Boats

The MARCONI was the first of a series of 6 boats and which bears its name (Marconi Class). Of this class, 5 boats were sunk and one captured. The boat was laid down at the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on September 19th, 1938, launched on July 30th of the following year, and delivered to the Navy on February 2nd, 1940. After a brief period of training and testing, the boat was assigned to the 22nd Squadron, 2nd Submarine Group with its base in Naples.

The MARCONI still on the slip just before its launch
(Photo USMM)

Operational Life

1940

The first war patrol of the submarine MARCELLO was particularly successful. In July 1940, a few weeks after Italy’s declaration of war, the Italian Submarine Command organized a large and continuous patrol line east of the Strait of Gibraltar. The area in question was patrolled by a total of 11 boats divided into 3 groups. The MARCELLO, along with the Emo, Dandolo and Barbarigo, was assigned to the first group. This patrol started on July 1st and lasted for almost two weeks. The Emo and MARCONI were assigned to the westernmost area. The Emo patrolled south of the meridian of Alboran (about halfway between the Moroccan and Spanish coast), while the MARCONI was assigned north of this meridian and closer to the Spanish coast.

The MARCONI receiving final touches before being delivered to the Navy
(Photo USMM)

The MARCONI, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giulio Chialaberto, was already in position when, the evening of July 2, it sighted in position 36° 25’N, 03° 48’W a group of six destroyers. In the darkness of the night (it was about 30 minutes to midnight), the captain launched a single torpedo at about 1,000 meters from the nearest target. The weapon failed right away, assuming the wrong course, so a second weapon was also expended. The presence of such a large formation forced the MARCONI to seeking refuge in the depths of the sea, thus the results of the attack could not be immediately ascertained. Later reports would confirm that as a result of this action, H.M.S. Vortigen (D37) was hit and sustained damage, but was able to get back to base. H.M.S. Vortigen, a British destroyer of the V Class built in 1916, would eventually be lost on May 15th, 1942.

Toward the end of the patrol, on July 11th (possibly earlier), the MARCONI sighted another destroyer. After having made contact around 03:00, the captain moved the boat into a favorable attack position and launched a single torpedo. The weapon hit the British destroyer H.M.S. Escort which, along with H.M.S. Forester (H66), was returning to Gibraltar following operation “MA 5”. The attack took place in position 36° 20’N, 03° 40’W and, following the attack, the MARCONI had to avoid an attempted ramming by H.M.S. Forester. H.M.S. Escort was a destroyer of the E class built in 1933 and following the attack that had destroyed the forward boiler room, there was a failed attempt to tow it back to port.

Upon returning to Naples, the MARCONI was one of the earlier boats selected for service in the Atlantic. At the end of August, MARCICOSOM, the Italian submarine command, issued the necessary orders to transfer another group of submarines to the Atlantic. This group was to cross the treacherous Strait of Gibraltar during the new moon around September 2nd. The group included the MARCONI, Emo, Faà di Bruno, Giuliani, Baracca, Torelli, Tarantini, Finzi and Bagnolini.

The MARCONI, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giulio Chialamberto, left Naples on September 6th and reached the approach to the strait on the 11th. Having noticed the presence of British patrol units, the captain decided to cross the narrow and perilous strait underwater, eventually reaching the Atlantic side without any problems. Once in the Atlantic, the MARCONI assumed the assigned patrol position off Cape Finesterre just north of the position assigned to the Finzi, a boat under the command of Commander Alberto Dominici. The Marconi remained in the area from the 15th to the 28th. On the 19th, Captain Chialamberto sighted a small ship and proceeded to sink it. Unfortunately, it was the Spanish trawler Alm. Jose de Carranza of 330 tons, a neutral vessel used for commercial fishing. In due course, the first Atlantic mission of the MARCONI ended with its arrival in Bordeaux on September 29th.
The permanence in Bordeaux was not long; in early October Betasom was asked by B.d.U. to organize two attack groups to join German forces in the north Atlantic. The MARCONI was assigned to the Bagnolini Group along with the Bagnolini itself, the Baracca, and the Finzi. The MARCONI left base on October 27th, the last of the group. Once at sea, the boat received a discovery signal in the afternoon of December 4th from the Malaspina. Despite the immediate search, the boat failed to locate the convoy previously signaled and continued on to the assigned area. Between the 6th and 8th of November, the MARCONI was in the patrol area spanning from 20° W to 26° W and from 55°20’N to 56°20’ N. On the 8th, the radioman aboard the submarine intercepted a radio message from the British cargo ship Cornish City of 4,952 tons which had claimed having heard a violent explosion. The MARCONI sighted the merchant ship and immediately after an escort unit forced it to seek refuge into the depths. The escort unit went on with the usual lengthy hunt dropping 14 depth charges, but missing the target because the captain had been very ingenious in taking the boat down to 125 meters. At that time, British escort units did not know that Axis boats could reach such depths. Eventually, the unit in question noticed fuel, oil, and wreckage bubbling to the surface and, assuming a kill, gave up the hunt.

It is known that the Cornish City was the lead ship of convoy HX.84 that on the 5th had been attacked and dispersed by the German heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer. The commodore aboard this ship was trying to get the convoy back together when a German FW 200 attacked. One of the escort units, H.M.S. Havelock, assumed that the explosion had been caused by a torpedo and moved forward, eventually encountering the MARCONI.

On the 9th, having received a signal with the necessary instructions, the MARCONI moved on toward a position indicated by the Otaria as one of a naval formation including an aircraft carrier and a few destroyers. Instead of the formation, the MARCONI found a straggling merchant ship already damaged by a previous attack by a FW 200 of KG40 and ablaze. Past sunset, after a first failed attack, the MARCONI placed a torpedo into the side of the Swedish ship Vingaland of 2,734 tons (some sources give the displacement at only 2,720 tons). Original Italian documentation assumed that this ship was able to reach port, but this assumption, like many others, was mistaken. This Swedish ship was built in 1935 by the shipyard Eriksberg, MekaniskeVerkstads of Gothenburg and was part of convoy HX.84 from Halifax. The sinking took place in position 55°41’N, 18°24’W with a total of six casualties and 19 crewmembers later rescued.

A few days later, in the early morning of November 14th, the MARCONI sighted another merchant ship. It could have been the opportunity for another kill, but the boat had lost the use of the attack periscope since the beginning of the mission and the use of the second periscope brought part of the turret out of the water more than once. At about 2500 meters, a single torpedo was launched but failed the target and then the captain decided to give up the chase since the ship was faster than his boat. Two days later, and precisely on the 16th, the MARCONI received another signal but the severe weather conditions did not allow it to make much progress toward a fairly large convoy. On the 18th, another signal brought the boat on another chase, but there was no contact made and soon after the submarine had to return to base, reaching Bordeaux on November 28th.

After the usual period for refitting, the MARCONI was again sent to sea, this time off Oporto, Portugal. The boat left Bordeaux on January 16th, reaching the assigned area around the 21st. Here, the MARCONI waited off the estuary of the River Tago for a convoy of about 20 ships sailing up from Gibraltar and directed to England. On the 10th, aboard the submarine a considerable trail left by leaking fuel was detected. The seriousness of the problem suggested abandoning the search for the convoy, but the morning of the same day Captain Chialaberto attacked, while submerged, a merchant ship without identifying it and failing to sink it. On the 12th, the boat left the patrol area returning to Bordeaux on the 17th of February.

1941

After a long period of refitting, in May the MARCONI was assigned to a screen which included the Argo, Mocenigo, Veniero, Brin, Velella and Emo running north to south along 12°00’N. During the refitting preceding this mission, Lieutenant Commander Chialamberto had been transferred to the submarine Bagnolini and had been replaced by Lieutenant Mario Paolo Pollina. The precise date of the MARCONI’s departure from Bordeaux is not known, but took place between the19th and the 29th of May.

Lieutenant Pollina (first officer on the left) returning to base after a patrol in the Atlantic Ocean
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

On the 30th, at 08:00, the crew sighted the British tanker Cairndale and proceeded to sink it with two launches of two torpedoes each. The attack took place in position 35°20’N, 8°45’W just west of the Strait of Gibraltar (170 miles from Cape Trafalgar). The position of the sinking was given by the British authorities in 35°19’N, 8°33’W with the reported loss of four crewmembers. The Cairndale was a motor tanker (oiler) of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and had been laid down in 1938 as the Erato. Built in 1939 by the Harland & Wolff of Belfast, it had a displacement of 8,129 tons. The reaction of the escort was immediate, but despite the launch of numerous depth charges, the boat lived to tell the story. The following day, Captain Pollina sank the Portuguese steam trawler Exportador I (given by some authors as Equador Primero) of 318 tons with the deck gun. It is not known why a neutral ship would become the target of the submarine, but we could assume that it was providing some service to the British forces.

At 23:50 on the night of June5th, the MARCONI sighted a convoy in position 35°05’, 11°45W. Along with the Velella, the MARCONI began approaching the convoy hoping to be able to break through the columns, but the intervention of one of the escorts forced it to withdraw. The attack was resumed in the early hours of the 6th, and at 04:22 the MARCONI launched two torpedoes against a large tanker described as type “Daghestan”. This was a tanker built in 1921 by the Short Bros. Ltd of Sunderland, displacing 5,842 tons and sunk by U 57 in 1940. According to the report presented by the MARCONI, one more ship was also damaged.

Two other torpedoes hit the British freighter Baron Lovat of 3,395 tons, sinking it, and one of the last weapons launched hit the Swedish cargo Taberg. The first vessel was built by Ayrshire Dockyard of Irvine in 1926 and belonged to the Hogarth Shipping Co. of Glasgow. The position of the sinking was given as 35°30N, 11°30’W and all 35 crewmembers were rescued. The Baron Lovat was carrying 3,245 tons of coke. Of the Taberg we have very limited information if only that it displaced 1,392 tons and was in ballast and thay only 6 out of the 22 crewmembers were later saved by a British ship.

The Baron Lovat and Taberg were part of convoy OG.63 from Liverpool to Gibraltar. The convoy had left Great Britain on May 25th with a total of 39 ships, later arriving in Gibraltar on June 7th after having lost 3 vessels. The British reports would indicate that in addition to the two ships sunk by the MARCONI, a third one (Glen Head), was sunk by an aircraft. During this operation, both the Velella and Emo conducted similar attacks but failed to score any success. Immediately after the audacious attack, the boat became the object of the attentions of the escort unit, and after the first few cannon shots, the captain took the boat underwater where it remained until the afternoon. The same night, having exhausted all the torpedoes, the MARCONI began the journey back to base.

After the usual refitting, the MARCONI was again assigned to a patrol, this time along with the Finzi, and again in the area just off the Strait of Gibraltar. The submarine left Bordeaux on the 3rd of August reaching the assigned area about 200 miles from the strait a few days later. On the 11th at 03:45 AM in position 37°32N, 10°20’W, the MARCONI attacked a small formation which included the corvette H.M.S. Convolvulus (K45) of the Flower class and the sloop H.M.S. Deptford (L53) of the Grimsby Class, launching two torpedoes against the latter one. Although the crew was convinced of having scored a hit, post-war records do not indicate any damage to the British units.

Meantime, it had been ascertained that a British convoy (HG.70 from Gibraltar to Great Britain) was on the move and all submarines in the area, both German and Italian, were sent on the hunt. On the 14th, the MARCONI sighted the merchant ship Sud, a Yugoslavian freighter of 2,598 tons. Having failed the attack with the torpedo, the MARCONI proceeded to finish the ship with the deck gun. Once the ship hit by many rounds came to a halt, the captain waited for the enemy crewmembers to abandon ship. Meantime, a German submarine, U 126 commanded by Korvettenkapitنn Ernst Bauer intervened, firing a few rounds into the hull of the sinking ship and claiming it as his own (he ended the war with a record of 119.110 tons sunk). All 33 crewmembers were later saved. The position of the sinking is given as 41°00’N, 17°41’W. For the record, the Sud belonged to the Oceania Brodarsko Ackionarsko Drustvo of Susak and was built in 1901 by Roger & Co. of Glasgow. Roger Jordan gives the displacement as only 2,520 tons. After the attack, the MARCONI continued chasing the convoy until the 17th and then began the return voyage to base reaching Bordeaux on August 29th. Immediately after, Lieutenant Pollina was disembarked due to health reasons and replaced by Lieutenant Commander Livio Piomarta who had already served aboard the submarine Ferraris.

