Galileo Ferraris was an oceanic submarine of the Archimede class (displacement of 970 tons on the surface and 1,239 submerged). During the World War II it was not successful, while in the Spanish Civil War it had sunk three merchant ships for a total of 9,052 GRT.
Brief and Partial Chronology
October 15, 1931
Setting up began at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto.
August 11th, 1934
Ferraris was launched at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto. The outfitting took place under the supervision first of the Lieutenant Commander Amleto Baldo (from February 1st through 8th, 1935) and then by his peer Mario Grassi (from March 1st through 5th, 1935), after which the command of the unit (March 6th,1935) was assumed by the Lieutenant Commander Enrico Simola, who would be commander at the beginning of active service and until 1937.
Ferraris at sea for sea trials
August 31st, 1935
Ferraris entered active service, the last unit of the Archimede class to do so. Its flag case was designed by the painter, sculptor and decorator Giorgio Ceragioli.
Together with the twin boats Archimede, Evangelista Torricelli and Galileo Galilei, Ferraris formed the XII Squadron of the III Submarine Flotilla (later to become the XLI and then XLIV Submarine Squadron of the VII Grupsom), based in Taranto. (According to another source, it was assigned to the III Submarine Group, of Messina).
After a period of intense training and short cruises, Ferraris was deployed to Tobruk together with the other boats of the group.
December 9th through 25th, 1936
Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Enrico Giovanni Simola, Ferraris carried out a first clandestine mission (with departure and return to La Maddalena and ambush between Valencia and Formentera) with which it participated in the Spanish Civil War. It was one of the most active Italian submarines (in all it carried out eight missions). However, on this patrol, it did not spot any Republican ships.
February 2nd, 1937
The boat sailed from Taranto at 9.30 PM, for the second mission (to be carried out off the coast of Tarragona) in the context of the Spanish Civil war. The commander was the Lieutenant Commander Primo Longobardo, who replaced Simola on January 26th. Lieutenant Juan García-Frías of the Republican Navy was also on board, alongside Longobardo. The orders were to block the sea area between Vilanoz and Vilanova i la Geltrù, keeping 30 miles from the coast.
February 5th, 1937
After sailing as much as possible unnoticed, Ferraris arrived off the coast of Tarragona in the early hours of the morning. The boat remained lurking submerged throughout the day, but only spotted a three-masted sailing ship that Longobard refuses to attack, considering it a target of little importance. During the night it resurfaced, moved away from the coast and recharged its batteries offshore.
February 6th, 1937
Ferraris returned to Tarragona in the morning and sighted the Spanish tanker Campeador and a steamer of the Ybarra company in the port. The departing and arriving ships, however, sail close to the coast, which prevented the submarine from getting close to the coast, due to the too shallow waters.
February 7th, 1937
The day passes in ambush in front of Tarragona, with no noticeable events.
February 8th, 1937
While Ferraris was two miles south of the breakwater lighthouse, the Campeador comes out of the harbor at full speed. The submarine tried to approach submerged to torpedo it, but the ship moved away before an attack would be possible.
Considering that the characteristics of the waters in front of the port of Tarragona, and traffic of Republican ships near the coast made it impossible to attack while remaining in that position, Longobard decided to move to Cabo Gros, at the end of the bay where Tarragona was located.
As soon as Ferraris reached Cabo Gros, the crew sighted a steamer to the east with lights off and no flag, which was proceeding along the coast. Longobardo ordered two torpedo tubes to be prepared forward, and approached keeping perpendicular to the coast, while the seabed decreased rapidly, to a depth of only twelve meters. Shortly after the ship was identified with the periscope: it was the Spanish Republican steamer Navarre (1,688 GRT, under the command of Captain José Delltell Lloret), sailing from Marseilles to Tarragona (where it intends to stop for the night, and then continue to Barcelona and Valencia) with a cargo of 1,200 tons of materials sent by the French Aid Committee to the Republic of Spain (on paper, spare parts, medicines and supplies for Spanish women and children; in reality, even weapons, machine guns – some of which were discovered due to the breakage of some of the crates when a fire that broke out on board in the port of Marseille – trucks and clothing; according to the information that had been provided to Ferraris, the ship was carrying trucks).
After estimating the course and speed of the target at 240° and 8 knots, at 4:00 PM Ferraris launched two torpedoes from 700 meters away, with an aiming angle of 11°. Immediately after launching, the Navarre steered with the full rudder to starboard, and intentionally ran aground on the nearby beach, at the mouth of the Rio Gayá (seven miles from Torredembarra). On Ferraris it was suspected that one of the two torpedoes had hit but, since the explosion was not heard nor were any damage or signs of sinking visible, it was decided to launch a third torpedo. However, since the seabed was now so shallow, the course was reversed, and the torpedo was launched from the stern tubes. This torpedo hit the Navarre conspicuously, opening a large gash forward of the bridge.
During the abandonment of the ship Marcel Basset, delegate of the French Popular Front (and head of the delegation accompanying the cargo), fell into the sea and drowned. The rest of the men on board (33 crew members and the other three members of the French delegation) meanwhile got to safety with a lifeboat, before the launch of the third torpedo.
The Republican tugboat Montcabrer, which had been sent to the scene to untangle the Navarre and tow it to a safe port, found that the irreparable damage suffered by the steamer made it impossible to do so. Part of the steamer’s cargo was recovered by fishing boats, barges and pontoons between February 10th and 20th, while the wreck of the Navarre was scrapped on site after the end of the civil war.
The Navarre will be the first of ten merchant ships destroyed by Italian units in the Spanish Civil War. Commander Longobardo, for the action, received his first Silver Medal for Military Valor. The Spanish press spoke of a pirate attack (and in fact, since there was no war declared between Italy and the Republic of Spain, the attack took place in violation of international conventions). On February 13th, the French communist deputy Jean Cristofol arrived by plane in Barcelona to carry out an investigation into the incident. According to Cristofol, the crew of the Navarre identified the attacking submarine as German.
