941
Introini	Herve	Sergeant	Sergente	8/2/1941
Ladisa	Francesco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Lanfranchi	Luigi	Ensign	Guardiamarina	8/2/1941
Lettieri	Raffaele	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Ietro	Gennaro	Naval Rating	Comune	6/12/1941
Lucchetti	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Magnani	Tommaso	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	8/2/1941
Mazzella	Silverio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Moto	Romeo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Nardini	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Orru	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Paolantonio	Francesco	Sergeant	Sergente	8/2/1941
Pedicini	Gabriele	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Pisini	Raffaele	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Ritonnato	Federico	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Salatino	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Siroti	Fernando	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/2/1941
Tarrana	Benedetto	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Toccarino	Michele	Sergeant	Sergente	8/2/1941
Ugolini	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941
Vassena	Carlo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Venturi	Umberto	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/2/1941
Viesti	Renato	Naval Rating	Comune	8/2/1941

Neghelli was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (displacement of 698 tons on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed 9 war missions (5 patrols and 4 transfers), covering 5,226 miles on the surface and 714 submerged and damaging two ships including the light cruiser H.M.S. Coventry.

Brief and partial chronology

February 25th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

Neghelli still on the slip

November 7th, 1937

Launched in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano (La Spezia) shipyards.

The launch of Neghelli

February 28th, 1938

Neghelli entered into service.

March 3rd, 1938

Placed under the command of the Submarine Fleet Command (Maricosom). The boat completed an endurance training cruise in the Dodecanese, then was deployed to Leros.

Some crewmembers from the submarine Neghelli in Leros
Photo taken by the militarized worker Oscar Natale Formaro, at the time in service at the naval workshop of San Giorgio in Leros and provided by Giovanni Lanzillotta

May 1940

Transferred to La Spezia.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s enter the World War II, Neghelli, which with the boatsof the same class  Gondar, Ascianghi and Scirè formed the XV Submarine Squadron of the I Grupsom (La Spezia), was sent on an exploratory mission west of the Gulf of Genoa.

June 14th, 1940

The boat returned to base without spotting any enemy units.

August 1st, 1940

Neghelli (Lieutenant Carlo Ferracuti) was sent north of Cape Bougaroni for an ambush on the British Force H, which had left Gibraltar. The submarines Scirè, Argo, Turchese, Medusa, Axum, Jaspro and Luciano Manara were also sent to the same area and for the same reason.

Lieutenant Carlo Ferracuti

August 5th, 1940

At 6.50 PM, west of Point Asinara (Sardinia), Neghelli was attacked with two torpedoes by an enemy submarine. The boat managed to evade weapons with a prompt maneuver. (TN While reported in the official records of the Italian Navy – Volume XIII “I Sommergibili in Mediterraneo” Tomo I, Page 76 -, there is no report of such an attack in the British records nor it is reported by naval historian and researcher Jürgen Rohwer – “Allied Submarine Attacks of World War Two”)

December 1940

A new mission, still under the command of Lieutenant Ferracuti, 45 miles north of Marsa Matruh, until Christmas. In the same area, the submarines Naiade and Narvalo were on patrol to counter the British naval forces sent to shell the Italian positions on the Cyrenian coasts in support of the advance of the land forces.

December 13th, 1940

At 08:22 PM, Neghelli, while on the surface, sighted the British light cruiser H.M.S. Coventry (Captain David Gilmour), part of the “Stand-by Bombarding Force” engaged in the bombardment of Italian coastal roads and fortifications as part of Operation “Compass”, the British offensive that would lead to the fall of Cyrenaica (Ferracuti, however, mistook his target for a larger and more modern Southampton-class cruiser).

Approaching on the surface, in position 32°37′ N and 26°44′ E (80 miles north-northwest of Marsa Matruh and 40 miles northeast of Sidi el Barrani), at 08:36 PM (or 08:42 PM) the submarine launched a salvo of four torpedoes (three 533 mm and one 450 mm) against the cruiser, then remained on the surface without moving away so that it could observe the result of the launch. One of the four torpedoes hit H.M.S. Coventry forward of the bridge, removing most of the forward hull (but without causing any loss among the crew); the cruiser reacts by opening fire on Neghelli, which however manages to escape without damage (while the next day the Naiade, who was in the same area, will be the unfortunate victim of an attack).

H.M.S. Coventry was a Ceres sub-class of the Royal Navy’s C-type light cruisers

H.M.S. Coventry managed to return to Alexandria, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Janus, and H.M.S. Hereward, but needed repairs that lasted until January 20^th, 1941 (returning to operation in March) and suffered a permanent decrease in speed from 29 knots to 23 knots.

Neghelli’s action was announced in war bulletin no. 191 of December 15^th, 1940, which spoke of the sinking, and not damage, of the British cruiser (“The submarine Neghelli, under the command of corvette captain Carlo Ferracuti, torpedoed and sank off the Egyptian coast an enemy cruiser of the Southampton type“). Commander Ferracuti would be decorated with a Silver Medal for Military Valor.

The Last Attack

On January 14^th, 1941, Neghelli, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlo Ferracuti and with 46 crewmen (5 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers, sub-chiefs and sailors; another officer, Giacomo Gaudino, remained ashore due to a sudden fever), left Leros for a new mission off the Aegean islands, an offensive ambush on the route to Piraeus. The boat, however, was never heard from again after leaving the base.

The tale of Neghelli’s last attack was learned at the end of the war, from the archives of the former enemy. On the morning of January 19^th, 1941, Ferracuti’s boat attacked the Greek destroyer Psara without result, and then, at 11:53 AM, the British convoy “AS. 12′, sailing from Piraeus (from where it had departed at eight o’clock that day) to Alexandria as part of the British operation ‘Excess’ with the steamers Clan Cumming, Clan MacDonald and Empire Song escorted by the British anti-aircraft cruiser H.M.S. Calcutta and the destroyers, also British, H.M.S. Defender, H.M.S. Janus and H.M.S. Greyhound. Neghelli hit the Clan Cumming (7,264 GRT) with a torpedo, in position 37°15′ N and 24°04′ E (off the island of Agios Georgios, 20 miles east-north-east of the island of Serifos and 25 miles south of Piraeus), damaging it so badly that it was forced to return to Piraeus escorted by H.M.S. Janus.

S/S Clan Cumming

Immediately afterwards H.M.S. Greyhound (Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A’Deane) counterattacked with depth charges (also assisted by another destroyer, H.M.S. Ilex, which, however, did not drop any depth charges), sinking Neghelli with its entire crew 48 miles by 160.4° from Athens, 40 miles northeast of the island of Falkonera (TN also known as Gerakoulia).

H.M.S. Greyhound’s anti-submarine action was considered to have had “questionable results”, but Neghelli never returned to base, and, although there was no news of it since its departure from Leros on January 14th, there were no other Italian submarines in the area that could have torpedoed the Cumming Clan, nor were there any that were lost during that period. (TN H.M.S. Greyhound obtained an ASDIC contact at 1,800 meters and carried out three attacks with a total of eighteen depth-charges (5 at 11:30 AM, 6 at 11:39 AM and 7 at 11:46 AM) set at 30, 45, 75 and 150 meters, however no result, such as a debris or a oil, could be observed.)

Some Greek sources still attribute the sinking of Neghelli to the Greek submarine Triton (under the command of Lieutenant Dyonisios Zeppos, who was promoted for this alleged success), which at 00.17 AM on  January 9^th, 1941, while submerged in the Otranto channel, launched two torpedoes against a submarine sighted in the moonlight and claimed to have seen it explode and sink (the submarine was seen only by Commander Zeppos,  whose account was partially corroborated by the third officer and a sailor, who heard the explosion and saw a column of smoke through the periscope but they were unable to figure out what kind of unit had been hit). This was not possible, given that on January 9^th, Neghelli was still in port (which the unit left only five days later). Probably the Triton attacked another unit, mistaken for a submarine, and – since there were no compatible losses in terms of date and place – the sinking was only an erroneous impression like those obtained in countless circumstances by submariners of all navies.

A second Silver Medal for Military Valour was awarded to the memory of Commander Carlo Ferracuti, born in San Pietro di Feletto (TV) on  January 9^th, 1906, with the following motivation:

«Commander of a submarine deployed in waters particularly dangerous to the adversary, he carried out numerous war missions, torpedoing, among other things, a cruiser of 9,000 tons. In the midst of dangers and many pitfalls, he showed serene courage, professional skill and contempt for danger. He disappeared at sea fighting for his homeland following the sinking of the Unit under his command.

Mediterranean, 10 June 1940 – 22 January 1941.”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	9		5226	714	51	116.47	4.85

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
12/13/1940	22:22	T.V. Carlo Ferracuti	Mediterranean	32°37’N-26°44’E		Torpedo	Damaged	H.M.S. Coventry	Anti-Aircraft Cruiser	4190	Great Britain
1/19/1941		T.V. Carlo Ferracuti	Mediterranean			Torpedo	Failed	Psara	Destroyer		Greece
1/19/1941	11:53	T.V. Carlo Ferracuti	Mediterranean	37°15’N-24°04’E		Torpedo	Damaged	Clan Cumming	Steam Freighter	7264	Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Ammaturo	Ascanio	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Baggioli	Alessandro	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Becciolini	Stefano	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Begherini	Ghino	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
Blazer	Ferruccio	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Brignola	Mario	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	1/19/1941
Carli	Egidio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
De benedictis	Giacinto	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
Delfino	Cristoforo	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Delfino	Lorenzo	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Di Martino	Angelo	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Ferracuti	Carlo	Lieutenant Commander	Capitano di Corvetta	1/19/1941
Fiorino	Vito	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Gaiardelli	Luigi	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Gelli	Ludovico	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Gentino	Dino	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Giacomazzo	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Guaschi	Angelo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Guglia	Rodolfo	Ensign	Guardiamarina	1/19/1941
Iacobellis	Luigi	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Iodice	Nicola	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Lacirignola	Giovanni	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Lanna	Pasquale	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Luise	Guido	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Macchia	Edoardo	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe	1/19/1941
Manfrini	Rino	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Marsilio	Costantino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Marzetti	Raffaele	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Masserani	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
Mattiazzi	Ugolino	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	1/19/1941
Mazza	Ezio	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Molaro	Adolfo	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Munafa	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Niola	Costantino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Paladini	Francesco	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Petrucci	Giorgio	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Pizzorna	Giuseppe	Ensign	Guardiamarina	1/19/1941
Pucci	Ezio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
Rezzani	Francesco	Lieutenant Other Branches	Capitano G.N.	1/19/1941
Ricca	Renato	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Sangani	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Saverino	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	1/19/1941
Tarantino	Edoardo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	1/19/1941
Tucci	Armando	Sergeant	Sergente	1/19/1941
Vallini	Augusto	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Valsecchi	Pietro	Naval Rating	Comune	1/19/1941
Meneghelli	Ardito	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	6/7/1942

The submarine Lafolè was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed five war missions (four patrol and a transfer), covering a total of 2,442 miles on the surface and 901 miles submerged, and spent 40 days at sea.

Brief and Partial Chronology

June 30th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

April 10th, 1938

Launched at the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyard (La Spezia).

The launch of the Lafolè

August 13th, 1938

Entry into service.

December 12th, 1938

Deployed in Leros under the command of Maricosom (the command of the Italian submarine fleet) and precisely of the V Submarine Group.

May 1940

Assigned to the LXII Submarine Squadron (VI Submarine Group) and deployed to Tobruk, under the command of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini.

Lafolè at sea
(From “Sommergibili italiani” By Alessandro Turrini andOttorino Ottone Miozzi, U.S.M.M.)

June 10th, 1940

With Italy’s entry into the World War II, Lafolè, which was still part of the LXII Squadron based in Tobruk (along with Topazio, Nereide, Diamante and Galatea), was first sent off Sollum (where it forms a barrage together with Diamante, Topazio and Nereide, positioned with an interval of 20 miles from each other starting from a point 30 miles by 30° from Ras Azzaz),  to protect the ports of Cyrenaica and, if possible, to attack enemy ships sailing between Alexandria and Malta, and then off Tobruk, on an offensive patrol.

June 20th, 1940

The boat returned from the patrol without having spotted any enemy ships.

July 3rd, 1940

Lafolè was sent to lie in wait on the Gavdos-Derna junction (in the middle of the junction itself) along with other submarines.

July 7^th and 8^th, 1940

The crew detects enemy ships engaged in intense anti-submarine activity (a convoy returning from Malta to Alexandria was in fact at sea) but failed to locate them.

July 14th, 1940

Lafolè returned to base without having made any sightings.

September 21st, 1940

The boat was sent to ambush at night in the Gulf of Taranto. In September it carried out other anti-submarine defensive ambush missions in the Gulf of Taranto.

The Sinking

On October 8 (or 10),1940, Lafolè (Lieutenant Pietro Riccomini) left Taranto to reach the patrol sector assigned to it, bounded to the north by the parallel 35°40′ N and to the south by the stretch of Moroccan coast between Cape Quillates and Cape Agua, east of Gibraltar. When the mission was over, the boat was supposed to pass through the Strait of Bonifacio and then reach Naples: but this would never happen.

On October 15th, the submarine reached the assigned area, southeast of the island of Alborán and north of Cape Tres Forcas (not far from Melilla) and began patrolling it.

Five days later, at about eleven o’clock in the morning of October 20th, Lafolè sighted 12 miles north of Cape Tres Forcas two British destroyers, H.M.S. Gallant, and H.M.S. Griffin, which were swinging in systematic anti-submarine search at low speed, apparently unaware of its presence. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the submarine closed the distance up to 500 meters, in an attempt to attack.

What Commander Riccomini could not have known, however, was that the British were fully aware of the presence of his unit. Two days earlier, in fact, the submarine Durbo (twin of Lafolè), also on a mission not far from Lafolè (the two submarines had been sent together to patrol the waters east of Gibraltar), had been sunk by the destroyers H.M.S. Firedrake and H.M.S. Wrestler,  and a British boarding party, before the boat sank, had managed to get on board and capture ciphers, orders of operation and other documents, in which was indicated, among other things, the position of Lafolè, that is, off Cape Tres Forcas.

Six destroyers (H.M.S. Gallant, H.M.S. Griffin, H.M.S. Hotspur, H.M.S. Forester and two others) had set out from Gibraltar to hunt down the submarine in the area where it was supposed to be. When Lafolè had sighted H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin, they had also detected the presence of the Italian boat but had not gone on the counterattack so as not to arouse suspicion. While Lafolè was approaching to attack them, the third destroyer belonging to the trap device, H.M.S. Hotspur, had moved to 5,000-6,000 meters from Riccomini’s submarine (who had not realized it), with a very narrow beta, in the opposite direction to that where H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin were. The boat was thus surrounded. Listened to for some time, the Italian submarine was allowed to get as close as possible, and then went on the counterattack as soon as it hinted at launching torpedoes.

Having arrived at a suitable distance to attack, Lafolè launched a first torpedo with its stern tubes, and immediately all three destroyers (first H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin, and then also H.M.S. Hotspur which had meanwhile arrived on the point) went on the counterattack, bombarding the Italian unit with depth charges. Already the first discharge of bombs caused serious damage to the submarine, knocking out the electric motors and trim pumps, deforming the shafts of the propellers and opening waterways. The damage suffered (including waterways) prevented Lafolè from maneuvering and maintaining trim and depth, so that the submarine swung sharply at various depths and repeatedly found itself coming onto the surface, but the crew always managed to bring it back to the depths in an attempt to escape the hunt.

Despite everything, Lafolè managed to remain submerged for seven hours, resisting the very hard anti-submarine hunt, but having to proceed at very low speed, it was continuously subjected to the launch of depth charges. At 6.30 PM (5.30 PM for another source), however, the submarine, having lost the ability to control depth abruptly, surfaced once again, and this time its entire conning tower came out of the water (according to another version, the surfacing maneuver was wanted and ordered by Commander Riccomini, who intended to take advantage of it to reduce the excessive internal pressure so that it could then dive again):  this just as H.M.S. Hotspur arrived at full force to carry out a new launch of depth charges (for one version the submarine, surfaced, was also strafed, and was deliberately rammed to prevent that, having reached the surface, it could try to react with the cannon). The collision was inevitable: rammed by H.M.S. Hotspur, Lafolè sank in a few moments at 35°50′ N and 02°53′ W (or 36°00′ N and 03°00′ W), north of Melilla, together with 40 men, including Commander Riccomini and three officers.

The moment in which H.M.S. Hotspur rammed the submarine Lafolè

It could have been the end for everyone, but nine, out of the 49 men who made up the submarine’s crew, surprisingly made it out alive. When Lafolè had come onto the surface, the second-in-command, Lieutenant Giuseppe Accardi, with eight men had tried to open the hatch of the conning tower to reduce the internal pressure: just at that moment the ramming had taken place, and it was precisely the internal pressure that had thrown Accardi and the other eight men (including the sailors Agostino Di Bartolomeo and Antonio Anastasio) outside,  through the gash that the bow of the Hotspur had opened in the hull and conning tower of the submarine (for another version through the hatch itself). Air bubbles escaping from the sinking hull brought them to the surface. It was H.M.S. Hotspur himself who rescued seven of the survivors, while H.M.S. Gallant rescued the other two. H.M.S. Hotspur, whose hull structures had suffered severe damage in the collision, would require repairs that would last until February 20^th, 1941. The survivors of Lafolè, by then prisoners of war, were disembarked in Gibraltar.

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to the memory of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini, born in Modena on October 2, 1908:

“Commander of a submarine, during a risky war mission he boldly attacked two enemy destroyers escorted by aircraft with torpedoes. Subjected to violent and prolonged hunting, with the engine apparatus unused and serious infiltration of water on board, with shrewd and daring maneuvers, he tried to escape the enemy reaction, facing the adverse fate with serene determination and great skill. In a last-ditch attempt to prolong the resistance and elude the hunt to which he was subjected, with admirable coolness he ordered the rapid emergence of the unit, in order to reduce the high internal pressure by opening a hatch and then resume diving again. In his daring intent he found a glorious end with the unit, which sank, hit by a new enemy offense. An example of exceptional leadership virtues and sublime attack on duty.

(Central Mediterranean, 20 October 1940).”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	5		2442	901	40	83.57	3.48

Actions

Date

Time

Captain

Area

Coordinates

Convoy

Weapon

Result

Ship

Type

Tonns

Flag

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Ancorato	Vittorio	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Arrabbito	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Baldini	Fernando	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Bruceri	Alfonso	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Busoni	Aldo	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Cafaro	Giulio	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	10/20/1940
Castello	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	10/20/1940
D’ambrogio	Gino	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Dazzara	Renato	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
De Carli	Silvio	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Del Bà	Astemio	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Di Giuseppe	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Farnetti	Arrigo	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe	10/20/1940
Federici	Mario	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.	10/20/1940
Ghiringhelli	Celestino	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Macorini	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Martuccelli	Antonino	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Migliorati	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Molino	Pietro	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Molino	Vincenzo	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	10/20/1940
Nuzzo	Vitale	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Palmieri	Giuseppe	Sergeant	Sergente	10/20/1940
Pedicini	Carlo	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	10/20/1940
Piazza	Carmelo	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Piazza	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Pizzi	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Porracin	Mario	Sergeant	Sergente	10/20/1940
Possenti	Modesto	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Riccomini	Piero	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	10/20/1940
Rietti	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Romano	Gaetano	Ensign	Guardiamarina	10/20/1940
Ruggero	Antonio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	10/20/1940
Russo	Vittorio	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Salmoiraghi	Angelino	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Stroppiana	Nevio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	10/20/1940
Tani	Romeo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	10/20/1940
Targhi	Osvaldo	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Tezza	Ugo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	10/20/1940
Tosini	Aniello	Naval Rating	Comune	10/20/1940
Zaccarà	Mario	Sergeant	Sergente	10/20/1940

Gondar was a coastal submarine of the Adwa-class (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). During World War II, the boat completed a total of 4 patrols, covering 3,440 miles on the surface and 534 submerged for a total of 33 days spent at sea.

Brief and partial chronology

January 15th, 1937

Setting up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

October 3rd, 1937

Launch in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

The launch of the Gondar in Muggiano, La Spezia

February 28th, 1938

Entry into service.

The Gondar near La Spezia in 1938

June 10th, 1940

On the date of Italy’s entry into the World War II, Gondar was part of the XV Submarine Squadron (based in La Spezia, under the command of the I Grupsom), which it formed together with the twin boats Neghelli, Ascianghi and Scirè. Gondar was immediately sent into on patrol west of the Gulf of Genoa, off the French Riviera.

June 14th, 1940

Gondar was unsuccessfully attacked by a Vought SB2U Vindicator dive bomber (V-156) of the AB3 squadron of the French naval aviation, operating in support of the French naval squadron (cruisers Foch, Algerie, Dupleix and Colbert and eleven destroyers) which was carrying out a bombardment of Genoa and Savona. On the same day, the submarine returned to base without encountering any enemy ships.

The submarine Gondar at sea

June 18th, 1940

The boat set off for the second war patrol (TN under the command of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini).

June 25th, 1940

The boat returned to base.

August 5th, 1940

Gondar was sent on patrol east of Gibraltar, along with the submarines Ascianghi and Marcello.

August 16th, 1940

Gondar returned to base.

The Gondar in La Spezia being fitted with the SLC carriers

Slow-moving Torpedoes

When Italy entered the World War II, on 10 June 1940, the I Flotilla MAS, the special unit of the Regia Marina in charge of preparing and carrying out raids with insidious means against enemy ports (only on March 15^th, 1941, this unit would take the name of X Flotilla MAS, with which it would become famous), was far from being ready for action.  Formed just over a year earlier, on April 23rd, 1939, the Flotilla was still in the training phase, as well as short of resources.

At the end of July 1940, Admiral Raffaele De Courten, superintendent of assault craft at Supermarina, verbally invited the commander of the I Flotilla MAS, frigate captain Mario Giorgini, to prepare an attack on Alexandria – the Royal Navy’s main base in the Mediterranean – with the use of Slow Running Torpedoes (SLC), better known as “pigs”.

This first mission, called “G.A. 1”, ended in tragedy before it even began: the submarine in charge of taking the SLCs to Alexandria, Iride, was in fact sighted by British air reconnaissance and sunk by torpedo bombers in the Gulf of Bomba, in Cyrenaica, together with the support ship Monte Gargano.

This was on August 22nd, 1940, but at the same time two other submarines were already undergoing the modification works necessary to transform them into carriers for slow-moving torpedoes, they were Gondar and the twin boat Scirè

Gondar with the SLC carriers fitted docked next to the Argo

While the system for the transport and release of the SLCs adopted on the Iride was very rudimentary (the assault craft were simply placed and harnessed on two pairs of saddles on the deck of the submarine), Gondar and Scirè (in August-September 1940) underwent more specific adaptation works. Both submarines were equipped with watertight container cylinders, positioned on deck, in which to place the SLCs (the Gondar, on which work began at the end of August 1940, was the first submarine of the Regia Marina to be equipped with such cylinders).