On October 5th, the MARCONI was again at sea and directed to Gibraltar to intercept a convoy along with the Ferraris, Archimede, and Barbarigo. On October 22nd, the MARCONI was located 720 miles WNW of the strait. On the 25th, the Ferraris was scuttled after an aerial bombing (Catalina A of the 202 R.A.F. Squadron) and later attacked and sunk by the British destroyer H.M.S. Lamerton. On the 26th, the Ferraris made contact with the convoy. On the 28th, the MARCONI sighted many flares and, at 23:30, following a request from Betasom, it communicated its position (42°55’N, 21°55W).

The Marconi in Bordeaux in July 1941 after an extensive refitting which included the redesign of the conning tower
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

A German submarine, also in the area, indicated that at that point the MARCONI was about 30 miles south of the convoy. The same day, U-432 sank the British cargo Ulea (part of HG.75 including 17 ships, 4 of which were lost) at 05:09 in position 41°17N, 21°40W. Assuming that the positions given are accurate, the MARCONI was almost 100 miles from the position where the Ulea was lost. Furthermore, the MARCONI was north, not south of the convoy. In any event, this was the last time the whereabouts of the MARCONI were known. The submarine failed to return to base and was declared lost west of Gibraltar between October 28th and December 4th (the last date being the maximum endurance at sea).

Additional notes

Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli wrote in “Sommergibili in Guerra”: “[the Marconi] would be lost under the command of Liutenant Commander Livio Piomarta, probably sunk by mistake by the German submarine U.67 on October 28th, 1941 during an attack against a convoy off Portugal.” But suggestion that the submarine Marconi was sunk by the German U-boat U67 in 1941 has proved incorrect as the German boat was not at sea at the time of the Marconi’s disappearance

The MARCELLO was the first of a series of 11 boats and which bears its name (Marcello Class). The boat was laid down at the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone on January 4th, 1937, launched on November 20th of the same year, and delivered to the Navy on March 5th, 1938.

Monfalcone, November 20th, 1937 – The launch of the MARCELLO.
(Photo USMM)

After a brief period of training and testing, the boat was assigned to the 21st Squadron, 2nd Submarine Group with its base in Naples. Foles Buonamici commanded the MARCELLO from the 25th of September 1939 to the 22nd of February 1940. Later, the boat was under the command of Raffaele Barbera from February 23rd 1940 to April 4th, and later transferred to the command of Luigi Domini.

Operational Life

Even before the beginning of the hostilities, the MARCELLO was one of the six boats assigned to a screen to be deployed between Capo Palos, Cape Falcon and Cape Tenes in the western Mediterranean. The MARCELLO left Naples on June 5th, 1940 and while in navigation a failure of the cooling system caused a methyl chloride leak with subsequent poisoning of part of the crew. Thus the mission was abandoned and the boat returned to Cagliari on June 10th, the day of the declaration of war.

After the necessary repairs, the MARCELLO was called up to another mission with the MEDUSA for a short patrol 25 miles NE, 40 miles east of the Island of La Galite to be conducted in coordination with surface vessels of the 1st Naval Division against French traffic to North Africa. The boat arrived in the area on June 23rd, but then returned right away to port due to the cancellation of the action. Eventually, the boat reached Naples where the commanding officer, Luigi Domini was disembarked on July 29th and replaced by Carlo Alberto Teppati who would perish aboard the vessel in Atlantic.

During the month of August, the MARCELLO was part of another mission in the western Mediterranean (from the 2th to the 19th), which included the GONDAR and the ASCIANGHI, to patrol the area east of the Strait of Gibraltar, primarily around the 36th parallel. In those days operation “Hurry” was underway for the transport of aircraft from Gibraltar to Malta. Furthermore, the British had organized the bombardment of Cagliari by carrier-based aircrafts and also a diversionary action off the Balearic Islands. Despite the large activity at sea, the MARCELLO did not sight any vessel and, at the end of the mission, returned to port having navigated 2,432 miles.

The MARCELLO in Naples

At the end of this mission, the boat received orders to transfer to the Atlantic to become part of the new submarine base established in Bordeaux. The MARCELLO was part of a transfer group that included the BIANCHI, MOROSINI, and BRIN, while the MOCENIGO and VELELLA were delayed. After departure, which took place on October 31st (the day before the new moon), the boat crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to then go on patrol off Oporto. The MARCELLO, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlo Alberto Teppani, completed the difficult crossing the night of November 5th, submerged, with favorable weather conditions and without encountering any enemy vessel. During navigation the boat received orders to replace the BIANCHI which, due to damage suffered during the Strait of Gibraltar, had to make directly for the base. Thus, from the 7th to the 27th of November, the MARCELLO remained on patrol off Cape S. Vincenzo but without intercepting any target despite news received of a convoy departing Gibraltar. Having left the patrol area on November 27th, the boat arrived in Bordeaux for the first time on December 2nd.

In early January 1941, the MARCELLO left for its first mission completely in the Atlantic as part of a group that included the MALASPINA and TORELLI. The group was assigned an area between 59 30’ N, 53 00’ N and 17 00’ W, 20 00’ W. The MARCELLO left Le Verdon, at the estuary of the river Gironde, the night of January 11th to reach the area of operations six days later. As soon as he arrived, Commander Teppani sighted a convoy and moved to its stern to determine speed and direction. Soon after, a destroyer from the escort sighted the Italian boat (not too difficult due to the size of the conning tower), thus the MARCELLO had to dive even before launching the discovery signal. The enemy vessel launched only 5 depth charges, but they damaged the forward trim tank. After the all clear, the boat surfaced to launch the discovery signal. After assessing the seriousness of the damage, the MARCELLO aborted the mission on the 19th to return to Bordeaux. On the 20th, after having sighted a ship on the surface, the crew lost contact underwater (maybe due to problems with the hydrophones or the horrible weather conditions), and regained it once back on the surface where it attacked with the deck gun.

Despite Italian documentation dating back to 1963 which indicates that this attack failed, it has been ascertained that the MARCELLO indeed attacked and sank the Belgian ship “Portugal”, of 1,550 t. and not the Greek “Eleni” as indicated at the time by the xB-Dienst (naval cryptanalytic division). The “Portugal” was an old ship built in 1906 by the AG Neptun shipyard of Rostok (Germany) and previously known as the “Barman” (1922), “Consule Cords”, and “Minna Bolt”. The ship belonged to “Compagnie National Belge de Transports Maritimes”. It should be said that during the attack four gunners were dragged into the sea by the fierce weather. Three were rescued, but the fourth, probably stunned after an impact with the boat’s structure, disappeared between the waves despite the intense search. The MARCELLO continued on, arriving in Puillac on January 24th.

After a brief period at the base, the MARCELLO was again assigned to a mission, this time as part of the “Group Bianchi”, along with the BIANCHI, OTARIA, and BARBARIGO. The MARCELLO, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Teppani, left Bordeaux on February 6th with orders to reach an area between 14 00’ W and 17 00’ W and between 55 N and 56 N (a rectangle of about 61 by 101 miles). On the 18th, the MARCELLO was ordered to a new prearranged patrol area further north. The same day, the MARCELLO received orders to attack a large tanker that at 1330 was in position 6167 square 11 (to be determined) and previously damaged by an aircraft. On the 19th at 1205 (Rome Standard Time), the MARCELLO was ordered to a new area designated “B”. Later, at 1920, the MARCELLO and BARBARIGO were informed that an airplane had sighted a convoy in quadrant 4615 and the BARBARIGO was ordered to sub-quadrant 66 and the MARCELLO to sub-quadrant 46 both with orders to patrol along the parallel (East-West and vice-versa). The boats were also informed that Germans submarines were in the area of operations. On the 21st, at 0223, BETASOM issued a new set of orders. BARBARIGO was assigned to 46-67-36, BIANCHI to 46-99-52 and MARCELLO to 27-74-43. The following day, February 22nd at 0120, BETASOM sent another signal ordering the three submarines to patrol on a 45° route at a speed of 8 knots until further orders.

What follows are a series of assumptions often resulting from various mistakes made by the British and Italian naval authorities.

On the 24th at 1015, BETASOM ordered the submarines to communicate their position. The same order was issued again on the 25th at 1200. Later that day, at 2020, BETASOM ordered the BARBARIGO, BIANCHI and MARCELLO to move to a new position; 5399 11 for the BARBARIGO, 2799 44 for the BIANCHI and 6199 13 for the MARCELLO. The same message indicated a convoy of 25 ships in position 2715 sub quadrant 25 direction 270 at the speed of 7 knots at 1400. The following day, BETASOM indicated at 0220 that the convoy was at 2350 (of the previous day) in position 61 90, sub quadrant 56 moving at 8 knots in direction 230. The boats were ordered to converge.

On the 27th at 0215, BETASOM informed the submarines that the convoy was now dispersed and ordered the attack on two ships in position 56-99/66 moving at the speed of 4 knots in direction 270. The same day, BETASOM informed Rome at 1125 that they had lost contact with the MARCELLO. This telegram was followed by another one on the 9th of March in which BETASOM informed Rome of the following:

The morning of February 22nd at 1000, the BIANCHI sighted a “submerged submarine” in position 57° 55’ N, 17° 40’ W which could have been the MARCELLO. The same boat heard depth charges explosions, about 40 total, at 16:00 and again 21:15. The destroyer Montgomery, one of the old American four-stacks transferred to the Royal Navy by President Roosevelt, conducted an antisubmarine action in position 59° 00’ N, 17° 00’ W at 15:00 (16:00 Italian time) and it is believed that this action brought about the destruction of the Italian vessel. If the time is correct, between 10 AM (early morning in the area of operations and still under cover of darkness) and 4 PM the MARCELLO navigated no less than 68 miles while submerged. Assuming that the boat never came to the surface, it would be impossible for a boat of the MARCELLO class to cover 68 miles in 6 hours if not on the surface and at elevated speed.

If one also considers that the original document “German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War” published in 1946 by the Admiralty attributes the sinking of the MARCELLO to a Sunderland of the 210 Squadron of the R.A.F. on January 6th (a month before the boat left port) west of the Hebrides Islands, then we must assume that the necessary checks and double checks did not take place.

On March 18th, 1941 BETASOM and MARICOSOM finally declared the MARCELLO missing. Years went by and with the cessation of the hostilities the various historical departments attempted to shed light on many war events, amongst them the loss of the MARCELLO. On February 12th 1949 the Italian Navy officially requested the collaboration of the British authorities in clarifying these events. The first correction made was simple since the R.A.F. had claimed the MARCELLO following an attack by a Sunderland (4210) on January 6th, 1941 date in which the MARCELLO was still in Bordeaux.

Later, the British Admiralty forwarded a letter to the Italian authorities on May 17th, 1954 (HSL.159/54) in which they informed their former enemies that the information reported on page 52 of “Warship Losses” (Navi Perdute, Tomo I) indicating the loss of the MARCELLO following an attack by a British Hurricane (aircraft) was also erroneous. The British attempted to clarify the record by indicating that “the most likely cause of the MARCELLO’s destruction seems to have been the attack by the Motgomery at 1550 of February 22nd 191”.

The Italian inquire completed on October 9th, 1949 was indeed embarrassing has it not only mistakenly reported some of the data provided by the British, but also failed to provide for the necessary references. In essence, it looked like the only interested was closing the file and moving on to new matters. As noted on the original documentation, this new version was accepted by the Ufficio Storico (USMM) on November 15th, 1956 and a note was handwritten indicating that the book “Navi Perdute – Tomo I” would be updated accordingly. To these days, the causes of the MARCELLO’s loss are still unknown.

Additional notes

Clair Blair, the author of the book “Hitler’s U-Boot War” wrote: “During the night of February 23-25, five German boats and the Italian Bianchi attacked… During this melee, the Italian submarine Marcello, commanded by Carlo Alberto Teppani, arrived on the scene . One of the convoy escorts, the ex-American four-stack destroyer Montgomery, merely a month out of her overhaul and upgrade, spotted Marcello and attacked with guns and depth charges [1]. The attack was successful: Marcello sank with all hands. She was the first Axis submarine to fall victim to one of the American warship transferred to the Royal Navy in the “Destroyer Deal…”.

Giorgio Giorgerini, in his book “Uomini sul Fondo” (Men on the Bottom) published by Mondadori in 1994 wrote: “In the fist ten days of February the group “Bianchi” left Bordeaux (Bianchi, Marcello, Otaria, Barbarigo); unfortunately the Marcello lost all contacts: disappeared, without survivors. Some sources indicate February 21st as the possible date of the loss, and also indicate as the possible cause one of the three antisubmarine actions conducted by British ships. The first was conducted by the destroyer HURRICANE in position 56 19’ N, 07 59’ W. The second was conducted by the destroyer MOTGOMERY in position 59 00’ N, 17 00’ W. The third was conducted by the corvette PERWINKLE in position 59 18’ N, 14 32’ W. Nevertheless, none [of these actions] is positioned in full in the operational area of the Marcello which, starting February 19th, was between 57° 00’ N and 58° 00’ N.”