February 17th, 1937
Ferraris concluded the mission with his arrival in Naples.
April 2nd, 1937
Commander Longobardo left the command of Ferraris, which was temporarily taken over by Lieutenant Vincenzo D’Amato.
April 25th, 1937
The new commander of Ferraris was Lieutenant Commander Sergio Lusena.
August 10th, 1937
Ferraris set sail from Leros for the third mission in the Spanish Civil War.
August 14th, 1937
Ferraris while submerged, launched two torpedoes against a merchant ship, which was missed; it was the British steamer Socony.
August 15th, 1937
In the early hours of the morning, the boat intercepted the Spanish Republican motor ship Ciudad de Cadiz (4,602 GRT, under the command of Captain Francisco Mugartegui Tellechea), sailing from Odessa to Valencia (or Barcelona) with a cargo of 73,875 tons of steel, 177 crates of spare parts and 43 trucks (for other sources provisions, fuel and vehicles, or weapons). Just out of the Dardanelles Strait, Ferraris came to the surface on portside of the motor ship, passes alongside it with a course towards Tenedos, moves three miles aft of it and then reverses course by 180°, starting to follow it.
The Ciudad de Cadiz tried to escape at top speed, but Ferraris was faster. The submarine made a first maneuver to torpedo the ship but performed it badly and therefore had to start again, while the motor ship began to call for help by radio. Returning to the attack, the submarine positioned itself 300-400 meters to starboard of the Ciudad de Cadiz. After a three-hour chase, at 10:30 AM, Ferraris hoisted the Spanish Nationalist flag, to deflect suspicion about its nationality (since there was no state of war between Italy and Republican Spain, in fact, these attacks were illegal) and opened fire with the cannon from a distance of about 300 meters.
From aboard the Spanish ship, the sailors notice that the striker’s gunners are wearing uniforms without badges. The first shot of Ferraris hits the superstructures and the mast that supports the radio antennas; immediately the crew of the Spanish ship hoisted a white flag, but Ferraris launches two torpedoes, which hit the Ciudad de Cadiz respectively at the height of the first class cabins and in hold number 2 (adjacent compartments), then resumes firing with the cannon, hitting the superstructures with seven more shells (in all, eight 100 mm hits were scored, out of twelve shots).
At this point the Spanish captain orders the ship to be abandoned; the 79 men of the crew, all unharmed, took refuge on three boats, then the Ciudad de Cadiz sank in ten minutes (sixteen minutes in all had elapsed since the beginning of the attack) in position 39°38′ N and 25°46′ E, 15 miles from the island of Tenedos/Bozcaada. Ferraris, which had witnessed the final stages of the freighter’s agony from a distance of half a mile, steered west and pulled away at full speed.
The boats with 77 castaways were recovered by the Soviet tanker Varlaam Avassanev and disembarked in Istanbul on August 17th (where the commander Tellechea protested about the incident), while the other two men, who stayed on board to save the ship’s dogs and cats and then forced to dive into the sea, were rescued by a Danish ship.
The castaways reported that they had been attacked by a submarine of modern construction, with two large guns at the bow and stern, anti-aircraft guns and a direction finder; without a flag and with the initials C. 3 painted in large red letters (for other sources, black).
August 17th, 1937
Ferraris (whose identity and nationality are not ascertained) was spotted by units of the Turkish Navy while carrying out attack maneuvers in the territorial waters of Turkey. The old armored-cruiser Hamidiye and a squadron of planes were sent to search for it, but they do not find it; If that had happened, there would have been an international incident.
August 18th, 1937
Ferraris fired torpedoes at the Spanish steamer Aldecoa but missed. The ship manages to escape. A few hours later, shortly after 10:00 PM, Ferraris encountered the Spanish steamship Armuru of 2,762 GRT, sailing from Odessa to Spain with a cargo of, depending on the sources (Italian or Spanish), weapons for the Republican forces or food, depending on the sources (Italian or Spanish) and hit it with a torpedo. The ship, to avoid sinking, runs aground on the island of Tenedos, but sank shortly after, while the crew was rescued by the Turkish steamer Kemal.
August 25th, 1937
Ferraris returned to Leros. During the mission, in all, the submarine carried out 48 attack maneuvers.
September 1937
Following the protests unleashed internationally (not only by Republican Spain, but also by the Non-Intervention Committee and the League of Nations) for the illegal attacks by Italian ships and submarines (including those on the Ciudad de Cadiz and the Armuru, although the aggressor had not been identified), it was decided to suspend the offensive and instead surrender or lend some units to the Spanish Nationalist Navy.
Among the units “loaned” there was Ferraris. For this purpose, the submarine left Leros and moved to La Maddalena.
September 17th, 1937
Ferraris left La Maddalena for Soller (Balearic Islands).
September 20th, 1937
The boat arrived in Soller in the morning. Renamed first General Sanjurio II and then L. 2 (i.e. Legionnaire 2), the submarine was deployed in that port and framed in the Tercio de Estranjeros, the Spanish Foreign Legion, with an Italian crew of volunteers, who, however, wore Spanish uniforms, and Spanish “consultants” (on Ferraris, Lieutenant Gonzalo Díaz García). Placed under Admiral Francisco Moreno, of the Spanish Nationalist Navy. The rules for the missions of the “legionary” submarines (four in all: in addition to Ferraris, the Galilei and the smaller Iride and Onice) were very restrictive, to avoid accidents: do not to attack any non-Spanish Republican ship outside Spanish territorial waters; do not to attack any foreign-flagged vessel outside territorial waters; Never attack, even within territorial waters, British, French, U.S. and Japanese ships.
October 17th through 25th, 1937
Ambush off the coast of Barcelona, to no avail.
November 11th, 1937
Commander Lusena was replaced by Lieutenant Junio Valerio Borghese.
November 22nd through 30th, 1937
A new ambush was launched in the waters off Port Mahon, with orders to attack Spanish Republican ships and, if encountered, the French steamers La Corse and La Gaulois, which were connecting Mahon and France (unless escorted by foreign warships). The mission ends without results.