This device, designed by the Odero Terni Orlando shipyard in La Spezia, made it possible, among other things, to dive and activate the SLCs up to a depth of 90 meters, against the maximum of only 30 meters allowed by the method used on the Iride. In addition, the support of any other unit was not necessary, and it was possible to transport the SLCs from the start, eliminating the intermediate stopovers that had been fatal to the Iris.

There were three cylinders, one located forward of the conning tower and the other two (side by side) aft of the same. Each of them weighed 2.8 tons and could withstand, as mentioned, a pressure equal to that of 90 meters deep, i.e. the maximum test depth of the Adwa-class submarines. The cylinders were connected to the submarine (by means of a system of valves and pipes that could be operated from inside the submarine) to be flooded (each cylinder could hold 21.75 tons of water) and drained, as well as for the ventilation necessary for the SLC batteries (there were also electrical systems to keep the latter charged). Each cylinder was closed by a hemispherical watertight hatch, with side opening. The forward cylinder of Gondar had no reinforcing rings, the only difference compared to those of the submarine Scirè. On the other hand, to lighten the overall weight, the 100/47 mm deck gun, its ammunition, two torpedoes and other weights deemed superfluous were eliminated.

Top, the forward container without the reinforcing rings. Below the aft contains

There were two possible methods for the release of SLCs. One was for the submarine to surface (with only the top of the conning tower above the surface), stationary, and for the SLC operators to exit from inside the unit through the upper hatch, walk along the deck to the cylinders, which in the meantime was flooded, open the hatches, extract the SLCs, close the hatches and set the SLCs in motion, heading towards the target.

In the second case, however, the submarine had to lie on the seabed at a depth of a dozen meters; the raiders, equipped with breathing apparatus, would escape from the floodable escape compartment, opened the cylinder doors (meanwhile flooded), extracted the SLCs and headed towards their targets.

Already a few days after the sinking of the Iride, the Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, sent a new mission order to Commander Giorgini. This time the I Flotilla MAS was to conduct an almost simultaneous attack against both Alexandria (headquarters of the Mediterranean Fleet) and Gibraltar (headquarters of Force H), again using SLCs.

Gondar and Scirè, on which the work of adapting to SLC carriers (carried out in the shipyard of La Spezia) was being completed, were therefore immediately chosen for this mission: Gondar was to attack Alexandria, Scirè Gibraltar.

Lieutenant Francesco Brunetti, former commander – and shipwrecked – of the lost Iride in the ill-fated operation “G.A. 1” was appointed to command the Gondar (TN replacing Lieutenant Piero Riccomini). He had asked to be able to complete the mission begun with the Iride, to avenge his men who perished in the sinking. They wanted to avenge the defeat and the deaths in the Gulf of Bomba. Hitting Alexandria would now become a matter of principle for the 1st Flotilla MAS, but it would be more than a year before the enterprise would be crowned with success.

On September 19^th, 1940, Supermarina sent Commander Giorgini order number 4973, which sanctioned the start of Operation “G.A. 2” against Alexandria in Egypt. The raid was scheduled to take place on the night of September 28^th-29th (to take advantage of the moon at the last quarter), or, in case of delays (due to interference by British ships or aircraft, or due to slow navigation), the following night. The release of the SLCs was to be accomplished in half an hour.

S.L.C.

The very detailed order of operation provided for the SLC raiders to choose battleships as their priority target, with aircraft carriers as their second choice, followed in order of precedence by the floating dock and cruisers. The SLC warheads, weighing 225 kg each, had to be adjusted to explode after two hours. Each raider would be provided with £10. Once their mission was accomplished, the crews of the SLCs were to destroy their vessels, if possible, near one of the French warships interned in Alexandria since the surrender of France, then board these ships and declare themselves officers of the Regia Marina in permanent effective service (for this purpose they would have to be provided with the identification card),  refraining from saying anything else about their mission. To maintain contact with Supermarina, Gondar would have used the special code ‘G’.

On Gondar were then embarked the three SLCs destined to force the port of Alessandria and their crews, each composed of two men: the first was formed by the lieutenant Alberto Branzini and the ensign Alberto Cacioppo, the second by the captain of the Naval Engineers Elios Toschi (who, with his colleague and friend Teseo Tesei, had been the inventor of the slow-moving torpedo) and by the diver sergeant Umberto Ragnati, the third by Naval Weapons Captain Gustavo Stefanini and Diver Sergeant Alessandro Scappino. The three SLCs were loaded in La Spezia (where they were immediately placed in the container cylinders), while the crews would board in Messina, where Gondar arrived at 09:00 PM on September 23rd, after leaving La Spezia on the night of the 21st.

In addition to the six men who formed the crews of the SLCs, Commander Giorgini himself went up to Gondar in Messina, as head of the mission, and three reserve operators, in charge of replacing the men of the SLCs in case of need. They were Ensign Aristide Calcagno, Sergeant Diver Giovanni Lazzaroni and Chief Electrician Second Class Cipriano Cipriani.

Toschi and Lazzaroni were veterans of the failed operation of the “G.A. 1”, in which, shipwrecked after the sinking of the Iride, they had helped to save some sailors trapped in the wreck of the submarine.

After disembarking part of the secret archive and replenishing its supplies of fuel and water at night, Gondar set sail from Messina at 07.30 AM on September 24^th, 1940, bound for Alessandria. It was planned for the submarine to reach a predetermined point, called “D”, to check that everything was quiet on the surface. If that verification was successful, it would then have continued to a second conventional point, ‘A’, where the SLCs would be released, which would then enter the port of Alexandria. The navigation approaching the target, which took place at night on the surface and during the day submerged to avoid being spotted, was not characterized by any significant events. Several ships were sighted, none of which, however, sighted the Italian boat.

Gondar arrived off the coast of Egypt on the night of September28th-29th, as planned, but the situation was far from calm: a British corvette was sighted, which forced the submarine to dive. After a couple of hours, Gondar resurfaced, with no more ships in sight.

On the night between the 28th and the 29th, the boat had to dive again. Hydrophones reported the noise of at least three turbine-driven ships sailing nearby, and later also the sounds of the engines of other ships moving away. Numerous ships were sighted, at distances between 500 and 2,000 meters: on board it was not known, but it was the Mediterranean Fleet, which went out to sea for operation “MB. 5».

Around 07:00 PM on the 29th, with some delay (but not enough to prevent the SLCs from being released for the attack on the port), Gondar emerged only six miles (for another source, 22 miles) from Alexandria, also to change air and recharge the batteries, but after a few minutes he was reached by a message from Supermarina, ordering Gondar to reach Tobruk and then await further orders.

This was because Supermarina had been informed, while Gondar was sailing towards Alexandria, that the entire Mediterranean Fleet (battleships H.M.S. Valiant and H.M.S. Warspite, aircraft carriers H.M.S. Illustrious, cruisers H.M.S. York, H.M.S. Sydney and H.M.S. Orion and destroyers H.M.S. Hyperion, H.M.S. Hero, H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Imperial, H.M.S. Ilex, H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Juno, H.M.S. Janus, H.M.S. Mohawk, H.M.S. Nubian and H.M.S. Stuart) had left Alexandria on the 28th to provide support for an attempt to reinforce the garrison of Malta by sending 2,000 men  embarked on the cruisers H.M.S. Liverpool and H.M.S. Gloucester; the aforementioned operation “MB. 5». Alexandria had no battleships, aircraft carriers or cruisers left: no valuable targets, and Gondar’s mission had become useless. At 01.55 PM Supermarina had therefore sent the message PAPA ( (Absolute Precedence over Absolute Precedence) no. 28644 to the Naval Command of Tobruk, in which the latter was informed that Gondar had been ordered to reach this base. Marina Tobruk was to inform Commander Giorgini that Operation “G.A. 2” was postponed due to the sudden departure of the main forces, and that Gondar should be ready to leave as soon as the Mediterranean Fleet returned to port.

But the submarine, sailing submerged, had not been able to receive the message until the last moment, when it had surfaced, on the evening of the 29th.

Having received the message, Gondar changed course to reach Tobruk, continuing to recharge its batteries, but at about 20.30 it sighted an enemy ship (according to another source, two) starboard in the bow, at a distance of one and a half kilometers, sailing alongside: it was the Australian destroyer H.M.A.S. Stuart, under the command of the Lieutenant Commander Norman Joseph MacDonald Teacher (who was normally the navigation officer and had just assumed command of the ship – which was supposed to reach Malta for work – replacing the actual  commander, Lieutenant Captain Robinson, who fell ill). H.M.A.S. Stuart, which went out to sea for operation “MB. 5” with the rest of the Mediterranean Fleet, was now returning to Alexandria at 10 knots due to boiler failures (a steam pipe had burst), taking advantage of this to conduct anti-submarine rakes with sonar. The Italian boat immediately dove to a depth of 80 meters, 110 miles by 300° from the lighthouse of Alessandria (i.e., northwest of that base, as well as north of Sollum). On board they arranged for the silent trim, stopping the engines and any other machinery, but shortly afterwards H.M.A.S. Stuart’s Asdic (which, according to one version, had spotted it from the bridge before it dove) spotted it, and the hunt began.

According to an article by Alan Payne and L. J. Lind in the June 1977 Naval Historical Review, it was at 10:15 PM that H.M.A.S. Stuart made contact with Asdic, namely that a submarine, starboard forward 2,700 yards away, was slowly crossing its course from starboard to port. Second Lieutenants J. G. Griffin and T. S. Cree (the latter was the officer in charge of Asdic) and Petty Officers Ronald A. H. MacDonald and L. T. Pike were on sonar duty; The contact was very sharp.

On the submarine Gondar, Brunetti understood from the hydrophones that the submarine had been discovered.

At 10:20 PM (according to Italian sources, 15 minutes after the submarine had submerged) H.M.A.S. Stuart sailed up the course of Gondar and launched a first package of six depth charges, at the same time throwing a calcium fire into the water to illuminate the surface of the sea and facilitate the sighting of any wreckage or fuel slicks.

Aboard Gondar, the explosion of the first depth charges (which, according to a source, occurred while the immersion maneuver was still in progress) knocked out the depth gauges, blew out the lights, and caused the cylinder-containers of the SLCs to flood.

More bomb discharges followed, once an hour (between four and six bombs per discharge), intermittently but regularly. After the first attack, H.M.A.S. Stuart regained contact aft to port, 1,370 yards away, but a defect in the Asdic apparatus made it difficult to maintain contact; fearing that this might cause him to escape his prey, Teacher contacted Alexandria and asked for some other units to be sent to help. A second destroyer, H.M.S. Diamond departed from Alexandria. According to Italian sources, the vessel arrived on the spot at 10.30 PM, together with a “corvette”, but according to British sources, in reality, H.M.S. Diamond arrived on the spot at the end of the hunt, when Gondar was already sinking (or even later), and it was only H.M.S. Stuart that conducted the hunt during the night, even if on Gondar there was the impression (from the hydrophones) of being hunted by three ships,  two of which came later.

At 10:45 PM Lieutenant Cree of H.M.A.S. Stuart reported the position of the target to the bridge, and the destroyer reduced speed to 12 knots, dropped five more depth charges, and fired another charge into the sea, but again no wreckage or fuel was sighted. The effect of this second attack, however, was devastating: the bombs exploded under the submarine, damaging various instruments, other pressure gauges and a fuel tank (which began to leak) and disabling the Gondar’s air purification apparatus, thus reducing the maximum time the submarine could stay submerged. Then, water started seeping into the aft area.

Between attacks, H.M.A.S. Stuart began to cross over the vertical of the Gondar, continuously executing mock attacks at high speed, to unnerve the submarine’s crew. It was probably this set of maneuvers that convinced the men of Gondar that not one, but three enemy ships were hunting them.

At one o’clock in the morning of the 30th, H.M.A.S. Stuart circled the submerged submarine, at a distance of between 1,370 and 18,30 meters, to ascertain its position, then launched a third discharge of depth charges; The fourth discharge followed at four o’clock in the morning, the fifth at 5.30 AM. Between 5:30 and 6:25 AM., H.M.A.S. Stuart carried out a series of mock attacks for demoralizing purposes, then carried out a final bomb drop at 6:25 AM. The first light of day revealed small fuel slicks to the Australian crew, indicating that the submarine had been damaged.

Within a few hours, about fifty depth charges were dropped, all of which exploded very close to Gondar. The crew of the submarine, gathered in small groups of four or five men, could do nothing but listen to the sound of the ship coming and going (or rather, of the ships, since they seemed to be three) and waiting in silence and semi-darkness for the bombs to explode, hoping that they were not too close. It was hot, there was no air, and the floor was strewn with fuel leaking from a damaged tank. Each time the submarine was violently shaken by the explosions, the bulkheads threatened to give way. The night seemed to go on forever.

The concussions caused by the detonations of the bombs also caused various water infiltrations, and gradually knocked out the Gondar’s equipment.

The chief engineer, Lieutenant of the Naval Engineers Vincenzo Cicirello, examined the apparatus for air purification and tried to fix it, but without success. He reported the situation to Commander Brunetti, who shook his head and ordered some air to be released, in the hope of improving the internal situation a little, but nothing changed.

After six hours of immobility, Commander Brunetti made an attempt to get away and escape, correcting his depth from time to time, but the “characteristic noise like a whip, similar to that produced by lead pellets falling on a metal sheet” persisted. The sign that the enemy’s Asdic did not let go. (According to another version, in the interval between two bomb drops, Gondar managed to get away, but, when he thought, he had probably managed to disengage from the enemy, he was again located and bombarded with other depth charges, very well centered).

At a certain point, probably because of the damage suffered, Gondar began to rise involuntarily in depth, reaching a depth of 40 meters. This allowed depth charge discharges to have even more devastating effects.

Five minutes after the water raised by H.M.A.S. Stuart’s last bomb blast (at 6:25 AM) had subsided, the anti-submarine seaplane Short Sunderland Mk I number L2166 (the “U” aircraft of the 230th Squadron of the Royal Air Force), piloted by Captain P. H. Alington and Lieutenant Brand, also arrived from the south. Taking off from Alexandria at 5.30 AM, once on the spot (indicated by the pilot as 31°35′ N and 28°43′ E) the plane circled H.M.A.S. Stuart, made a light signal of recognition and then began to fly over the sea at low altitude, in search of the submarine. An hour later (according to another source, at seven o’clock in the morning), as if that were not enough, the anti-submarine trawler H.M.S. Sindonis also arrived on the scene and joined the hunt.

The Gondar photographed by the crew of the Sunderland
(Imperial War Museum)

Gondar tried in every way to evade the chase, but after hours and hours of bombardment the damage became too serious to be able to hope to survive much longer. The efforts of the chief engineer Cicirello were no longer enough to repair the damage. At seven o’clock, a bomb exploded very close to Gondar and caused a violent change in depth. To counteract the waterways, the internal pressure had been raised to three atmospheres, almost exhausting the available reserve.

It was interesting to note a significant discrepancy between the British and Australian sources. According to Australian Navy sources, while this was happening, H.M.A.S. Stuart meanwhile kept the sonar contact with the submarine, which it never lost, until it emerged. According to Normak Franks’ book “Search, find and kill”, dedicated to the RAF’s successes in anti-submarine warfare, H.M.A.S. Stuart had lost contact when Alington’s Sunderland arrived on the scene. It was the seaplane that found the boat, when the crew spotted air bubbles surfacing a couple of miles from the destroyer. At this point Sunderland dropped a depth charge on the bubble sighted. The crew then spotted another bubble and dropped a second bomb on it, but this time the device did not explode. A third bomb exploded, and this time Gondar had to emerge.

According to Australian sources, at 8:20 AM (9:20 AM H.M.A.S. Stuart time) the Sunderland dropped a cluster of bombs about 2,700 meters deep forward of the Stuart.

In any case, around 8.30 AM Gondar began to take on water more copiously, while it was now impossible to maintain depth. Compressed air reserve was reduced to 30 kg/cm2, the minimum for attempting to surface. Commander Giorgini conferred with the officers and then, believing that the situation was now unbearable and that remaining submerged would have meant sinking at any moment with the total loss of the crew, he ordered Commander Brunetti to surface, abandon, and sink the boat by itself. Giorgini ordered Brunetti not to attempt an attack or launch torpedoes unless the submarine was in a suitable position to launch at the time of coming to the surface. So, it was done. The men put on their life jackets, and at 8.40 AM Commander Brunetti had the diving tank and the double central bottoms blown.

(A source, probably erroneous, gives a rather different version: at eight o’clock in the morning Gondar began to sink uncontrollably due to the damage suffered, so all the tanks were blown to stop the sinking; the submarine stopped at a depth of 155 meters, but then began to rise uncontrollably, with increasing speed, until it came to the surface).

According to some British sources, during the surfacing maneuver the Sunderland dropped a bomb on the air bubble from an altitude of 210 meters that signaled that the submarine was about to surface. This caused Gondar to lose control, which was at that time at a depth of about twenty meters, and which sank again to a depth of 90 meters, and then resumed the surfacing maneuver when all the tanks were blown.

Rising rapidly to the surface, at a speed of about 10 knots, the battered Gondar resurfaced one last time right in the middle of the enemy ships. Her bow came to the surface only 730 meters from the bow of H.M.A.S. Stuart. It was 9:20 AM, 11 hours had passed since the first depth charge attack.

H.M.A.S. Stuart immediately opened fire with all the guns, fortunately not very accurate (the destroyer was estimated to have passed the conning tower from side to side with a cannonade, while others fell all around the submarine), while H.M.S. Sindonis maneuvered to get closer, the Sunderland dropped one or perhaps three bombs, which exploded close to the submarine (Brunetti, in his report, spoke of two bombs, dropped from the Sunderland from about 50 meters above sea level, while the crew was abandoning the unit; they exploded about ten meters forward to port).

The Gondar sinking
(Australian War Memorial)

Gondar’s navigation officer, Ensign Giuseppe Dell’Oro, was instructed by Commander Brunetti to throw the box containing the secret publications into the sea, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. When he opened the hatch to be among the first, the strong pressure inside the submarine, much higher than the external one, threw him into the air, causing him to fall back on deck, wounded. After him, the men began to escape through the hatches of the bow and conning tower, jumping into the water.

On H.M.A.S. Stuart, after firing the first salvo, it was seen that the crew of Gondar was abandoning the unit, so firing ceased, and Commander Teacher ordered a dingy to be put to sea. The distance between the two units was just over 900 meters; some of the Italian sailors swam all the way aboard H.M.A.S. Stuart, while others were picked up by the dingy. They were soaked, dirty, and exhausted.

Commander Francesco Brunetti (in this picture already promoted to Captain)
(Giovanni Pinna Collection)

When almost the entire crew had thrown themselves into the sea, Commander Brunetti and some other men, including sailor electrician Luigi Longobardi, went down to the maneuvering room, opened the air vents of the surface, the double central bottoms and the rapid, to sink the submarine (according to some sources, they also activated a dozen explosive charges for self-destruction),  and then, having climbed back into the conning tower, they left the boat last (according to another version, Brunetti, after opening the Kingstone, climbed into the conning tower and waited for the submarine to sink under him, until he found himself in the water). Captain Giorgini made one last lap to check that there was no one left on board, then jumped into the sea.

Electrician  Luigi Longobardi
(Giovanni Pinna Collection)

Captain Teacher of H.M.A.S. Stuart had hoped to capture Gondar intact and tow it to Alexandria, but when the dingy moved to the side of the dying submarine, her occupants realized that the scuttling procedures had been initiated. Explosive charges exploded shortly after the last man had left the boat. Gradually but rapidly, Gondar settled and slid beneath the waves at 32°02′ N and 27°54′ E (according to Italian sources) or 31°33′ N and 28°33′ E (according to British sources; a dozen miles off Marsa Matruh, and 25 miles off El Daba), in water more than 2,000 meters deep. The bow of the submarine remained above the surface for five or ten minutes, before finally disappearing into the abyss. It was 9:25 AM (9:50 AM for another source) on September 30th, 1940.

The Sunderland, after flying over the sinking boat taking several photos, returned to its base, where it arrived at 10.30 AM.

H.M.A.S. Stuart rescuing some of the crewmembers of the Gondar photographed from the Sunderland

The Italian crew and raiders were rescued and taken prisoner by the British units. H.M.A.S. Stuart recovered 28 men, including Brunetti, Giorgini, Cicirello and a second lieutenant, while another 19 survivors, including Toschi, were recovered by the H.M.S. Sindonis.

Signaller L. E. Clifford later recalled that one of the survivors, while boarding H.M.A.S. Stuart, saw an Australian sailor armed with a rifle with a bayonet and shouted, “No kill”, misunderstanding the meaning of that presence. Commander Brunetti, who spoke fairly good English, stated that he had been forced to surface because the bombs had destroyed the air purification apparatus, it had not been possible to repair it, and the air had become unbreathable.

There was only one victim, the Neapolitan sailor Luigi Longobardi. Lingering on board, with the commander Brunetti and a few others, to provide for the sinking, he threw himself into the sea among the very last one and was probably killed at sea by the explosion of an airplane bomb. He was decorated with the Gold Medal for Military Valor, in memory.

(Strangely, British sources speak of two casualties among the crew of the Gondar, one of whom would have drowned and the other killed by a bomb from Sunderland: but the only one who fell among the crew of the submarine would have been Luigi Longobardi).

The sinking of Gondar was a hard blow for the young I Flotilla MAS: in one fell swoop a submarine SLC carrier, three SLCs, as many trained and capable crews and the commander of the flotilla himself had been lost.

As a result of the loss of the Gondar, moreover, the veil of secrecy that covered the assault craft employed by the 1st MAS Flotilla began to crack. When the submarine surfaced before sinking, in fact, British ships and planes did not fail to notice the unusual cylinders on its deck. The presence on the submarine of so many officers and divers also aroused many suspicions. Upon their arrival in Alexandria, the survivors were immediately interrogated, especially Giorgini, the highest ranking (who on H.M.A.S. Stuart had passed himself off, apparently successfully, as a destroyer commander embarked on Gondar as a passenger). The questions focused mainly on the cylinders and the presence of officers and divers. Giorgini did not answer, but a British Naval Intelligence officer surprised him when he asked him if he was the commander of the I Flotilla MAS based in La Spezia, and if, on the coast between La Spezia and Livorno, officers and non-commissioned officers were trained who would then have to attack British ports and naval bases in the Mediterranean.

According to the aforementioned article by Payne and Lind in the June 1977 Naval Historical Review, it was the commander of the Gondar, questioned by Teacher, who “broke down in tears” and revealed that the submarine was carrying three “human torpedoes” for an attack on the ship in the port of Alexandria.

One way or another, the British already knew something about the Flotilla’s activities, but this would not allow them to stop the attacks on Alexandria, Suda, Gibraltar and Algiers that would be launched in the years to come, once the Flotilla, having recovered from its initial losses and drawing on past experiences, had refined its methods.