[1] We don’t know where he gets his gun attack from, the report from Montgomery is quite specific “attacked firm contact with six depth charges – there was no evidence of destruction”.

The submarine MAREA was part of the “TRITONE” class (sometimes also referred to as “FLUTTO”, another boat of this class) and more precisely the first of the three series planned for a total of 48 units (12, 24 and again 12). The project for this class, developed when the war had already begun, was born from the need of having medium-size boats at a reasonable cost, to be produced in quantity, and which could take advantage of the experience gained in the first year of war. The original intentions called for this class to become the backbone of the Italian submarine fleet. The project originated from the class “ARGO”, which amongst the 113 submarines with which the Italian Navy had entered World War II, was the one which had better demonstrated the ability to operate both in the Mediterranean and in the oceans.

One of the boats of the TRITONE class at the Muggiano shipyard
(Photo Turrini)

The project resulted in excellent and matching expectations, also gaining appreciation from the Germans, but due to war events, of the ambitious program of 48 boats, only 8 were completed and of these only 5 entered service: TRITONE, GORGO, FLUTTO, MAREA and VORTICE. The MAREA (call name “MR”, later replaced during the co-belligerence by “MA”) was built by the C.R.D.A. shipyard of Monfalcone, Gorizia. Laid down on December 1st, 1941, it was launched on December 10th, 1942 and delivered to the Navy on May 7th, 1943. Operational Life The MAREA entered service on May 7th under the command of Sub-Lieutenant (later Lieutenant) Attilio Mario RUSSO. After the necessary crew training in the waters of the upper Adriatic, on August 1st the boat reached Naples. From here, on September 3rd, it sailed for the first war mission to patrol off the Gulf of Policastro (Calabria). The mission’s order called for actions against the VIII British Army, thought to be soon landing near Reggio and Villa S. Giovanni. Having failed to complete any sighting, the boat returned to Naples. On the 7th it was again at sea in the Gulf of Salerno, part of a screen of 10 submarines in the lower Tyrrhenian (as part or Operation Zeta) to oppose probable Allied landing operations on Italian soil. At 18:30 of the following day, September 8th, radio Algiers announced to the world the armistice between the Italian and Allied armed forces. Thus, the same night MARICOSON (Italian Submarine Command) ordered all the boats at sea to avoid any hostile action, immediately submerge to a depth of 80 meters, and surface on the 9th at 8:00 AM to remain on the surface flying the national flag and a black signal off the forward periscope. The following day, the submarines which were part of the Tyrrhenian screen, amongst them the MAREA, were ordered to Bona (Algeria), where they arrived between the 11th and 13th of September to complete the bitter task of surrendering to the British. A few days later, these boats were relocated to Malta. Here, on October 6th, the MAREA was sent back to Taranto and almost immediately moved to Brindisi in preparation for operations in collaboration with the Allies.

These were “Special Missions”, and the submarine had to drop off and pick up spies past the frontline. The MAREA completed two missions, both successful: one between the 3rd and 9th of November, with the disembarkation of six spies along the coast of Cortellazzo near the estuary of the river Piave, and the second one, similar to the first, between December 23rd and 29th. A report written by Lieutenant Commander Raul Galletti Of these missions exist. He participated as Chief of the Secret Service Bureau of Brindisi. The report praises Captain Russo and his crew:

Lieutenant Commander Raul Galletti Chief of the Secret Service Bureau of Brindisi The submarine MAREA left port having previously taken aboard myself and six infiltrators divided into two cells. On November 5th at 23:35 we moved toward the coast. At 23:45, since the sound of our engines was probably heard from shore, the lighthouse of Cortellazzo was turned on… We moved close to the coast up to the point where the boat stopped at a depth of 6 meters, resting on the bottom at about 1.5 miles from Cortellazzo… “Due to the current, sea force 2, and a 4 knots wind from NE, we decided to look for deeper waters. … At 01:16 we invited the civilians to quickly disembark on the rubber dinghy previously prepared. The civilians declared their unwillingness to disembark due to the weather conditions, but mostly because they were not able to see the nearby but obscured coastline (due to the severely overcast conditions), thus assuming that they could not reach it… I proposed to repeat the attempt near Chioggia, but the infiltrators categorically refused to do so, thus the submarine reached the prearranged diving position in a 50 meter depth area. “ November 6th, we surfaced at 18:30 and a small plane flew over the submarine at about 200-meter altitude. We dived again and at 20:30 we resurfaced. “Even this time an airplane flew over the boat going north at an altitude of 150 meters. “Visibility is relatively good, the moon is high and the sea almost calm. “ To the almost certain sighting of the boat near Port Cortellazzo the night before, and to the probable alarm, we attributed the presence of the airplanes in a systematic search for submarines. “ …We went to a new position for the landing established near Cattolica. [Having disembarked the informers without problems, the submarine returned to base] “I made present the spirit of sacrifice and sense of duty demonstrated by the crew, especially emphasizing the failures which have taken place (depth meter, planes had to be operated manually, and more serious, impossibility to replenish the air tanks due to the failure of both air compressors), which although making very feeble the possibility of completing the mission, did not minimally impact the morale of the crew, but instead stimulated their tenacity for the completion of the mission.”

At this point the MAREA left the special missions in the Adriatic – which would be continued by other submarines – and after a short period of refitting in Taranto, in February 1944, still under the command of Lieutenant Russo, it was transferred to Bermuda to perform, along with other Italian boats, anti-submarine training activity in support of Allied vessels. Activity in the Atlantic was intense until he end of the European conflict (May 1945), and then it ceased. The MAREA completed 139 training missions, with an average of 10 sorties per month, operating from various bases in Bermuda, and as far away as New London and Key West and others. When, in the following October the MAREA left the American waters to return to Italy, it was saluted by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King.

The MAREA (Left) in Bermuda along with the ONICE in summer 1944
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

With the return to Taranto ended the operational life of the MAREA under the Italian flag. The boat was inactive up to the moment it was stricken from the Italian Naval roster on February 1st, 1948. A year later, with a civilian crew and flying the flag of the Italian Merchant Marine, the boat reached the Albanian port of Valona where, on February 7th, 1949 it was delivered, along with the NICHELIO, to the Soviet Union as dictated by the clauses of the peace treaty as war reparations. The MAREA was renamed “Z 13” first, and later “I41” (until June 16th, 1949) and again “S 42”. It was used for training activity in the Black Sea up to February 17th, 1946 and then removed from service on December 27th of the same year. It was scrapped in the early 1960s.

Translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

The submarine Malaspina was one of the six boats of the Marconi class. It was named after Alessandro Malaspina, the world-famous Italian navigator. Laid down in 1939 by the shipyard OTO of Muggiano, near La Spezia, the vessel was delivered to the Navy on June 20th, 1940, a few days after the beginning of the war. Following a relatively short period for the usual shake down, the boat was assigned to the submarine base of La Spezia.

Operational Life

1940

On July 29th, the Malaspina left La Spezia for a patrol into the Atlantic. Under the command of Commander Mario Leoni, the submarine crossed the Strait of Gibraltar the night of September 3rd, while proceeding at the maximum speed of 16 knots, and at 3:35 AM the crew sighted in the clear and luminescent night the menacing silhouette of an enemy destroyer. The captain gave the order to dive and, slowly the large vessel disappeared under the surface to meet, and fortunately avoid, a tragic destiny. Commander Leoni described these tense moments in his mission report:

“The submarine, as usual, for the first 30 to 40 seconds remained horizontal, dove one or two meters, and thereafter began going down by the bow. When the bow was down 10°, in leveling the aft planes, it is discovered that they are locked in a down 20° position. The forward planes are then set full up and at a depth of 20 meters I give orders to blow the emergency tank.

The submarine goes down quickly by the bow up to 35° and in a few seconds reaches the depth of 25 meters. After we passed the 15° down by the bow, I order the tanks closed and air to the ballast tanks (except the aft ballast tank), full blown.

The submarine, in seven or eight seconds, thus before the tank valves were closed, reaches a depth of 70 meters.

The opening of the air valves and the leveling of the two reserve air systems is done rapidly, but with great difficulties because personnel in the control room has fallen, since the beginning of the maneuver, near the forward passageway, while I am gripped to the controls of the hydraulic system, but cannot reach the telegraphs to order the engine stopped.

Although we keep pumping air into the tanks, ballast tanks and emergency tank, the submarine keeps going down quickly remaining 35° down by the bow.

Reached 130 meters, the descend slows down, but it does not stop. At a depth of 147 meters at the main gage (152 meters at the center of the hull and 165 meters forward) the submarine stops, and still 35° down by the bow remains at this depth for about 10 seconds and then begins to rise, first slowly and then rapidly.”

After surviving this ordeal and having successfully crossed the strait, the boat began its patrol and, on August 12th, intercepted the British tanker “British Fame”, a unit dispersed from convoy OB193 from Liverpool. The sinking took place in position 37° 44’ N, 22° 56’ W. Three of the crew members perished, one was captured as a prisoner of war, and the remaining 45 survived. According to Walter Ghetti, author of “Storia della Marina italiana”, Commander Leoni towed the surviving crew of the British vessel closer to land. This modern motor tanker, built in 1936 by the shipyards Swan, Hunter, & Wigham Richardson of Sunderland, belonged to the British Tanker Company of London.

Eventually, the Malaspina reached Bordeaux on September 4th, at 8:00 PM (Rome Standard Time). During this first patrol, the second in command was Lieutenant Oreste Odorici, while the navigation officer was sub-lieutenant Giovanni Volterra.

The Malaspina in Bordeaux. The crew is loading torpedoes
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

On the last day of September, the Malaspina was visited by Admiral Doenitz as part of his inspection of the newly established Italian base of Bordeaux. Soon after, the boat would be again at sea for another patrol. This patrol is eloquently narrated by the U.S.M.M. (Historical Division of the Italian Navy) in the book “I sommergibili negli oceani”:

“The Malaspina (Commander Mario Leoni) left Bordeaux in the afternoon of October 9th and on the 18th of the same month reached the patrol area west of Scotland where it intercepted a discovery signal radioed by a German submarine. Having immediately changed course to approach the convoy, the boat continued for 30 hours, reaching position 59 25 N, 30 10 W without sighting the convoy, which meantime had dispersed.

The night of the 20th, the Malaspina attacked a ship of about 3,400 t. The first torpedo was deflected by the waves, and of a second launch of three torpedoes, one reached the target. The Malaspina began firing with the deck gun, but it soon had to interrupt due to the darkness of the night, which did not allow the crew to locate their hits, while it gave the ship, which had the advantage of better stability and a higher position, the possibility of closing their hits to the conning tower. Contact with the merchant ship, lost after a heavy squall, was later never re-established. On October 31st, at 13:15 in position 57 17 Nm 23 25 W with heavy sea and marine fog, the Malaspina sighted during a brief clearing a convoy of 7 ships at a speed of 12 knots on course due SW with the escort of two destroyers, one of which, placing itself constantly between the convoy and the submarine, forced the boat first to go away and then submerge. Thus, the boat lost contact with the convoy.

On November 4th, at 13:10 in position 51 00 N, 20 $) W, having left the patrol area two days ahead of schedule due to limited range, the boat sighted another convoy of 17 ships, on course due SSE, speed 8 knots, all vessels of limited displacement escorted by an auxiliary cruiser positioned at the end of the convoy. The submarine, which had kept uninterrupted contact, attempted around sunset to close distance, but the auxiliary cruiser, probably having sighted the submarine, maneuvered several times to remain in between, forcing the submarine to go away until darkness, when the opportunity of the Malspina to reestablish contact vanished.

On November 5th, at 7:10 at about 800 miles from the Gironde, near the 20th meridian, where at the time the largest part of the British traffic was routed, the Malaspina sited an auxiliary cruiser, a converted liner of great displacement on due course NW and which, having sighted the submarine, changed course to intercept the vessel at a speed of 20 knots. At about 5,000 meters, the cruiser opened fire, forcing the submarine to dive. Lost contact, and after two quick reappearances of the cruisers in between squalls, the Malaspina gave up the chase and moved on toward Bordeaux where it arrived in the afternoon of November 9th.”