December 17th through 25th, 1937
New mission off Cape Creux. The heavy cruiser Canarias, of the Francoist Navy, not having been informed of the presence of Ferraris in the area, twice tried to ram it, believing it to be a Republican submarine.
January 8th, 1938
Commander Borghese was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Franco Baslini.
January 12th through 21st, 1938
New unsuccessful ambush off the coast of Barcelona.
January 27th through Early February 1938
Last mission in the waters of Barcelona, again without construction.
August 5th, 1938
The command of Ferraris, now back in regular service for the Regia Marina, was taken over by the Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Mellina.
1938
Temporarily assigned to the XLIV Submarine Squadron (Taranto Submarine Group), together with her twin boat Galileo Galilei and the more modern Archimede, Brin, Guglielmotti, Torricelli and Galvani.
Ferraris visiting Naples in 1938
September 28th, 1938
The command of Ferraris was hand over to Lieutenant Antonio Cuzzaniti.
April 11th, 1939
Cuzzaniti left command of the boat, which was temporarily taken over by his peer Bolo Monechi.
July 8th, 1939
The command of Ferraris was taken over by the Lieutenant Commander Candido Corvetti.
August 1st, 1939
Commander Corvetti handed over command to Michele Morisani.
November 30th, 1939
Command of Ferraris was assumed by the Lieutenant Commander Livio Piomarta.
March 1940
Ferraris left Italy and reached Massawa, Eritrea (Red Sea, Italian East Africa).
June 10th, 1940
Upon Italy’s entry into World War II, Ferraris (Lieutenant Commander Livio Piomarta) was part of the LXXXI Submarine Squadron (with the Galilei and the more modern Guglielmotti and Galvani), based in Massawa.
In the early hours of June10th, even before the declaration of war was announced, Ferraris put to sea for its first war mission, off the coast of Djibouti. After crossing the Gulf of Zula, the submarine skirted the east coast of Eritrea proceeding at full force on the surface. In the afternoon, Commander Piomarta informed the crew that Ferraris has not gone out to sea for an exercise, and that Italy had entered the war. During the night, Ferraris crosses the Perim Strait on the surface, a presumably mined area, then reaches its ambush sector.
June 12th and 13th, 1940
On the night between the 12th and the 13th, the submarine, while crossing the strait of Bab el-Mandeb, sighted a destroyer. It began a crash dive to get into an attack position, but in doing so a valve (“trumpet”) for the ventilation of the batteries hold was closed late and thus allowed seawater to enter, which damaged the batteries and caused several failures. There were also chlorine leaks (from batteries that had come into contact with seawater), which made it possible to notice the flooding of the battery hold and close the valve before it was too late. Gas masks were worn, and the air purification apparatus was activated. The submarine spends several hours motionless at a great depth, while the destroyer (for another source, two) crosses on its vertical, without ever launching depth charges.
In the end, with the enemy gone, Ferraris re-emerged. There were also methyl chloride leaks, which intoxicated several men, and thus Ferraris was forced to abort the mission.
On 13 June, while coasting northwest of Eritrea, the submarine came in sight of Assab and at that moment two surface units appeared in the distance, apparently in pursuit of it. The coastal batteries of Assab mistook Ferraris for an enemy submarine and opened fire, hitting and damaging the submarine which hoisted sheets like white flags, thus causing a ceasefire. While the sighted ships left, Ferraris was joined by two tugboats and motorboats, since in the meantime it has been understood in Assab that it was an Italian unit.
June 14th, 1940
After a brief stop in Assab, Ferraris returned to Massawa in the evening, mooring in the bay of Ras Carrar. The submarine Torricelli was sent out to replace it, but it will be lured into a trap and sunk after an unequal fight against five British ships.
Shortly after Ferraris arrived in port, Massawa was bombed by air raids. The submarine defended itself with its 13.2 mm machine guns.
June 15th, 1940
While repairs were being made for the cannonade received at Assab, with the help of about twenty civilian workers from the local arsenal, the damaged batteries were removed and brought ashore to restore them to efficiency. In the evening there was a new aerial bombardment – now a constant in the daily life in Massawa.
June-August 1940
Repair work.
August 6th, 1940
After the completion of the work a few days earlier, Ferraris, together with Archimede and Guglielmotti (the submarines were spaced 15 meters apart), was moored at the pier in the port of Massawa (at the southern end of which there were the torpedo boats Giovanni Acerbi and Vincenzo Giordano Orsini, two tugboats and some motorboats) when at 6:00 PM the port suffered an air raid by two or three British Bristol Blenheim bombers. The airplanes, flying low, dropped their bombs against the pier where the submarines and torpedo boats were moored. While the former did not suffer any damage, the torpedo boats were hit in full, with 15 victims among the crew and very serious damage (it would never return to service). A bomb also hit the floating galley serving the torpedo boats, moored at the same jetty, destroying it along with its occupants.
The following day, the Massawa Marine Command ordered the three submarines to be unmoored, removed from the jetty and moored instead at the halfway point in the bay, two hundred meters from each other, to disperse the targets and make attacks by the British bombers more difficult.
August 14th, 1940
Ferraris left Massawa in the morning (still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Piomarta) to intercept a British battleship, which, according to information received from the Addis Ababa command, was to transit the Red Sea, coming from Suez and heading south, between August 15th and 17th (it was H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, bound for Aden).
August 15th, 1940
Ferraris reached the area of operations, lying in wait for the probable north-south routes that the battleship would travel, with orders to keep preferably east of the Red Sea sundial, and remain in the area until the 17th. Due to the monsoon winds and the consequent rough seas, Ferraris pitches and rolls strongly, until it tilted up to 45° to starboard. The captain ordered to correct the excessive heeling by giving full air to the starboard ballast tanks, while the electric pumps run out of water in the port ballast tanks. The starboard motor pump, however, decouples from the coupling of the electric motor and vacuum pump, so much so that the submersible risked capsizing. This happens because the sub-chief engineer in charge – embarked for this mission to replace the ‘owner’ Vincenzo La Commare, who remained on the ground due to illness – and who had already shown signs of imbalance after boarding, did not carry out the precise instructions received. Ferraris was head to the wind, with a 180° south course and bow against the sea and against the wind. Once the problem was resolved, the boat continued with the mission.