On arrival in Alexandria, H.M.A.S. Stuart was given a hero’s welcome, especially – in very colorful terms – by the other units of the Australian destroyer flotilla (H.M.A.S. Vampire, H.M.A.S. Vendetta and H.M.A.S. Waterhen). Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, reported it to the fleet as “an outstanding example of a result obtained through patience and skill in the use of the Asdic (sonar) apparatus”. The commander of H.M.A.S. Stuart was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order for the sinking of the Gondar, while the sonar officers (Second Lieutenants J. G. Griffin and T. S. Cree and Petty Officers Ronald A. H. MacDonald and L. T. Pike) received the Distinguished Service Cross (the two officers) and the Distinguished Service Medal (the two non-commissioned officers).

The men of Gondar first ended up in the prison camp of Geneifa, Egypt, where the survivors of the submarines Berillo, Rubino, Galvani and Uebi Scebeli and other units sunk during the summer of 1940 were already located; later they were transferred to various prison camps in India.

Not everyone resigned themselves to spending the rest of the war behind a fence. Elios Toschi, in particular, after passing through the camps of Ahmednagar and Ramgarh, ended up in Yol, a camp reserved for prisoners who had already tried several times to escape. From there Toschi escaped together with the Lieutenant Commander Camillo Milesi Ferretti, former commander of the submarine Berillo. Their paths diverged and Toschi, who had attempted to cross the Himalayas to try to return to Italy, was recaptured. Fleeing again, Toschi finally took refuge in neutral Portuguese India.

Captain Naval Weapons Gustavo Stefanini, future managing director of OTO Melara, remained a prisoner in Bangalore until 1946; Commander Giorgini also remained in captivity until April 1946, while Commander Brunetti was repatriated in 1944, during the co-belligerence.

After the war, Stefanini returned to the Italian defense industrial scene, becoming CEO of OTO Melara.
He was the ‘father’ of the 76mm gun mount, the most prolific and successful naval gun mount of modern times.
(Naval Historical Society of Australia)

The motivation for the Gold Medal for Military Valor awarded to the memory of the electrician sailor Luigi Longobardi, born in Lettere (NA) on April 22, 1920:

“An electrician embarked on a submarine attacked with depth charges by three enemy ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours, he worked tirelessly in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him with skill and determination. When it became necessary to emerge in order to scuttle the submarine that had been unused by the explosions of the bombs, he gave proof of exceptional courage and a deep sense of duty, remaining at his post until the last possible possibilities in order to contribute to the salvation of the Unit. Throwing himself into the sea in his last moments, he was hit by the explosion of bombs dropped from an airplane and sacrificed his young life for an extreme ideal of his homeland that had kept him on the ship beyond his duty. Eastern Mediterranean, 30 September 1940.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Lieutenant Francesco Brunetti, born in La Spezia on November 20, 1909:

“Commander of a submarine destined to carry out the offensive with special means to an armed enemy naval base, he was attacked with depth charges by three ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours. In difficult conditions due to continuous serious damage suffered by the submarine, he tried by every means to escape the persistent enemy chase until every further attempt at resistance was frustrated, he did his utmost and arranged for the crew to abandon the submarine in a disciplined and rapid manner. Oblivious to the artillery fire and the throwing of bombs by the unit, which it abandoned only when the force of the sea tore it from the bridge. An example of cold blood, skill and a high sense of duty.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Lieutenant Vincenzo Cicirello of the Naval Engineers Machinery Directorate:

“Chief Engineer of a submarine attacked with depth charges by three enemy ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours, in difficult environmental conditions due to continuous serious failures reported by the unit, he worked tirelessly to repair the failures themselves and effectively assisted the commander in prolonging the submarine’s resistance as much as possible. He left the unit only at the command of the commander, showing a cool head, a spirit of sacrifice and a high sense of duty.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Ensign Giuseppe Dell’Oro:

“A course officer of submarines attacked with depth charges… he worked tirelessly to ensure the smooth running of his service. Having been ordered to be one of the first to abandon the unit to throw the box of secret publications into the sea, he managed to carry out the order, despite the fact that when he came out of the hatch he was thrown onto the deck by the strong internal pressure, being injured.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valour awarded to frigate captain Mario Giorgini, born in Massa Carrara on March 19, 1900:

“Embarked on a submarine as the leader of an expedition of assault vehicles destined for a risky mission against an enemy base, he gave the commander of the unit, subjected to a long and exhausting hunt by three ships and an aircraft, the solid support dictated by his valid experience and his indomitable courage. After 12 hours of hunting, the unit emerged due to irreparable damage, and ordered its rapid sinking in order to ensure that the disappearance of the hull also that of the treacherous vehicles embarked. As the unit began to sink, he entered the interior rooms to personally supervise the complete evacuation of the crew. An example of serene bravery and of the highest military virtues.”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	4		3440	534	33	120.42	5.02

Actions

Date

Time

Captain

Area

Coordinates

Convoy

Weapon

Result

Ship

Type

Tonns

Flag

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Longobardi	Luigi	Electrician	Elettricista	9/30/1940

The submarine Durbo was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed 6 missions in the war, covering a total of 2,598 miles on the surface and 976 submerged.

Brief and partial chronology

March 8th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero-Terni-Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

March 6th, 1938

Launched at the Odero-Terni-Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

The launch of Durbo
(From “I sommergibili classe 600 Serie Adua” by Alessandro Turrini)

July 1st, 1938

Official entry into service followed by a training cruise.

Durbo at sea

August 10th, 1938

Durbo was stationed in Leros – an island that for the men of Durbo, and the others who were stationed there, consisted of “only rocks and no fun” – under the command of Maricosom (the command of the Italian submarine fleet), spending a year engaged in exercises between Rhodes and Leros before returning to Italy.

June 9th, 1940

Durbo (Lieutenant Commander Armando Acanfora), which with the twin boats Beilul and Tembien formed the XXXV Submarine Squadron (III Grupsom) based in Messina (or Augusta), left base for an offensive-exploratory mission in the Gulf of Hammamet.

Four hours after departure – it was by then June 10^th – Commander Acanfora, while sailing on the surface, opened an envelope and informed the crew that Italy was now at war with France and the United Kingdom.

During this period (from January 22^nd, 1940 to shortly after the entry into the war) the second in command of the unit was the Lieutenant Commander Gianfranco Gazzana Priaroggia, future Atlantic ace on the submarine Da Vinci.

June 16th, 1940

At 6.10 AM, an position 34°06′ N and 11°33′ E (in the Gulf of Hammament, northeast of Susa and 44 miles southwest of Pantelleria), while sailing towards its patrol area, Durbo launched a pair of torpedoes against a light unit (perhaps a corvette, or a French destroyer), hearing a violent detonation after two minutes,  But rough seas made it impossible to verify whether the ship was really hit. After the attack, the submarine had to dive to a depth of 70-80 meters and remained motionless, in order to evade the enemy reaction.

Some Italian sources have speculated that on June 16^th, Durbo may have torpedoed the French submarine Morse, which disappeared in those days in the waters off Tunisia, but the discovery of the wreck of the French unit off Sfax – the Morse was found already on August 16th, 1940 (the wreck was later recovered in 1956) broken in two,  next to a French minefield that was missing a mine – it actually allowed its loss to be attributed to the collision with a mine of the French defensive barriers.

July 1940

Complete two patrols, with no major events.

September 1940

Durbo carried out a patrol, without results.

October 1940

Durbo completed another mission, also without any events worth mentioning. Some of the summer-autumn patrols were carried out in the waters of Pantelleria, or in the vicinity of Malta.

The Sinking

On October 9^th, 1940, Durbo, still under the command of Lieutenant Acanfora, departed Messina, immediately after the end of a British bombardment, to reach the new assigned operational area, about seventy miles east of Gibraltar (between the meridians of Malaga and Almeria), where it arrived on October 12th. Not far away, was operating the twin boat Lafolè. The two submarines, which had left at the same time to patrol the waters east of Gibraltar, at the end of the mission, were supposed to transit through the Strait of Bonifacio and then reach Naples.

On the 12th, Durbo reached its own area off the island of Alboran, south of Malaga and 70 miles east of Gibraltar, and began to patrol it in anticipation of a British convoy that was supposed to enter the western Mediterranean and of which the submarine was supposed to signal the entry into the Mediterranean, however it was not sighted. The days of the patrol passed empty, and they were all the same, without attacks or major events. The submarine spent the day immersed at periscope depth, to avoid sighting, and the night on the surface, to recharge the batteries. The only ships sighted were one or two neutral passenger steamers, probably Spanish, which were allowed to pass.

On the afternoon of October 17th, Durbo sighted a British destroyer, but Commander Acanfora felt that the sea was too rough to attempt an attack. The encounter with the enemy warship, however, put Acanfora on his toes, so that he decided to stay submerged for most of the following night, contrary to what he had done in the previous days.

At 9:30 AM on October 18th, however, the seaplane Saunders Roe A. 27 “London” K 5913 of the 202nd Squadron of the Royal Air Force, piloted by Captain Percy R. Hatfield (later protagonist of the search and identification in the Atlantic of the German battleship Bismarck), sighted air bubbles and a small slick of fuel while flying off the island of Alboran, 65 miles east of the Strait of Gibraltar. Those were the tracks of the Durbo. On board the submarine, in fact, the crew was trying to repair a leak in the compressed air system, which had always caused problems.

Along with another “London” seaplane of the 202nd Squadron, piloted by Captain N. F. Eagleton, Hatfield dropped bombs over the point from which the bubbles and fuel came, then recalled two British destroyers, H.M.S. Firedrake (Commander Stephen Hugh Norris, who would receive the Distinguished Service Order for the action), detached from the escort of convoy “HG 45”, and H.M.S. Wrestler (Lieutenant Eric Lister Jones). One of the two arrived the same morning, followed in the afternoon by the second, spotting a large slick of fuel, the two ships soon made sonar contact.

The bombs dropped by the planes, which exploded while the unit was coming to periscope depth, had not damaged the Durbo, which then dove to a depth of 35 meters, but in the following half an hour the submarine’s crew realized that warships had also arrived, and were now chasing it. At 10:00 AM in the morning, the submarine suffered the first heavy bombardment with depth charges. The first depth charge exploded near the fuel tanks, damaging them and causing a leak that began to come on the surface, marking the position of the Italian unit even more visibly (according to the memory of a survivor, in addition to the diesel tanks, the torpedo room was also damaged). Durbo then descended to 58 meters and tried to get away, but at very low speed, since the previous night the period on the surface for recharging the batteries had lasted less than usual, the electric motors now had little energy to use.

Against the Durbo, which continued to maneuver in every way tring to get away and evade the chase, was unleashed a storm of depth charges not only by the two destroyers, which continued to follow it and bombard it with intense and repeated bomb drops, but also by the two “Londons” of Hatfield and Eagleton (for a source,  probably erroneous, the destroyer H.M.S. Vidette or H.M.S. Hotspur would also have participated in the hunt).

At 1:30 PM the boat was hit by a second violent depth discharge, and the crew was “pleasantly” surprised to see how well the hull was able to withstand explosions. At 4:30 PM Durbo received a third shower of depth charges, this time with devastating effects: all the instruments were put out of action, the pumps were damaged, and the light failed, so much so that the only thing left to illuminate the dark rooms of the submarine were the flashlights of the captain and the chief engineer and a few portable lights supplied to the crew.

The main propeller shafts were deformed, which made it difficult to keep the engines running, reducing their efficiency to a scant 40 revolutions per minute with 1,000 amperes. As if that was not enough, waterways sprang in the aft compartments (aft torpedo room and engine room), and the consequent flooding caused the stern to sink, until it reached an angle of 20 degrees. Durbo descended to a depth of 110 meters, thirty meters more than the test depth. The stern pumps were no longer usable because their motors were already underwater. Chlorine gas was poisoning the air and the pressure of the compressed air had dropped to 40 kg, while the pressure inside the submarine itself was becoming unbearable. The conning tower was also badly damaged.

At 9:00 PM, after eleven hours of hammering, with the boat badly damaged, water continuing to rise, air reserves almost exhausted, and a worrying development of chlorine gas, the crew gathered in the maneuvering room.

There Commander Acanfora, after a few moments of reflection, had to order “ready to surface”; there was nothing more to do. At 9:30 PM Durbo appeared on the surface. The detonations of the depth charges had put the deck gun out of action, so, the boat was not even able to attempt to fight on the surface – with a predictable outcome – the commander had to order to start the scuttling maneuvers and to abandon the ship.

As soon as the first man opened the conning tower’s hatch, however, he was greeted by a burst of machine-gun fire from one of the destroyers, who probably believed that the submarine wanted to engage in surface combat. In the officers’ quarters, the volunteer electrician Armando Albanelli, a nineteen-year-old from Bologna who had joined the submariners because he was looking for adventure, sipped liquor to make his fear go away, as did other members of the crew.

The chief engineer shouted, “Hail to the Duce, long live the king, long live Italy.” The navigation officer went on deck and flashed lights, prompting the British ships to cease fire, after which the crew lined up and began to go out on deck. According to Armando Albanelli’s recollection, Commander Acanfora gave the order “to get out, to make the two boxes with the codes disappear and to open the scuttling valves”, but unfortunately, apparently, the second of the three provisions was not implemented.

One of the last men to abandon the boat, after having opened the seacock valves on the orders of the captain – to avoid the capture and towing of the unit – was Antonio Pisciotta. For unknown reasons his name would not appear on the first list of prisoners, so that in Italy he was reported missing, presumably fallen in action, and his parents received a telegram informing them of their son’s death.

Armando Albanelli, who also went on deck after opening the valves, threw himself into the sea as the others had done before him. The sea space in front of it was illuminated by the searchlights of the enemy ships. Albanelli immediately began to swim towards H.M.S. Firedrake, about thirty meters away, which had already lowered several cargo nets along its bulwarks, so that the castaways could cling to it.

H.M.S. Firedrake

Before the waters of the Mediterranean closed forever over the Durbo, a British boarding team composed of H.M.S. Firedrake and H.M.S. Wrestler’s men had time to get on board. Second Lieutenant Peter Louis Meryon (who later received the Distinguished Service Order), of H.M.S. Wrestler, led Sergeant Harold Brown (later decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal) and Sergeant Stoker George Andrews.  They were also H.M.S. Wrestler’s, down the ladder that led to the submarine’s maneuvering chamber, where the water was rising through the specially opened seacock valves. Cutting through the darkness of the room with a flashlight, H.M.S. Wrestler’s three men and Second Lieutenant Basil Wilson of the Firedrake (later mentioned in the dispatches as well as Sergeant Andrews), joined them, and took papers, ciphers, and operation orders – secret documents that should have been destroyed before abandoning ship, according to the instructions – before having to abandon the boat after five minutes.

Durbo sank aft at 7:50 PM (the time zone, different from the one indicating the surface at 9:30 PM, is unclear) on September 18th, shortly after being abandoned by the crew, in position 35°57′ N and 04°00′ W (or 34°54′ N and 04°17′ W according to other sources, probably erroneous, 120 miles east of Gibraltar, and off the island of Alboran), while all 46 men of his crew (5 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers and sailors; by other sources, 48 men in all) were picked up by H.M.S. Firedrake, where they were treated amicably. There were no casualties. The survivors, after receiving dry clothes, food and cigarettes on H.M.S. Firedrake, were disembarked in Gibraltar the same day.

The sinking of Durbo was the only success in anti-submarine warfare achieved by the “London” seaplanes, aircraft by that time outdated and close to replacement.

The capture of the secret documents, unfortunately, had a disastrous outcome in a very short term: the position of other Italian submarines was indicated on them, and just two days later, on October 20th, a group of British destroyers would set a trap for Lafolè, whose close position had emerged from the captured documents. Lafolè was sunk after a hard hunt, leaving only nine survivors.

In Italy, no one knew about the capture of the documents on the submarine Durbo, so ciphers and operation orders were not changed. Also from the documents captured on the Durbo, the British secret services learned the future position of three other Italian submarines in the Aegean Sea: Neghelli was found at dawn on November 25^th, 1940 in position 36°30′ N and 26°30′ E, Naiade reached the same point at dawn on the 26th and Atropos was there at dawn on the 27th. Fortunately, no traps could be set up in such cases, and the three boats completed their patrols unaware of the danger they had run.

After arriving in Gibraltar, the survivors of the submarine Durbo were embarked on the troop transport Reina del Pacifico, which transported them to England to captivity at the end of October. Here, for the first 18 months, they were placed in various prison camps, the first of which was set up in the Scottish residence of Glenbranter House (POW Camp 6), but there one of the prisoners, unable to endure the cold and wet Scottish winter, the lack of food and the distance from his family, killed himself.

Later the prisoners were moved to POW Camp 13, in Derbyshire (central England), and then (autumn 1941) to POW Camp 16 near Rugeley.

When the camp became overcrowded, the men of the submarine Durbo, in the autumn of 1942, were transferred to the large transit camp of Lodge Moor (Camp 17), from where they were then embarked on a ship, crossed the Atlantic disembarking at Halifax and finally interned in a prison camp in the United States, in Tennessee, remaining in America until 1946. While in Britain, where supplies were scarce, the prisoners were almost starving, in the United States they were abundantly refreshed, and found much better conditions.

Vittorio Rappini, a radio operator (a seventeen-year-old volunteer who had enlisted in the Navy in search of adventure), during his imprisonment learned that H.M.S. Firedrake, on December 17th, 1942 (more or less at the time of the transfer of Durbo’s prisoners from the United Kingdom to the United States), had been sunk in the Atlantic by the German submarine U 211,  leaving only 26 survivors out of 196 men of his crew:. Recalling the friendly treatment he received from the sailors of the destroyer, Rappini was saddened to learn that almost all of them had died.

As for Antonio Pisciotta, Vittorio Rappini’s family had also received, on November 14^th, 1940, a telegram signed by Admiral Guido Cappucci (commander of the Royal Maritime Crews Corps), informing them that their son was missing. Bu then came the news that Vittorio was alive and a prisoner of war, and that he was sending greetings and good wishes, arrived as early as December 27th through the Vatican (from the Apostolic Delegate in London), through the work of Cardinal Giovanni Montini, the future Pope Paul VI.

In 1944, after the armistice between Italy and the Allies, Rappini joined the Italian Service Units, groups of volunteer prisoners employed as a workforce in support of the Allied war effort (Rappini was part of the Italian Service Unit at Fort Meade). Also during his imprisonment, Rappini had the opportunity to learn to speak and write in English, which after the war would allow him to work with the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation program) and later – after an unfortunate attempt to emigrate to Boston – he emigrate to Canada, disembarking in June 1951 at Pier 21 of the Port of Halifax,  the same pier at which he had landed in 1942 as a prisoner, coming from Great Britain and bound for the Tennessee prison camp. Here Rampini found work and a girl who became his wife.

Durbo’s crewmembers in POW Camp 17, Lodge Moor, fall 1942.

Only six months after the sinking, Antonio Pisciotta’s parents, who believed their son to be dead, received a telegram informing them that their son was alive and a prisoner. After the war, in 1951, Pisciotta returned to the United States, to settle there with his wife and three children.

Below, an eyewitness recount from the BBC ”People’s War’ published on 20 May 2004

The date was October 7th. We resumed our anti-submarine patrols on our return to Gib. The next incident I remember was some 10 days later, when we engaged an Italian submarine in company with the destroyers Wrestler and Vidette and eventually sunk the submarine. The original sighting was by the air patrol from Gib. The aircraft dropped bombs and caused the sub. to dive. The destroyers then were called in and we then engaged in a combined operation dropping depth charges in relay. I was in the wheelhouse on duty at action stations and was able to follow the action at first hand. The submarine suddenly surfaced and a short exchange of gunfire ensued. Very soon it was apparent that the Italian crew were abandoning ship. A boarding party was dispatched by one of the destroyers and some papers were recovered before the submarine sank. The next action to involve us was the receipt of a dozen or so of prisoners in our mess deck. A very strange feeling to have them amongst us but very soon we were made aware that they were much relieved to be out of the war They were singing songs to us later in the mess deck and making it so obvious they were no longer a threat. I have in my possession a drawing in pencil made by one of them showing his impressions of the sinking.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	6		2598	976	34	105.12	4.38

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
6/16/1940	06:10	C.C. Armando Acanfora	Mediterranean	34°06’N-11°33’E		Torpedo	Failed	?	Corvette or Destroyer		France

Crew Members Lost

Last Name

First Name

Rank

Italian Rank

Date

The submarine Dessiè was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged).

The boat completed 27 missions of various types (18 patrols, 1 transport, and 8 transfers), covering a total of 15,193 miles on the surface and 4,263 submerged.

The launch of the submarine Dessiè from a real of the ‘Istituto Luce’

Brief and partial chronology

April 20th, 1936

Setting up at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto.

November 20th, 1936

Launched at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto.

Dessiè, and the twin boat Dagabur, on the slip in Taranto

April 14, 1937

Entry into service. Dessiè was assigned to the XLIII Submarine Squadron, based in Taranto.

The early captains were Lieutenant Gino Birindelli, and later Primo Longobardo, both future M.O.V.M. (Gold Medal for Valor). Birindelli would also reach the top rank in the Navy in the 70s.

August 20th, 1937

Under the command of Lieutenant Mario Muro, Dessiè sailed from Leros to participate in the Spanish Civil War as part of a clandestine mission in the Aegean Sea against the traffic of supplies for the Spanish Republican forces.

August 29th, 1937

The boat returned to Leros, ending the mission without having reaped any results.

1938

Located in Tobruk.

Dessiè in 1938

1940

Transferred to Taranto and later to Augusta.

June 10th, 1940

When Italy entered the war, Dessiè (Lieutenant Commander Fausto Sestini) was part of the XLVI Submarine Squadron (IV Grupsom of Taranto), along with the twin boats Dagabur, Uarsciek and Uebi Scebeli.

August 8th, 1940

Sent on patrol southwest of Crete, between the parallel of Gaudo, the coast of Crete and the meridian of Cerigotto. It was the first war patrol under the command of Lieutenant Commander Fausto Sestini.

August 13th, 1940

In the evening, the crew sighted a fast steamer heading east and chased it on the surface, but was unable to complete the attack maneuver, because the merchant took advantage of its higher speed to escape.

August 16th, 1940

The boat concludes the mission, returning to base.

October 28th, 1940

The boat was among the submarines sent to form a barrier between the Ionian Sea and the Aegean Sea. Even though the Mediterranean Fleet (which operates in that area, going as far west as the Ionian Islands) had gone out to sea, Dessiè, sent south of Crete, did not see anything: the barrier it forms with three other boats (Luigi Settembrini, Ciro Menotti, Tricheco) was in fact too wide.

November 25th, 1940

Dessiè (Lieutenant Adriano Pini) was sent off the coast of Malta to participate in the fight against the British operation “Collar” (transfer of ships from Alexandria to Gibraltar, dispatch of convoys with supplies from Gibraltar to Malta and the ports of the Levant, all with the help of Force H and the Mediterranean Fleet: the inconclusive battle of Cape Teulada would be the result).

