R. Smg. Neghelli

Neghelli was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (displacement of 698 tons on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed 9 war missions (5 patrols and 4 transfers), covering 5,226 miles on the surface and 714 submerged and damaging two ships including the light cruiser H.M.S. Coventry.

Brief and partial chronology

February 25th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

Neghelli still on the slip

November 7th, 1937

Launched in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano (La Spezia) shipyards.

The launch of Neghelli

February 28th, 1938

Neghelli entered into service.

March 3rd, 1938

Placed under the command of the Submarine Fleet Command (Maricosom). The boat completed an endurance training cruise in the Dodecanese, then was deployed to Leros.

Some crewmembers from the submarine Neghelli in Leros
Photo taken by the militarized worker Oscar Natale Formaro, at the time in service at the naval workshop of San Giorgio in Leros and provided by Giovanni Lanzillotta

May 1940

Transferred to La Spezia.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s enter the World War II, Neghelli, which with the boatsof the same class  Gondar, Ascianghi and Scirè formed the XV Submarine Squadron of the I Grupsom (La Spezia), was sent on an exploratory mission west of the Gulf of Genoa.

June 14th, 1940

The boat returned to base without spotting any enemy units.

August 1st, 1940

Neghelli (Lieutenant Carlo Ferracuti) was sent north of Cape Bougaroni for an ambush on the British Force H, which had left Gibraltar. The submarines Scirè, Argo, Turchese, Medusa, Axum, Jaspro and Luciano Manara were also sent to the same area and for the same reason.

Lieutenant Carlo Ferracuti

August 5th, 1940

At 6.50 PM, west of Point Asinara (Sardinia), Neghelli was attacked with two torpedoes by an enemy submarine. The boat managed to evade weapons with a prompt maneuver. (TN While reported in the official records of the Italian Navy – Volume XIII “I Sommergibili in Mediterraneo” Tomo I, Page 76 -, there is no report of such an attack in the British records nor it is reported by naval historian and researcher Jürgen Rohwer – “Allied Submarine Attacks of World War Two”)

December 1940

A new mission, still under the command of Lieutenant Ferracuti, 45 miles north of Marsa Matruh, until Christmas. In the same area, the submarines Naiade and Narvalo were on patrol to counter the British naval forces sent to shell the Italian positions on the Cyrenian coasts in support of the advance of the land forces.

December 13th, 1940

At 08:22 PM, Neghelli, while on the surface, sighted the British light cruiser H.M.S. Coventry (Captain David Gilmour), part of the “Stand-by Bombarding Force” engaged in the bombardment of Italian coastal roads and fortifications as part of Operation “Compass”, the British offensive that would lead to the fall of Cyrenaica (Ferracuti, however, mistook his target for a larger and more modern Southampton-class cruiser).

Approaching on the surface, in position 32°37′ N and 26°44′ E (80 miles north-northwest of Marsa Matruh and 40 miles northeast of Sidi el Barrani), at 08:36 PM (or 08:42 PM) the submarine launched a salvo of four torpedoes (three 533 mm and one 450 mm) against the cruiser, then remained on the surface without moving away so that it could observe the result of the launch. One of the four torpedoes hit H.M.S. Coventry forward of the bridge, removing most of the forward hull (but without causing any loss among the crew); the cruiser reacts by opening fire on Neghelli, which however manages to escape without damage (while the next day the Naiade, who was in the same area, will be the unfortunate victim of an attack).

H.M.S. Coventry was a Ceres sub-class of the Royal Navy’s C-type light cruisers

H.M.S. Coventry managed to return to Alexandria, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Janus, and H.M.S. Hereward, but needed repairs that lasted until January 20th, 1941 (returning to operation in March) and suffered a permanent decrease in speed from 29 knots to 23 knots.

Neghelli’s action was announced in war bulletin no. 191 of December 15th, 1940, which spoke of the sinking, and not damage, of the British cruiser (“The submarine Neghelli, under the command of corvette captain Carlo Ferracuti, torpedoed and sank off the Egyptian coast an enemy cruiser of the Southampton type“). Commander Ferracuti would be decorated with a Silver Medal for Military Valor.

The Last Attack

On January 14th, 1941, Neghelli, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlo Ferracuti and with 46 crewmen (5 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers, sub-chiefs and sailors; another officer, Giacomo Gaudino, remained ashore due to a sudden fever), left Leros for a new mission off the Aegean islands, an offensive ambush on the route to Piraeus. The boat, however, was never heard from again after leaving the base.