1941

After a brief period for refitting, the Malaspina was again at sea on January 5th, 1941, assigned to the same operational area west of Scotland. On the 13th, the boat reached the assigned area where it continued the patrol until the 24th without detecting any traffic. Following orders from Betasom, Commander Leoni moved to a new area to the south where, within 2 days from its arrival, the crew sighted a destroyer which, due to the poor beta, could not be attacked. Again, in the morning of the 28th, Commander Leoni had the opportunity to attack another enemy vessel, this time an auxiliary cruiser moving at about 16 knots, but the distance to the target was too great to conduct a favorable attack. The 30th of January, the Malaspina left the patrol area, reaching Le Verdon February 28th. At the end of this patrol, Commander Leoni left the Malaspina to take command of the destroyer Malocello, while Lieutenant Giuliano Prini replaced him.

Captain Giuliano Prini, Gold Metal for Bravery
Here in a picture as a Cadet.
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

Another unsuccessful patrol took place from the 23rd of April to early June as part of the Da Vinci patrol group. This time, despite having sighted a large convoy of over 20 ships west of Ireland, the boat failed to conduct an attack. As with other Italian submarines, operations in the North Atlantic were becoming less and less productive. According to the documentation provided by the U.S.M.M., on the night of May 3rd the Malaspina attacked, hitting with one torpedo the British liner Lycaon that, despite some substantial damage, was able to take advantage of the frequent squalls to elude the hunter. On the 20th, the Malaspina was attacked by an airplane, followed by three destroyers, which hunted the boat for over 9 hours making any offensive maneuver improbable and certainly impossible. This would be the last patrol north, as the following one took place off Gibraltar and produced two successes.

After having left Bordeaux on June 27th, following a very brief period of rest, the Malaspina was sent west of Gibraltar. On July 3rd, the crew sighted a destroyer, which could not be attacked due to unfavorable kinematics conditions. A few days later, on the 14th, Captain Prini hunted down the Greek merchant ship Nikiklis of 3,576 t. 105 miles southwest of the Azores. This older ship, built in 1921 by the Burger Shipyard as the Lingedijk belonged to the Maraitis Lines of Athens. Of the 28 crewmembers, 17 survived.

Only three days later, Captain Prini scored another success, this time the British merchant ship Guelma of 4,402 t. Belonging to “La Tunisienne Steamship Co”, the Guelma was built in 1928 by the Rhead Shipyard. The sinking took place in position 30° 44’ N, 17° 33’ W and all 41 crewmembers were rescued. After a few additional days on patrol, the Malaspina returned to base for another period of refitting, this time lasting until September.

On September 18th, 1941 Captain Romolo Polacchini, who since April had replaced Captain Also Cocchia as the Chief of Staff of Betasom, took over the command of the Italian Atlantic submarine forces from vice-admiral Angelo Parona, who, in the meantime, had been called to command a naval division. It is during this period that the Morosini was assigned to a new mission, along with the Da Vinci, Morosini and Torelli, west of the Strait of Gibraltar, a patrol area just visited during the previous mission and mode adapted to the characteristics of the Italian vessels. Thus, on September 7th, the Morosini sailed from Bordeaux still under the command of Lieutenant Prini. The official records indicate that the boat was due back to port in late October, but never arrived. On November 18th, the Italian authorities declared it lost at sea in unknown circumstances.

The fate of the Malaspina remained uncertain for several decades until, in March 2004, Dr. Axel Niestlè and Eric Zimmerman published a report crediting the loss of this submarine to an attack by a Sunderland. Part of this report reads:

“In some post-war publications the destruction of Malaspina is attributed to the attack of the destroyer HMS Vimy on 21 September 1941 while escorting convoy HG 73 enroute from Gibraltar to Liverpool. However this attack was actually directed against the Italian submarine Luigi Torelli, which suffered serious damage in the action, forcing the boat to return to base. Likewise, Malaspina was credited by the German U-boat Command and Betasom Command with a successful attack against convoy HG-73 in position BE 7648 (44.09’N / 21.45’W) on 24 September 1941. However, this credit was based entirely on the observation of a German reconnaissance aircraft of KG 40, which had sighted a convoy in the above given position and then noted two sinking steamers and another on fire at 1410 and 1425 hours. As there were no reported successes by either German or Italian submarines it was decided that the Malaspina must have been responsible. This decision was made despite the fact that there had been no signal from the boat made since her departure from Bordeaux and that also signals sent to her had gone unheeded. Moreover, there is no report of any Allied ships being lost or damaged in this area on that date.

A thorough examination of all Allied A/S-attacks during September 1941 in the Bay of Biscay and within the boundaries of the initial operational area assigned to Malaspina nevertheless revealed a very promising attack by Sunderland “U” of 10 Squadron RAAF on 10 September 1941 in position 46º23’N / 11º22’W. At 1200 hours, the aircraft sighted a fully surfaced submarine 1000 yards away on the port bow, running on course 260º and estimated speed of 8 knots. As the aircraft was at 1000 feet at the time of sighting and too close to make a direct attack, a turn was made to starboard and height lost to 50 feet. As the turn commenced the submarine submerged bow first. The aircraft closed and attacked down line of the submerging wash with the blue green shape of the submarine hull still visible when the Mk VII depth charges, set to explode at 50 and 100 feet, were released. The first depth charge was estimated to have been a direct hit between the conning tower and the stern and the second depth charge is thought to have been a hit forward of the conning tower. The third depth charge hung up and the fourth fell approximately 140 feet ahead of the submarine. After the attack the Sunderland climbed to 500 feet and turned to investigate a large red-brown patch approximately 100 yards from the position of the explosions. The front gunner observed what might have been the under wash of the submarine attacked but the observer stated that from the port midships position he distinctly saw the submarine stationary underwater partly in the brown patch. A second attack was made thereafter with the one remaining depth charge, which, however, failed to explode. A film of oil was observed on the surface three minutes after the first explosions. The aircraft then circled over the position for 20 minutes. The submarine, which was thought to be a German ocean going U-boat, was camouflaged with purple, green, and gray paint. No forward gun was visible and no members of the crew were seen. Afterwards the Sunderland carried out a search in the attack area until 1525 hours when the Prudent Limit of Endurance was reached and course was set back to base. 48 hours after this attack and within 35 miles of the position other aircraft investigating the area saw a large oil patch. Also oil bubbles two feet in diameter were gushing to the surface at the location but no air bubbles were seen.

From the description of the attack it is very likely that the boat attacked must have suffered at least serious damage if not sunk. From relevant German and Italian documents it is known that none of the Axis submarines transiting through the Bay of Biscay on 10 September 1941 and returning to base thereafter reported being attacked by aircraft this day at or anywhere near the position of attack. In addition, none of the German U-boats then at sea and lost thereafter could have been the target of the attack. The only boat in question was the outbound Malaspina, which could have reached the position of attack at the time given.

Based on the foregoing information it is proposed to amend the loss of the Italian submarine Alessandro Malaspina in the way that it was sunk on 10 September 1941 by depth charges from Sunderland “U” (serial # W3986) of 10 Squadron RAAF, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Athol Galway Hope Wearne, in position 46º23’N / 11º22’W.”
Considering that the location of the attack was 435 miles from Bordeaux, and that the estimated speed of the vessel (8 knots) was the accurate cruising speed, it is reasonable to accept the findings of these two researchers as accurate and therefore the official Italian records should be emended.

The report of Dr. Axel Niestlè and Mr. Eric Zimmerman is copyrighted and reproduced with permission of the authors.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
0	6	27,281	1,851	177	164.59	6.86

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
8/13/1940	05.50	C.F. Mario Leoni	Atlantic Ocean	37°44’N-22°56’W	OB.193d	Torpedo	Sank	British Fame	Motor Tanker	8406	Great Britain
7/14/1941	22.15	T.V. Giuliano Prini	Atlantic Ocean	36°N-21°’W	OG.67 d	Torpedo	Sank	Nikoklis	Steam Freighter	3575	Greece
7/15/1941	16.45	T.V. Giuliano Prini	Atlantic Ocean	30°44’N-17°33’W		Torpedo	Sank	Guelma	Steam Freighter	4402	Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank
Alessi	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune
Ambrosino	Michele	Naval Rating	Comune
Bariati	Alfonso	Naval Rating	Comune
Basciu	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune
Bernasconi	Arturo	Naval Rating	Comune
Bonanni	Luigi	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Brancaccia	Aldo	Naval Rating	Comune
Brunacci	Mario	Ensign Other Branches	Sottotenente Altri Corpi
Buzzelli	Tullio	Naval Rating	Comune
Cairo	Pietro	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello
Camesasca	Angelo	Naval Rating	Comune
Candiago	Francesco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Capriotti	Carlo	Naval Rating	Comune
Caratelli	Claudio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Cassinelli	Ilario	Naval Rating	Comune
Cecchi	Pietro	Ensign Other Branches	Sottotenente Altri Corpi
Ciarocchi	Guido	Naval Rating	Comune
Corradetti	Costantino	Naval Rating	Comune
Cristini	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
De rosa	Romolo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
De Salvo	Placido	Naval Rating	Comune
Del Lungo	Riccardo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Forghieri	Mario	Sergeant	Sergente
Forte	Giuseppe	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Frangi	Marcello	Naval Rating	Comune
Incarbona	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune
Incitti	Siro	Naval Rating	Comune
Lanzoni	Alberto	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Leonetti	Giuseppe	Sergeant	Sergente
Lolla	Luigi	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Lucarelli	Luigino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Mavero	Vittorio	Naval Rating	Comune
Mazzoni	Antonio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Mennuni	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Merola	Pasquale	Sergeant	Sergente
Modanesi	Libero	Naval Rating	Comune
Pallottini	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune
Pentangelo	Francesco	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Persico	Antonio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Perugini	Orlando	Naval Rating	Comune
Prini	Giuliano	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello
Raiteri	Ettore	Naval Rating	Comune
Rega	Emilio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Revello	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Rosa	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune
Rubagotti	Ulderico	Naval Rating	Comune
Ruffo	Carlo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Rusignoli	Renzo	Naval Rating	Comune
Russo	Francesco	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.
Sciamerà	Alberto	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Solimene	Marino	Sergeant	Sergente
Spadoni	Mario	Chief 1st Class	Capo di 1a Classe
Spinetti	Ferruccio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Trimarchi	Rosario	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Trono	Giobatta	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Vaglia	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune
Viviani	Delfo	Naval Rating	Comune
Volponi	Nicola	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Vusconi	Aldo	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello
Malaspina	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune

The submarine Glauco was built by CRDA of Monfalcone on behalf of Portugal, as part of a large reorganization and modernization plan of the navy of this Iberian country. The Glauco belonged to a class of construction comprising only two units, the other boat was the Otaria, and was designed by the naval engineer Curio Bernardis based on prior experience with the class Squalo.

1935, the Glauco is launched at the CRDA shipyard in Monfalcone near Trieste
(Istituto Luce B060402)

Eventually, after the cancellation of the contract by the Portuguese government, the Regia Marina bought the vessels taking over the Glauco on September 20th, 1935. After the early stages of testing and sea trials, the Glauco was assigned, along the sister ship Otaria, the 4th Submarine Group based in Taranto. In the summer of 1936, both boats were moved to Naples. Between 1936 and August 1937, the boat completed two missions off Spain, part of the Italian assistance to Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War.

At the beginning of the Second World War, the Glauco, at the time under the command of Commander Candido Corvetti, was part of a group of five submarines, which included in addition to the Glauco the Tazzoli, Toti, Marcello and Medusa, assigned to operate along the Algerian and Tunisian coastlines with the task of intercepting French and English traffic due to possible movements from Gibraltar. The Glauco was on patrol June 23rd to 26th in an area spanning from west of Cape Carbon and near Cape Corbellin. Here, on the night of 26th at around 2:50 AM, the crew sighted a ship with armed escort that was first attacked with the torpedo and then with the deck gun. Despite hitting the ship repeatedly, eventually the Glauco had to disengage; it was the Baron Erskine of 3657 t.

The Glauco at sea

In early July, the Glauco was again on a mission part of a group of eight submarines, some of which were assigned to areas off the island of Galite. Here, with the Scirè and Diaspro, the Glauco was on patrol on July 4th and 5th without spotting anything, just like like the rest of the group. A similar mission was repeated between the 9th and 11th after which the boat was reassigned to the new Atlantic base of Bordeaux. Before departure, the Glauco was in Naples for about two months to be adapted to its new roles in the Atlantic. During this period, Commander Corvetti passed the command to Commander Giuseppe Melina.

The Glauco was part of the group of 12 submarines that were added to operation in Atlantic in September to six previously arrived. Left Naples on September 26th, 1940, the boat crossed the Strait of Gibraltar on October 2nd and with many difficulties due to heavy wind on the surface and sudden loss of altitude while submerged. Once it reached Cape Malabata (Tangier), commander Melina continued on the surface taking advantage of darkness.