November 28th, 1940

At 3.02 AM Dessiè, lying in ambush 50 miles east/southeast of Pantelleria (and west of Malta), sighted in position 36°30′ N and 12°59′ E three major units proceeding in a line with an estimated course of 270° (westward) and speed 20 knots: it was the British 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the heavy cruiser H.M.S. York and the light cruisers H.M.S. Glasgow and H.M.S. Gloucester,  at sea as part of British convoy traffic in connection with Operation Collar. At 3:05 AM the submarine launched two torpedoes from the aft tubes, from a distance of 3,500 meters, against the middle ship (H.M.S. Glasgow), then disengaged in diving. Two loud explosions were heard and then a violent explosion, however, no ship was hit.

December 16^th through 25th, 1940

The boat was sent to patrol, along with the submarines Fratelli Bandiera and Serpente, in the waters around Malta.

January 1941

Unsuccessful ambush off the coast of Derna.

May 20th, 1941

Sent to lie in wait between Crete, Alexandria and Sollum, along with numerous other submarines, in support of the German invasion of Crete (Operation “Merkur”).

July 21^st and 22nd, 1941

Sent between Pantelleria and Malta, together with three other submarines (Fratelli Bandiera, Luciano Manara and Ruggero Settimo; the boats were deployed twenty miles from each other), in contrast to the British operation “Substance”, consisting in sending to Malta a convoy of supplies – six cargo ships and a troop transport – escorted by the battleship H.M.S. Nelson, the light cruisers H.M.S. Edinburgh,  H.M.S. Manchester and H.M.S. Arethusa and 11 destroyers, and at the same time the return from Malta of six unloaded merchant ships and the military tanker Breconshire, escorted by the destroyer Encounter. Force H, which went out to sea with the battlecruiser H.M.S. Renown, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal, the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione and six destroyers, provided cover for the operation, while units of the Mediterranean Fleet from Haifa and Alexandria carried out diversionary actions. Dessiè did not spot the British convoy.

January 3rd, 1942

Sent to lie in wait south of Malta (the ambush began at noon on January 3rd), in the area between the meridians 23°20′ E and 23°40′ E and the parallels 33°00′ N and 33°40′ N, with the task of sighting and attacking any British naval forces that might take to the sea to oppose Operation “M. 43”,  consisting of sending a large convoy of supplies to Libya. Such a threat would not manifest itself.

June 11th, 1942

The boat was sent, together with four other submarines (Onice, Ascianghi, Aradam and Corallo) to ambush in the triangle between Malta, Pantelleria and Lampedusa in contrast to the British operation “Harpoon” (a heavily escorted convoy from Gibraltar to Malta), as part of the Battle of Mid-June. However, Dessiè did not see any ships.

July 15th, 1942

The submarine Dessiè, along with other submarines, was sent to lie in wait between La Galite, the Isle of Dogs, Cape Bon, and Cape Kelibia to intercept the British fast minelayer H.M.S. Welshman, bound for Malta with urgent supplies. The boat did not spot British unity.

August 11th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Renato Scandola, Dessiè departed from Trapani bound for a sector north of the Gulf of Tunis, to participate in the fight against the British convoy “Pedestal” bound for Malta, an operation that would lead to the largest air-naval battle of the Mediterranean war, the Battle of Mid-August. Dessiè, along with Otaria, Dandolo, Emo, Avorio, Cobalto, Alagi, Ascianghi, Axum and Bronzo, forms a barrage of ten submarines north of Tunisia, between the meridians of the Scogli Fratelli and the Banco Skerki (from the waters east of La Galite to the approaches of the Strait of Sicily), constituting a barrier line of the western entrance of the Strait of Sicily,  north of the La Galite-Banco Skerki junction. The orders were to act with great offensive determination, launching as many torpedoes as possible against any target, merchant, or military, larger than a destroyer. The specific Dessiè ambush area was located 80 miles north of Tunisia, in the Skerki Bank channel.

August 12th, 1942

At 5.22 AM Dessiè dove, entering the assigned area.

At 6:07 PM, a hydrophone picked up an indistinct noise on a 270° bearing, but observation on the periscope revealed nothing. The submarine then maneuvered to get closer to the source of the noise, the rotation of which gave Commander Scandola the impression that it was falling slightly towards the coast. Dessiè took a course perpendicular to the survey, and at 7:00 PM it sighted the treetops and the smoke emitted by the ships of the convoy on the periscope (according to a source, Dessiè would have been guided towards the convoy also by the smoke of the fires of the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Indomitable, severely damaged by Axis air attacks).

At 7:07 PM, Dessiè observed an attack by Italian planes against the convoy, whose ships proceeded in scattered order, zigzagging under the protection of destroyers. At 7:10 PM, Scandola counted 24 ships on the periscope: 14 merchant ships and 10 destroyers. Several large merchant ships were forming a compact nucleus (with a true course of 110° and an estimated speed of 15 knots), while some others continued in scattered order. Three destroyers crossed forward of the larger group, and two others defended the port side towards the stern. Two other destroyers, further north, keep Dessiè on about zero beta.

The sea was very calm, the sun low on the horizon. Dessiè was on an attack course due to an impact of 110°, and at 7.38 PM (in position 37°38′ N and 10°25′ E, 45 miles northwest of Cape Bon), from an estimated distance of 1800 meters, launched at intervals of three seconds the four torpedoes of the forward tubes, with a divergence of two degrees between one and the other. The target was a group of eight large merchant ships (estimated tonnage 10,000-15,000 GRT) very close to each other (to the point that the bow of some “covers” the stern of others), with modern lines (slender bow and cruiser stern) and propelled by turbines.

After launching, Dessiè involuntarily surfaces with the conning tower. Scandola ordered a dive to a depth of 40 meters, and as this happened, the detonations of two torpedoes were heard 1 minute and 40 seconds after the first launch. Continuous explosions could be heard on the hydrophones, which made it impossible to understand if any ship had stopped. Commander Scandola then decided to return to periscope depth, to attack other ships, if possible, with torpedoes from the stern tubes.

At 7:56 PM, while Dessiè was going up, the counterattack of the escort began. Three enemy units, equipped with sonar and probably hydrophones, launch about 120 depth charges in the space of an hour and a half. None, however, exploded close enough to cause damage to the submarine, which was stationary at 90 meters, in silent trim. With each restart of the engines, the hunt resumes with greater intensity.

At 9:20 PM the drops became weaker until they disappeared, and at 9:27 PM the anti-submarine hunt was finally over. Commander Scandola had the impression that the launch of the torpedoes has achieved results, because the counterattack came only after twenty minutes and two of the enemy destroyers always kept in the same sector (the one where Scandola thinks the affected merchant ships were located), moving away from it only to launch the depth charges.

The outcome of the launch of Dessiè is, to this day, still the subject of a debate. Several historians believe it was likely that it was one of its torpedoes that hit the large British motor ship Brisbane Star, of 12,791 GRT, which suffered serious damage (initially immobilized, it soon managed to start up again; a few hours later it was hit by a second torpedo, launched by an aircraft) but it was one of the few merchant ships in the convoy to be able to reach Malta. Some also believe that one or more torpedoes from Dessiè sank the British motor ship Deucalion, of 7516 GRT (which sank in position 37°38′ N and 10°25′ E, five miles east of the Isle of Dogs and 39 miles northeast of Bizerte), already damaged by German air attacks. However, the careful research of the historian Francesco Mattesini, as well as most historians, credits the sinking of the Deucalion to the action of German Heinkel He 111 torpedo bombers alone. Since the moment of the attack of Dessiè also coincided with that of an Italian-German air attack, with torpedo launched by Italian Savoia Marchetti SM aircraft. 79 “Sparviero” and German Junkers Ju 88 and Heinkel He 111, there was also no absolute certainty as to whether the Brisbane Star was hit by a torpedo from Dessiè, rather than by one of the torpedo bombers.

At 10:12 PM, Dessiè came to the surface. At the stern, about a mile and a half distant, two steamers were visible, burned, and near them a dense black cloud in which flashes could be seen, which was believed to be a third steamer, also on fire. The violence of the fires on the steamers leads Scandola to believe that they were all already condemned.  In need of the charge of air and electricity, Scandola decided to leave and return to the site as soon as possible. At 11.50 PM the steamer exploded in the cloud of smoke, hit by torpedoes; with flames blazing even more violently.

August 13th, 1942

At 3:15 AM the last flames of the three steamers were extinguished. Dessiè headed towards this area, crossing the sea strewn with naphtha and wreckage. At 5:36 AM the boat dove, and at 10:47 AM received an encrypted message (064113) ordering the captain to emerge and go to his mopping up area, which he did. At 11:59 AM, three bombers were sighted heading west and 10 km away, flying at an altitude of about 200 meters, thus a crash dive was ordered. An hour later, Dessiè resurfaced, and then dove again with a crash dive at 2.27 PM. At 3.22 PM, the boat returned to the surface, but at 3.37 PM crash-dove again due to the sighting of an aircraft. At 4:12 PM Dessiè came to the surface once again, and after three minutes sighted an immense column of smoke to the south, a sign of a burning ship. At 4:26 PM, two planes were also spotted circling the fire, and at 5:08 PM Dessiè headed in that direction. Aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe continuously flew over the submarine, which exchanged recognition signals with them. At 5:14 PM, Dessiè spotted some boats in the vicinity of the fire. At 5:30 PM, as the fire continues, Scandola concludes that the ship had probably sunk.

At 5:56 PM, another sighting of planes forced Dessiè to dive once again until 6:48 PM, when the boat resurfaced and headed towards the wrecks, to look for something that would allow the identity of the sunken ship to be traced. At 7:20 PM, the submarine went under a lifeboat, but it was empty, as were the nearby boats. However, some objects were recovered, to trace the name of the ship. At 7.30 PM Dessiè moved away at full speed, while the flames floating on the sea were extinguished.

At 7:35 PM, the submarine sighted formations of German bombers, dropping bombs near the fire. The crew lighted two recognition flares and unfurled a second magnitude (large) Italian flag on the bridge, but the bombers – a dozen of them – attack Dessiè anyway. The first, a discharge of bombs fell into the sea forward of the submarine, the subsequent ones frame it from the side. Commander Scandola, three other officers, two non-commissioned officers and two sailors were injured by shrapnel from the bombs, which also caused various damage to the unit. One of the injured, the 23-year-old sailor Antonio Fontana from Syracuse, died on board Dessiè the following day, August 14th, from the severity of his injuries.

At 7:38 PM, after the flagship aircraft had made a reconnaissance tour over the bridge of Dessiè, the bombers left. At 7.40 PM the verification of the damage suffered began (the bombs of the planes caused several failures to the hull and to the on-board equipment, breaking among other things some elements of the accumulator batteries, and thus causing acid leaks), meanwhile taking course for the north-eastern end of the assigned sector. Maricosom was asked to send a torpedo boat to transfer the most seriously wounded. Maricosom responds by ordering the submarine to return to base instead, as the damage caused by the air attack prevents it from diving.

At 9:27 PM, the return telegram was sent. At 11.50 PM, during the return navigation (which had to be conducted by the second in command, as Scandola was injured), some planes launched four flares aft of Dessiè, 2 km away.

August 14th, 1942

At 2:22 AM, Dessiè sent the landing telegram. After passing through the obstructions at eight o’clock in the morning, the submarine moored half an hour later.

November 2nd, 1942

Dessiè sailed from Messina at 9.15 PM bound for Tobruk, for a mission to transport 20 tons of ammunition. The second battle of El Alamein, which would seal the fate of the Axis in North Africa, was raging.

November 5^th or 6^th,1942

The boat arrived in Tobruk at eight in the morning, disembarked the cargo and left at 16.10 to return to Messina. Following the defeat of the Italian-German armored army, Tobruk fell to the British on November 13th.

November 11th, 1942

The boat arrived in Messina at 8.15 am.

The Sinking

On the morning of November 18^th, 1942, Dessiè, under the command of Lieutenant Alberto Gorini, set sail from Messina for a new mission off Bona (now Annaba), Algeria. On November 8th, Operation “Torch” had begun, the Anglo-American landing in French North Africa, and from that day on, droves of Allied merchant ships continued to pour men and equipment onto the coasts of Morocco and Algeria, signing the death warrant for the Axis troops in North Africa, who would soon find themselves caught between two fires in Tunisia: the British advancing from the east and the Americans from the west.

Many Axis submarines were sent to counter the influx of Allied men and materials into Algeria. Many were successful, but almost as many did not return.

Dessiè’s task was an ambush in front of Bona and night offensive bets in the harbor of Bougie and Philippeville. The submarine’s last communication with the base occurred at 7:12 PM on November 27^th, 1942, when it regularly responded to a call, after that, Dessiè was never heard from again. Losing all hope, the crew was declared missing on December 23rd, 1942.

The incident became known after the end of the war.

Initially, it was believed that Dessiè had been sunk by depth charges from a Lockheed Hudson bomber of the Royal Air Force’s 500th Squadron, but further research found a version that better matched what was known about the submarine’s disappearance.

At 2:05 PM on November 28^th, 1942, Dessiè was spotted proceeding on the surface towards the port of Bona by a British aircraft, which recalled two destroyers, the Australian H.M.A.S. Quiberon and the H.M.S. British Quentin.

In that period, Commonwealth Marine destroyers had undergone a modification to their depth charges, whereas previously they could be adjusted to explode at a maximum depth of 106 meters, they could now be adjusted to a maximum depth of 152 meters by applying a weight, which would have sunk them more quickly. This was because some submarines, subjected to bombardment with depth charges, had managed to elude the hunt by descending to a depth of 150 meters, a depth that until then the British considered impossible to reach and maintain. In addition, the sonars of British ships, due to the “direction” assumed by the sound waves, could not detect the presence of a submarine submerged at 150 meters, if it was 600 meters or more as the crow flies from their position.

H.M.S. Quentin (Lieutenant Captain Allan Herbert Percy Noble), being the destroyer assigned to “primary emergencies”, was the first to be sent to the scene, seven miles northeast of Bona. The boat carried out numerous attacks with depth charges, until it exhausted the entire supply (70 bombs), but without obtaining the slightest sign of damage inflicted on the submarine: no wreckage, not even a drop of fuel. Meanwhile, H.M.A.S. Quiberon (frigate captain Hugh Waters Shelley Browning), as a unit for “secondary emergencies” (in service for a few months, had never participated in a real anti-submarine hunt), was waiting in case its help was needed. The crew had a quiet lunch, then the men off duty went to rest. It was at that point that H.M.S. Quentin, having finished its depth charges, sent orders to H.M.A.S. Quiberon to go and hunt down the enemy submarine.

Leaving the port of Bona, H.M.A.S. Quiberon headed out to sea at high speed, while the crew was sent to the combat posts provided for antisubmarine actions. Speed was then reduced to 15 knots, to check the condition of the sonar.

Arriving in the area, H.M.A.S. Quiberon initially did not detect any echo that could reveal a submarine submerged in a radius of almost two kilometers.  Dessiè was evidently crouched in a silent position, also taking advantage of the great disturbance caused in the mass of water by the depth charges of the Quentin and by its long crossing in the area at 12 knots, w\which confused the echoes that reached the sonar of the Quiberon, disturbing its search.

While H.M.S. Quentin searched the outermost area to make sure there were no other submarines in the area, H.M.A.S. Quiberon meticulously “sifted” the waters where the submarine was supposed to be, carefully examining any “disturbance” in the body of water. Expert Asdic operator Kendall reported each detection and comment to Lieutenant Physician John Hardcastle, who reported them. At one point, Kendall and anti-submarine armament officer Max Darling noticed a close-range bearing slightly different from the others. When Quiberon examined it with ASDIC, there was no echo. Another sound pulse was sent, and again there was no echo: the men of H.M.A.S. Quiberon were reminded of the Admiralty’s note, from a short time before, about submarines avoiding sonar by diving to a depth of 150 meters. It occurred to them that the submarine might be submerged at a deeper depth than the explosions of Quentin’s depth charges.

H.M.A.S. Quiberon

H.M.A.S. Quiberon moved away 1,370 meters, then approached the suspicious point by scanning the bearing that connected it to that position with sonar. This time there was an echo, faint and vague (the disturbances caused by the depth charges and the Quentin’s wakes were still felt, so much so that they hindered the maintenance of contact); It disappeared altogether when the distance became 550 meters. At this point, it was decided to carry out a test launch on H.M.A.S. Quiberon: five depth charges, three from the aft bomb launchers and two from the side bomb launchers. The destroyer then moved away again by 1,370 meters, moving into the least “disturbed” water it could find, returned to approach along the survey and regained contact (very faint, the echo could barely be heard at 1,000 meters away). It was so weak that, if the search speed of 7 knots had been increased to the minimum speed prescribed for the attack, 12 knots, the noise of H.M.A.S. Quiberon’s propellers would have been sufficient to make it lose. At a distance of 610 meters, the echo faded to the point of disappearing (there were still two minutes and 49 seconds left to reach the vertical of contact), but the Australian ship continued on its course. When it reached the vertical of the submarine, H.M.A.S. Quiberon launched five depth charges in the space of ten seconds, all adjusted to explode at the maximum depth, 152 meters.

H.M.S. Quentin

The crew of the destroyer waited, holding their breath, for the 70 seconds it took for the bombs to descend to a depth of 150 meters before exploding. It was impossible to imagine what the men of Dessiè were feeling at that very moment.

The silence was broken by the explosions of the five bombs, in quick succession. The Asdic operator of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, through the hydrophones, distinctly heard a noise as of hammering on metal, perhaps against a watertight bulkhead, then a slight whistle, followed by sounds indicating the breaking and crushing of something, which Kendall likened to eggshells being crushed in a paper bag. Finally, a dull thud, and then nothing, only silence. It was about three o’clock in the afternoon.

What was reported was the description given by Max Darling, Asdic operator of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, in the volume “Lost military ships” of the Historical Office of the Navy, as well as in the book “The Italian war on the sea” by Giorgio Giorgerini, the last moments of Dessiè were instead described differently. The submarine came to the surface, heeled and soared, evidently without control, and then immediately sank again from the stern, erectly. It would then have been located on the seabed, in position 37°04′ N and 07°49′ E (TN or 37°05’N, 07°55’E). The source of this version was unclear, as it was incompatible with the one described by Darling.

Soon after, H.M.S. Quentin appeared in front of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, advancing at 12 knots with the attack flag in the wind, and launched her last depth charge (there was only one left), then moved away again towards the open sea. H.M.A.S. Quiberon, about 730 meters away from the launch site, returned to the scene and saw, three minutes after the explosion of the bombs, a whitish turbulence perturbing the surface of the sea – for an area of two abundant acres – for a couple of minutes, then gradually extinguishing itself within another three minutes. The chief engineer of H.M.A.S. Quiberon believed that it was the gases produced by the explosion of the bombs, and the air contained in the submarine, which had now escaped from the torn hull. Entering the disturbed area in search of evidence of the submarine’s sinking, the destroyer found only air bubbles that continued to surface on the surface, and oil floating on the waves. Samples were collected, which were then analyzed and identified as belonging to four different types of motor oil. The chief engineer commented that they would hardly find more, considering that the submarine had imploded at a depth of 150 meters.

H.M.A.S. and H.M.S. Quentin, having finished their work, arranged themselves in a line and returned to Bona, continuing to scan the sea with their sonar.

Thus ended the life of Dessiè and the entire crew, 5 officers and 43 non-commissioned officers and sailors. They rest, in their “iron coffin,” in position 37°05’N, 07°55’E, 10 (TN, 16) miles north of Bona.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	26		15193	4263	173	112.46	4.69

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
11/28/1940	03.05	T.V. Adriano Pini	Mediterranean	36°30’N-12°59’E		Torpedo	Failed	Glasgow	Light Cruiser		Great Britain
8/12/1942	19.38	T.V. Renato Scandola	Mediterranean	37°38’N-10°25’E	WS21S	Torpedo	Sank	Deucalion	Motor Freighter	7516	Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Adella	Filippo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Alianelli	Bernardino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Aluffi	Francesco	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Baldi	Giordano	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Bampa	Attilio	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Baroni	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Bartoletti	Ugo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Berlato	Giacomo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Bilardello	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Brusadin	Teseo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Caktieri	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Cardone	Vincenzo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Carletti	Luigi	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Cingati	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Colombo	Luigi	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Coratella	Corrado	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Cremonesi	Carlo	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Crispino	Domenico	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
D’angelo	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Delle Noci	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Di Scala	Gaspare	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Esposito	Michele	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Fontana	Antonio	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Foresio	Domenico	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	11/28/1942
Gambuzza	Vincenzo	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Gianelli	Guido	Ensign	Guardiamarina	11/28/1942
Gorini	Alberto	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	11/28/1942
Guidi	Alfredo	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
La Monica	Rosario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Lugani	Cesare	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Lugniani	Guglielmo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Maranna	Felice	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.	11/28/1942
Marciano	Alfredo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Miele	Ferdinando	Sergeant	Sergente	11/28/1942
Minniti	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Mura	Silvio	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	11/28/1942
Mussi	Rino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Orsini	Nello	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Pace	Catello	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Pascali	Raffaele	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Piccinini	Giuseppe	Ensign	Guardiamarina	11/28/1942
Pinocchio	Arnaldo	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Pipito	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942
Rocchi	Ivan	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Rossi	Licinio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Santambrogio	Angelo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	11/28/1942
Savioli	Bruno	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/28/1942
Vianello	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune	11/28/1942

The submarine Dagabur was an Adua-class coastal submarine with a displacement of 698 tons on the surface and 866 tons submerged. During the war, it completed 23 patrols (15 offensive and 8 transfer), covering a total of 17,364 miles on the surface and 3,888 submerged

Brief and Partial Chronology

April 16th, 1936

Setting up at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto.

Dagabur still on the slip in Taranto and nearly ready to be launched.

November 22nd, 1936

Launch at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto.

Dagabur soon after the launch in Taranto at the Tosi shipyard
(U.S.M.M.)

April 9th, 1937

Entry into service.

Dagabour near Taranto in 1937
(“I sommergibili italiani” by Alessandro Turrini and Ottorino Ottone Miozzi, USMM)

April 25th, 1937

Placed under Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) and deployed in Taranto, within the XLIII Submarine Squadron (IV Submarine Group). Shortly after completion the boat made a training cruise in the waters of the Dodecanese and Libya.

August 1st, 1937

Dagabur received the combat flag, donated by the city of Ortona. The godmother of the ceremony was Emma Sepe, wife of the prefect of Chieti.

August 12th, 1937

Under the command of Lieutenant Gian Maria Uzielli, Dagabur set sail from Leros to carry out a mission in the Aegean Sea as part of the Italian underwater campaign related to the Spanish Civil War.

August 13th, 1937

During the mission, Dagabur sighted a steamer and fired a torpedo, but failed to hit the target.

August 17th, 1937

The boat returned to Leros, having had to interrupt the mission due to the failure of one of the shafts.

August 30th, 1937

Once the damage was repaired, Dagabur left Leros again under the command of Lieutenant Uzielli to carry out a second mission related to the Spanish war, in the same Aegean area as the previous mission.

During this mission, Dagabur initiated several attack maneuvers, but did not complete any of them, due to the impossibility of identifying the targets with certainty.

September 5th, 1937

The boat returned to base, but in the afternoon of the same day left for the third and last “Spanish” mission, still under the command of Lieutenant Uzielli and always in the same sector of operations.