Around 8:00 PM an unknown ship was sighted on the portside, which could not be attacked because it was too far away (as well as due to haze and adverse weather and sea conditions). At 10:00 PM, in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (in position 19° N and 39° E), a destroyer or small cruiser was sighted zigzagging, and the submarine approached to attack. The commander gave the order to flood the launch tube number 2 and prepare it for launch. The British ship, coming from the south, proceeded northwards, and Ferraris had to change course, approaching to the east, which put it in the sea sideways, causing it to roll violently.
At 11:55 PM, from a kilometer away, the submarine launched two torpedoes at the enemy unit, but did not hit (according to helmsman Mario Cassisa, because the strong roll and pitch, caused by the rough sea, caused the bow to move a few degrees). The British unit counterattacked with depth charges, which lasted for three hours, but Ferraris managed to disengage. The attacked ship was probably one of three destroyers escorting H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, H.M.S. Dainty, H.M.S. Defender and H.M.S. Decoy. According to other sources, the attack, unsuccessful, would have been directed against the Royal Sovereign itself, but this is a mistake.
August 19th, 1940
Ferraris return to base. As soon as the submarine approaches the buoy to moor, a new air attack immediately begins, but it causes little damage. The next night, there was another bombing, and another the following day. From aboard Ferraris, the crew had the opportunity to witness the exploits of the pilot Mario Visentin, ace of the Regia Aeronautica, who defended Massawa from British air attacks, winning numerous air battles.
August 25th through September 1st, 1940
Offensive mission between Gebel Tair and Gebel Zucur, to no avail.
September 5th through 8th, 1940
Another offensive mission, in the waters of the Dahlak Islands (area identified by coordinates 18° N and 40° E), without success. Ferraris searched unsuccessfully for the British convoy “BS. 4”. According to helmsman Mario Cassisa, the sound of a propeller was heard, and the source was approached, which turned out to be an enemy unit, which nevertheless escaped the attack.
October 20th through 23rd, 1940
New unsuccessful offensive mission in the Red Sea. Ferraris searched in vain for the British convoy “BN. 7″ (32 merchant ships escorted by the light cruiser H.M.S. Leander, the destroyer H.M.S. Kimberley, the sloops H.M.S. Auckland, H.M.A.S. Yarra and H.M.I.S. Indus and the destroyers H.M.S. Huntley and H.M.S. Derby, as well as about fifty aircraft), sailing from Aden (where the convoy arrived from Bombay) to Suez. The destroyers Nazario Sauro, Francesco Nullo, Leone and Pantera found it, but their attack failed, ending with the loss of the Nullo.
On the way back, more air raids. During one of these attacks, a plane attacking Ferraris was hit in the fuel tank and crashes into the waters of the harbor. The two members of its crew were recovered from a motorboat and taken prisoner, while the aircraft was recovered from the seabed in the following days to be examined.
November 24th through 28th, 1940
Another offensive mission in the Red Sea, again under the command of Lieutenant Commander Piomarta.
November 26th, 1940
During the mission, at the first light of dawn, Ferraris spotted some dark mass on the horizon, then some trees and finally a convoy of merchant ships escorted by light cruisers and destroyers, at an estimated speed of 7 knots. The submarine partially submerged, allowing the conning tower to be out of the water, and prepared launch tubes 1, 3 and 4. When one of the destroyers, during a maneuver, left a “hole” in the protective screen, Ferraris moved between the merchant ships and the escort and launched three torpedoes from 700 meters, then quickly dove into the depths.
Piomarta believed that he had hit three steamers (three explosions were heard in succession on board the submarine, the third much more prolonged and violent than the other two), and the news was also announced in Bulletin No. 174 of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces (November 28th, 1940): “In the Red Sea, on the morning of the 26th, one of our submarines, The Galileo Ferraris, fired three torpedoes at three steamers of a heavily escorted enemy convoy. All three steamers were hit in full and sunk’. However, it was a wrong impression, and in reality, no torpedoes hit a target.
December 3rd through 8th, 1940
Offensive mission off Masamaruh, also unproductive. Ferraris was again looking for a convoy (as well as the destroyers Tigre, Leone and Daniele Manin), but did not find it.
December 23rd through 30th, 1940
Offensive mission off Port Sudan, unsuccessful. According to helmsman Mario Cassisa, on Christmas Day a formation of four British warships was sighted, and Ferraris attempted to attack them, but the attack had to be abandoned due to the excessive distance.
January 1941
More bombing of Massawa. Shortly after returning to base, Ferraris was visited, together with the Guglielmotti and the other units present in Massawa, by Amedeo of Savoy-Aosta, viceroy of Italian East Africa.
During a direct bombing raid against Ferraris and Guglielmotti, on an afternoon in January 1941, many bombs missed their targets and one fell in the square in front of the Massawa Arsenal, where dozens of civilian workers were running towards the air-raid shelters, causing a massacre.
January 20th through 26th, 1941
The last offensive mission, between Gebel Tair and Gebel Zucur, was once again fruitless. Only one hospital ship was sighted, which of course was not attacked.
February 1941
Ferraris underwent adaptation work in preparation for a long crossing to Bordeaux in occupied France. In fact, it seemed inevitable that Italian East Africa would fall within a few months, so it was decided to transfer the four remaining submarines of Massawa (in addition to Ferraris, Guglielmotti, Archimede and Perla) to Bordeaux, home of the Italian Atlantic base of Betasom, with a long circumnavigation of Africa. For communications with Bordeaux, Ferraris was assigned the distinctive signs 18F and D92.
March 3rd, 1941
Ferraris left Massawa, under the command of the Lieutenant Commander Piomarta.