During the transfer to the assigned patrol area off the Azores, the Glauco attacked three ships, possibly military-type patrols, hitting one. The attack, which occurred at 4:35 am, has no reference in any British documentation. The location given was around 36 N and 6 W in practice halfway between Cape Spartel (south) and Cape Trafalgar (north).

The Glauco reached the area assigned for its patrol on October 6th. The following day, a maneuver approaching a convoy was aborted due to the presence of escort units. But restarted the maneuver, the Glauco sighted a second convoy. In all, about thirty ships were reaching a meeting point that would have provided prey in any circumstance, but this was not the case with the Glauco. The timidity of the first Italian operations in the Atlantic were certainly a disadvantage. After arriving in Bordeaux on October 22nd and following a review of the instructions issued to all vessels prior to their departure, it was assessed that the orders given to the commanders were too vague. More peremptory orders, such as those issued by the German command, they would have ensured greater successes.

It should also be remembered that the Glauco had one of the two diesel engines fail and therefore would have not been able to follow the convoy to the surface at a proper distance. It should be added that before arriving in Bordeaux, the Glauco was assigned to yet another mission along with the Da Vinci with the failed intention to attack another convoy.

After arriving in Bordeaux, the Commander Mellina was disembarked leaving the command to the Lieutenant Luigi Baroni. The first real Atlantic mission did not start until December 23rd when the Glauco was assigned to a patrol area off the coast of Scotland with a group that included the Da Vinci and the Nani. Having reached the assigned area on the 28th, the boat moved about 150 miles SE on January 6th due to the total lack of enemy traffic.
The 9th at night and with good luminescence, the Glauco attacked a ship of 4000 t. with the torpedo. Having missed, the captain continued the attack on the surface with the deck gun. The prompt and accurate enemy fire created a difficult situation which was evaded with the help of machine guns from the bridge and a fast dive. The name of the merchant in question is not known, but considering that the Glauco reported having been hit by at least two rounds greater than 100 mm (the estimate of the ship’s officers was 120 or 152 mm), it certainly was a ship of a certain size .

Sadly, during the brief but violent confrontation, the gun officer sub lieutenant Carlo Marenco di Moriondo was fatally struck by shrapnel and disappeared into the sea. The young officer was the son of Admiral Alberto Marenco of Moriondo, commander of the 4th Marine Division. For this act of courage and dedication to the Navy, the sub lieutenant Marenco di Moriondo received the Gold Medal for Military Valor. At the end of the unsuccessful mission, the Glauco returned to base.

The following patrol began on January 27th off to Cabo Silleiro, Oporto and Cabo San Vicente off the Iberian Peninsula. On February 14th, sighted by light enemy units off the estuary of the Tagus river, the boat was the subject of a fierce attack with the launch of to about 130 depth charges which caused serious damage to the hull forcing the sudden return to the base.

After a long period of repairs, on June 18th, 1941, the Glauco left Bordeaux to return home, but even before reaching the Strait of Gibraltar, it was forced to return to base due to a failure with one of the internal combustion engines. After emergency repairs, the boat departed on the 24th of the same month, but it never reached the Mediterranean.

On June 27th, in the early afternoon while submerged off Cape Spartel, the Glauco was detected and attacked by the British destroyer HMS Wishart (Cdr. E.T. Cooper), a destroyer of the W class from the period immediately after the First World War. The same destroyer will be responsible for the sinking of U-74 in the Mediterranean in May 1942. Badly struck, the submarine was forced to the surface before being scuttled by its crew. Eight of the crew members were not able to escape and disappeared with the submarine. The rest of the crew, including the commander, were taken prisoners by the British.

The Reginaldo Giuliani was one of the four submarines of the “Liuzzi” class of the “Cavallini” type. Laid down on March 12th, 1939 it was launched on December 2nd of the same year and entered service on February 2nd of 1940, a few months before the beginning of the conflict. Like all boats of the same class, it was built by the Tosi shipyard of Taranto and was considered an ‘Ocean Going’ submarine capable of long range cruises. Although tested to only 100 meters maximum depth, operational life indicated a greater diving capacity, but a general vulnerability to rough seas and adverse atmospheric conditions.

The Reginaldo Giuliani upon its arrival in Gotenhafen (Gdynia) on April 6th, 1941

The submarine was named after a Catholic chaplain who fought in World War I and later participated in the occupation of Fiume with D’Annunzio and the war in Ethiopia. He died at the Battle of the Uarieu Pass in January 1934 and would thereafter become a Fascist hero.

There is no record of the training activity of the Giuliani during the brief period between being commissioned and becoming fully operational. At the beginning of the conflict in June 1940, it was assigned to one of the Italian submarine patrol lines. The one south of Gaudos was maintained by four boats — Salpa, Bagnolini, Tarantini, Giuliani – positioned about 20 miles apart. Of the four vessels, only the small Salpa failed to sight any traffic and returned to base on the 16th of June. The night of the 12th the Giuliani, under the command of Lieutenant Bruno Zelik, sighted a light unit very close and almost to the bow. forcing a quick disengagement through a rapid dive. The Bagnolini, on the other hand, was more successful in scoring, the same night and not too far away, the sinking of the British cruiser Calypso.

In July the Giuliani, along with the Bagnolini and Toti, was sent again south of Gaudos and closer to Derna (Lybia), for a patrol from July 15th through the 24th in which the Toti participated only after the 19th. After the uneventful patrol, in the early morning of the 27th Captain Zelik sighted a large submarine about 25 miles off Cape S. Maria di Leuca (Southern Italy). Unsure of the identity of the vessel and fearing that it could be the Bragadin, which was also returning to base, the captain disengaged ordering a dive soon after the crew had sighted the wake of a torpedo fired by the enemy unit.

At the end of this mission the boat received orders to transfer to the Atlantic Ocean to become part of the new submarine base established in Bordeaux. With command transferred to Lieutenant Commander Renato d’Elia, the Giuliani left Trapani (Sicily) on August 29th to then cross the Strait of Gibraltar on the 10th. The crossing, mostly completed while submerged, did not present any obstacle other than the strong wind and rough seas. Once in the Atlantic, the boat was assigned to a patrol area south of Madera, while the other vessels – Emo and Faà di Bruno – were positioned further north. During this patrol, which lasted from the 14th of September through the 30th, the Giuliani encountered only one armed merchant of unknown nationality which was attacked with the deck gun at a great distance. The attack had to be aborted due to a malfunction of the weapon.

In early October, on its way to the new base and upon reaching the mouth of the Gironde, the Giuliani joined the Baracca to make the final approach when an enemy submarine launched three torpedoes which fortunately failed to hit the vessels. This was the second time that the Giuliani would be attacked by another submarine. Eventually, its loss was caused by a submarine attack. In the following several weeks, numerous boats, including the Giuliani, left Bordeaux to complete short practice missions.

Between November 11th and 22nd, four more units were sent on patrol between 15 00 and 20 00 W and 55 20 and 53 20 N, west of the patrol area maintained by the Germans. This group was named “Giuliani”, after the leader boat, and included the Tarantini, Torelli and Argo. Having left Bordeaux on the 11th, the Giuliani reached the assigned patrol area on the 24th, sighting an auxiliary cruiser which was avoided by submerging. Thereafter, the boat started experiencing a series of mechanical failures which, at times, would jeopardize not just the mission but the boat itself. First, the outside cover of one of the forward torpedo tubes failed to open, then the forward horizontal planes failed completely while the rear ones defaulted to manual operations.

On the 29th of November, while trying to mend some of the damaged machinery, the Giuliani sighted three ships which could not be attacked on the surface due to the adverse sea conditions. Furthermore, with the forward planes unable to retract, navigation in rough waters could have seriously damaged the hull, causing grave deformations. Having assessed the impossibility of making further repairs at sea, the Giuliani began the return voyage to base which, on December 4th, was interrupted by the sighting of a British Sunderland flying boat. The submarine dove seeking shelter underwater but the malfunctioning of the forward planes – the forward planes were used to control depth – and slow manual operations of the rear planes, caused the vessel to lose control and reach a depth of 135 meters. Still, although this depth was far superior to the maximum allowed depth, there were no damages. Eventually, the Giuliani made it to port.

Meantime, having given up on the idea of creating a training center in France, Adm. Doenitz proposed Adm. Parona, the Italian commander of Betasom, to transfer Italian submarines to Germany to provide for advance training. Two boats were selected, the Giuliani and Bagnolini, at the time both undergoing repairs in Bordeaux, but eventually the Bagnolini was not sent due to operational needs. Thus, the Giuliani left Bordeaux on March 16th under the command of Commander Vittore Raccanelli, reaching Gotenhafen (Gdynia) on April 6th. While in transfer on March 19th, following a sighting by a German FW200, the boat joined U 46, Brin and Mocenigo on a hunt. Following the arrival in Germany, where command was transferred to Lieutenant Commander Adalberto Giovannini on the 21st, the Giuliani began an intense training activity which lasted many months. Giovannini was chosen for his experience and had the necessary knowledge to conduct the mission. Other famous Italian submarine commanders followed, including Enzo Grosso, Luigi Longanesi Cattani, Ugo Giudice and Mario Tei.

The Italian General Consul visiting the Giuliani in Danzig

At the submarine school, Italian officers and crews were trained on attack techniques and methodologies employed by the Germans . The school received a telegraph denomination of Marigammasom. The Italians were assigned by the Germans the submarine support ship Isar of 3850 t. which, in addition to providing logistical support, served as a moving target. For more complex training, convoy simulation, torpedo boats, gunboats and airplanes were provided by the 27th German Flotilla. Training courses lasted between two and five weeks with cruises of 10 to 20 days. In total, there were seven courses completed, while the eighth was cancelled due to weather conditions. Eventually, the Giuliani was needed back in active service and the Germans and Italians jointly agreed to close the training camp. On April 21st, 1942 command was transferred again, this time to Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Bruno who would take the boat back to France and on May 23rd, 1942 the Giuliani was once again in Bordeaux.

While the Giuliani was in Germany (occupied Poland), the Betasom’s primary area of operations had shifted from the North Atlantic to the Americas. Upon its return to base and following a brief period to ready the vessel, on June 24th the boat was already at sea under the command of Commander Giovanni Bruno. This mission in parallel with the Calvi was to bring the submarine up to the Windward Passage into the Caribbean. While still navigating toward the assigned area of operations, at 15:45 on July 16th, the Giuliani changed course trying to reach a merchantman previously attacked by another submarine. Having reached 22 00 N, 61 22 W and in sight of the vessel, the boat was attacked by a flying fortress which dropped three bombs which did not cause any damage, but forced a dive and abandonment of the attack.
On the 24th of the same month, the Giuliani received 50 t. of fuel from the Finzi and was reassigned to a new operational area east of the Island of Guadalupe. Thereafter, in position 22 15 N 60 25 W it launched two torpedoes against a two-funneled motor vessel of new construction which, despite having been hit once, was able to run away at high speed. It has not been possible to identify the ship in question. The assigned patrol area was reached on the 29th of July, but soon after the boat was ordered south of the Islands of Capo Verde.

It was during this transfer that the Giuliani would score all of its operational successes. These attacks were carried out by torpedo and gun with the use of 10 torpedoes, four of which reached the target, five of which behaved erratically, and the last one was unable to leave the launch tube and was later exploded. The first victim, on the 10th in position 9 26N, 38 28W, was the Medon, a British ship of 5,444 t. built in 1923 by the Palmer Shipyards and belonging to the Ocean Steamshipping Co. All 64 crewmembers survived the sinking which was carried out with the use of the deck gun.
On the 13th followed the American California, a 5,441 ship built in Los Angeles in 1920 and belonging to the States Steamship Co. The sinking, in position 9 21 N, 34 35W, was accomplished by the use of the deck gun and torpedoes and caused the loss of one crewmember while the remaining 35 survived. The following day on the 14th, another British vessel, the Sylvia de Larrinaga of 5,218t was the final victim. This armed vessel built in 1925 and belonging to the Larrinnaga Steamship Co Ltd Liverpool was disposed of by torpedoes in position 10 49N, 33 35W, resulting in three casualties. The remaining 50 crew members survived.