During the mission, the boat began an attack maneuver, but did not complete it, once again, because of the inability to identify the target with certainty.

September 12th, 1937

Dagabur returned to Leros, concluding the mission.

1938

Based in Tobruk.

1940

Dagabur returned to Italy and was deployed first to Taranto and then to Augusta (Sicily).

June 10th, 1940

When Italy entered the war, Dagabur (Lieutenant Domenico Romano) was part of the XLVI Submarine Squadron (IV Grupsom of Taranto), along with the twin boats Dessiè, Uarsciek and Uebi Scebeli.

August 1940

The boat carried out some anti-submarine defensive patrols in the Gulf of Taranto.

Summer 1940 – Early 1941

In the first months of the war, Dagabur carried out mainly defensive missions (mainly anti-submarine patrols) in the Gulf of Taranto, and subsequently offensive patrols along the Libyan and Tunisian coasts, without ever encountering enemy ships. Subsequently, according to a source, Dagabur was assigned to the V Submarine Group of Leros.

December 5th, 1940

The gunnery sailor Tommaso Bellonio, 22 years old, from Ortona, was declared missing in the central Mediterranean.

January 1^st though 7th, 1941

Dagabur patrolled the waters of Cyrenaica unsuccessfully.

February 19th, 1941

Sent on patrol south-east of Malta, the crew did not find anything.

March 5th, 1941

Sent in search of a British convoys off Crete, along with other submarines (Ondina, Beilul, Galatea, Malachite, Smeraldo, Nereide, Ascianghi, Ambra, and Onice), in contrast to the British operation “Lustre” (consisting of sending 58,000 men from Egypt to Greece, as reinforcements for Greece, with a series of convoys one every three days, from Alexandria to Piraeus, over the course of a month). The first two convoys of “Lustre” departed on March 6th: cruisers H.M.S. York, H.M.S. Gloucester and H.M.S. Bonaventure with troops from Alexandria to Piraeus (where they arrived on March 7th) and the Sri Lankan and Clan Macauley merchant ships with tanks and supplies, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Wryneck, H.M.S. Nubian and H.M.S. Mohawk, also from Alexandria to Piraeus (where they arrived on March 8th). Dagabur did not spot anything.

End of March 1941

Dagabur (Lieutenant Domenico Romano) was sent to lie in wait on the Alexandria-Cape Krio route (southeastern coast of Crete) along with the submarines Ambra (which was to be positioned 60 miles southeast of Dagabur) and Ascianghi (which was to be positioned 60 miles southeast of Ambra), with which it was to form a barrage.

March 29th, 1941

Dagabur reached the assigned area, between Crete and Egypt. The deployment of the submarines in the eastern Mediterranean (not far away there were two others, Nereide and Galatea) was planned as part of Operation “Gaudo”, an incursion into the Aegean by a large part of the Italian fleet, with the aim of attacking British convoys in that sector. The submarines had an exploratory purpose (to report any sightings of enemy naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean) as well as to support the action of surface forces, but they were not warned of the operation in progress, and of the particular importance of reporting any type of movement detected. The submarines would not obtain the desired result, the British fleet passed through the too wide meshes of the barrage, and of the five boats, only the Ambra would detect some signs of the passage of British ships (engine noises picked up on the hydrophone), but without be able to sight anything.

By the time Dagabur reached its assigned sector, however, Operation Gaudo had already ended in tragedy: the massacre at Cape Matapan had been going on for a few hours.

March 30th, 1941

At 08:27 PM Dagabur sighted at 33°47′ N and 25°24′ E (or 33°30′ N and 25°20′ E), south of Crete (halfway between Crete and Egypt), a unit that was identified – with a certain overestimation in displacement – as a light cruiser of 9,000 tons: it was in fact the British light cruiser H.M.S. Bonaventure (captain H. J. Egerton).  engaged with three destroyers (H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Griffin, and H.M.A.S. Stuart) in escorting a convoy of two merchant ships, “G.A. 8”, sailing from Greece to Alexandria in Egypt.

Being in optimal position and conditions to attack (the beta was quite wide, H.M.S. Bonaventure was sailing at a moderate speed, and its silhouette stood out clearly against the moon near sunset, thus being perfectly distinguishable). At 08.37 Dagabur launched two (or three) torpedoes against the enemy cruiser. Two minutes and 50 seconds after launch, two loud explosions were heard, which lead the commander of the submarine to believe that he had damaged the target. In reality, it does not appear that the Bonaventure was hit (some sources claim that it was “probably” damaged, but there seems to be no evidence to support this thesis). Four hours later (at 2:44 AM on March 31st, in position 33°20′ N and 26°35′ E), H.M.S. Bonaventure was sunk by another Italian submarine, Ambra. On the Italian side, initially, the sinking of the Bonaventure was wrongly attributed to the actions of the Dagabur, rather than to those of the Ambra.

According to a British source, Dagabur also unsuccessfully launched a torpedo against H.M.A.S. Stuart, which was engaged in the hunt with depth charges (the torpedo avoided by the Australian ship, exploded in its wake); however, it seems more likely that this was to be attributed to the Ambra.

June 1941

Dagabur was sent to lie in wait off the Syrian-Palestinian coast, along with Jantina and Ondina, during the British invasion of Syria and Lebanon, controlled by Vichy French forces.

July 1941

towards the end of the month, the boat was sent to the waters of Cyrenaica, to counter the British attempts to resupply the stronghold of Tobruk, besieged by Italian-German troops.

September 7th, 1941

At 01.10 PM Dagabur, sailing on the surface in the Eastern Mediterranean, was sighted in position 32°29′ N and 29°07′ E by the British submarine H.M.S. Torbay (Lieutenant Commander Anthony Cecil Capel Miers), which approached to attack it. The attack maneuver, however, did not go as planned by the British commander (the “trap” planned by Miers after the sighting did not work: perhaps this meant that Dagabur maneuvered differently from what was expected), so that at 01.32 PM H.M.S. Torbay emerged to attack with the gun, opening fire from 1,370 meters away. The first shot fired from the Torbay misfired, and Dagabur disengaged by diving. At 01.37 PM , H.M.S. Torbay also dove, but shortly afterwards lost contact with the Italian submarine.

October 1941

Sent on a mission off the coast of Alexandretta, Turkey.

November 1941

Sent on a mission in the central-eastern Mediterranean, however it did not spot any enemy ships.

December 13th, 1941

Dagabur (Lieutenant Commander Alberto Torri) was sent to patrol the waters south of Crete, along with the submarines Ascianghi and Galatea, to counter a possible exit from Alexandria of the British Force B, to protect the traffic operation “M. 41” (which provided for the dispatch of 3 convoys for a total of 8 merchant ships, with the direct escort of 7 destroyers and a torpedo boat as well as the remote escort of three heavy groups that count in all 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 18 destroyers and two torpedo boats) for the supply of Libya (later aborted as a result of the intense British attacks and the related damage and losses suffered). At the same time, other submarines (Santarosa, Narvalo, Squalo, Topazio and Veniero) were sent off Malta to counter a possible sortie by Force K based there (light cruisers Aurora, Penelope and Neptune and some destroyers).

Force B (light cruisers H.M.S. Euryalus, H.M.S. Naiad and H.M.S. Galatea and destroyers H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Kingston, H.M.S. Kipling, H.M.S. Kimberley, H.M.S. Griffin, H.M.S. Havock, H.M.S. Hotspur, H.M.A.S. Napier and H.M.A.S. Nizam, the last two Australians), under the command of Admiral Philip L. Vian, actually sailed from Alexandria in opposition to Operation “M. 41”, joining Force K which had left Malta to search for Italian convoys in the Ionian Sea. However, the British ships were unable to intercept anything, since the convoys had been sent back, so after hours of fruitless searches they started the return navigation to Malta (Force K) and Alexandria (Force B).

December 14th, 1941

At 07.55 PM, in position 34°01′ N and 26°02′ E, Dagabur, while on the surface, launched two torpedoes against a silhouette which, due to the poor visibility, was not identified with certainty (Commander Torri would later report that “it could have been a cruiser”), after which it immediately disengaged by diving. After one minute and 45 seconds, the crew heard two detonations, so that the Italians mistakenly believed that they had sunk the target. War bulletin no. 561 of the Italian Supreme Command, on December 15th, stated that “The submarine under the command of Lieutenant Commander Torri attacked and torpedoed a British cruiser in the eastern Mediterranean“, and the subsequent bulletin No. 567, of December 21st, added that “Further information received confirms the sinking of the enemy cruiser whose torpedoing in the eastern Mediterranean, by one of our submarines, was announced in bulletin number 561.”

The target of Dagabur’s attack has long been identified by various sources as the British light cruiser H.M.S. Galatea, part of Force B, which was returning to Alexandria after the fruitless search for Italian convoys. H.M.S. Galatea, missed by the Dagabur’s torpedoes (some secondary sources even go so far as to hypothesize that Dagabur may have damaged the cruiser in this circumstance), would instead be sunk four hours later (around midnight), in position 31°17′ N and 29°13′ E (35 miles west of Alexandria), by the torpedoes of the German submarine U 557.

According to more recent research, however, Dagabur’s attack on was not actually directed against H.M.S. Galatea, but against the British submarine H.M.S. Talisman (Commander Michael Willmott), which was also returning to Alexandria. At 07:52 PM on December 14th, Talisman sighted at position 34°05′ N and 25°39′ E (in the Cerigotto Channel, south of Crete) a dark object believed to be a submarine, 730 meters away, at 205° bearing. At 7:55 PM, exactly at the time when Dagabur would launch two torpedoes at H.M.S. Galatea, some sailors in the forward compartments of the Talisman heard the sound of two torpedoes hurtling through the water not far away. A minute later, H.M.S. Talisman opened fire on the Dagabur with its 102 mm gun, and Willmott estimated that the second shot fired hit the cunning tower of the Italian submarine, at a height of about 90 centimeters above the deck. Meanwhile, Dagabur was diving; the distance between the two submarines was only about ninety yards, and when the Talisman passed by at 07:57 PM, the British commander stated that “it was noticed that the hatches [of the Dagabur] were open” while the boat was diving, which led Willmott to believe that the enemy “was diving towards their end” and to claim that the boat had sunk. (According to one source, probably erroneous, in addition to the cannon shots, the Talisman also fired two torpedoes at the Dagabur, without success.) In fact, the Talisman men must have made a mistake in this regard, since Dagabur came out of the fight with only minor damage to the conning tower.

The unfeasibility that the attack of Dagabur was directed against H.M.S. Galatea was demonstrated by the comparison between the position where the attack of the Italian boat took place and that in which the Galatea was sunk by U 557: the two positions are about 250 miles apart, and to cover that distance in four hours the Galatea would have had to travel at the impossible speed of over 60 knots. The position indicated by H.M.S. Talisman, on the other hand, was only about twenty miles from the one indicated by Dagabur (a discrepancy that can be explained by the aforementioned poor visibility, which in addition to determining the identification error of Commander Torri – who mistakenly believed that he had attacked a unit that could have been a cruiser – could have prevented him from accurately calculating the position based on the stars),  and the time matches practically perfectly: 07.55 PM according to Dagabur time, 07.56 PM according to that of H.M.S. Talisman. From this it is almost absolutely certain that Dagabur attacked H.M.S. Talisman and not H.M.S. Galatea. (Thanks to Platon Alexiades for these remarks.)

December 18th, 1941

Dagabur, along with other submarines (Squalo, Ascianghi, Topazio, Galatea, and Santorre Santarosa) was deployed in the central-eastern Mediterranean with exploratory/offensive tasks, in support of the “M. 42” traffic operation, consisting of sending to Libya two convoys with urgent supplies for the Italian-German troops in North Africa (312 vehicles, 3224 tons of fuel and lubricants, 1137 tons of ammunition,  10,409 tons of miscellaneous materials) with the escort of substantial shares of the battle fleet. The operation ended happily with the arrival of the convoys in Libyan ports.

February 13^th through 19th, 1942

The boat was sent to lie in wait off the coasts of Syria and Palestine, with no results.

July 15^th or 18^th, 1942

Dagabur, along with the submarines Axum, Cobalto, Dessiè, Velella, Bronzo, and Malachite (some of which were already present in the area and others sent specifically on July 15^th to the waters between La Galite, the Isle of Dogs, Cape Bon and Cape Kelibia following the news of the imminent passage of a fast unit), forms a barrage line off Cape Bon to intercept the British fast minelayer H.M.S. Welshman,  sent to Malta with a cargo of urgent supplies.

According to a source, the submarines also tried to intercept the British Force H (aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle, anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Cairo and H.M.S. Charybdis, destroyers H.M.S. Antelope, H.M.S. Ithuriel, H.M.S. Vansittart, H.M.S. Westcott, and H.M.S. Wrestler) which had gone out to sea for the “Pinpoint” operation, the sending to Malta of Spitfire fighters taking off from the Eagle; but this seems unlikely, since this force went only south of the Balearic Islands, and not as far as Cape Bon.

Despite the dispatch of submarines, H.M.S. Welshman arrived unscathed in Malta on July 16th and returned on the 17th, after delivering her cargo. Of the Italian submarines deployed in the area, only Axum was able to spot it, but its attack was fruitless, also due to the rough seas.

Mid-August

On 4 August 1942 , Dagabur, under the command of Lieutenant Renato Pecori, sailed from Cagliari to reach an ambush area between the meridians 1°40′ E and 2°40′ E, south of the channel between Ibiza and Mallorca and north of Algeria; Initially, the assigned sector was between Menorca and the North African coast, about 50 miles northwest of Bougie, but later on the same day of  August 4^th the order came to move further west, north of Algiers and south of the Balearic Islands.

On August 10^th, the boat received orders, in case of sighting of enemy ships, to give priority to the signaling of the sighting, and to attack only after having launched the signal of discovery. The battle of Mid-August had begun, and it was necessary that as many submarines as possible could identify and attack the British convoy “Pedestal”, thus it was of paramount importance that any sighting be immediately brought to the attention of all boats who were in the area.

Moreover, since experience had shown that too often reconnaissance planes were intercepted and shot down by fighters on carriers before they could perform their task, the contribution of submarines was particularly important in enabling the commanders to have reliable information on the composition, course and speed of enemy formation, which was essential for coordinating the action of the air and naval forces destined to attack the enemy. convoy, especially air convoys.

The Battle of Mid-August was the consequence of the Royal Navy’s new attempt to supply the island of Malta, besieged by Axis air and naval forces and exhausted after months of bombing and the partial or total failure of the refueling operations attempted in March (convoy “M.W. 10”, culminating in the second battle of Sirte) and June (operations “Harpoon” and “Vigorous”,  culminating in the Battle of Mid-June). The new operation, called “Pedestal”, consisted of a single large convoy which, assembled in the United Kingdom (from where it departed on 3 August 1942), would then cross the Strait of Gibraltar (9/10 August) and then head towards Malta.

All along, as many as 16 Italian submarines and two German U-boats contributed to the formation of a powerful barrage of submarines in the western Mediterranean: seven of them, including Dagabur (the others were Brin, Giada, Uarsciek and Volframio and the German U 73 and U 205), were placed in the waters between Algeria and the Balearic Islands, while the other eleven formed a second group much further east,  north of Tunisia. On August 11th, Allied naval forces were sighted coming from Gibraltar and heading east.

On the night between August 11th and 12th, Dagabur met the British aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious and the destroyers escorting it south of the Balearic Islands: they were the group assigned to Operation Bellows, a sub-operation of “Pedestal”, whose objective was to send to Malta 39 Supermarine Spitfire fighter planes, which were supposed to reach the island (to replenish the squadrons decimated by continuous air attacks) after taking off from the old aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious.

Furious had loaded the 39 Spitfires on the Clyde, UK, from where the boat departed on 4 August along with the light cruiser H.M.S. Manchester and the destroyers H.M.S. Sardonyx (which left the group on the night of 5–6 August) and Blyskawica (the latter Polish). On August 7h, H.M.S. Furious and H.M.S. Manchester had joined convoy WS.21S, with which they had crossed the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 August (H.M.S. Furious was to accompany the convoy only for the distance necessary to reach “flight” range from Malta); the following day, H.M.S. Furious, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Lookout and H.M.S. Lightning, had separated from the main group and moved to a fixed point south of the Balearic Islands, about 584 (or 550, or 635) miles west of Malta, where the boat launched 38 of the 39 Spitfires.

The operation had taken place in the early afternoon of August 11th: at noon H.M.S. Furious, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Lookout had detached from the left side of the convoy, and the old aircraft carrier had assumed a favorable position, given the wind conditions, to facilitate the take-off of the planes. The first eight Spitfires took off at 12:29 PM, followed by a second group of eight fighters at 01:09 PM. Six minutes later, however, the German submarine U 73 torpedoed and sunk the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle, and flight operations were suspended until the rescue of her crew was completed, while H.M.S. Furious made emergency approaches to frustrate any further attack attempts. After about an hour and a half, when the rescue was over, H.M.S. Furious had resumed the launches; the last seven planes (in all, the Spitfires had departed into five groups) had taken off at 03:08 PM (or 03:12 PM). One of the fighters had problems with the propeller and had to land shortly afterwards on the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Indomitable, while another disappeared in flight without a trace; the other 36 had all reached Malta, landing at the bases of Luqa and Takali.

At the time of the encounter with Dagabur, the British formation was proceeding at 21 knots on course 262°; It was a dark, moonless night, but with very bright stars. The ships, as always in wartime, proceeded with their lights off.

At 00:54 AM on August 12th, the Type 271 radar of the British destroyer H.M.S. Wolverine (Lieutenant Commander Peter William Gretton), which occupied the “O”/”Orange” position in the formation and was at that moment zigzagging on course 232°, located a submarine that had emerged at a distance of about 4,570 meters, on a 265° bearing: it was Dagabur. According to some sources, the Italian submarine had spotted the force of “Bellows” and was trying to approach on the surface to attack H.M.S. Furious. According to others, the boat was caught on the surface while it was recharging the batteries and could not dive for this reason. Conjecture, in both cases: it is impossible to know the truth.

H.M.S. Wolverine was an Admiralty modified W-class destroyer built in 1918. After being fully refitted, it reentered service in 1939

In any case, H.M.S. Wolverine immediately went on the attack. When distance was reduced to 4,390 meters, the officer on the watch aboard the destroyer ordered it to approach the contact. When Commander Gretton, alerted to what was happening, reached the bridge, distance had been reduced to 4,115 meters. Once distance had been further reduced, to 3,200 meters, Gretton decided to radio H.M.S. Keppel with the conventional message “JOHNNY 284”; when they were close to just 915 meters, H.M.S. Wolverine made the same signal to H.M.S. Malcolm, which was not far back, in a position further back (“P”/”Pudding”). Depth charges were prepared for use on H.M.S. Wolverine, and a cannon (‘B’) was pointed in the direction of the submarine; Gretton’s intention was to ram the enemy, so he did not open fire, but merely held ready to do so if necessary.

H.M.S. Wolverine optically sighted Dagabur at a distance of 640 meters, and when it was at 550 meters Gretton could identify it with certainty as a submarine. He therefore ordered the engines to be brought to maximum speed (an order facilitated by the fact that at that moment three boilers were on and connected) and to pull over to ram it. With the engines propelled at full force, the speed of the destroyer was increased to 26/27 knots, although immediately before the collision it was reduced to 20 knots to mitigate the violence of the impact, which would not have left the ship unscathed either. The signal to prepare for impact (“Crash Stations”) was sounded.

Dagabur, which presumably had not noticed the destroyer that was rushing at it due to the very dark night (not having, like its adversary, a radar that could overcome this problem), was taken completely by surprise. H.M.S. Wolverine rammed it amidships, at the aft end of the conning tower, at a 90° angle to starboard. The impact was terrible, and the Italian submarine capsized and sank instantly in position 37°18′ N and 01°55′ (or 01°58′) E, 40 miles north-northeast of Cape Blanc, south of the Balearic Islands (more precisely, of Formentera) and 50 miles northwest of Algiers.

Commander Gretton later described the impact in a few words: “We climbed onto the conning tower of the submarine and cut it in two.” The commander of H.M.S. Wolverine also recalled that he expected his second in command to compliment the ramming of the enemy unit, and instead he, having sensed the impact but being unaware of what was happening, rushed to the bridge, and asked worriedly “O Lord, what have we hit?”. The roar of the collision was so loud that it could be heard on other ships in the formation: George Amyes, a survivor of H.M.S. Eagle rescued by the destroyer H.M.S. Laforey, recalled that he and other survivors on board the destroyer were trying to sleep when they were suddenly awakened by a tremendous crashing noise, followed by “noises of wild confusion“, so much so that for a moment he thought he had been torpedoed again. The next morning, he saw that the destroyer that should have been on the port side of H.M.S. Laforey was no longer there, while on the starboard side was visible a battered destroyer that was advancing with difficulty: it was H.M.S. Wolverine; Amyes later learned of the ramming of the Dagabur.

The impact had been so violent that H.M.S. Wolverine itself suffered very serious damage to the bow, which came out half-destroyed (the first nine or ten meters no longer existed; fortunately, Gretton later wrote, the bow locker in deformation had bent backwards up to the height of the waterline, so that it had acted as a partial and improvised watertight bulkhead),  and he also had a turbine out of order (the one on the left); At 02:00 AM the destroyer reported that the boat was stationary due to damage sustained in the collision, and Malcolm was detached to assist her.

H.M.S. Wolverine with a temporary repair to the bow

Due to a ruptured steam pipe, the engine room also had to be evacuated. H.M.S. Wolverine then started again, driven only by the starboard turbine, but due to the severity of the damage it had to leave the formation and head on its own to Gibraltar, where it arrived at 12.30 AM on August 13th, escorted by H.M.S. Malcolm (which arrived in port three hours later, while H.M.S. Furious and escort had arrived there since 07.30 PM the previous day). At Gibraltar, H.M.S. Wolverine received a provisional bow for the voyage to the United Kingdom, at Devonport, where the boat was placed in dry dock and underwent more extensive repairs that lasted until December. For the sinking of the Dagabur, Commander Gretton would receive the Distinguished Service Order; For several years after the war, the British commander would remain in the dark about the identity of the submarine he had sunk, which he believed to be a German U-boat.

The crew of H.M.S. Wolverine celebrating the sinking of Dagabur.

According to some accounts, some men from Dagabur initially survived the sinking of the submarine but were not rescued by the British ships. Sub-Lieutenant Robert Michael Crosley, a Fleet Air Arm pilot rescued by Malcolm after the sinking of H.M.S. Eagle (on which he was embarked), described what happened in his memoir “They Gave Me a Seafire“: “That night, August 12th, we tried to sleep a little on deck, but we were so excited by the events of the day that few of us were able to do so. Suddenly, at about one o’clock in the morning, we heard the ship heel from a turn made with the full rudder. Then we saw little blue lights passing us on either side, low on the water. We could hear voices. They looked like they were shouting something as they slipped away. We returned to the previous route almost immediately, without slowing down. Second Lieutenant Godfrey Parish of 801 Squadron went up to the bridge to ask the commander, Commander Campbell, what it was all about. Apparently, the destroyer Wolverine, in front of us and also crowded with survivors of the Eagle, had surprised the Italian submarine Dagabur on the surface and rammed it at full speed, cutting it in two. We had just passed through its wreckage and castaways. Parrish was a little angry that we hadn’t stopped to retrieve them. On the other hand, we were close to the Balearic Islands, and the Spaniards later announced their rescue [this last statement, unfortunately, was not true].”