March 2st1, 1941
Ferraris faces a violent typhoon, which causes some damage to the stern.
April 10th, 1941
In the evening Ferraris, in position 24°33′ S and 19°29′ W, was sighted by the British submarine H.M.S. Severn (Lieutenant Commander Andrew Neil Gillespie Campbell).
Through the decryption (by means of “ULTRA”) of some messages sent from Rome to Asmara and Massawa, the British learned of the transfer of the Italian boats from Massawa to Bordeaux and therefore organized the “Grab” operation, with the aim of intercepting and capturing, or destroying, the four Italian submarines and the German tanker Nordmark, sent to supply them. H.M.S. Severn, along with the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara and the sloop Milford, were sent to hunt down the five Axis units (the Nordmark will also be spotted by an Alcantara seaplane on April 14th but managed to pass herself off as the U.S. tanker Prairie).
H.M.S. Severn launched four torpedoes at 07:47 PM, and then two more at 07:50 PM, but none of the weapons hit Ferraris, which moved away without even noticing the attack.
April 12th, 1941
At 11.06 AM Ferraris was located by the British on a 345° bearing from Darwin (probably with direction finding equipment).
April 16th and 17th, 1941
After diving in the Red Sea and the Perim Strait, crossing the Mozambique Channel and rounding the Cape of Good Hope, thus entering the Atlantic Ocean, Ferraris met as planned the German refueler Nordmark, northwest of Tristan da Cunha, and thus carries out the only refueling of food and fuel of the long crossing. The ship arrived after a few days of waiting (if it had not arrived, the submarine would have reached Pernambuco in Brazil and be interned there), disguised as a British ship. Ferraris was ready to attack it in case it was a real enemy ship, but then Nordmark was recognized and the refueling took place.
May 9th, 1941
After passing west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, Ferraris finally reached Bordeaux. The boat traveled 14,000 miles in 68 days. Commander Piomarta received the Silver Medal for Military Valor in recognition of his remarkable seafaring feat.
Ferraris arriving in Bordeaux
May 15th through October 1st, 1941
Subjected to extensive maintenance work (especially the diesel engines), at the Bordeaux shipyard, to be returned to working conditions after the exhausting journey.
Some of the damaged that needed repairing in Bordeaux after the long journey from East Africa
The Sinking
On October 10th, 1941, after the completion of the repair work, Ferraris left Bordeaux for its first Atlantic mission, under the command of Lieutenant Filippo Flores (Commander Piomarta had been transferred to the submarine Marconi: fate would have it that this boat, with all the crew, disappeared in the same days and in the same area where Ferraris was sunk). When the submarine left the quay, only a priest remained on the pier to watch it. Someone on board interpreted this as a bad omen.
On exiting the locks, the boat crossed to starboard, and when Commander Flores ordered the whole tiller to be put to port the bow did not immediately straighten. The problem was solved, however, and Ferraris took the Gironde with two engines and 200 mines, preceded and followed by two German minesweepers, and with a French pilot on board.
Arriving at Le Verdon after seven hours, the boat anchored there until the next day, then proceeded to La Pallice, where it arrived at two o’clock in the afternoon of October 12th. After replenishing supplies, Ferraris left France for good on October 14th.
The submarine was assigned an operational sector to the east-northeast of the Azores. On October 17th, Ferraris formed, together with Archimede and Guglielmo Marconi, a barrage of Italian submarines located west of another barrage of German boats (U 71, U 83 and U 204 off Cape Spartel, U 206, U 563 and U 564 off Cape Trafalgar) for the interception of convoys coming from or going to Gibraltar. Spies operating in Spain and Morocco, had reported that convoy “HG. 75” (17 merchant ships, escorted by 4 destroyers, 7 corvettes, a sloop and the aircraft launcher H.M.S. Ariguani) would depart Gibraltar for England.
For five days Ferraris was stationed in the assigned area, without any major events. One of the helmsmen having fallen ill, the other helmsmen were forced to increase the number of watchmen for four days to replace him.
On the evening of October 24th, the submarine received a phonogram in which the submarine command of the Kriegsmarine informed it of the presence of the “HG 75” in the area (which, having departed on the evening of October 22nd, had already been attacked by the U-boats of the first barrage, which had sunk three merchant ships and the destroyer H.M.S. Cossack). Ferraris took a course of approach to the convoy, on the surface at full force, forcing the engines.
The convoy, however, was preceded by the PBY Catalina ‘A’ seaplane of the Royal Air Force’s 202nd Squadron, which took off from Gibraltar and was assigned to its escort. The aircraft, the AH-538 piloted by Major (Squadron Leader) Norman F. Eagleton, followed a zigzag search path, and in doing so, at 10:41 AM on October 25th, sighted Ferraris as it sailed on the surface, northwest of the convoy (i.e., 17 miles forward of it). The submarine in turn sighted the plane but, having been informed of the presence of German aircraft in the area, mistook it for a German Focke-Wulf FW 200 “Condor” reconnaissance aircraft. He signaled with his sign lamp, but the aircraft moved away without responding.
Returning shortly after, the Catalina approached from the stern and swooped down, and Ferraris, taken by surprise, did not dive. Commander Flores immediately sent the gunners to the stern gun and machine guns, and the submarine returned fire with the latter. The seaplane dropped two depth charges, but the second-in-command Furlan ordered “the whole tiller to port” and so the bombs missed the boat, falling into the sea at starboard bow (at distances varying between 10 and 50 meters from the boat) without exploding. Moreover, the Catalina also opened fire with its machine guns, then – not wanting to waste any more depth charges – began to fly in circles around the submarine, keeping in sight of it, and radioed the sighting to the escort of the convoy “HG. 75”. In the message, however, Eagleton forgot to indicate the position of the submarine in relation to the convoy, so the destroyer sent to hunt him, H.M.S. Duncan, was sent in the wrong direction. On Ferraris, the depth charges had not caused any damage, but the strafing had pierced the ballast tanks and the double aft tanks, causing a loss of fuel. The submarine tried to move away to the surface, but the Catalina followed. Another plane was seen coming from the bow but turned and immediately drove away.