The eventful mission was at its end, and on the 16th the boat was ordered back to base due to the limited amount of ammunition and fuel remaining. The first two weeks of the long voyage back were ordinary, but at only 170 miles from base and while recharging its battery on the surface, the Giuliani was attacked by a Sunderland which was soon joined by two more. The attack was extremely violent both due to the volume of fire and the amount of bombs dropped. Captain Bruno was seriously wounded in his throat and was forced to transfer command to his second, Lieutenant Arezio Calzigna. Another crew member was also wounded. The intense machine gun fire from the Giuliani caused one of the airplanes, which had been repeatedly hit, to abort and, as later reported, land in Spain. Meantime, the Giuliani had been able to dive, but it was attacked two more times. The following day another attack followed and in this case bombs were dropped less than 30 meters away, causing grave damage. The ship report indicated:

September 2nd, 1942
12:44
From an altitude of about 30 meters the airplane drops four depth charges which fall one on deck, aft of the tower and then rolls into the sea, the other three within a few meters of the hull forward to the left. The bombs explode under the hull and the boat, hit full on, undergoes a very violent shock first, and then a tremble. I’m pushed upward and then fall on deck. The boat is hit full on by columns of water which completely cover it; it is still and heavily listing portside. The sea is covered in fuel which is copiously leaking out of the main tanks and the other tanks which still have any left. From the explosion, helmsman 3rd Class Andra Assali and gunner Francesco Perali are thrown into the sea.
12:50 The airplane comes back for another attack and opens fire with machine guns and launches another depth charge which falls 40 meters off the stern. Gunner Pietro Capilli, who at the time was holding the portside gun, suffers a broken arm. Double hull N. 3 portside has been completely removed. Even double hulls 2 and 4 portside must have also been seriously damaged.
13:40 The airplane, after having strafed the submarine, goes away. The inside of the submarine is devastated by explosions and there is no light. The boat is slowly recovering from listing, but at the same time is sinking. From double hull N. 2 seaside some fuel is leaking from holes caused by the machine gun fire. Gunner Mario Gentilini – shrapnel in the right thigh – and sailor Odilio Malatesta –loss of a finger and large wound on his right arm – are also wounded. Helsman Andrea Assali and gunner Francesco Perali are lost at sea.

The attack causes extremely serious damage which jeopardizes the boat’s sea worthiness such that the airplane crew considered the submarine lost. Instead, on the morning of September 3rd , the Giuliani was able to reach the Spanish port of Santander. The same port had previously provided safe harbor to the Torelli a few months earlier. From here, after lengthy repairs lasting more than two months, on November 8th the Giuliani was able to leave with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities and reach Le Verdon safely under the escort of the Luftwaffe the following day. This would be the last patrol for the Giuliani as an attack boat.

On February 8th, 1943 Dönitz proposed to the Italians to re-purpose the remaining submarine for transport service from France to Japan. In exchange, the Germans would transfer 10 VII-C class U-boats to the Italian Navy, and Italian crews and commanders began training in Germany soon after. Under the supervision of Rear-Admiral (E) Fenu, the remaining boats began extensive refitting work. The deck guns were removed, the ammunition magazines turned into additional fuel depots, the attack periscope removed, and a great part of the on board comforts, including one of the heads, removed to give space for cargo. The torpedo tubes were also sheared off. With the transformation of these few remaining boats, the Italian participation in the Battle of the Atlantic practically concluded.

Completing the necessary transformations, the Giuliani took to the sea on May 16th, 1943 along with the Tazzoli with a load of 130 t. of mercury, special steel, munitions and other war materiel. There was Italian personnel on board assigned to the Singapore base and two German civil engineers. The return voyage had already been booked with 135 t. of rubber and 70 t. of tin. Only a day into the voyage, the Giuliani returned to base to repair the forward planes, the same ones that had caused so much trouble before. On May 23rd, the boat was again at sea and on June 3rd, at about 120 miles off Madera, was attacked on the surface by a four-engine plane while under the illusory protection of sea fog . Following an exchange of gunfire and the dropping of two bombs, the Giuliani was able to vanish into the fog. On June 17th, Betasom ordered the Giuliani to a position 300 miles east of the Island of St. Helena for a rendezvous with the Tazzoli which never showed up

The Tazzoli, which was assumed by Betasom to have radio communication problems, was later presumed lost between the 18th and the 24th of May, most probably in the Bay of Biscay. After the war the Italian Navy conducted an inquiry with the assistance of the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy, but there was no confirmation of any successful Allied attack. The Giuliani continued on the long journey, reaching the Italian escort ship Eritrea in Sabang on July 28th. Under the escort of the Eritrea, the Giuliani reached Keppel Harbour (Singapore) on August 1st.

After September 8th, the Giuliani was surprised in Singapore by the events of the Italian armistice. The boat, already under German control, was manned by German personnel and the command transferred to Captain Heinrich Shäfer, while the Italian crew were sent to POW camps. Eventually, part of the crew opted to continue fighting along with the old allies and the Giuliani, now renamed UIT-23, continued serving until February 14th, 1944 when UIT-23 was sunk in the Straits of Malacca in position 04 27 N, 100 11 E, by torpedoes launched by the British submarine HMS Tally-Ho (P317). There were 26 casualties and 14 survivors. The Giuliani had served just a few days more than four years and was only a ghost of the original, proud submarine.

he submarine GEMMA was one of the 10 boats of the “PERLA” series, part of the class “600” of coastal submarines. This successful series, just like whole class “600”, was built by the C.R.D.A. shipyard (6 units) of Monfalcone (Gorizia) and O.T.O. (4 units) of Muggiano (La Spezia) between 1935 and 1936.

The GEMMA in the early days
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

The GEMMA belonged to Monfalcone’s group and was laid down on September 7th, 1935, launched on May 21st, 1936 and delivered to the Regia Marina on July 8th of the same year.

Operational Life

Upon entering service, the GEMMA was assigned to the 35th Squadron, based in Messina. From here, it completed a long cruise of the Italian islands in the Aegean Sea, repeating it in 1937. Under the command of Lieutenant Carlo Ferracuti, the GEMMA participated in the Spanish Civil War with a patrol off the Sicilian coast lasting nine days, from August 27th to September 5th, 1937.

In 1938, the GEMMA was assigned to the Red Sea, in Massaua. From this base, along with the PERLA, in spring of 1939 it completed long cruises in the Indian Ocean to test, during the monsoon, the sea worthiness and operation of the boat. From the mission reports, in addition to the navigational issues (sea force 9, inability to use the weapons or keep periscope depth), surfaced the danger of the air conditioning systems. The gas used, methylchlorid, was found to be toxic and would cause great problems with the boats so equipped.

The GEMMA still being fitted
(Photo Turrini)

Having returned to Italy toward the end of 1939, the GEMMA was assigned to the 14th Squadron, 1st GRUPSOM based in La Spezia. After Italy’s entry into the war (June 10th, 1940), while still part of the 1st GROUPSOM, the boat was transferred to the 13th Squadron under the command of Lieutenant Commander Guido Cordero di Montezemolo and relocated to Leros, the Italian naval base in the Aegean Sea.

The initial fruitless missions took place:
From June 10th to the 15th, 1940, in the waters off Khios.
From June 30th to July 8th, 1940 off Sollum, along the Egyptian coast
From the 7th to the 16th of August, 1940, north of Crete.
On September 30th, the GEMMA left for the fourth war mission with the assignment of patrolling, from the 1st to the 8th of October along with the AMETISTA and TRICHECO, the Kassos Channel (East of the Island of Crete).

The area of the passage was divided into three areas – north, center, and south – assigned in the same order to the GEMMA, AMETISTA, and TRICHECO. After two fruitless days, on the 3rd of October only the GEMMA was ordered to the east to patrol the area between Rhodes and Scarpanto (Karphatos) (to be more precise in the square defined by the Island of Seria and Cape Monolito (Rhodes), Cape Prosso (southernmost point of Rhodes), Cape Castello (southernmost point of the island of Scarpanto), until the evening of the 8th. It was precisely in this area that on the night of the 7th a tragedy took place.

The night of the 7th, the TRICHECO (Lieutenant Commander Alberto Avogadro di Cerrione), a day before completing its patrol, had left its assigned area south of the Island of Kassos because of a wounded person aboard, and it was navigating along the western coast of Scarpanto, thus in the area occupied by the GEMMA.

Due to a fatal mishap with radio communication, neither the GEMMA nor the TRICHECO were informed of each other’s movements. In addition, a message in cipher dated the 6th in which Leros, via SUPERMARINA, ordered the GEMMA to immediately return to base, was never transmitted by the central operating office. Around 1:15 on the 8th, the TRICHECO sighted a profile of a submarine and, unaware of the presence of an Italian boat in that area, and assuming that such a presence would have been signaled, believed it was an enemy submarine. This situation, with the equipment available at the time, did not leave time to attempt recognition: only the submarine that fires first survives.

Thus, around 1:21, the TRICHECO launched two torpedoes. The distance was close: impossible to miss the target. The GEMMA, hit midship, sank immediately in position 35 30’N, 27 18’E, three miles for 078 off Kero Panagia, not too distant from the City of Scarpanto. No one survived. The opposite could have taken place if the GEMMA had sighted the other submarine first. These are accidents that, unfortunately, take place in all wars and all Navies.

Anyway, such danger for the Italian Navy was very limited. As a matter of fact, Italian naval doctrine was based on the concept of “ambush war” and each boat was assigned a small square of sea from which it was absolutely not allowed to trespass, remaining in waiting for enemy ships. This tactic, inherited from the experience of WW I, proved unsuccessful.

The Germans, on the other hand, since the beginning adopted a method which we could describe as “guerre de corse”: the area assigned to each boat was relatively large and they would pursue ships. After a sighting, all the boats within reach were called to concentrate on the target (often a convoy), forming a “wolf pack”. Operating in this way, the risk of friendly fire was high, but the Germans took it into consideration.

Translated from Italian by Cristiano D’Adamo

Luigi Galvani was a Brin-class oceanic submarine (displacement of 1,016 tons on the surface and 1,266 submerged).

Operational Life

1940

At the beginning of the hostilities, the Regia Marina had a small flotilla of submarines deployed in Italian East Africa (A.O.E. ). There were six ocean going submarines (Archimede, Galilei, Torricelli, Ferraris, Galvani, Guglielmotti ) and two costal vessels (Perla, Makallè). The Torricelli and Galvani had recently reached the area to replace the smaller Iride and Onice, which had been sent back to the Mediterranean. The Galvani was of recent construction (1938) and in good operational conditions.

The beautiful silhouette of the R. Smg Galvani
(Photo Turrini Collection)

Apparently, during construction, the shipyard and the design engineers had properly consider the operational conditions the submarine would be experiencing, including tropical climates. Two primary issues had been considered and addressed: the presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean of violently potent storms (monsoons), and very high humidity (often 100%). The first issue was solved by providing the boats with sufficiently strong superstructures, which would not be torn away by the rough sea. The second issue, of greater importance, was solved by providing the submarine with an air conditioning system . Unfortunately, freon-based cooling equipment was not quite available , and the builder (Tosi of Taranto) opted for a methylchlorid-based system (CH3Cl). This was an odorless, colorless but highly toxic gas.

Following a plan of action developed in preparation for the upcoming hostilities, most Italian submarines left base (Massaua, Eritrea) on June 10th, 1940 directed to their patrol area; the Ferraris was sent off Djibouti, the Galilei off Aden, the Macallè off Port Sudan, and the Galvani, with the longest mission, was sent to the Gulf of Oman. The mission of the Galvani, expected to last about 28 days, was intended as a deterrent against the tanker traffic from the Persian Gulf. The boat reached the assigned area on the 23rd of June, but by then the secrecy of the mission had been already compromised.

The crew of the Galvani before the war. The first sailor to the right after the petty office is Antonio Fais
(Photo Francesco Guarducci)

It is assumed that, even before the war, British authorities were expecting similar missions; therefore they had organized the necessary countermeasures. Unfortunately, with the capture of the Galilei (June 19th) the Royal Navy had come into possession of the complete operational plan of the small Italian submarine forces. This practice of sharing plans between boats operating in similar areas was highly questionable, and proved to be disastrous. Information in hand, the Royal Navy immediately redirected all the tanker traffic and, by the time the Galvani reached the Gulf of Oman, the ocean was clean of all commercial traffic.