The tale of Neghelli’s last attack was learned at the end of the war, from the archives of the former enemy. On the morning of January 19th, 1941, Ferracuti’s boat attacked the Greek destroyer Psara without result, and then, at 11:53 AM, the British convoy “AS. 12′, sailing from Piraeus (from where it had departed at eight o’clock that day) to Alexandria as part of the British operation ‘Excess’ with the steamers Clan Cumming, Clan MacDonald and Empire Song escorted by the British anti-aircraft cruiser H.M.S. Calcutta and the destroyers, also British, H.M.S. Defender, H.M.S. Janus and H.M.S. Greyhound. Neghelli hit the Clan Cumming (7,264 GRT) with a torpedo, in position 37°15′ N and 24°04′ E (off the island of Agios Georgios, 20 miles east-north-east of the island of Serifos and 25 miles south of Piraeus), damaging it so badly that it was forced to return to Piraeus escorted by H.M.S. Janus.

S/S Clan Cumming

Immediately afterwards H.M.S. Greyhound (Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A’Deane) counterattacked with depth charges (also assisted by another destroyer, H.M.S. Ilex, which, however, did not drop any depth charges), sinking Neghelli with its entire crew 48 miles by 160.4° from Athens, 40 miles northeast of the island of Falkonera (TN also known as Gerakoulia).

H.M.S. Greyhound’s anti-submarine action was considered to have had “questionable results”, but Neghelli never returned to base, and, although there was no news of it since its departure from Leros on January 14th, there were no other Italian submarines in the area that could have torpedoed the Cumming Clan, nor were there any that were lost during that period. (TN H.M.S. Greyhound obtained an ASDIC contact at 1,800 meters and carried out three attacks with a total of eighteen depth-charges (5 at 11:30 AM, 6 at 11:39 AM and 7 at 11:46 AM) set at 30, 45, 75 and 150 meters, however no result, such as a debris or a oil, could be observed.)

Some Greek sources still attribute the sinking of Neghelli to the Greek submarine Triton (under the command of Lieutenant Dyonisios Zeppos, who was promoted for this alleged success), which at 00.17 AM on  January 9th, 1941, while submerged in the Otranto channel, launched two torpedoes against a submarine sighted in the moonlight and claimed to have seen it explode and sink (the submarine was seen only by Commander Zeppos,  whose account was partially corroborated by the third officer and a sailor, who heard the explosion and saw a column of smoke through the periscope but they were unable to figure out what kind of unit had been hit). This was not possible, given that on January 9th, Neghelli was still in port (which the unit left only five days later). Probably the Triton attacked another unit, mistaken for a submarine, and – since there were no compatible losses in terms of date and place – the sinking was only an erroneous impression like those obtained in countless circumstances by submariners of all navies.

A second Silver Medal for Military Valour was awarded to the memory of Commander Carlo Ferracuti, born in San Pietro di Feletto (TV) on  January 9th, 1906, with the following motivation:

«Commander of a submarine deployed in waters particularly dangerous to the adversary, he carried out numerous war missions, torpedoing, among other things, a cruiser of 9,000 tons. In the midst of dangers and many pitfalls, he showed serene courage, professional skill and contempt for danger. He disappeared at sea fighting for his homeland following the sinking of the Unit under his command.

Mediterranean, 10 June 1940 – 22 January 1941.”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal9 5,226 714 51116.474.85