Another British destroyer belonging to the escort of “HG. 75’” , H.M.S. Lamerton (Lieutenant Commander Hugh Crofton Simms) of the 12th Escort Group, had temporarily left the convoy’s escort at 8:17 AM to refuel (not having enough to reach the UK) at Punta Delgada in the Azores. The destroyer was sailing 30 miles south of the convoy (i.e. forward of it) and the submarine, when at 11:07 AM a lookout sighted another Catalina seaplane to the north, as well as two German Fw 200 “Condors”. H.M.S. Lamerton turned north, in the direction of the sighted aircraft, and a beacon contacted the Catalina with light signals. One of the two Catalinas (it is not clear which of the two) said over the radio that he was on top of an emerged U-boat (it was actually, of course, Ferraris).
H.M.S. Lamerton, a destroyer of the Hunt Class, Type II
At 11:35 AM, Lamerton sighted Eagleton’s Catalina, and at 11:40 AM Eagleton reported to the destroyer “Full speed” and at 11:45 AM that she was flying in circles over a 330° U-boat. Around that moment, H.M.S. Lamerton spotted smoke on the horizon, and realized that the submarine (not yet visible) was attempting to escape to the surface. Putting the engines at full strength, the destroyer soon came to sighting the Italian unit.
When Commander Flores saw H.M.S. Lamerton approaching, he mistakenly identified it as a corvette (having a slower speed than a destroyer), which could also have beaten in speed, therefore – in view of the fact that the fuel leak could have signaled the position of the submarine, if it had dived, as well as the fact that the hydrophones were out of order and therefore, once submerged, the submarine would not have been able to know where the attacker was – he decided to try to escape at full speed, remaining on the surface. The British ship set out in pursuit of Ferraris, which lasted for 31 miles, but the surface speed of a submarine remained well below that of a destroyer (Ferraris could reach a maximum of 17 knots, H.M.S. Lamerton could reach 27).
At noon, when the distance had been reduced to six miles (for another source, 8.8 km), H.M.S. Lamerton opened fire on the Italian submarine with the twin 101 mm “A” system, whereupon Ferraris turned 90° to starboard and returned fire with the aft gun (in the meantime, Commander Flores ordered the gunners to arm the forward gun as well). The Catalina also returned to attack with strafing passes, but each time it was repulsed by the submarine’s fire.
A Ferraris shell hit the bow castle of H.M.S. Lamerton, causing some slight damage, but the submarine’s shots were short and irregular, also because the British ship zigzagged for the precise purpose of preventing the Italian gunners from adjusting their aim (as well as to avert the possible risk of launching a torpedo). H.M.S. Lamerton continued to fire as it closed its distance, and four or five shots hit Ferraris in full, immobilizing it and opening holes on board (according to the narration of the helmsman Giovanni Serpe, however, none of the gunshots of the destroyer hit the target, always falling around the submarine). Two machine guns jammed, and it was not possible to restore them to working order. The lookouts spotted the fumes of two other ships forward, and a new plane came in from the stern.
In the end, Commander Flores, realizing that he had no hope of escaping – since he could not dive – let alone defeat a destroyer in a surface engagement, gave the order to cease fire and go on deck. The secret documents were destroyed, and the crew began to throw themselves into the sea; Flores himself, the second-in-command Furlan and the chief engineer, Captain of the Naval Engineers Francesco Rubino, were the last to remain on board. The latter was supposed to provide for the self-scuttling. Also on board was a sub-chief radio telegraphist, almost certainly Gerardo Zorzi (who had volunteered and had been on board Ferraris since before the outbreak of the war).
While the crew abandoned the boat (Commander Flores abandoned it last), Chief Engineer Rubino went down to the maneuvering room together with Sub-Chief Zorzi and opened the air vents, to sink the submarine. Ferraris, however, at that point abruptly accelerated its sinking, and sank in a very short time, taking with it to the bottom of the sea its chief engineer and the sub-chief who had accompanied him. To the memory of Captain Rubino was awarded the Bronze Medal for Military Valor.
Ferraris disappeared at 12:23 PM on October 25th, 1941, in position 37°27′ N and 14°33′ W (Italian sources; for the British sources, 37°07′ N and 14°19′ E), east of the Azores and 400 miles west of the Strait of Gibraltar. Scarcely three minutes had elapsed since Commander Flores’ ordered to go on deck.
At that moment H.M.S. Lamerton was 5.8 km away and continued to approach. When it arrived there, it initially carried out a sonar search, fearing that the submarine had submerged. To be on the safe side, it dropped a pack of four depth charges at the spot where Ferraris had disappeared. The ensuing concussion made the men overboard perceive a crushing effect but, at least apparently, caused no casualties (in addition to Rubino and Zorzi, there were three other victims in the sinking of Ferraris, but there seems to be no news about the circumstances of their deaths, however they could also have been killed by the explosion of the depth charges).
The large number of men overboard, however, soon convinced Commander Simms that the submarine had sunk. After initially leaving, H.M.S. Lamerton returned to the scene shortly afterwards to retrieve the castaways.
The crew of Ferraris formed a united group at sea, except for the helmsman Giovanni Serpe and a chief engineman, who had been separated from the others by a gust of sea. Many castaways were crying out for help, because they did not know how to swim. The best swimmers among their teammates helped them stay afloat. There was a long sea.
When H.M.S. Lamerton returned to the scene, she sounded her siren in victory and circled the castaways twice, throwing pieces of coal and empty milk, while British sailors whistled and shouted at the survivors of Ferraris. The Catalina made a tonneau as a sign of celebration.
H.M.S. Lamerton rescuing the crewmembers of Ferraris
At last, the destroyer stopped beside the group of castaways, and lowered nets and biscay along the bulwark. The survivors rushed towards them, but several were swept back by the waves. However, almost all of them managed to board H.M.S. Lamerton, except nine, who were in a very precarious situation. Once on board, the castaways were stripped of the soaked clothes they were wearing and naked, were gathered in the bow. Once the recovery of the bulk of the survivors was completed, H.M.S. Lamerton restarted and rescued the last ones who had remained out of reach. In the meantime, the carpenter of the British ship was plugging the holes opened by the splinters of Ferraris’ bullets with wooden dowels.