The operational orders captured by British aboard the R. Smg Galilei were so detailed that the British knew the Galvani would be operating about 8 miles from the entrance to the Gulf of Oman. The corvette H.M.S. Falmounth and the destroyer H.M.S. Kimberly were immediately dispatched to the area. The evening of June 23rd, unaware of the situation, the Galvani entered the gulf and the usual tanker traffic was completely absent; thereafter, the vessel was sighted by the corvette Falmouth. The official British report states that the crew of the Falmouth sighted a shadow at about two and one half miles and moved closer to identify it, discovering it was a submarine proceeding on the surface. The reports continues:

“At 23:08 at about 600 yards, the Falmouth signaled “who’s there”, and then open fire with the 4” gun”.
Lieutenant Commander (capitano di corvetta) Renato Spano, the captain of the Galvani, immediately ordered a crash dive, but while the boat was slow in submerging, and the stern section was still visibly out of the water and was hit by one of the shells. At this point, with the resistant hull badly compromised, chief 2nd class torpedoman Pietro Venuti (from the town of Codroipo, Udine) evacuated the aft torpedo room, locked himself in, and sealed the water-tight hatch. Immediately after, the Falmouth brought itself closer to the wounded submarine discharging a well-placed series of depth charges, which caused enormous damage.

2nd class torpedoman Pietro Venuti
Gold Medal for Valor

With the realization that the boat was lost, but some of the crew could still be saved, the captain order the boat to the surface, but this was achieved only with great difficulties, probably due to the several tons of water aboard and the damage to the control equipment. Of the original crew of fifty-seven, 31 are saved by the British vessels, while the remaining 26, including three officers, disappear with the Galvani. At the end of the conflict, captain Spano wrote a report (1) narrating the events that brought about the loss of the Galvani:

“ At 2:09 of June 24th, according to our estimations, we were at about 50 miles for 130° from Little Qoin, when midshipman Car, subordinate to the navigating officer sighted a shadow starboard of the bow. I recognized the silhouette of a ship with Beta 10° to starboard with polar bearing 45° at a distance of 7-800 meters. We crash dove with a concurrent turn to port, while the enemy opened fire with all guns and a projectile exploded aft of the bridge. While diving, I heard another projectile explode on bridge; I shut the water-thigh hatch. While the submarine was submerging with a strong inclination forward and with the diving plains down, I experienced a sudden heeling over which corrected itself. I believe that the enemy’s hull almost touched our aft stays which, at that point, were about 2 to 3 meters below surface. A few second later, with the boat down by the bow at a depth of about 30 meters, a lifted some of the aft planes and at the same time the submarine was violently shaken by a nearby explosion of a cluster of depth charges. While the stern kept going down, I ascertained the following damage: No lights – rudder and plans were frozen – manometers were broken – removal of the main control panel in the control room and projection of this into the middle of the room – starboard electric motor went down to 600 rpm, while the port one stopped – I could not communicate with the other compartments. Since we were down 40° aft, I had the strong feeling that the boat was lost. I decided to emerge blowing all tanks. The submarine responded with great difficulty emerging only in part. I ordered the hatch open while the gunners came up to the conning tower . I follow them and I reminded the midshipman to destroy all codebooks. As soon as I was out, I made the following observations: Aft, to port, a destroyer – the submarine had the “T” of the post of aft antenna truncated – a great gash on deck – the water was up to the aft hatch, while the boat started sinking again. Realizing that I did not have the time to arm the gun and open fire due to the heavy listing, I ordered the crew on deck and those who were already there were told to abandon ship. Lieutenant Mondaini, walking through the gash in the plating, went forward to open the hatch from which the personnel of the aft compartments escaped. The water was almost at the hatch of the conning tower. No one came up to the deck, nor anyone replied to my calls inside the submarine. I assumed that no one was left behind, and I ordered the personnel grouped aft to jump into the water while the ocean starts pouring into the conning tower’s hatch. It was 02:17. I had just left the boat when it came upright with about 8 meters of the bow sticking out of the water, and then it rapidly sunk. Since come to surface, the boat had not remained afloat for more than two minutes. Meantime, the British gunboat had lowered two lifeboats which picked up the shipwrecked. I made sure that no one was still in the water, and then I also got aboard the lifeboat. Aboard the gunboat Falmouth, I made a roll call and I realized that 26 men were missing, including Captain (EN) Torzuoli, Lieutenant (EN) Bassetti, and midshipman Gemignani. The survivors were 31, including 4 officers. “

The crewmembers of the Galvani spent the rest of the war in a prisoners of war camp.
(1) Lupinacci, P.F. Le operazioni in Africa orientale (Operations in East Africa).
Ufficio Storico Marina Militare. Rome, 1976.

Edited by Laura K. Yost

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Oceanic	0	1	1,400	120	13	116.92	4.87

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Andreone	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Bassetti	Rodolfo	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.	6/24/1940
Boldorini	Raniero	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Bonodi	Giacomo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	6/24/1940
Caporuzza	Armando	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Cois	Silvio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	6/24/1940
De Rosa	Vincenzo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	6/24/1940
Ferraris	Angelo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	6/24/1940
Gavioli	Umberto	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	6/24/1940
Gemignani	Pietro	Ensign	Guardiamarina	6/24/1940
Giaccari	Pasquale	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Giuncato	Rosvaldo	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Leva	Gerardo	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Martinico	Antonino	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Perra	Edmondo	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Perrone	Emanuele	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	6/24/1940
Regolo	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	6/24/1940
Ricci	Achileo	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Sardella	Vincenzo	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Sottile	Nunzio	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940
Tedesco	Ruggero	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe	6/24/1940
Torzuoli	Aldo	Lieutenant Other Branches	Capitano G.N.	6/24/1940
Venuti	Pietro	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	6/24/1940
Veschetti	Luciano	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	6/24/1940
Zampaglioni	Dionisio	Naval Rating	Comune	6/24/1940

The ocean-going submarine Finzi was a boat of the Calvi class.

Muggiano (La Spezia) June 29th, 1935 the launch of the Finzi.

Operational Life

1940

The first war patrol of the submarine Finzi took place from the port of Cagliari, Sardinia on June 5th, 1940 (5 days before the official declaration of war). The boat reached the patrol zone off the Canary Islands and then returned to the Sardinian base on July 10th. The night of June 12th, when it was approaching Point Almina, the Finzi was attacked by the British destroyer H.M.S. Watchman, which forced Captain Dominici to remain submerged. Avoiding the attack, the crossing continued on the surface at a speed of about 12 knots with favorable weather conditions and no moonlight. The crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar took place without problems, and once in the assigned area, the boat did not encounter any enemy vessel. The mission of the Finzi had been planned in synchrony with the Cappellini, but this boat was forced to take refuge in Ceuta after an enemy attack. Despite the absence of tangible results, the mission was undoubtedly useful in assessing the British defensive network and confirming the possibility of crossing the Strait of Gibraltar without any particular problem. As a matter of fact, during the conflict not a single Italian submarine was lost during the crossing of the narrow strait.

The Finzi the day of its launch from the Shipyard of Muggiano
(Photo Turrini)

Once back in Italy, the Finzi was assigned to the newly established Atlantic base of Bordeaux. The boat was part of the first transfer group from the domestic bases to the Acquitaine capital. This group included the Dandolo, Marconi, and Bagnolini, while the Barbarigo had already completed the transfer. On September 7th, the boat left La Spezia under the command of C.C. Alberto Dominici to cross the Strait of Gibraltar between the 12th and the 13th. Once off Vigo, the boat was attacked by an enemy aircraft which caused the loss of two crewmembers. Later on, Captain Dominici was able to alude an incoming enemy destroyer. Failing to detect enemy traffic, the Finzi left the patrol area and reached Bordeaux on the 29th of September. The arrival of the first Italian submarines in Bordeaux was received with great enthusiasm by the German ally.

On September 30th, Admiral Donitz, who practically was in charge of the Italian naval forces in the Atlantic even though they had some level of autonomy, conducted an official visit of the Bordeaux base of the Regia Marina. The admiral participated in a parade of six crews and personally visited two boats, the Finzi and the Malaspina. This was not a superficial visit, but direct contact between an old submariner and the enthusiastic crews and officers of the Italian vessels.

Admiral Donitz during his visit to the newly established Italian submarine base of Bordeaux
(Photo U.S.M.M.)

Taking into consideration the greater range, better habitability and better performances (this factor would be later reevaluated) of the Italian submarines, Donitz decided that the Italian sharks would conduct operations between 58 20 N and 51 N and between 20 W and 27 W. This quadrant was west of the operational area occupied by the Germans and extended from the British Isles west. Eventually, due to operational reasons, the Italian area was shifted about 100 miles east, closer to the Scottish coast.

The Finzi, still under the command of C.C. Dominici, took to the sea for its first mission in the North Atlantic as part of the Bagnolini group. The vessel left mooring in Bordeaux on October 24th, 1940 along with the Bagnolini and the Baracca, while the Marconi took to the sea three days later. On October 30th, while the boat was still in transfer, west of the British Isles, the crew sighted a ship of about 3,000 t. at about 10,000 meters (quite a distance). The captain ordered a dive, but rough sea conditions made the vessel come up to the surface, thus allowing the merchant ship to become aware of the danger. After having fired a torpedo, which failed the target, the submarine was subjected to depth charge attacks (there were nine explosions) by the escorting units, without incurring any damage. Continuing its mission, Captain Dominici reached the patrol area on the 31st of the same month. After more than two weeks of back and forth navigation, on November 16th Betasom finally transmitted a discovery signal. The boat immediately began the approach, but it had to desist due to the horrible weather conditions. Two days later, another signal brought the diesel to a frenetic tempo while the vessel desperately sought to close on the enemy convoy. Unfortunately, marine fog and enemy aircraft called for diving and seeking refuge in the abyss. Later, having detected the speed of the convoy and believing this to be too high, Captain Dominici abandoned the chase.

The massive conning tower of the Finzi before it was modified
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

On the 22nd, while the ocean exploded ever more violently into whitecaps of gale force 8 or 9, the lookouts (very unpleasant job) detected the presence of a ship. After having dove to periscope depth (a maneuver typical of the Italian boats but not adopted by the Germans, who preferred remaining on the surface), the captain understood the challenges of keeping the boat hidden, thus giving up any bellicose intentions, and sought the security of the abyss. From the hydrophones, the crew detected the presence of a convoy of 10 or more ships escorted by auxiliary cruisers (recognizable by the alternative engines instead of the turbines installed on light units) and also the explosions of some depth charges far away.
This litany of sighting, rough seas, and inability to attack continued until the 27th of November when, after having avoided a destroyer, the Finzi began the return voyage returning to Bordeaux on December 4th after having avoided an attack from a British submarine near the coast. The mission was certainly a failure, but at the same time the inability to conduct attacks was attributed to the deficiencies of the technical means more than the men. In particular, it was discovered that the air intake (mushroom valve) for the diesel engines was too exposed to the weather, forcing the use of the hatch on the turret. If the hutch shut, the crew suffered from a sudden loss of pressure due to the sucking action of the motor, but with the hatch open, tons of water would infiltrate inside the hull, causing damage and inconvenience. Practically, it had been quickly realized that the Italian boats were not designed for the terrible weather conditions of the North Atlantic.

1941

After the failed expectations in the north, the Italian submarines were relocated more to the south near Madera, the Strait of Gibraltar, Freetown, and the other islands of the mid-Atlantic. The first boat to be sent off Freetown was the Cappellini, and the Finzi followed it. Still under the command of C.C. Dominici, the Finzi left Bordeaux on March 10th, 1941 to patrol west of the Canary islands and east of the Island of Capo Verde (17 W, 21 W). Unfortunately, after several days of patrol in various areas and without having encountered any enemy traffic, the Finzi began the return voyage, reaching the Atlantic base on April 17th after the short mission. During this patrol Captain Dominici had discovered some convoys which were not attacked due to the presence of escort vessels. It is not known if the Italian command interpreted this lack of results by C.C. Dominici in negative terms, but at the end of the fruitless patrol he was transferred and C.V. Ugo Giudice assumed the command of the vessel. The first mission of the new skipper took place in the waters off Freetown and in coordination with the Marconi, the Tazzoli of Commander Fecia di Cossato, and the Calvi. Departing on August 1st, the Finzi reached the patrol area off the Strait of Gibraltar, 100 miles from Cape San Vincenzo. Without having accomplished any action, the boat returned to base at the end of the same month.

The Finzi returning from a successful patrol displaying the flags representing its successes in tons of enemy shipping sunk

On December 7th, the Finzi was again in action, this time to participate, between the 7th and the 29th, in the rescue of the crewmembers of the German raider “Atlantis” and the auxiliary cruiser “Python”. Due to special circumstances, the Italian boat brought the rescued sailors back to Saint-Nazaire instead of Le Verdon. The Torelli, Finzi, Tazzoli and Calvi transferred from the U-Boot 254 sailors utilizing rubber dinghy with which the German boats were equipped.