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
12/13/194022:22T.V. Carlo FerracutiMediterranean32°37’N-26°44’E TorpedoDamagedH.M.S. Coventry Anti-Aircraft Cruiser4190Great Britain
1/19/1941T.V. Carlo FerracutiMediterraneanTorpedoFailedPsara DestroyerGreece
1/19/194111:53 T.V. Carlo FerracutiMediterranean37°15’N-24°04’E TorpedoDamagedClan Cumming Steam Freighter7264Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
AmmaturoAscanioSergeantSergente1/19/1941
BaggioliAlessandroNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
BeccioliniStefanoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
BegheriniGhinoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
BlazerFerruccioNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
BrignolaMarioSublieutenantSottotenente di Vascello1/19/1941
CarliEgidioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
De benedictisGiacintoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
DelfinoCristoforoSergeantSergente1/19/1941
DelfinoLorenzoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
Di MartinoAngeloNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
FerracutiCarloLieutenant CommanderCapitano di Corvetta1/19/1941
FiorinoVitoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
GaiardelliLuigiJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
GelliLudovicoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
GentinoDinoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
GiacomazzoGiuseppeNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
GuaschiAngeloJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
GugliaRodolfoEnsignGuardiamarina1/19/1941
IacobellisLuigiNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
IodiceNicolaSergeantSergente1/19/1941
LacirignolaGiovanniSergeantSergente1/19/1941
LannaPasqualeNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
LuiseGuidoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MacchiaEdoardoChief 1st ClassCapo di 1a Classe1/19/1941
ManfriniRinoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MarsilioCostantinoJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
MarzettiRaffaeleNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MasseraniGiuseppeChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
MattiazziUgolinoChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe1/19/1941
MazzaEzioNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MolaroAdolfoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MunafaGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
NiolaCostantinoJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
PaladiniFrancescoSergeantSergente1/19/1941
PetrucciGiorgioNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
PizzornaGiuseppeEnsignGuardiamarina1/19/1941
PucciEzioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
RezzaniFrancescoLieutenant Other BranchesCapitano G.N.1/19/1941
RiccaRenatoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
SanganiGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
SaverinoGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo1/19/1941
TarantinoEdoardoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe1/19/1941
TucciArmandoSergeantSergente1/19/1941
ValliniAugustoNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
ValsecchiPietroNaval RatingComune1/19/1941
MeneghelliArditoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe6/7/1942

R. Smg. Lafolè

The submarine Lafolè was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed five war missions (four patrol and a transfer), covering a total of 2,442 miles on the surface and 901 miles submerged, and spent 40 days at sea.

Brief and Partial Chronology

June 30th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

April 10th, 1938

Launched at the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyard (La Spezia).

The launch of the Lafolè

August 13th, 1938

Entry into service.

December 12th, 1938

Deployed in Leros under the command of Maricosom (the command of the Italian submarine fleet) and precisely of the V Submarine Group.

May 1940

Assigned to the LXII Submarine Squadron (VI Submarine Group) and deployed to Tobruk, under the command of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini.

Lafolè at sea
(From “Sommergibili italiani” By Alessandro Turrini andOttorino Ottone Miozzi, U.S.M.M.)

June 10th, 1940

With Italy’s entry into the World War II, Lafolè, which was still part of the LXII Squadron based in Tobruk (along with Topazio, Nereide, Diamante and Galatea), was first sent off Sollum (where it forms a barrage together with Diamante, Topazio and Nereide, positioned with an interval of 20 miles from each other starting from a point 30 miles by 30° from Ras Azzaz),  to protect the ports of Cyrenaica and, if possible, to attack enemy ships sailing between Alexandria and Malta, and then off Tobruk, on an offensive patrol.

June 20th, 1940

The boat returned from the patrol without having spotted any enemy ships.

July 3rd, 1940

Lafolè was sent to lie in wait on the Gavdos-Derna junction (in the middle of the junction itself) along with other submarines.

July 7th and 8th, 1940

The crew detects enemy ships engaged in intense anti-submarine activity (a convoy returning from Malta to Alexandria was in fact at sea) but failed to locate them.

July 14th, 1940

Lafolè returned to base without having made any sightings.

September 21st, 1940

The boat was sent to ambush at night in the Gulf of Taranto. In September it carried out other anti-submarine defensive ambush missions in the Gulf of Taranto.

The Sinking

On October 8 (or 10),1940, Lafolè (Lieutenant Pietro Riccomini) left Taranto to reach the patrol sector assigned to it, bounded to the north by the parallel 35°40′ N and to the south by the stretch of Moroccan coast between Cape Quillates and Cape Agua, east of Gibraltar. When the mission was over, the boat was supposed to pass through the Strait of Bonifacio and then reach Naples: but this would never happen.

On October 15th, the submarine reached the assigned area, southeast of the island of Alborán and north of Cape Tres Forcas (not far from Melilla) and began patrolling it.

Five days later, at about eleven o’clock in the morning of October 20th, Lafolè sighted 12 miles north of Cape Tres Forcas two British destroyers, H.M.S. Gallant, and H.M.S. Griffin, which were swinging in systematic anti-submarine search at low speed, apparently unaware of its presence. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the submarine closed the distance up to 500 meters, in an attempt to attack.