Sam Moses’ book “At All Costs” also states that Malcolm reported hearing castaways screaming in the water, but did not pick them up, concluding, “They thought it was a German U-boat.”

There were no survivors among the 5 officers and 40 non-commissioned officers and sailors who made up the crew of the Dagabur.

On August 12th, Maricosom informed the submarines at sea of the presence of a large British formation sailing from Gibraltar to Malta, and ordered them to attack it at all costs; That evening, at 07:00 PM, the Submarine Squadron Command ordered Dagabur, Brin, Uarsciek and Volframio to move westwards, informing them at the same time that a part of the British ships (the heavy support force, which was to accompany the convoy only to the mouth of the Strait of Sicily, and then return to Gibraltar) had reversed course. But Dagabur never received these communications: at that moment, Commander Pecori’s submarine was already lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean. On August 17th, still not having heard back from Dagabur, Maricosom repeatedly radioed the submarine, but never received an answer. On September 2^nd,1942, the crew of Dagabur was reported missing. It was only after the war that the truth was learned from British sources.

Among the missing was the chief engine engineer second class Federico Ghezzi, from Piacenza. For his family this was the second mourning caused by the war on the sea; less than a year earlier, in September 1941, his younger brother Giacomo, second lieutenant commissioner in the Army, had disappeared in the sinking of the motor ship Andrea Gritti, on which he was serving as a royal commissioner.

Like him, sailor Ugo Di Blasi, from Naples, was declared missing on the Dagabur: in a letter a few months earlier, in May 1942, he had written: “My friends have all disappeared, some hit by enemy bombs, some lost in battles on the sea; I’m amazed I’m not dead yet…”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	23		17364	3888	179	118.73	4.95

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
3/29/1941	20:27	T.V. Domenico Romano	Mediterranean	33°47′ N-25°24′ E		Torpedo	Damaged (?)	H.M.S. Bonaventure	Light Cruiser	5440	Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Alfieri	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Basso	Primo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Bellonio	Tommaso	Sailor	Comune	5/12/1940
Bertazzi	Alessandro	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Brondi	Bernardo	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	8/12/1942
Campagna	Filippo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Cannia	Matteo	Sergeant	Sergente	8/12/1942
Casella	Francesco	Sergeant	Sergente	8/12/1942
Catalano	Domenico	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	8/12/1942
Cavallotti	Guglielmo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Cerami	Francesco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Ceresoli	Mario	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Cesarotti	Eros	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Corallo	Salvatore	Sergeant	Sergente	8/12/1942
De Hoffmann	Gabriele	Ensign	Guardiamarina	8/12/1942
Di Bella	Giacomo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Di Blasi	Ugo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Di Lucia	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Ellena	Arturo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Femmino	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Filippini	Renato	Lieutenant Other Branches	Capitano G.N.	8/12/1942
Gaggiott	Vincenzo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Galano	Adamo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Gatti	Alfredo	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	8/12/1942
Ghezzi	Federico	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Grapputo	Evelino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Lops	Donato	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Marci	Raffaele	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	8/12/1942
Marzocchi	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Mele	Biagio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Midili	Antonino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Modica	Salvatore	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Napoleone	Aniello	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Orlandi	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Pasquero	Giustino	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	8/12/1942
Pecori	Renato	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello	8/12/1942
Pileddu	Enrico	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Riva	Adriano	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Salemi	Saverio	Sergeant	Sergente	8/12/1942
Salvanelli	Renato	Ensign	Guardiamarina	8/12/1942
Soffietti	Renzo	Naval Rating	Comune	8/12/1942
Stabile	Salvatore	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Stefanini	Gennaro	Sergeant	Sergente	8/12/1942
Travain	Giuseppe	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe	8/12/1942
Vallorini	Nello	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942
Zaccaria	Agostino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	8/12/1942

Turchese was a coastal submarine of the Perla class with a displacement of 680 tons on the surface and 844 submerged.

During the conflict against the Allies (June 10^th, 1940, through September 8^th, 1943) the boat carried out 32 patrols (mostly in the Strait of Sicily and along the North African coast) and 26 transfer missions, covering 27,904 miles on the surface and 5255 submerged, as well as 95 outings for training or sea trials. It was thus the second Italian submarine for the number of missions carried out in the 1940-1943 conflict, surpassed only by the old H 2 which, however, was used for “second line” tasks in much less dangerous waters.

Seriously damaged by a British aircraft in an episode of “friendly fire” in the aftermath of the armistice, it was never repaired, remaining unused until the end of the war and was subsequent demolition under the conditions of the peace treaty.

Brief and partial chronology

September 27^th or 28^th, or 29^th, 1935

Setting up at the “Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico” (C.R.D.A.) in Monfalcone (construction number 1143).

Turchese under construction. Note the joining of the sheet metal using large rivets.

July 19th, 1936

Launched at the C.R.D.A. in Monfalcone.

Turchese in Monfalcone after its launch
(Museo della Cantieristica di Monfalcone)

September 21st, 1936

Entry into service.

October 15, 1936

Turchese was placed under Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) and assigned to the XXXV Submarine Squadron, based in Messina (for another source, to the XXXIV Squadron of the III Grupsom, also based in Messina).

Turchese in Messina, Sicily

End of 1936

After completing his initial training, the boat made a long endurance cruise in the Dodecanese.

1937

Turchese carried out a training campaign in the Dodecanese and in the Mediterranean.

1938

Another training campaign in the Dodecanese and in the Mediterranean.

May 5th, 1938

Under the command of Lieutenant Francesco Coelli (1), the submarine Turchese took part in the naval magazine “H” organized in the Gulf of Naples for Adolf Hitler’s visit to Italy. Most of the Italian fleet took part in the review: the battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour, the seven heavy cruisers of the I and III Divisions, the eleven light cruisers of the II, IV, VII and VIII Divisions, 7 “light explorers” of the “Navigatori” class, 18 destroyers (the Squadrons VII, VIII, IX and X, plus the Borea and the Zeffiro),  30 torpedo boats (the Squadrons IX, X, XI and XII, plus the old Audace, Castelfidardo, Curtatone, Francesco Stocco, Nicola Fabrizi and Giuseppe La Masa and the four “escort notices” of the Orsa class), as many as 85 submarines of the Submarine Squadron under the command of Admiral Antonio Legnani, and 24 MAS (Squadrons IV, V, VIII, IX, X and XI), as well as the training ships Cristoforo Colombo and Amerigo Vespucci,  Benito Mussolini’s yacht, the Aurora, the royal ship Savoy and the target ship San Marco.

The Submarine Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Antonio Legnani, was the protagonist of one of the most spectacular moments of the parade, in which the 85 boats carried out a series of synchronized maneuvers. First, arranged in two columns, at 1.15 PM they pass opposite direction between the two naval squadrons proceeding on parallel routes. Then, at 1:25 PM, all the submarines made a simultaneous mass dive, proceeded for a short distance submerged and then emerged simultaneously and executed a salvo of eleven shots with their respective guns.

1. Promoted to Commander, Coelli died aboard the Heavy Cruiser Pola on March 3rd, 1941 during the Battle of Matapan.

May 1938

Turchese, part of the XXXIV Submarine Squadron (I Grupsom of La Spezia) along with Medusa, Jasper and Corallo, was among the numerous units (battleships Cesare and Cavour, heavy cruisers Zara, Pola, Fiume, Gorizia, Trento, Trieste and Bolzano, light cruisers Duca degli Abruzzi, Garibaldi, Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d’Aosta, Attendolo, Da Barbiano, Di Giussano, Colleoni, Cadorna, Diaz,  Bande Nere, twenty destroyers of Squadrons VII, VIII, IX and X, 54 submarines of Squadrons XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XXI, XXXIV, XLI, XLII) concentrated in Genoa for another naval review organized on the occasion of Benito Mussolini’s official visit to the city, the first in twelve years.

In his speech to the Genoese on 14 May, Mussolini declared: “… The guidelines of our policy are clear: we want peace, peace with everyone. (…) But peace, to be sure, must be armed. That is why I wanted the whole fleet to gather in Genoa: to show you and the Italians of the two most continental regions, which are Piedmont and Lombardy, what our real strength is on the sea. We want peace, but we must be ready with all our might to defend it, especially when we hear speeches, even from across the Atlantic, on which we must reflect. It is perhaps out of the question that the so-called great democracies are really preparing for a war of doctrines. However, it is good to know that, in this case, totalitarian states will immediately block and march to the end.“

The fleet remained in Genoa until the end of the month, open to visits by the civilian population: a total of 650,000 visitors flocked to see it, of which 430,000 were Genoese and 220,000 from the rest of Liguria, Piedmont, and Lombardy.

June 19^th, 1938

Turchese received the combat flag in Riposto (TN Near Catania, Sicily), offered by the city, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the battle of the Piave.

The ceremony for the delivery of the battle flag to the Turchese organized by the Fascist Party in Riposto

October 15th, 1938

Turchese was assigned to the submarine Command School.

Spring 1939

Turchese was deployed in Cagliari, as part of the LXXII Submarine Squadron along with Diapro, Coralllo and Medusa.

January 1st, 1940

Lieutenant commander Gustavo Miniero (1), 33, from Gragnano, took command of Turchese.

1. Promoted to Commander, Miniero died on January 5th, 1942 aboard the submarine Ammiraglio Saint Bon.

June 9, 1940

Under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 10.02 PM to form a barrage on the meridian of Capo Teulada, along with Adua, Axum and Aradam. Turchese, specifically, patrolling 35 miles south of Cape Teulada.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into the World War II, Turchese was part of the LXXII Submarine Squadron based in Cagliari, along with Diaspo, Corallo, and Medusa.

June 13th, 1940

Tuirchse received orders to move to the Gulf of Lion, after which the boat patrolled the waters 15 miles east of Cape Creus until the evening of the 19th, in search of French and British merchant traffic.

June 21st, 1940

At 10:15 AM, the crew sighted three small military units from 20 km away in quadrant 0261, northeast of the Balearic Islands. Approaching up to 14 km, Captain Miniero realized that he was dealing with a large enemy formation thus gave up the chase at 11.48 AM.

Probably, the units sighted were the French destroyers of the 8éme Division de Contre-Torpilleurs, the fastest warships in the world.

At 10.05 PM Turchese returned to Cagliari, after having covered 1,052 miles.

July 3rd, 1940

The boat sailed from Cagliari at 2.16 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, to lay in ambush in position 37°54′ N and 07°40′ E, forming a patrol line between Bona and Cap de Fer with Aradam (which sailed along with Turchese), Alagi and Axum.

July 6th, 1940

The boat returned to Cagliari at noon, after having covered 262 miles.

July 9th, 1940

Still under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 00.57 for a patrol in position 37°50′ N and 09°40′ E, between the island of Galite and Tunisia.

July 12th, 1940

At 2.25 AM, during the return navigation, the officer of the watch sighted an illuminated ship in position 38°24′ N and 09°19′ E. Turchese approached using the electric motors, to remain silent and avoid revealing its presence. The unknown ship behaves strangely (it seems to be stationary), so much so that it was believed that it is not a neutral ship – as it should be, given the lights on – but an enemy ship engaged in laying mines.

At 3:25 AM, Turchese launched a 533 mm torpedo from the forward tubes from only 500 meters away. The phosphorescent wake pointed straight to the center of the target, but the torpedo passed under the hull without exploding. At 3:26 AM a second torpedo was launched, again 533 mm and again 500 meters, but this too passed under the hull of the unknown ship. Commander Miniero wanted to try again with a third torpedo, and open fire with the cannon, but at 3.35 AM Turchese violently hit a metal object, at 3.38 AM a second collision occurs, more violent than the first. At 4:10 AM, the submarine broke contact and moved away (according to another source, the unknown ship would have been able to disengage thanks to the increased speed). At 11.05 AM Turchese returned to Cagliari, after having covered 354 miles.

August 1st, 1940

Still under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at one o’clock in the morning for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, in position 37°25′ N and 06°30′ E. It was to form a barrage along with the submarines Argo, Scirè, Neghelli, Medusa, Axum and Diaspro, arranged in two lines of three and four units spaced ten miles apart (while the distance between two submarines of the same line was twenty miles) north of Cape Bougaroni. The formation of the barrage was ordered by Supermarina following the report of the exit from Gibraltar of the British Force H (which sailed with the aircraft carriers H.M.S. Argus and H.M.S. Ark Royal, the battlecruiser H.M.S. Hood, the light cruiser H.M.S. Enterprise and the destroyers H.M.S. Faulknor, H.M.S. Foxhound, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Encounter, H.M.S. Gallant, H.M.S. Greyhound and H.M.S. Hotspur for operations “Hurry” and “Crush”, consisting respectively of sending to Malta twelve fighters launched by H.M.S. Argus and an air attack against Cagliari by planes that took off from H.M.S. Ark Royal).

Turchese was part of the line of four units, together with Diaspro, Axum and Medusa (which after two days had to be replaced by the submarine Luciano Manara following a breakdown). Force H, however, would move north of the area where the submarines were deployed, thus they were not able to attack.

August 9th, 1940

Turchese returnd at 11.40 AM to La Maddalena, after having covered 1,342 miles without any noteworthy encounters.

August 23rd, 1940

The boat left La Maddalena at one o’clock in the morning, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to transfer to Pula.

August 28th, 1940

Turchese arrived in Pula at 11.40 AM, after having covered 1,054 miles.

August 30th, 1940

The boat left Pula at 5.45 AM, still under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Monfalcone, where it arrived at 12.30 PM after having traveled 74 miles. There it entered the shipyard for works.

November 9th, 1940

Once the work was completed, Turchese completed a training patrol from Monfalcone, from 9.18 AM to 4.10 PM, covering 40 miles. The commander was still Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero.

November 22nd, 1940

Another training patrol from Monfalcone, from 9.30 AM to 3.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero. The boat traveled 44 miles.

November 24th, 1940

Turchese left Monfalcone at 9.33 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Pula, where it arrived at 4.40 PM, after having covered 74 miles.

November 29th, 1940

Exited Pula for a training patrol from 9.03 AM to 9.53 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, covering five miles.

December 2nd, 1940

The boat left Pula at 9.10 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Rijeka, escorted by his twin boat Galatea. During the transfer navigation, it performed a diving test at 60 meters. Turchese arrived in Rijeka at 5.45 PM, after covering 63 miles.

December 5th, 1940

Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, 31, from Milan, took command of Turchese, replacing Lieutenant Commander Miniero.

On the same day, the submarine made an exit from Rijeka, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, from 12.12 AM to 4.35 PM for a diving test at 60 meters, returning to port after covering 18 miles.

December 6th, 1940

The boat left Rijeka at 8.36 AM to move to Pula, where it arrived at 2.36 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, traveling 63 miles.

December 7th, 1940

Engines were fired up, from 14.10 AM to 14.40 AM, to change anchorage, always staying in Pula.

December 9th, 1940

Departure from Pula from 8.05 AM to 5.25 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, escorted by the auxiliary escort ship F 134 Laurana, travrlling 61 miles.

December 11th, 1940

Left port for sea trials from Pula from 8 AM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 57 miles.

December 12th, 1940

Left Pula from 8.20 AM to 2.25 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing travelling 14 miles.

December 13th, 1940

Under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, Turchese left Pula from 8.10 AM to 5.10 PM, along with the submarine Ettore Fieramosca and with the escort of the tugboat Tenace, for torpedo launch exercises with the torpedo boat Audace travelling 57 miles.

December 14th, 1940

Engines were fired up from 2.18 PM to 2.35 PM to change anchorage in the port of Pula.

December 26th, 1940

Turchese left Pula at 7.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Brindisi.

December 28th, 1940

The boat arrived in Brindisi at 2.15 PM, after having covered 370 miles.

December 30th, 1940

Turchese sailed from Brindisi at ten o’clock in the morning for a patrol south of the Otranto Channel and west of Corfu, in position 39°30′ N and 19°10′ E, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico. Together with the submarines Ambra and Filippo Corridoni, it protected traffic between Italy and Albania.

January 9th, 1941

At 7:25 AM, the Greek submarine Triton (Lieutenant Commander Dyonisios Zeppos) unsuccessfully attacked a submarine west of Othoni, in the Otranto Channel. It is possible that the submarine attacked was Turchese, which for its part, however, did not notice the attack.

January 10th, 1941

Turchse returned to Brindisi at 5:30 PM, after having covered 887 miles without any major events, apart from detecting engine noises.

January 22nd, 1941

Departure from Brindisi for sea trials from 9:00 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 18 miles.

January 29th, 1941

Departure from Brindisi for sea trials from 8.42 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 18 miles.

January 30th, 1941

Turchese set sail from Brindisi at ten o’clock, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol off the Albanian coast, within a radius of ten miles from point 39°10′ N and 19°20′ E, to protect traffic between Italy and Albania.

February 10th, 1941

The boat returned to Brindisi at 6:15 PM, after having covered 908 miles without detecting anything more than distant engine noise.

February 21st, 1941

Turchese sailed from Brindisi at 1:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol west of Corfu, within a radius of ten miles from point 39°10′ N and 19°20′ E, again to protect convoys sailing to and from Albania.

March 4th, 1941

The boat returned to Brindisi at 2.50 PM, after having covered 985 miles without major events.

March 15th, 1941

Turchese left Brindisi at 10:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Crotone.

March 16th, 1941

The boat arrived in Crotone at 5.35 PM, after having covered 179 miles.

March 20th, 1941

Turchese left Crotone at 2:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Cagliari.

Some sources erroneously state that on this date Turchese unsuccessfully attacked a destroyer, being bombarded with depth charges, but this is a mistake; There is no record of this incident in the mission report.

March 22nd, 1941

The boat arrived in Cagliari at 5.30 PM, after having covered 485 miles.

Turchese at sea

March 31st, 1941

The boat left Cagliari from 8:00 AM to 12.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials travelling 31 miles.

April 3rd, 1941

Turchese left Cagliari at 12.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol north of Cape Blanc, within a radius of twenty miles from point 37°30′ N and 09°50′ E forming a barrage with its twin boat Corallo.

April 9th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 5.15 PM, after having traveled 552 miles without sighting anything but ships of Vichy France.

April 18, 1941

Turchese left Cagliari at eight o’clock in the evening, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Messina.

April 20^th, 1941

The boat arrived in Messina at ten o’clock in the morning, after having covered 360 miles.

April 21st, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, Turchese sailed from Messina at 6.56 PM for a patrol in the Gulf of Sollum and off Marsa Matruh, within a radius of 20 miles from point 32°10′ N and 27°30′ E, along an axis oriented from northeast to southwest.

April 30rd, 1941

At 5:27 PM, Turchese, engaged in hydrophone surveillance while submerged, when it was suddenly shaken by two explosions, which were attributed to aircraft bombs. At 6:42 PM, eight more explosions occurred, and then more until 7:40 PM.

They were not aircraft bombs but depth charges, dropped in position 32°59′ N and 27°52′ E by the British destroyers H.M.S Jaguar and H.M.S. Juno, which wrongly believe that they have sunk the attacked submarine (H.M.S. Juno will have five dead and eleven wounded among the crew due to the premature explosion of a depth charge). To escape the hunt, Turchese descended to a depth of 90-95 meters.

May 1st, 1941

More explosions were heard, but at a great distance.

May 3rd, 1941

Following trouble with the diesel engines, Turchese aborted its mission and headed towards Leros.

May 7th, 1941

Turchese reached Leros at 2.40 PM, after having covered 1,451 miles.

May 26th, 1941

The boat left Leros for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 12.19 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 23 miles.

May 27th, 1941

The boat left Leros from 7.38 AM to 10.43 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials covering 3 miles.

May 31st, 1941

Turhse left Leros at 3:20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol south of the island of Kupho (southeast of Crete), within a radius of twenty miles from 33°50′ N and 26°00′ E.

June 5th, 1941

At 8:43 PM, twenty miles southwest of Cape Krio, a submarine was sighted two thousand yards away. Captain Di Domenico decided to dive as a precaution, but during the diving phase the boat was identified as Italian. It was in fact Smeraldo, which in turn recognized the other unit as Italian (although it was wrong about the class, believing to be the Fisalia) and carried out the recognition signals. Subsequently, Turchese headed to Taranto due to engine problems.

June 8th, 1941

The boat arrived in Taranto at 2.35 PM, after having covered 1,040 miles.

June 20th, 1941

The boat left Taranto from 2.45 PM to 5.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing covering 2 miles.

June 24th, 1941

Engines were fired up for 10 minutes for a change of anchorage in the port of Taranto.

August 21st, 1941

Departure from Taranto from 11.49 AM to 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials, with the escort of the auxiliary escort ship F 46 Limbara travelling 29 miles.

August 23rd, 1941

Left Taranto from 2.14 PM to 4.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing covering 2 miles.

August 24th, 1941

Left Taranto for sea trials from 8.42 AM to 5.52 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico. travelling 63 miles.

August 27th, 1941

Left Taranto for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 5.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 60 miles.

August 29th, 1941

Departure for sea trials from Taranto from 11:00 AM to 6.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, with the escort of the torpedo boat Altair travelling 33 miles.

September 1st, 1941

Turchse left Taranto at 8.55 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Messina.

September 2nd, 1941

The boat arrived in Messina at 12.10 PM, after having covered 255 miles.

September 3rd, 1941

The boat left Messina at 7:00 PM to move to Cagliari, still under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico.

September 5th, 1941

The boat arrived in Cagliari at 7.07 AM, after covering 351 miles.

September 9th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 7.30 AM to 1.55 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 26 miles.

September 11th, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 1.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol in position 38°00′ N and 06°00′ E, north of Capo Bougaroni forming a barrage together with Adua and Axum.

September 14th, 1941

Turchese was ordered to move to a new ambush sector, centered on 38°10′ N and 04°00′ E.

September 16th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 9.33 AM, after having covered 685 miles without any major events.

September 22nd, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 7.08 AM to 12.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, along with the submarines Adua and Serpente and with the escort of the torpedo boat Giuseppe Cesare Abba and the auxiliary minelayer R 176 Balear travelling 35 miles.