1942

After alterations made to the vessel (increased number of torpedoes, projectiles, fuel and supplies), the Finzi took again to the sea from Le Verdon on February 6th, 1942. Within a few days from the base, the crew had to repair one of the thermal engines. This repair work took over six days and was performed under particularly difficult circumstances. Due to this breakdown, on February 10th the captain could not attack a convoy. On the 28th of the same month, Betasom changed the boat’s final destination from the Bahamas to the Caribbean Sea. On March 3rd, the Finzi reached Mona Pass, but a serious failure of one of the exhaust manifolds’ shutoff valves prompted the relocation of the boat to an area not as much covered by the enemy aerial reconnaissance. The repairs required four days, and during this period the boat intercepted a tanker which could not be attacked. At this point, the crew discovered that both periscopes had failed and that the forward planes (used to control depth) were out of service and operated only sporadically.

Despite the mechanical failures, on the 6th of March 1942 the Finzi sank the French tanker MELPOMESE of 7.011 t. with four torpedoes (and not 7.001 as suggested by some sources). This tanker belonged to “Compagnie Ausiliarie de Navigation” and was built by “Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde” of Bordeaux in 1923 and had been in service to the MoWT (Ministry of War Transport) since 1940. The sinking took place in position 23° 35’N, 62° 39’W and all 49 crewmembers were later saved.

Soon after, the Finzi intercepted another ship, the Swedish steamship SKÅNE of 4,528 t. which was sunk the night of March 6th with three torpedoes and a few gun shells. This old steamship (passenger and freight) was built in 1921 by the shipyard “A/B Lindholmens” of Gothenburg, Sweden and belonged to the shipping company “Translatlantic, Rederiaktiebolaget”, also of Gothenburg. The Skåne had changed name in 1941 and at the time of the sinking the ship was known as the “Boren”. Some authors erroneously state that the Boren did not fall victim to the Finzi, but this is confirmed and it took place in position 20° 50’N, 62° 05’W. All 36 crewmembers were rescued.

Two days later, on March 10th, the Finzi began moving to a location previously agreed to transfer oil fuel to the Morosini. During this transfer, the crew sighted a tanker which was promptly sunk with six torpedoes. The motor tanker in question was the Norwegian CHARLES RACINE of 9,957 t. , built in 1937 by the shipyard “Odense Staalskibsvaerft” of Odense, Denmark and belonging to the “Skibs-A/S Snefonn”. The torpedoing took place in position 23° 10’N, 60° 28’W, and all 41 crewmembers were later rescued. On March 13th, after having transferred 21 tons of fuel to the Morosini, the Finzi began the long return journey, reaching Le Verdon in the afternoon of March 31, completing a certainly successful patrol.

After the well-earned rest and the necessary repair work, the Finzi was once again sent off the American coasts, this time along with the Tazzoli. The boat left base on June 6th, 1942 to reach Cuba and Santo Domingo. On June 20th, the submarine received 11 tons of oil fuel from the Da Vinci which was returning to base. Eventually, this fuel was later transferred to the Morosini. On July 9th, the Finzi reached the patrol area off the Crooked Island Passage (Bahamas) and then moved to the Windham Passage, and later off Haiti. The night of the 12th, the crew sighted a large passenger ship escorted by light units and airplanes which was not attacked.

After some relocations, on the 19th the submarine returned off the Island of Crooked. On the 20th it sighted a fast tanker escorted by destroyers which was not attacked. On the 23rd, the Finzi transferred 50 tons of oil fuel and 5 tons of drinking water to the Giuliani. On the 27th it transferred more oil fuel to the Morosini. On the 29th of July the boat failed to hit with any of the three torpedoes launched a passenger ship moving at about 18 knots. On the 31st, having run out of fuel, the boat began the return voyage. Despite the intense enemy aerial patrol off the estuary of the Gironde, the Finzi reached Bordeaux in the afternoon of August 18 without any inconvenience.

After the necessary maintenance work, the Finzi took again to the sea with the Tazzoli leaving on November 26th destined for Brazil. During refitting, T.V. Angelo Amendola had assumed the command. Unfortunately, on December 10th the various breakdowns detected aboard forced the boat back to base.

1943

During the maintenance period, there was another change of command; T.V. Amendola disembarked and was replaced by T.V. Mario Rossetto. Repair work completed, the boat left on February 11th, 1943 along with the Da Vinci for a mission off the African coast and the Indian Ocean. On March 18th, when the Finzi was ready to meet the Da Vinci for a conspicuous exchange of fuel, foodstuff, and more to allow the other submarine to continue on its mission well past the Cape of Good Hope , T.V. Rossetto sighted the British ship Lulworth and three torpedoes. Unfortunately, all weapons failed to operate properly.

The Finzi on April 18th, 1943

The Finzi had to interrupt the chase of the merchant ship due to the failure of both diesel engines. At the same time the meeting with the Da Vinci was taking place, thus Rossetto gave Gazzana all the information so that he could chase, attack and sink the merchant ship. After the sinking, the Da Vinci took 90 tons of oil fuel, 6 tons of oil, 10 tons of drinking water, 3 small 450 mm torpedoes and foodstuff.

In the afternoon of March 28th, the Finzi intercepted and sank the Greek steamship GRANICOS of 3,689 tons. The sinking took place in position 02° N 15° 30’W, 30 crewmembers were lost and one, a Portuguese, was captured by the Finzi.
Captain Rossetto wrote to us saying that ” The Granikos, loaded with iron ore, sank in very little time, less than 30 seconds, and for this reason most probably the crew did not have the opportunity to lower the life boats and could not save themselves, except Jaquim Rodriguez. He, holding on to a small piece of wood, was calling for help but hiding whenever the submarine search light was passing by because he was afraid of being machine gunned. Before departing Rio de Janeiro, the crew had been told that “submarines machine gunned shipwrecked sailors!”.

In the afternoon of March 29th (and not the 30th as cited by some sources), the Finzi sank the British ship CELTIC STAR of 5,575 tons. This old ship, built in 1918 by “Dunlop, Bremner & Co” of Glasgow was previously known as the Celtistar (1929) and Campana (1918). The ship belonged to “Union Cold Storage Co. Ltd” and the sinking took place in position 16° N, 17° 44’W. Two crewmembers died, a Canadian was captured, and the remaining 63 were later rescued. On April 18th the Finzi reached the estuary of the river Gironde and, while under escort by a German minesweeper, it triggered a magnetic mine which exploded under the keel at about 30 meters deep. Damages were minor, and the boat arrived in Le Verdon (at the estuary of the Gironde) without further problems. The mission, considering the transfer of fuel and the two sinkings, was considered a success. Unfortunately, the Da Vinci did not return to base.

Following negotiations with the Germans, the Finzi was one of the seven submarines designated to be transformed into transports. Supposedly, the idea of transforming these boats originated with C.V. Enzo Grossi, then commander of the base, who had realized that these submarines were no longer fitted for offensive operations. Grossi made a proposal to Adm. Donitz: in exchange for the seven Italian submarines, the Germans would transfer seven newly constructed U-boats to the Italian Navy. Although it could appear that the proposal was preposterous, it was actually warmly welcomed, especially because the Germans were producing a boat a day, but did not have enough personnel to man them.

As part of the final agreement reached between the two navies, the Krisgmarine transferred seven U-boats of the class VII-c (designated by the Italians as class ‘S’) in exchange of an equivalent number of Italian boats which, due to their dimensions, were better suited for the long voyage to Japan. Of the seven boats, only five began the journey. This operation was completely under German control, and the boats were assigned a German name, but retained their Italian crew. Of the five boats, the Tazzoli was lost soon after its departure, while the Barbarigo was probably lost soon after. Both losses were never documented and remain a mystery to these days. The two remaining transport submarines, the Bagnolini and the Finzi, were trapped by the events surrounding the Italian surrender while still in Bordeaux and never left.

The alterations made to the various boats were different; guns were removed, ammo depots were turned into oil depots. The attack periscope was removed, one of the heads and most of the on-board amenities were also removed to give room for goods. Work aboard the Finzi was completed in Le Verdon’s shipyard and the command transferred from T.V. Rosetto to T.V. Nicola Dellino. On September 8th, the boat was still in Bordeaux, delayed with various excuses by the Germans who had sensed the imminent Italian surrender. Considering the precarious condition of the vessel and the advanced decay of the machinery, the German Navy decided not to utilize the boat. On July 25th 1944, during the German retreat, demolition specialists of the Kriegsmarine scuttled the Finzi in the port of Le Verdon.

Our special thanks to Captain Rossetto for providing us with some corrections and additional information.

Edited by Laura K. Yost

This submarine represented a kind of experiment; it was not successful and thus it was not reproduced in series. This submarine was part of the type of boats that, after War World I, all navies of a certain caliber attempted to complete to give their underwater vessels performances similar to the surface units (range, speed, weaponry, etc).

The FIERAMOSCA in late 1940
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

In short, since the submarine had come out of the war showing all of its limitations as a submergible unit, despite having asserted its value as a weapon, it was thought to increase surface performances. In essence, if one had to temporary give up the idea of an ideal “submergible”, then one has to make it a fleet submarine to be employed along with the surface ships. For example, one should think of the French SURCOUF.

But, as already mentioned, the results were not positive, and the idea was soon abandoned by all navies and the evolution of the submarine (at least until the advent of the single propulsion plan for both surface and underwater navigation) focused of the idea of the submergible, a ship capable of submerging, even though for limited periods of time, but nevertheless different from a real surface unit.

In reality, since the beginning the Italian Navy was quite skeptical of the project, and the project was troubled by many alterations and afterthoughts. Even the idea to carry a small hydroplane (eventually never selected) was given up, but the boat was built with a hangar located aft of the conning tower. Later, this was dismantled after the boat was delivered to the Navy.

The submarine FIERAMOSCA was built by the Tosi shipyard of Taranto and laid down on July 17th, 1926. It was launched on April 14th, 1929 and delivered to the Navy on December 5th, 1931.

Operational Life

The operational activity of the FIERAMOSCA was quite modest and marked by several breakdowns and incidents, at times with injuries to personnel,. After a long period of testing and trials, the boat was assigned to the 1st Squadron of the 1st Flotilla based in Taranto. Until 1935, its activity was quite limited. Then, the boat returned to Taranto for a period of refitting by the builder. At the end of this work, it was assigned to the 2nd Squadron in La Spezia. It later was assigned to the 2nd Submarine Group with base in Naples, when, in 1936 and 1937, the boat participated to the Spanish Civil War completing two patrols.

The submarine FIERAMOSCA
(Photo Turrini)

During the first mission, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Mario Bartalesi, the boat completed a patrol off Valencia from December 21st, 1936 to January 5th, 1937 departing Leghorn and returning to La Spezia. It would sight a dozen ships, but on the 27th was able to conduct a night attack on the surface against only one, the cruiser Mendez Nunez, with the release of three torpedoes wich failed to hit the target.

The second mission, also in the waters off Valencia, began in La Spezia on January 28th, 1937 and was interrupted soon after due to a mechanical failure. Repaired the problem, the FIERAMOSCA left again La Spezia on February 2nd, this time to patrol off Barcelona. Despite the numerous sightings, the boat did not complete any attack. Instead, it completed two night bombardments of the port of Barcelona; the first the night of February 8th, firing ten 120mm shots before the weapon jammed, and the second the following night firing in 15 minutes 35 shells, one of which seriously damaged the Spanish tanker Zorrosa. It reentered base on February 16th.
Later on, it completed a cruise to Tunis and in 1939 to Barcelona. The same year, the FIERAMOSCA was assigned to the 1st Submarine Group, as part of the 12th Squadron along with the CALVI, FINZI and TAZZOLI. At the beginning of the war, due to the redistribution of responsibilities implemented by the command of the submarine squadrons (MARICOSOM), this squadron became the 11th. At the beginning of the hostilities, the FIERAMOSCA was already on patrol off the French cost under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Mellina. Having failed to locate any traffic, the 14th of June the boat returned to Genoa.

On the 19th the boat was again on patrol off the island of Hyères, near Toulon. A few days later a violent explosion of one of the batteries caused serious damages and the wounding of a few crewmembers forcing the boat to return to La Spezia, where it arrived on the 25th of June.

After this incident, which evidenced the poor reliability of the boat, the FIERAMOSCA was withdrawn from active service. After a period of refitting (during which Captain Mellina was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Beppino Manca, later also replaced by Lieutenant Commander Cristiano Masi), on October 15th 1940 the boat was assigned to the submarine school of Pula where, until March 1941, it completed 28 training sorties for the cadets. On April 10th, 1941 the FIERAMOSCA was removed from service and would later be scrapped in 1946.

Translated from Italian by Cristiano D’Adamo