What Commander Riccomini could not have known, however, was that the British were fully aware of the presence of his unit. Two days earlier, in fact, the submarine Durbo (twin of Lafolè), also on a mission not far from Lafolè (the two submarines had been sent together to patrol the waters east of Gibraltar), had been sunk by the destroyers H.M.S. Firedrake and H.M.S. Wrestler,  and a British boarding party, before the boat sank, had managed to get on board and capture ciphers, orders of operation and other documents, in which was indicated, among other things, the position of Lafolè, that is, off Cape Tres Forcas.

Six destroyers (H.M.S. Gallant, H.M.S. Griffin, H.M.S. Hotspur, H.M.S. Forester and two others) had set out from Gibraltar to hunt down the submarine in the area where it was supposed to be. When Lafolè had sighted H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin, they had also detected the presence of the Italian boat but had not gone on the counterattack so as not to arouse suspicion. While Lafolè was approaching to attack them, the third destroyer belonging to the trap device, H.M.S. Hotspur, had moved to 5,000-6,000 meters from Riccomini’s submarine (who had not realized it), with a very narrow beta, in the opposite direction to that where H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin were. The boat was thus surrounded. Listened to for some time, the Italian submarine was allowed to get as close as possible, and then went on the counterattack as soon as it hinted at launching torpedoes.

Having arrived at a suitable distance to attack, Lafolè launched a first torpedo with its stern tubes, and immediately all three destroyers (first H.M.S. Gallant and H.M.S. Griffin, and then also H.M.S. Hotspur which had meanwhile arrived on the point) went on the counterattack, bombarding the Italian unit with depth charges. Already the first discharge of bombs caused serious damage to the submarine, knocking out the electric motors and trim pumps, deforming the shafts of the propellers and opening waterways. The damage suffered (including waterways) prevented Lafolè from maneuvering and maintaining trim and depth, so that the submarine swung sharply at various depths and repeatedly found itself coming onto the surface, but the crew always managed to bring it back to the depths in an attempt to escape the hunt.

Despite everything, Lafolè managed to remain submerged for seven hours, resisting the very hard anti-submarine hunt, but having to proceed at very low speed, it was continuously subjected to the launch of depth charges. At 6.30 PM (5.30 PM for another source), however, the submarine, having lost the ability to control depth abruptly, surfaced once again, and this time its entire conning tower came out of the water (according to another version, the surfacing maneuver was wanted and ordered by Commander Riccomini, who intended to take advantage of it to reduce the excessive internal pressure so that it could then dive again):  this just as H.M.S. Hotspur arrived at full force to carry out a new launch of depth charges (for one version the submarine, surfaced, was also strafed, and was deliberately rammed to prevent that, having reached the surface, it could try to react with the cannon). The collision was inevitable: rammed by H.M.S. Hotspur, Lafolè sank in a few moments at 35°50′ N and 02°53′ W (or 36°00′ N and 03°00′ W), north of Melilla, together with 40 men, including Commander Riccomini and three officers.

The moment in which H.M.S. Hotspur rammed the submarine Lafolè

It could have been the end for everyone, but nine, out of the 49 men who made up the submarine’s crew, surprisingly made it out alive. When Lafolè had come onto the surface, the second-in-command, Lieutenant Giuseppe Accardi, with eight men had tried to open the hatch of the conning tower to reduce the internal pressure: just at that moment the ramming had taken place, and it was precisely the internal pressure that had thrown Accardi and the other eight men (including the sailors Agostino Di Bartolomeo and Antonio Anastasio) outside,  through the gash that the bow of the Hotspur had opened in the hull and conning tower of the submarine (for another version through the hatch itself). Air bubbles escaping from the sinking hull brought them to the surface. It was H.M.S. Hotspur himself who rescued seven of the survivors, while H.M.S. Gallant rescued the other two. H.M.S. Hotspur, whose hull structures had suffered severe damage in the collision, would require repairs that would last until February 20th, 1941. The survivors of Lafolè, by then prisoners of war, were disembarked in Gibraltar.

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to the memory of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini, born in Modena on October 2, 1908:

“Commander of a submarine, during a risky war mission he boldly attacked two enemy destroyers escorted by aircraft with torpedoes. Subjected to violent and prolonged hunting, with the engine apparatus unused and serious infiltration of water on board, with shrewd and daring maneuvers, he tried to escape the enemy reaction, facing the adverse fate with serene determination and great skill. In a last-ditch attempt to prolong the resistance and elude the hunt to which he was subjected, with admirable coolness he ordered the rapid emergence of the unit, in order to reduce the high internal pressure by opening a hatch and then resume diving again. In his daring intent he found a glorious end with the unit, which sank, hit by a new enemy offense. An example of exceptional leadership virtues and sublime attack on duty.