September 23rd, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 7:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, between Cape Palos and Cape Caxine (south/southwest of Ibiza), in an area bounded by the meridians 00°20′ E and 00°40′ E and the parallels 36°50′ N (or 36°30′ N) and 37°30′ N. It was part of a barrage together with the Adua, in contrast to the British operation ‘Halberd’. As part of this operation, Force H lefty Gibraltar, with the battleships H.M.S. Prince of Wales, H.M.S. Rodney and H.M.S. Nelson, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal and the destroyers H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Fury, H.M.S. Lance, H.M.S. Legion, H.M.S. Lively, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Zulu, Isaac Sweers (Dutch), Garland (Polish) and Piorun (Polish). The formation was divided by the British into various sub-groups, which departed at different times between September 24th and 25^th. The purpose was to protect the navigation to Malta of a convoy with supplies (WS. 11X, formed by the military tanker Breconshire and the cargo ships Ajax, City of Lincoln, City of Calcutta, Clan MacDonald, Clan Ferguson,  Rowallan Castle, Imperial Star and Dunedin Star with a combined cargo of 81,000 tons of supplies and the direct escort of the light cruisers H.M.S. Edinburgh, H.M.S. Sheffield, H.M.S. Euryalus, H.M.S. Kenya and H.M.S. Hermione and the destroyers H.M.S. Cossack, H.M.S. Farndale, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Heythrop, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Oribi of Force X), which would take place at the same time as the navigation of another convoy (three unloaded merchant ships,  escorted by a corvette) from Malta to Gibraltar and with a diversionary action by the Mediterranean Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean.

The departure of Force H in several groups, and the routes followed by them until the meeting (which took place on the morning of September 27th, one hundred miles south of Cagliari), deceived the Italian commands, who mistakenly believed that the purpose of the operation was a naval bombardment against targets on the coasts of the Peninsula (as attested by the “Notiziario 73” of “Maristat Informazioni”,  on the morning of September 25th, according to which “The purpose of the mission would be retaliation against the Italian coasts”). To counter this hypothetical bombardment, Supermarina sent four submarines east of the Balearic Islands, three more southwest of Sardinia, three south/southwest of Ibiza and five in the Ligurian Sea. Turchese, Adua, Dandolo, Squalo, Delfino and Fratelli Bandiera were sent north of Cape Ferrat, Narvalo north of Cape Bon.

Turchese, Adua and Dandolo reached the assigned areas only after the British formation has already crossed them. Maricosom, as a consequence, ordered all submarines to move further south, attempting to intercept the British forces (whose real objective was meanwhile understood by Supermarina on the morning of the 27th, when news of the existence of a convoy bound for Malta arrived) during the re-entry phase, communicating at 8.45 PM on the 27th: “Enemy naval force already attacked and damaged by ARMERA (STOP) In search and attack act with maximum commitment and precision to inflict to the enemy further and more serious damage possible (STOP) I am sure that you will prove worthy of the trust that the Navy places in you (STOP)”. But even these new orders will not bring results.

Equally unsuccessful was the departure to sea of the battle squadron under the command of Admiral Angelo Iachino (battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, heavy cruisers Trento, Trieste and Gorizia, light cruisers Muzio Attendolo and Luigi di Savoia Duca degli Abruzzi, destroyers Granatiere, Bersagliere, Fuciliere, Ascari, Lanciere, Cuirassier, Carabiniere, Folgore, Maestrale, Grecale, Scirocco, Vincenzo Gioberti, Nicoloso Da Recco and Emanuele Pessagno).

September 30th, 1941

At 5:03 AM, a message was received reporting the sighting by the Adua, at 3:50 AM, of a group of eleven destroyers, which, however, given their position and course, would pass much further north than the position of Turchese.

At 10.17 AM smoke was sighted from 14,000 meters, in position 36°49′ N and 00°24′ E. Turchese maneuvered to approach, and at 10.39 AM, having dropped the distance to 6,000 meters, managed to distinguish two Arethusa-class cruisers and two destroyers. At 11:10 AM, while Turchese was at a depth of 19 meters, six explosions were detected quite close. Commander Di Domenico decides to descend to 40 meters. At 1:39 PM, the hydrophones no longer picked up any noise.

The destroyers sighted by Turchese were probably the British H.M.S. Legion and H.M.S. Gurkha, which formed the advanced screen of Force H returning from operation “Halberd”. in a few hours they would sink the Adua.

October 2nd, 1941

At 6.50 AM a submarine, probably Italian, was sighted from 2,000 meters away, in position 37°15′ N and 03°12′ E. Given the poor visibility, however, Turchese maneuvers as a precaution to get away.

October 4th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 10.25 PM, after having covered 1,258 miles.

October 15th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 30 miles.

October 16th, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 11.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol north of Cap de Fer, together with the submarines Alagi, Serpente, Diaspro and Aradam, in an area between the parallels 37°40′ N and 37°50′ N (for another source, 37°10′ N and 37°20′ N) and the meridians 06°40′ N and 07°20′ E. The five submarines formed a barrage between 37°10′ N and 37°50′ N, each occupying an area of ten miles radius (another source speaks of a much larger barrage in the Strait of Sicily, formed by Ambra, Alagi, Ametista, Corallo, Fratelli Bandiera, Diaspro, Serpente, Squalo, Turchese, Delfino, and Narvalo).

October 21st, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 11:16 AM, after having traveled 552 miles without having sighted anything but ships of Vichy France.

October 27th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 1.10 PM to 4.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, with the escort of the Balear travelling 15 miles. At the end of the mission, Lieutenant Di Domenico disembarked and was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Cunsolo, 31, from Petralia Sottana.

November 11th, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Cunsolo, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 6.30 PM for a patrol in the “K.1” area, between Cape Bon and Ras Mustafà (more precisely, between the parallel 37°12′ N and the Tunisian coast, and between the meridians 06°20′ E and 06°30′ E) forming a barrage with Alagi, Axum, and Aradam.

November 13th, 1941

At six o’clock in the morning an illuminated merchant ship was sighted, 80 miles by 000° from Cape Blanc. Turchese approached 6,000 meters and sees that the ship is heading towards Bizerte. In the following days, only Italian or Vichy French ships were sighted.

November 14th, 1941

At 3:04 AM Turchese was sighted by the Aradam.

November 17th, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.10 PM, after having covered 672 miles.

December 1st, 1941

Lieutenant Commander Cunsolo left command of Turchese, which was again taken over by Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo De Domenico.

December 18th, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant De Domenico, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 8.25 PM for a patrol off Cape Bougaroni, in an area bounded by the Algerian coast, the meridian 37°30′ N and the parallels 06°20′ E and 06°30′ E forming a barrage together with Axum, Alagi and Aradam.

December 19th, 1941

At 9.40 AM, a German submarine (possibly U 74) was sighted 3,000 meters away, in position 38°05′ N and 07°47′ E, which made an indecipherable signal. Turchese continued on its course.

December 21st, 1941

At 1.24 AM a steamer, believed to be French, was sighted in position 37°21′ N and 06°22′ E.

December 22nd, 1941

At 2.55 AM another French steamer was sighted, in position 37°32′ N and 06°28′ E.

December 23rd, 1941

At 2:45 PM, ship noises were picked up on the hydrophone, on a 248° bearing. However, their direction varied considerably. Turchese headed towards them, and at 5.05 PM, in position 37°21′ N and 06°26′ E (off Cape Bougaroni), Turchese sighted two cruisers identified as of the Newcastle class and four destroyers believed to be of the Jervis class, sailing southwest at 25 knots, 12 km away; It send the discovery signal. However, it could not get closer than 7,000 meters.

The ships sighted were probably the British light cruiser H.M.S. Dido and the destroyers H.M.S. Zulu, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Arrow, H.M.S. Foxhound and H.M.A.S. Nestor, the latter Australian.

December 25th, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.30 PM, after having covered 763 miles.

January 1st, 1942

At 8 PM Turchese sailed from Cagliari under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage between 60 and 100 miles south of Malta (line passing through point 35°00′ N and 13°00′ E) together with Alagi, Aradam and Axum, to protect the convoys sailing between Italy and Libya.  Their task was to spot and attack any British naval forces that might take to the sea to counter Operation M. 43, consisting of sending a large convoy of supplies to Libya. In total, as many as eleven submarines (Turchese, Aradam, Platino, Onice, Galatea, Beilul, Delfino, Alagi, Axum, Zaffiro and Dessiè) were deployed in ambush on the probable routes that a British naval formation could take; one group (Turchese, Aradam, Axum, Platino, Onice, Alagi and Delfino) was deployed to the east of Malta, against possible arrivals from this island, another (Beilul, Galatea and Dessiè) further east, between Crete and Cyrenaica, on the route that would follow a formation that takes the sea from Alexandria. The submarines had an offensive-exploratory assignment during the day and a total offensive at night.

Turchese, specifically, was assigned a patrol area bounded by the meridians 14°00′ E and 14°40′ E and the parallels 34°20′ N and 34°40′ N. (Another source speaks of a barrage between Tobruk and Ras Aamer, together with Ametista and Galatea).

No British naval force would be able to attack the convoy, as the Mediterranean Fleet had been reduced to a minimum as a result of the losses inflicted at the end of 1941 by mines, Italian assault craft and German submarines (a situation of which, however, Rome was not aware, so as to lead to extreme precautionary measures such as this deployment of underwater units to protect the navigation of an important convoy such as “M. 43”); The convoy reached its destination unscathed, bringing to Libya 15,379 tons of fuel, 2,417 tons of ammunition, 10,242 tons of various materials, 144 tanks, 520 vehicles and 901 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

January 2nd, 1942

A breakdown forced the boat to divert to Trapani. It enters the port at 4.50 PM, but once the fault was repaired, it left at 7:00 PM and reached the area assigned for the ambush.

January 8th, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 7.40 PM, after having covered 1,027 miles.

January 16th, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 1.45 PM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 14 miles.

January 28th, 1942

The boat set sail from Cagliari at 2.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to patrol the area between meridians 07°00′ E and 07°10′ E and the parallels 37°30′ N and 38°00′ N together with Alagi, Aradam, Axum and Brin (with which it formed a barrage). At 4:46 PM, however, he was called back to base, returning to Cagliari at 7:30 PM, after having covered 46 miles.

February 3rd, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 12.25 PM to 5.35 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 33 miles.

February 9th, 1942

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 15.35, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage off Philippeville and north of Cape Bougaroni, together with Aradam and Axum. It patrolled a sector between the meridians 06°00′ E and 06°10′ E and between the parallels 37°30′ N and 38°00′ N.

February 11th, 1942

At 3 PM, a submarine was sighted heading west; it was believed to be the Brin.

February 21st, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 11.10 AM, after having covered 1,143 miles.

February 27th, 1942

At 12.38 PM Turchese set sail from Cagliari, under the command of Lieutenant Di Vincenzo, for a patrol off the Algerian coast, together with Aradam, Axum and Brin. It was assigned a patrol a sector between the meridians 03°40′ E and 04°40′ E and the parallels 37°20′ N and 37°30′ N.

March 4th, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.30 PM, after having traveled 765 miles sighting only ships of Vichy France.

Turchese in 1942.
Erminio Bagnasco & Achille Rastelli noted that the boat in this picture was often identified as the Axum.
The crew in the foreground are those of the torpedo boat of Spica class.
(“Sommergibili in Guerra” Erminio Bagnasco & Achille Rastelli)

March 27th, 1942

The boat set sail from Cagliari at 10.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage off Capo Bougaroni together with the Aradam (and, according to another source, Narvalo and Santorre Santarosa). It was assigned a patrol area bounded by the meridians 05°20′ E and 06°20′ E and the parallels 37°10′ N and 37°20′ N; The task of the submarines was to intercept Force H (under the command of Admiral Neville Syfret), which left Gibraltar and headed east, should it go there. However, the British formation, whose purpose is to launch aircraft intended to reinforce the Malta squadrons (this is Operation “Picket II”. The aircraft carriers H.M.S. Eagle and H.M.S. Argus set sail from Gibraltar on March 27th with the escort of the battleship H.M.S. Malaya, the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione and the destroyers H.M.S. Active, H.M.S. Anthony, H.M.S. Blankney, H.M.S. Croome, H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Exmoor, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Wishart,  launching on March 29th 8 Supermarine Spitfire fighters that reached Malta, while it will not be possible to launch, as planned, 6 Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers).

March 30th, 1942

At 5:12 PM, while Turchese was heading to intercept an enemy cruiser reported at 8:09 PM the previous day southwest of La Galite, an aircraft was sighted 7,000 meters away, in position 37°25′ N and 06°29′ E. The submarine dove. On board, it was believed that the cruiser passed about 10 miles away.

April 1st, 1942

At three o’clock in the morning, a large seaplane, identified as a PBY Catalina, was sighted in position 37°40′ N and 06°26′ E, 1,000 meters away. Turchese dove precipitously as five bombs explode, causing only minor damage.

The attacker was indeed a Catalina, the “J” aircraft (serial number AJ. 160) of the 202nd Squadron of the R.A.F., piloted by Lieutenant I. F. Edgar, which detected Turchese on radar from 8 miles and then also sighted it optically on route 075°, dropping its bombs (eight depth charges, one of which, however, did not drop due to a failure) from an altitude of just over 20 meters while the submarine was diving. Edgar later reported that he had spotted a large patch of naphtha at the site of the attack.

April 2nd, 1942

Turchese reached Cagliari at 9.38 am, after covering 643 miles.

April 4th, 1942

The boat sailed from Cagliari at 1.18 AM, again under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to patrol the “K.1” area north of Cape Bon (bounded by the meridians 11°00′ E and 11°05′ E, by the parallel 37°12′ N and by the Tunisian coast), forming a barrage with the Aradam, which at the same time would patrol the “K.2” area, north of Cape Kelibia,  with the dual purpose of protecting Italian convoys bound for Libya from incursions by British naval forces based in Malta, and to attack any isolated British traffic that might pass through these waters. The Maricosom Operation Order (209/SRP of 3 April, 7.45 PM) establishes: “Confidential personnel (STOP) Executive ambushes Kappa one submarine Turchese and Kappa two submarine Aradam (STOP) Turchese submarine outward route number one (semialt) return route number four with return to Trapani its new location (STOP) Aradam outbound route number one (semialt) return route number five with return to Trapani its new location (STOP) Leave ambush to order (STOP)  Partial modification of the general order of operation Kappa during ambush during daylight hours, remain perched on the bottom without coming periscope altitude for listening to SITES (STOP) instead of sunset day five, arrive on ambush points as soon as possible after performed hidden navigation daylight hours day four”.

April 8th, 1942

At 9:20 PM, a message was received about the sighting of a cruiser and a destroyer sailing westward. Turchese and Aradam were ordered to approach the African coast. Turchese moved to just 2 miles from Cape Bon, but it did not spot anything.

April 11th, 1942

The boat returned to Cagliari at 8.50 AM, after having covered 674 miles.

April 18th, 1942

The boat left Cagliari at 14.05, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to move to Trapani.

April 19, 1942

Turchese arrived in Trapani at 10.40 am, after having covered 181 miles.

April 20th, 1942

At 3.40 PM Turchese, still under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, sailed from Trapani to patrol an area between the meridians 09°20′ E and 09°40′ E and the parallels 38°00′ N and 38°40′ N, in which an enemy naval force was reported. At 1:41 PM, however, the boat was recalled to base, where it returned at 9:55 PM, after having traveled 50 miles.

May 1st, 1942

The boat set sail from Trapani at 7.52 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol south of Formentera, in an area between the meridians 01°20′ E and 01°40′ E and the parallels 37°40′ N and 38°20′ N.

May 8, 1942

At 00:10 it was informed of a convoy sailing eastwards, but it was not in a suitable position to attempt to intercept it (it was located at 38°18′ N and 01°31′ E). At eight o’clock in the evening Turchese received orders to move 20 miles to the south.

May 9th, 1942

At 12:43 PM, a Short Sunderland seaplane was sighted from 7,000 meters away, in position 37°27′ N and 01°37′ E.

May 11th, 1942

At 5:00 PM, while in position 37°27′ N and 01°27′ E, Turchese received a signal of discovery relating to a cruiser sighted southwest of the Galite, sailing eastwards. The boat headed to intercept it, but at 8:00 PM received orders to move 40 miles to the south, a position it reached at 11:53 PM. It dove to make hydrophones listening but did not pick up any noise.

May 15th, 1942

At 2.33 PM, in position 38°05′ N and 04°20′ E, the French steamer Île Rousse was sighted, sailing on route 325°.

May 17th, 1942

The boat returned to Trapani at 10.15 AM, after having covered 1842 miles.

May 21st, 1942

The boat set sail from Trapani at 9.08 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to move to La Spezia.

May 23rd, 1942

The boat arrived in La Spezia at 9.25 pm, after having covered 400 miles.

May 29TH, 1942

The boat left La Spezia at 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico and escorted by MAS 566, to move to Genoa, where he arrived at 1.43 PM, after having covered 56 miles. In Genoa he entered the SHIPYARD for a period of renovation work.

During the works, two changes of command took place: on June 20TH, Lieutenant Di Domenico handed over command to Second Lieutenant Sergio Parodi, 25, from Pistoia, who on July 15TH handed it over to Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, 27, from Udine.

August 6th, 1942

At the end of the work, Turchese left Genoa from 10.10 PM to 4.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials travelling 26 miles.

August 9th, 1942

Departure from Genoa from 9.09 AM to 3.08 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials travelling 47 miles.

August 1th1, 1942

Turchese left Genoa at 9.55 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to La Spezia, where it arrived at 3.46 PM, after having covered 53 miles.

August 14th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 8.10 AM to 1.15 AM and from 3:00 PM to 6.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 45 miles.

August 17th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 10.36 AM to 12.03 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini covering 8 miles.

August 28th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 2.40 PM to 6.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 25 miles.

August 29th, 1942

Turchese sailed from La Spezia at 8.24 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for an exercise; after a stop in Portovenere from 5.30 PM to 8.06 PM, Turchese went out to sea again to continue the sea trial.

August 30th, 1942

Turchese returned to La Spezia at 00.30, after having covered a total of 81 miles.

September 1st, 1942

Turchese left La Spezia at 11.02 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials. At 11.45 PM, after covering 6 miles, it moored at the Fezzano buoy.

September 2nd, 1942

Turchese left the Fezzano buoy at seven in the morning for a training outing, after which it returned to La Spezia at 3.50 PM, after having covered 36 miles.

September 3rd, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left La Spezia at 12.26 to move to Trapani, escorted by MAS 509 in the initial stretch of navigation.

At 2:20 PM it was informed by the light cruiser Attilio Regolo of the sighting of an enemy submarine in quadrant 7648.

September 5th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Trapani at 9.30 AM, after having covered 416 miles.

September 8th, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 7.45 AM to 1.06 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 24 miles.

September 11th, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 7.50 AM to 12.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 20 miles.

September 22nd, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 8.32 to 11.47, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 18 miles.

October 19th, 1942

After embarking German G7e (TN Electric) torpedoes, Turchese sailed from Trapani at 1.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, between the meridians 02°20′ E and 02°40′ E and the parallels 37°40′ N and 38°10′ N.

October 21st, 1942

At 00.40 AM, 1.40 AM, and 2.50 AM Turchese was sighted several times by the submarine Corallo.

At 11:19 AM Turchese sighted an aircraft at 7,000 meters, in position 37°13′ N and 04°46′ E; and dove to avoid an attack.

October 24th, 1942

At 7.50 AM the boat sighted an aircraft at 5,000 meters, in position 38°06′ N and 02°29′ E; again, it dove.

October 25th, 1942

Another sighting of an aircraft, this time at 1.44 PM in position 37°47′ N and 02°29′ E, from 5,000 meters away. Once again, it dove.

October 28th, 1942

At 9:41 PM, Turchese was informed that a British naval force had left Gibraltar that morning: Force H (aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious, anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Aurora and H.M.S. Charybdis, destroyers H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lookout, H.M.S.  Bicester, H.M.S. Eskimo, H.M.S. Venomous, and H.M.S. Tartar), engaged in Operation “Baritone”, consisting of the launch of 29 Spitfire V fighters bound for Malta. In addition to Turchese, the submarines Brin, Corallo, Emo, Topazio, and Axum are also directed against it, to form a submarine barrage south of the Balearic Islands.

Turchese moved to the southern end of its patrol sector and went into hydrophone listening, but to no avail. None of the submarines encountered the British units, which moved north of Algiers to carry out the launch and then returned to base.

October 29th, 1942

At 11 AM, the boat received orders from Maricosom to move southwest of Cape Palos, but again there were no sightings.

October 30th, 1942

At 12.52 PM, in position 38°50′ N and 03°16′ E, a steamer was sighted sailing southwards, from 13 km away; Commander Asquini believed that the ship belongs to Vichy France. At 6:00 PM another steamer was sighted heading south, from 11 km away, in position 38°50′ N and 04°02′ E. This was also considered French.

November 1st, 1942

Turchese returned to Trapani at 2.40 PM, after having covered 1823 miles.

November 7th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese sailed from Trapani at one o’clock in the morning for a patrol off Bizerte, in position 37°12′ N and 08°00′ E (for another source, 37°30′ N and 10°00′ E, and shortly after 37°20′ N and 07°50′ E), to counter the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa (operation “Torch”). More than 800 British and American ships of all types are sailing towards the coasts of Morocco and Algeria, to land troops to open a second front in North Africa, at the same time as the breakthrough operated by the British Eighth Army in Egypt, at El Alamein.

Supermarina, informed of the sighting of large Anglo-American naval forces sailing westward from Gibraltar, correctly guessed that the Allies probably wanted to attempt a landing in North Africa, although Turchese did not completely exclude the possibility of a convoy heading to Malta.

In total, Maricosom – on the basis of an order from Supermarina, transmitted at 10.06 PM on November  6^th – sent twenty-one submarines to the western and central-western Mediterranean, to counter the enemy operation: twelve submarines of the VII Grupsom (Acciaio, Argento, Asteria, Aradam, Brin, Dandolo, Emo, Galatea, Mocenigo, Platino, Porfido, Velella) were deployed west of the island of La Galite (zone “A”), seven submarines of the VIII Grupsom (Bronze,  Alagi, Avorio, Corallo, Diaspro, Turchese) were sent north of Bizerte (zone “B”), and two others (Axum and Topazio) in an advanced position between Algeria and the Balearic Islands. These positions turned out to be too far from the actual landing zones (Oran and Algiers), but they were not modified, because the German commanders mistakenly believed that the Allies could attempt further landings in Tunisia as well (in which case the Italian submarines would be in an ideal position).

At 3:31 PM Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) informed all submarines lurking in the western Mediterranean of the position of a British naval squadron and an enemy convoy, reported at 10:40 AM. At 8:07 PM the Submarine Squadron Command reported the position of two convoys sighted on two separate occasions, both heading east and consisting of merchant ships escorted by battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and escort ships.

November 8th, 1942

The landings began: 500 Anglo-American transport ships, escorted by 350 warships of all kinds, land a total of 107,000 soldiers on the coasts of Algeria. Since these operations took place in the areas of Algiers and Oran, the Italian submarines were too far east to intervene. Also, since the German commanders believed that the Allies could make further landings further east, towards Tunisia, it was initially decided to leave the submarines where they were.

At 5:58 PM, north of Bizerte, Turchese sighted a submarine that was identified as the Bronzo. Both boats pulled over to get away, to avoid accidents.

November 9th, 1942

At 7.30 AM, in position 37°18′ N and 08°40′ E, a French ship of 2,000 tons was sighted, from 4,500 meters away.

November 11th, 1942

At 16:45 a submarine was sighted in position 37°08′ N and 07°58′ E and was identified as the Aradam.