Commander Simms of H.M.S. Lamerton was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the sinking of Ferraris; Lieutenant George Dudley Pound received the Distinguished Service Cross, three other men from the Lamerton (Sergeant Ellis Taylor, Signal Sergeant George Mason Ford, Sailor John Paterson) were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, and four others (Captain William Henry Stubbings, Lieutenant Alan Geoffrey Gardner, Chief Bomber Norman Frederick Govier and Sub-Chief Leslie Walker English) were mentioned in the dispatches.
At the end of the rescue, the Italian castaways were refreshed with a little canned meat put on a single plate, moldy crackers and a little dirty water. Then H.M.S. Lamerton rejoined the convoy, and transferred the survivors of Ferraris, by boat, to the destroyer H.M.S. Vidette. Here the treatment was noticeably better. Petty officers and sailors were accommodated in the stoker’s room under the bow castle, while the officers were accommodated in the stern, and trousers and shirts were distributed to those who did not have them.
However, the dangers were not over: now the risk was to end up torpedoed by the German allies, since the convoy was still under attack by the U-boats. About eleven o’clock that evening the alarm was raised, and the Italian castaways were brought under the bow castle, so that they would not be trapped in case of sinking; However, they were not given life jackets.
During the night, what seemed to be the sounds of attacks were heard three times; The next morning, the British sailors, in gestures and half-sentences, implied that they had seen a submarine emerge capsized and then sink. After two days, one morning the castaways of Ferraris were taken on deck to get some air; after two more days H.M.S. Vidette arrived in Gibraltar, at about 1.45 PM
Disembarking in Gibraltar, the men of Ferraris were initially locked up in the local prison for common criminals, and later transferred to Great Britain, arriving in Glasgow and being interned in a prison camp (P.O.W. Camp No. 17) near Sheffield. Later, the prisoners were transferred again, this time to the United States where they ended up in the Pine Camp (TN now Fort Drum) prison camp in New York State. Giovanni Asselle, Ferraris’ cook, arriving in America and seeing the wealth and industrial power of that country, came to the definitive certainty that Italy would lose the war.
The treatment at Pine Camp was good; after the armistice between Italy and the Allies (September 8th, 1943) Italian prisoners were offered the opportunity to collaborate with the Allied forces, and most accepted. Giovanni Asselle, like other castaways of Ferraris, thus ended up carrying out various auxiliary services, traveling around the United States, until the end of the war. One of the survivors of Ferraris, sailor gunner Antonio De Seta, died in captivity in the United States on September 22nd, 1944, becoming the sixth and last victim among the submarine’s crew.
The last mission of Ferraris in memory of the sailor helmsman Giovanni Serpe:
“We left Bordeaux on October 10th, 1941.
On exiting the locks, the submarine crossed to starboard, the commander gave the order: “tiller all the way to port” but the bow did not straighten, it was seen from then on, that luck was against us. Finally, we got out, we were all lined up along the edge to say goodbye to our comrades who had remained on base.
We took the Gironde with two engines at 200 rpm, accompanied us for dredging magnetic mines a German pirate ship [sic] (Harlequin, so called for its colorful painting) and a small German minesweeper, the first forward, the second behind, the pilot who was French gave orders to the commander, the commander in turn to the helmsman.
The sail to La Verdon lasted 7 hours, where we anchored until the next day.
We left the Gironde and headed for La Palice.
We arrived at 2:00 PM on October 12th.
Here we were supplied with fresh food.
The second-in-command (Mr. Furlan) took me with him to La Rochelle for a small personal shore, with him there was also our chief engineer (Mr. Rubino).
Along the navigation from Bordeax to La Palice you could still see the remains of the effects of the “Stugas” [Stukas, ed] and the German magnetic mines well known by the belligerent states, stranded steamers all dented to starboard and port of the Gironde, outside the port of La Palice was half sunk by a magnetic mine the French motor ship “Lo Sciale'” [probably the ocean liner Champlain, Editor’s note] a very modern ship that at the beginning of the war had been converted into a troop transport.
An Italian salvage company was working on it.
The next day we set out on our usual 40-day mission. After 5 days of sailing, we reached our area. We stayed in the area for 5 days, the navigation was going well, I was the helmsman doing my four and four watches, my resting place was in the stern launch room.
For four days our attacking helmsman felt ill, so we helmsmen were forced to increase the hours of the watch.
On the fifth day that we were in the area, the commander received a phonogram, he immediately changed course and so both engines in motion went in that new direction.
He spent the whole evening like this, but in the morning the lookouts spotted an aircraft, immediately made the recognition signals with the pistol, he turned and went away in the opposite direction.
Around eleven o’clock again the stern aircraft was sighted, the aircraft dove, the commander had already called the armament to the stern piece and to the machine guns, they began to fire, in the dive the aircraft dropped two bombs, thanks to the cold blood of the second officer who ordered: “the whole tiller to port!” the two bombs went to hit 50 meters to starboard from the bow of the boat, Thus began a heavy fight between us and the aircraft (Catalina) in this while another aircraft was sighted from the bow which he also did like the first, arrived at a certain point and turned and disappeared on the horizon.
An hour later smoke was seen from the stern, we had the hydrophones in failure and so if you dived it was difficult to hear which direction the destroyer was facing.
We also engaged in combat with the destroyer.
Every now and then the aircraft would swoop at us, a cannon shot from the stern would make it retreat, in one of these dives it machine-gunned the stern side double-bottoms, sending the fuel oil that was inside overboard, but this was not of vital importance.
In the meantime, the captain summoned the armament to the bow piece.
We had two jammed machine guns that were not easily repaired.
The destroyer fired two guns, but its salvos went to and from of the boat but without hitting it.