(Central Mediterranean, 20 October 1940).”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal5 2,442 901 4083.573.48

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
AncoratoVittorioNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
ArrabbitoGiovanniNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
BaldiniFernandoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
BruceriAlfonsoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
BusoniAldoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
CafaroGiulioChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe10/20/1940
CastelloGiuseppeChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe10/20/1940
D’ambrogioGinoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
DazzaraRenatoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
De CarliSilvioNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
Del BàAstemioNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
Di GiuseppeFrancescoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
FarnettiArrigoChief 1st ClassCapo di 1a Classe10/20/1940
FedericiMarioSublieutenant G.N.Tenente G.N.10/20/1940
GhiringhelliCelestinoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
MacoriniMarioNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
MartuccelliAntoninoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
MiglioratiFrancescoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
MolinoPietroNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
MolinoVincenzoSublieutenantSottotenente di Vascello10/20/1940
NuzzoVitaleNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
PalmieriGiuseppeSergeantSergente10/20/1940
PediciniCarloChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe10/20/1940
PiazzaCarmeloNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
PiazzaGiuseppeNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
PizziGiovanniNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
PorracinMarioSergeantSergente10/20/1940
PossentiModestoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
RiccominiPieroLieutenantTenente di Vascello10/20/1940
RiettiGiovanniNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
RomanoGaetanoEnsignGuardiamarina10/20/1940
RuggeroAntonioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe10/20/1940
RussoVittorioNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
SalmoiraghiAngelinoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
StroppianaNevioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe10/20/1940
TaniRomeoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe10/20/1940
TarghiOsvaldoNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
TezzaUgoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe10/20/1940
TosiniAnielloNaval RatingComune10/20/1940
ZaccaràMarioSergeantSergente10/20/1940

R. Smg. Gondar

Gondar was a coastal submarine of the Adwa-class (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). During World War II, the boat completed a total of 4 patrols, covering 3,440 miles on the surface and 534 submerged for a total of 33 days spent at sea.

Brief and partial chronology

January 15th, 1937

Setting up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

October 3rd, 1937

Launch in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

The launch of the Gondar in Muggiano, La Spezia

February 28th, 1938

Entry into service.

The Gondar near La Spezia in 1938

June 10th, 1940

On the date of Italy’s entry into the World War II, Gondar was part of the XV Submarine Squadron (based in La Spezia, under the command of the I Grupsom), which it formed together with the twin boats Neghelli, Ascianghi and Scirè. Gondar was immediately sent into on patrol west of the Gulf of Genoa, off the French Riviera.

June 14th, 1940

Gondar was unsuccessfully attacked by a Vought SB2U Vindicator dive bomber (V-156) of the AB3 squadron of the French naval aviation, operating in support of the French naval squadron (cruisers Foch, Algerie, Dupleix and Colbert and eleven destroyers) which was carrying out a bombardment of Genoa and Savona. On the same day, the submarine returned to base without encountering any enemy ships.

The submarine Gondar at sea

June 18th, 1940

The boat set off for the second war patrol (TN under the command of Lieutenant Piero Riccomini).

June 25th, 1940

The boat returned to base.

August 5th, 1940

Gondar was sent on patrol east of Gibraltar, along with the submarines Ascianghi and Marcello.

August 16th, 1940

Gondar returned to base.

The Gondar in La Spezia being fitted with the SLC carriers

Slow-moving Torpedoes

When Italy entered the World War II, on 10 June 1940, the I Flotilla MAS, the special unit of the Regia Marina in charge of preparing and carrying out raids with insidious means against enemy ports (only on March 15th, 1941, this unit would take the name of X Flotilla MAS, with which it would become famous), was far from being ready for action.  Formed just over a year earlier, on April 23rd, 1939, the Flotilla was still in the training phase, as well as short of resources.

At the end of July 1940, Admiral Raffaele De Courten, superintendent of assault craft at Supermarina, verbally invited the commander of the I Flotilla MAS, frigate captain Mario Giorgini, to prepare an attack on Alexandria – the Royal Navy’s main base in the Mediterranean – with the use of Slow Running Torpedoes (SLC), better known as “pigs”.