November 13th, 1942

At 7:45 AM, an aircraft was sighted in position 37°58′ N and 10°06′ E, 4,000 meters away. Turchese dove to escape an attack; then it headed back to the base, passing through the conventional point T.3. The boat arrived in Cagliari at 9.10 PM, after having covered 741 miles.

November 15th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left Trapani at 3 PM to move to Naples.

November 16th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Naples at 3:55 PM, after traveling 220 miles.

November 25th, 1942

Turchese left Naples at 3.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to La Maddalena.

November 27th, 1942

The boat arrived at La Maddalena at 8.30 AM, after having covered 232 miles.

December 2nd, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese set sail from La Maddalena at 3.54 AM for a patrol off the coast of Ajaccio, in a sector between the meridian 08°20′ E, the Corsican coast and the parallels 41°40′ N and 41°55′ N.

Images taken abord the submarine Turchese during war patrols
(Collection Angelo Ortu)

December 3rd, 1942

At 7:02 AM, Turchese sighted two steamers escorted by a torpedo boat off Cape Senetosa, heading north; However, the torpedo boat was identified as an Italian unit of the “Tre Pipe” type, so no offensive action was taken. At 10.10 PM Turchese returned to La Maddalena after having covered 262 miles.

December 6th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left La Maddalena at 6.15 PM to move to Cagliari, together with Diaspro and Corallo.

December 7th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Cagliari at 2.40 PM, after having covered 191 miles.

December 9th, 1942

Turchese set sail from Cagliari at 6:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol off the Algerian coast, in the area between meridians 08°20′ E and 08°40′ E and parallels 37°40′ N and 38°00′ N. At 9.45 PM the submarine Galatea was encountered, returning to base, with which the recognition signals were exchanged. Shortly thereafter, Turchese had to turn around to return to base due to engine problems.

December 10th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Cagliari at 12.08 pm, after having covered 86 miles.

December 22nd, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for exercise, from 8.27 AM to 11.27 AN, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 22 miles.

December 29th, 1942

Turchese left Cagliari at 12.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to Augusta. While sailing, the crew herard bomb explosions in the distance.

December 31st, 1942

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 3:40 PM, having covered 481 miles.

January 4th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 3.37 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol southwest of Malta. At 3:52 AM, however, while leaving the harbor in the dark and in poor visibility conditions, Turchese crashed into one of the base’s anti-torpedo obstructions, sustaining such damage that it had to turn back, mooring at Augusta at 8:43 AM after traveling 30 miles. Commander Asquini received a reprimand for what happened, while the navigational officer would be severely punished.

January 5th, 1943

Turchese left Augusta at 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to Messina.

January 6th, 1943

The boat arrived in Messina at 8.15 AM, after covering 74 miles.

January 11, 1943

Turchese left Messina at 6.34 AM, still under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, to return to Augusta, where it arrived at 1.41 PM, after having covered 73 miles.

January 17th, 1943

Turchese sailed from Augusta at 9:55 PM to patrol an area between the meridians 21°00′ E and 21°30′ E, the parallel 34°00′ N and the Libyan coast.

January 20th, 1943

At 5:00 PM, before reaching the sector assigned for the mission, the boat received orders to return to base.

January 22nd, 1943

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 7:11 AM, having covered 704 miles.

February 7th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 4.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, for a patrol off Cape Misrata, between the meridians 15°20′ E and 15°40′ E and the parallels 32°40′ N and 33°30′ N.

February 14th, 1943

Turchese was ordered to move to a new patrol area, between the meridians 15°50′ E and 16°40′ E and the parallels 32°00′ N and 32°10′ N (for another source, between 32°20′ N and 32°30′ N and between 15°00′ E and 18°00′ E).

February 16th, 1943

At 3:56 AM, Turchese received a signal of discovery of a convoy, launched from Axum. The boat changed course to 120° to intercept it, but it did not spot anything.

February 21st, 1943

The boat returned to Augusta at 9:50 AM, after having covered 1,395 miles.

February 26th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 4:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, to move to Taranto, where he had to undergo a period of refitting.

February 28th, 1943

The boat arrived in Taranto at midnight, after having traveled 297 miles, and entered the shipyard.

April 20th, 1943

Once work was completed, Turchese left Taranto for sea trials from 1:00 PM to 6.30 PM, again under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, covering 8 miles.

April 22nd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 6:00 AM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 38.5 miles.

April 24th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 2.20 PM to 6.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini navigating 2 miles.

April 26th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 6.30 AM to 2.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 27 miles.

April 27th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 7.35 AM to 1.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 24.5 miles.

April 28th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.46 AM to 5.33 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, together with the tugboat Gagliardo and with the escort of the auxiliary ship Claretta travelling 20 miles.

April 29th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 5.40 AM to 10.40 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 21 miles.

April 30th, 1943

Lieutenant Asquini handed over command of Turchese to Aredio Galzigna, 29, from Šibenik.

May 2nd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 12.05 PM to 7.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 27 miles.

May 3rd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 12.45 PM to 6.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 23 miles.

May 6th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.35 AM to 19.45 nAM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 34.5 miles.

May 8th, 1943

Departure from Taranto from 11.35 AM to 5.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, for sea trials together with the gunboat-submarine destroyer Vergada travelling 21.5 miles.

May 10th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.40 AM to 6.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 28 miles.

May 11th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 7.05 AM to 7.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 32 miles.

May 12th, 1943

Commander Carlo Liannazza, commander of the IV Submarine Group, recommends extending the training period of Turchese, since four of the five officers had recently assigned to the boat, and Commander Galzigna was on his first command.

May 15th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 3.35 PM to 1.05 AM on the 16th, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering 34.5 miles.

May 17th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sonar sea trials from 6.30 AM to 11.20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, together with the torpedo boat Monzambano and the corvette Gabbiano travelling 27.5 miles.

May 20th, 1943

Turchese left Taranto at 6:46 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, to move to Naples.

May 25th, 1943

At 11:35 AM the boat sighted a formation of four-engine bombers flying eastwards, in the Strait of Messina, and dove to avoid them. The planes spotted it and attacked it while it was submerged, forcing it to zigzag at top speed as several bombs fell into the sea about 900 meters aft.

Back on the surface, at 12:09 PM it sighted another formation of four-engine planes flying eastwards. Again, it dove with a crash dive to a depth of 70 meters, while several explosions of depth charges were heard in the distance.

Returning once again to the surface, at 1.34 PM Turchese sighted a third group of four-engine aircraft, this time flying southwards. Again, it dove precipitously, hearing the explosions of nearby bombs (but probably not directed at it) at 1:38 PM and 1:40 PM

May 27th, 1943

Turchese finally arrived in Naples at 6:45 AM, after traveling 644 miles. At 11.32 AM left for Pozzuoli, where it arrived at 12.50 PM, after having covered 8 miles.

May 29th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for sea trials, from 11:00 AM to 3.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling eleven miles.

May 30th, 1943

Turchese left Pozzuoli at 9.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, to move to Naples, where he arrived at 11.10 AM, after having covered 8 miles.

June 1st, 1943

Turchese left Naples at 5.30 PM under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, for an exercise.

June 2nd, 1943

At the end of the exercise, Turchese returned to Naples at 5.50 AM, after having covered 42 miles. The boat left at 9.35 AM to move to Pozzuoli, where it arrived at 11:00 AM, after having covered 8 miles.

June 3rd, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 9.03 AM to 3.53 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 4th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 2.05 PM to 5.56 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 16th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 4.23 AM to 12.16 PM and from 5.15 PM to 9.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering32 miles in the morning, and 30.5 in the evening.

June 17th, 1943

E Departure xit from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 2.15 PM to 6.45 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 15 miles.

June 18th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 8.34 AM to 12.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 19th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 8.20 AM to 10.05 AM and from 7.05 PM to 3.05 AM on June 20th, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering8 miles in the morning, and 34 in the evening.

June 23th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 11.13 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering 8 miles. At 11.01 PM Turchese left Pozzuoli to move to La Maddalena.

June 26th, 1943

Turchese arrived at La Maddalena at 6.40 AM, after having covered 312 miles, and left at 9.15 AM to move to Santo Stefano, where it arrived at 10.16 AM, after another 4 miles.

June 28th, 1943

The boat left Santo Stefano at 4:57 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, to move to Bonifacio, where it arrived at 7:45 PM, after having traveled 21 miles.

June 30th, 1943

Under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, Turchese sailed from Bonifacio at 10.36 PM for a patrol southwest of Sardinia, between meridians 07°00′ E and 07°40′ E and between parallels 38°00′ N and 38°40′ N.

July 1st, 1943

At 9:15 AM, in position 38°20′ N and 07°28′ E, a large air formation was sighted flying eastwards and the submarine dove to avoid being attacked.

July 2nd, 1943

At 7:58 PM Turchese received orders to go up to the parallel 37°20′ N, between 36°40′ N and 07°40′ E, and then return to the previously assigned sector.

July 6th, 1943

At 12:55 PM Turchese received orders to move 10 miles to the east, and then to reach the parallel 37°50′ N by dawn on the 7th. It then moved westwards, from meridian 08°10′ E to that of Cap de Fer (07°10′ E) on the parallel 37°20′ N, a transfer that took place late due to engine problems, and then returned to the original ambush area at dawn on the 8th.

The assignment was to form a preventive barrage to the south of Sardinia, in contrast to a possible Anglo-American landing (which will then take place in Sicily), together with Giada, Alagi, Argento, Nereide, Nichelio, Platino, and Diaspro.

July 10th, 1943

At 2:15 AM Turchese received the order, issued at 00:15 AM, to execute the “Zeta” plan and reach quadrant 96. At 2:25 PM the boat received a new message, transmitted at 11:41 AM, ordering it to reach zone 172 immediately.

July 11th, 1943

At 00.13 Turchese received an order (transmitted at 10.13 PM the previous evening) to reach zone 83 (east coast of Sicily) passing through point 39°00′ N and 15°00′ E and through the conventional point M 3 (off Capo Vaticano).

At 5:22 AM the boat sighted a twin-engine aircraft flying at low altitude with a south-easterly course, in position 38°20′ N and 09°25′ E, and dovew as a precaution. Back on the surface, at 9.08 AM (in 38°20′ N and 09°25′ E) the crew sighted another plane flying southwards. Again, Turchese submerged; at 8.22 PM (position 38°24′ N and 10°10′ E) a third aircraft was sighted flying southeastwards, and once again the boat dove.

At 9:10 PM, yet another new order was received, transmitted at 6:40 PM to move to zone 81; but at 9.32 the yet another plane was sighted, flying northwestwards, in position 38°25′ N and 10°12′ E, and Turchese dove yet another time.

July 12th, 1943

At 4:28 AM, in position 38°43′ N and 11°35′ E, another plane was sighted: another dive, repeated at 10:50 AM following the sighting of a second aircraft with a westerly course.

July 13th, 1943

Yet another sighting of an aircraft, at 3.50 AM, in position 38°48′ N and 12°30′ E: again, Turchese had to dive.

July 14th, 1943

At 00:07 Turchese received orders from Maricosom to move to the northern half of quadrant 80 but had to abandon the mission due to a breakdown. At 5.13 AM the boat dove following the sighting of an aircraft in position 39°00′ N and 13°20′ E.

July 16th, 1943

The boat arrived in Naples at 6.45 AM, after having covered 1,300.5 miles. At 11.05 AM it left to move to Castellammare di Stabia, where it arrived at 12.50 PM, after having covered 13.3 miles.

July 30rd, 1943

Departure from Castellammare di Stabia for sea trials, from 7.20 AM to 10.15 Am travelling 10 miles. At 8.47 PM, still under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, the boat left Castellammare to move to La Maddalena.

July 31st, 1943

At 2:20 AM, flares were sighted about 2,000 meters away; Turchese dove as a precautionary measure.

August 2nd, 1943

Turchese arrived in La Maddalena at 7.20 AM, after having covered 257 miles, and left at 12.15 PM to move to Mezzoschifo, where he arrived at 1.55 PM, after another 2 miles.

August 3rd, 1943

Turchese left Mezzoschifo at 4.34 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, to move to Bonifacio, where he arrived at 7.25 AM, after having covered 19 miles.

August 19th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.29 AM to 11.40 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna travelling 22.5 miles.

August 21st, 1943

Lieutenant Galzigna was replaced in command of Turchese by Eugenio Parodi, 26, from La Spezia.

August 24th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.25 AM to 11.59 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi travelling 26 miles.

August 27th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.36 AM to 12.22 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi travelling 27.5 miles.

August 31st, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.47 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi travelling 24 miles.

September 2nd, 1943

Turchese sailed from Bonifacio at 5.20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, to move to Villa Marina (on the island of Santo Stefano), where it arrived at 7.59 AM, after traveling 24 miles.

September 7th, 1943

At 3.15 PM (or 1.15 PM) Turchese (Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi) set sail from Villa Marina together with the similar submarine Topazio, for a patrol in the gulfs of Paola and Gaeta. Both submarines, together with Diaspro and Marea, were to form a barrage in the Gulf of Salerno, in contrast to the imminent Anglo-American landing (operation “Avalanche”). Eight other submarines (Brin, Giada, Galatea, Platino, Nichelio, Alagi, Axum, and Velella) complete the anti-landing screen in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea, along the Tyrrhenian coasts of Campania and Calabria between Paola and Gaeta, while ten (Onice, Settembrini, Vortece, Zoea, Bragadin, Squalo, Menotti, Bandiera, Jalea, and Manara) were deployed in the Ionian Sea along the eastern coasts of Sicily and Calabria.  All executed within the framework of the “Zeta” Plan: Supermarina ordered its activation by Maricosom following the sighting in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea by German air reconnaissance, on the evening of September 7th, of the Allied landing fleet heading towards Salerno.

At 4 PM, off the coast of La Maddalena, Turchese was accidentally targeted by a coastal battery, which fired three salvos without hitting; The shots fell short of about 200 meters.

September 8th, 1943

The armistice between Italy and the Allies was announced: Maricosom ordered all submarines to cease hostilities, immediately dive to a depth of 80 meters and resurface at eight o’clock in the morning of September 9th, and then remain on the surface flying the Italian flag and a black pennant on the periscope, waiting for further instructions. Subsequently, the order was given to head towards Bona, Algeria (for submarines lurking east of Sicily, towards other ports under Allied control such as Malta, Brindisi, and Augusta), keeping the signs of recognition clearly visible.

September 9th, 1943

Interrupted the mission as ordered, Turchese moved from its ambush position south of Sardinia, at 12.21 meeting Topazio (lieutenant Pier Vittorio Casarini) and Marea (sub-lieutenant Attilio Russo), and shortly afterwards the Diaspro (lieutenant Alberto Donato) to form a group. The respective commanders began “discussing” the situation by means of light signals made with the small flashes of light projectors supplied to each submarine (for another version, the “discussion” between the commanders would have taken place by means of megaphones, from their respective cunning towers, given the short distance).

Later, all four of them gather aboard the Diaspro to decide what to do. There are conflicting versions of the outcome of this meeting: according to various authors (including Achille Rastelli and Giuliano Manzari) this first meeting was followed by others on the mornings of September 10th and 11th, and in the end each of the commanders made a different decision. Marea to sail for Bona, Diaspro for Cagliari (assuming there were no German troops), Topazio to the north and Turchese to reach neutral Spain, more precisely the Balearic Islands (which, however, was not confirmed by Turchese’s report, according to which the submarine initially headed towards the 42nd parallel and then towards Bona).

According to the Marea’s report, however, at the end of the meeting the four commanders decided by mutual agreement to aim for Bona, sailing together and waiting for other submarines; the four submarines remained reunited or at least in sight of each other until the evening of the 10th (according to the Marea report, however, the latter and the Diaspro lost sight of Turchese and Topazio as early as 10.30 PM on the 9th, and then lost sight of each other as well). From ten o’clock on September 9th, Turchese sails towards the 42nd parallel.

September 10th, 1943

Turchese and Topazio separated at the Anzio parallel, slightly east of the 11° E parallel. At eight o’clock in the morning, Commander Parodi decided to go directly to Bona.

September 11th, 1943

At 9:27 PM, Turchese was attacked off Bona by an aircraft that was identified as a German Junkers Ju 88 bomber. The bombs that fell closer ended up in the water 6 meters from the bow, portside, exploding underwater at a depth of 10 meters. The explosions cause serious damage to the submarine, knocking out the left diesel engine (for another version, both engines, making it impossible to continue navigation).

The attacking aircraft was not German, but British: a Lockheed Hudson bomber of the 500th Squadron of the Royal Air Force, the “O” aircraft of Second Lieutenant G. M. Shires. Sighting the submarine, and doubtful of its nationality, Lieutenant Shires flew over it twice circling, throwing on the second lap the colors agreed for that day as a signal of recognition. Having received no response, he went on the attack, aiming at the submarine from the opposite direction to that of the Moon (from the starboard bow) and launching a salvo of four depth charges, which fell into the sea astride the cunning tower (according to a source, while the submarine was diving). After the attack, Lieutenant Shires watched the submarine dive astern. Half an hour later, he received orders from the base not to attack unless the boat took hostile action.

September 12th, 1943

In the late afternoon, Turchese encounters a British convoy and was taken in tow by the British armed trawler Stroma.

September 13th, 1943

The damaged Turchese reached Bona at 00:02, in tow of the Stroma, after covering 695 miles. The misunderstanding of which Turchese was the victim extends, with tragic consequences, to Topazio as well. Turchese, in fact, was not the only Italian submarine to be mistakenly attacked by British planes: on the morning of September 12th, Topazio, mistaken by a Bristol Blenheim for a German U-boat, was bombed, and sunk by the latter south of Sardinia.

Most of the crew, fifteen or twenty men, survived the sinking: the British Commands initially sent air and naval vessels to the site to recover them, but recalled them following the news that Turchese had been damaged by an air attack and was sailing towards Bona, mistakenly believing that the submarine attacked by the Blenheim was indeed Turchese.  and that the pilot’s assertion that he sank it was the result of a mistaken appreciation. The result of this incredible sequence of errors and misunderstandings will be that no one will come to the rescue of the castaways of the Topazio, of which there will be, consequently, no survivor.

September 14th, 1943

Still under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, Turchese sailed from Bona at 1.30 PM to Malta, in tow of the submarine Marea and together with the submarines Alagi, Giada, Galatea, Brin, Menotti and Platino, which converged in Bona following the armistice. The group was escorted by the British destroyer H.M.S. Isis.

A few hours after the departure, however, the tow cable snapped, and Turchese had to be towed back to Bona by a British ship, arriving there at 10:00 PM, after having traveled thirty miles. It then remained under repair in Bona, where the work was completed on September 24th.

September 27th, 1943

Turchese left Bona at 5.21 PM, still under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, to move to Malta. After a few hours, however, the engines failed, which forced the boat to be towed back to port.

September 28th, 1943

Turchese returned to Bona at 7.30 AM, after covering 59 miles, in tow of a British unit.

October 1st, 1943

Turchese left Bona in tow at 4.30 PM, to move to Bizerte. The commander was still Lieutenant Parodi.

October 2nd, 1943

The boat arrived in Bizerte at 5:15 PM, after traveling 123 miles.

October 4th, 1943

The boat left Bizerte at 11.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, for the third attempt to move to Malta. This time it was in tow of the British armed trawler Goth, together with the harbor tug C.T. 13, the motor launches ML 480 and HDML 1243 and the armed fishing vessel HMS Tango, in a convoy of three merchant vessels.

October 6th, 1943

Turchese, finally, arrived in Malta at 10.30 AM, after having covered 251 miles. It was the twenty-third and last Italian submarine to reach the island after the armistice. Turchese went to moor in Marsa Scirocco, under the command of the battleship Giulio Cesare, joining the submarines Atropo, Axum, Bandiera, Bragadin, Corridoni, Giada, Marea, Nichelio, Settembrini and Vortece, moored there since September.

November 27th, 1943

Still under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, and once again in tow (this time, of the corvette Chimera), Turchese left Malta at 3.30 PM to return to Italy. It was the last Italian submarine to leave the island. On the same date, the second chief torpedoman Giuseppe Da Rold, 22 years old, from Belluno, died in the metropolitan area.

November 28, 1943

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 9:30 AM, after traveling 117 miles.

December 11th, 1943

Lieutenant Parodi was replaced by Second Lieutenant Giorgio Mogni, 28, from Savignano Irpino.

March 11, 1944

Under the command of sub-lieutenant Giorgio Mogni, Turchese left Augusta in tow of the torpedo boat Monzambano to move to Brindisi.

March 12th, 1944

Turchese arrived in Brindisi at 7.45 PM, after covering 335 miles. There it entered the shipyard for long renovation work (according to another source, it was laid up there).

March 31st, 1944

Sub-lieutenant Mogni was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Renato Frascolla, 33, from Taranto.

September 13th, 1944

Lieutenant Commander Frascolla was replaced by Marco Revedin, 33 years old, from Bologna.

Lieutenant Commander Marco Revedin
(Collection Giovanni Pinna)

November 22nd, 1944

Lieutenant Commander Revedin handed over command of Turchese to Lieutenant Emilio Botta, 26, from Foggia, who held it until the following August.

June 22nd, 1945

Turchese left Brindisi at 6.05 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Emilio Botta, to move to Naples.

June 23rd, 1945

Turchese arrived in Naples at eight o’clock in the morning, after having covered 450 miles. It then remained in the reserve until the end of hostilities.

Turchese (in the background) in disarmament in Taranto in an image taken on February 27th, 1947. In the foreground the oceaning submarine Ammiraglio Cagni, in the third row the Galatea
(From “In guerra sul mare” by Erminio Bagnasco)

February 1st, 1948

Turchese was removed from the Navy rosters, as for the peace treaty requirements, and later demolished.

Another image of the remains of Italian submarines decommissioned in Taranto in February 1947: Turchese is at the far right, in the dock overlooking the Caserma Farinati (Farinati Barracks)
(STORIA militare)

According to Vittorio Iovino, a sailor in the Navy from 1949 to 1951, after the decommissioning Turchese was used for some time as a fuel oil depot, at the same time being used clandestinely for the training of submariners: “the conning tower had been removed and the boat was officially intended as a fuel depot. But we made up for it and built the part of the conning tower with sheet metal so that it would be all efficient to be able to continue going out to sea. The Americans knew everything, but they turned a blind eye, and we were able to go out to sea again for the exercises.” However, there is no trace of such use in any publication, and it seems more likely that Iovino misremembered the name of the submarine in question (two other submarines, Giada and Vortice, were in fact actually used clandestinely for training, while officially they had been downgraded to charging pontoons, in the period between the signing of the Paris peace treaty,  which prohibited Italy from owning submarines, and entry into NATO, following which this clause was allowed to lapse along with many others).

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	58		27904	5255	281	118.00	4.92

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
7/12/1940	03:25	T.V. Gustavo Miniero	Mediterranean	38°24’N-09°19’E		Tordepo, Deck Gun	Failed	Unknown	Ship		Unknown

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Da Rold	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	11/27/1943