I, two torpedo pilots and the chief torpedo pilot were in the aft launch chamber with the watertight door closed, and I was ordered to stay close to the hand rudder in case they hit the electric rudder.
The boat was on general alert, everyone was at their fighting posts.
Everything was going well, but at a certain point the lookouts spotted two bow fumes on the horizon and another aircraft approaching from the stern, we fired again, but their superiority gripped our forces.
The captain gave the order to cease fire and people on deck, as is done before sinking the boat, the secret documents were destroyed, we began to throw ourselves into the sea, the commander was always in his place together with him was the chief engineer and the second in command, the destroyer continued to fire.
We were all at sea except the captain, the chief engineer and a sub-chief R.T. who I don’t know why had remained on board, the chief engineer was down with the R.T., but the chief engineer was in the maneuvering room to open the air vents, but bad luck wanted that the submarine sank in an instant taking with it the chief engineer and the sub-chief R.T.
But all this maneuver, from the moment of the command “men overboard” to the sinking, only 3 minutes passed.
The destroyer rushed against us, but when it reached the height of the boat it dropped four depth charges producing a large column of water, which burst a short distance from us, which made us all crush our bellies, after this the destroyer moved away to the horizon disappearing.
We were all united at sea, except for me and the chief engine, because a gust of sea detached us from the group.
There were many in the sea who were crying out for help because they could not swim, but they were all rescued by those who knew how to swim well.
The sea was a bit rough, but it didn’t look like much because it was long.
After a long time, the destroyer was seen to appear again, whistling as if to greet the dead, we were all with gall in our mouths when we saw that he was circling around us, throwing us pieces of coal, empty milk, whistling and shouting at us.
Twice he repeated the same things, but the third time he stopped and threw along the edge where we were some ropes made of nets, which looked like ladders, we all rushed in that direction, many could not get close to us because the waves were pushing them back, so after a long time they managed to catch up with everyone, except for nine who were in worrying positions.
All of us who were already on board took off what we had on us and took us to the bow away, we were all naked and it almost seemed that we were dying of the cold, so cold was it, we always thought of our companions who were struggling with the waves, while the destroyer started to move, wetting us all from the spray of the mustache, it almost seemed as if he did not want to take our comrades overboard, so at last he turned and took the last survivors, while they were getting in, the carpenter on board with wooden dowels was plugging the holes formed by the splinters of our bullets.
They made us stay on board until the destroyer “Lamerton” reached the convoy, so we found ourselves in the middle of the convoy, consisting of an auxiliary cruiser of 18,000 tons, 22 steamers of different tonnage, 5 gunboats, 4 destroyers and a destroyer that formed the squadron leader.
Before the boat lowered the boat to take us on board the squadron leader, the destroyer “Lamerton” made us refresh ourselves (as they call it) with a little corned meat put on a single plate, with some crackers full of mold, and with a little dirty water where at the bottom we could see the rust of the water tanks.
Thus we spent our stay aboard the H.M.S. Lamerton.
We began our lives on board the destroyer H.M.S. Vidette as soon as we embarked, they put us in the bow under the bow castle, in the stokers’ room, while the officers put them in the stern.
Every now and then someone would come in with some trousers or shirt and hand them out to those who didn’t have them.
We were already waiting for something to happen that night, and so it was.
Around 11 o’clock you hear the ship, the ringtone? That trilled damn much, we were already depressed by what had happened, here we felt the danger approaching again, but even with the fear that we were in that state and closed, we always felt that in our veins there was Italian blood and so the morale rose again, we heard for three quarters of an hour explosions and cannons, He already foresaw what had happened.
As soon as the first explosions took place, the sentinels let us out and led us under the bow castle, ready to throw us into the sea if something happened, in the meantime we could see the English sailors taking off their heaviest clothes and inflating their life jackets, we were almost all naked and without life jackets.
We thanked God that it didn’t go badly for us. In the night there were three trills in the alarm ringer and three large-scale attacks.
In the morning they did not let us take in the air, but we could smell that there was a bad smell in the air, we could hear a murmur among these sailors that we did not understand, but by asking by means of gestures and small phrases we could understand that they said they had seen a submarine come up capsized and they had no loss.
But after two mornings that took us to get air on the deck of the convoy, only the auxiliary cruiser of 18,000 tons remained. badly damaged in the stern, four gunboats, two submarine destroyers and our squadron leader.
They remained for two more days circling this auxiliary cruiser, as it was impossible to tow it, they abandoned it and sank it by means of the “Kingston”.
So, the squadron leader headed for Gibraltar, while the other units headed for England.
Thus, we passed three-fourths of the day, the night, and in daylight we began to see the straits, and at about 1:45 PM we arrived at the stronghold of Gibraltar.”
Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo
Operational Records
| Type | Patrols (Med.) | Patrols (Other) | NM Surface | NM Sub. | Days at Sea | NM/Day | Average Speed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Submarine – Oceanic | 0 | 3 | 15,468 | 229 | 83 | 189.12 | 7.8 |
Actions
| Date | Time | Captain | Area | Coordinates | Convoy | Weapon | Result | Ship | Type | Tonns | Flag |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10/25/1941 | 11:35 | T.V. Filippo Flores | Atlantic Ocean | 37°27′ N-14°33′ W | Artillery | Slight damage | H.M.S. Lamerton | Destroyer | 1050 | Great Britain |
Crew Members Lost
| Last Name | First Name | Rank | Italian Rank | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abusco Scotto | Tommaso | Junior Chief | Sottocapo | 10/25/1941 |
| Castronovo | Giovanni | Ensign | Guardiamarina | 10/25/1941 |
| De Seta | Antonio | Naval Rating | Comune | 10/25/1941 |
| Fiori | Pierino | Naval Rating | Comune | 10/25/1941 |
| Rubino | Francesco | Lieutenant Other Branches | Capitano G.N. | 10/25/1941 |
| Zorzi | Gherardo | Junior Chief | Sottocapo | 10/25/1941 |