This first mission, called “G.A. 1”, ended in tragedy before it even began: the submarine in charge of taking the SLCs to Alexandria, Iride, was in fact sighted by British air reconnaissance and sunk by torpedo bombers in the Gulf of Bomba, in Cyrenaica, together with the support ship Monte Gargano.

This was on August 22nd, 1940, but at the same time two other submarines were already undergoing the modification works necessary to transform them into carriers for slow-moving torpedoes, they were Gondar and the twin boat Scirè

Gondar with the SLC carriers fitted docked next to the Argo

While the system for the transport and release of the SLCs adopted on the Iride was very rudimentary (the assault craft were simply placed and harnessed on two pairs of saddles on the deck of the submarine), Gondar and Scirè (in August-September 1940) underwent more specific adaptation works. Both submarines were equipped with watertight container cylinders, positioned on deck, in which to place the SLCs (the Gondar, on which work began at the end of August 1940, was the first submarine of the Regia Marina to be equipped with such cylinders).

This device, designed by the Odero Terni Orlando shipyard in La Spezia, made it possible, among other things, to dive and activate the SLCs up to a depth of 90 meters, against the maximum of only 30 meters allowed by the method used on the Iride. In addition, the support of any other unit was not necessary, and it was possible to transport the SLCs from the start, eliminating the intermediate stopovers that had been fatal to the Iris.

There were three cylinders, one located forward of the conning tower and the other two (side by side) aft of the same. Each of them weighed 2.8 tons and could withstand, as mentioned, a pressure equal to that of 90 meters deep, i.e. the maximum test depth of the Adwa-class submarines. The cylinders were connected to the submarine (by means of a system of valves and pipes that could be operated from inside the submarine) to be flooded (each cylinder could hold 21.75 tons of water) and drained, as well as for the ventilation necessary for the SLC batteries (there were also electrical systems to keep the latter charged). Each cylinder was closed by a hemispherical watertight hatch, with side opening. The forward cylinder of Gondar had no reinforcing rings, the only difference compared to those of the submarine Scirè. On the other hand, to lighten the overall weight, the 100/47 mm deck gun, its ammunition, two torpedoes and other weights deemed superfluous were eliminated.

Top, the forward container without the reinforcing rings. Below the aft contains

There were two possible methods for the release of SLCs. One was for the submarine to surface (with only the top of the conning tower above the surface), stationary, and for the SLC operators to exit from inside the unit through the upper hatch, walk along the deck to the cylinders, which in the meantime was flooded, open the hatches, extract the SLCs, close the hatches and set the SLCs in motion, heading towards the target.

In the second case, however, the submarine had to lie on the seabed at a depth of a dozen meters; the raiders, equipped with breathing apparatus, would escape from the floodable escape compartment, opened the cylinder doors (meanwhile flooded), extracted the SLCs and headed towards their targets.

Already a few days after the sinking of the Iride, the Chief of Staff of the Regia Marina, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, sent a new mission order to Commander Giorgini. This time the I Flotilla MAS was to conduct an almost simultaneous attack against both Alexandria (headquarters of the Mediterranean Fleet) and Gibraltar (headquarters of Force H), again using SLCs.

Gondar and Scirè, on which the work of adapting to SLC carriers (carried out in the shipyard of La Spezia) was being completed, were therefore immediately chosen for this mission: Gondar was to attack Alexandria, Scirè Gibraltar.

Lieutenant Francesco Brunetti, former commander – and shipwrecked – of the lost Iride in the ill-fated operation “G.A. 1” was appointed to command the Gondar (TN replacing Lieutenant Piero Riccomini). He had asked to be able to complete the mission begun with the Iride, to avenge his men who perished in the sinking. They wanted to avenge the defeat and the deaths in the Gulf of Bomba. Hitting Alexandria would now become a matter of principle for the 1st Flotilla MAS, but it would be more than a year before the enterprise would be crowned with success.

On September 19th, 1940, Supermarina sent Commander Giorgini order number 4973, which sanctioned the start of Operation “G.A. 2” against Alexandria in Egypt. The raid was scheduled to take place on the night of September 28th-29th (to take advantage of the moon at the last quarter), or, in case of delays (due to interference by British ships or aircraft, or due to slow navigation), the following night. The release of the SLCs was to be accomplished in half an hour.

S.L.C.

The very detailed order of operation provided for the SLC raiders to choose battleships as their priority target, with aircraft carriers as their second choice, followed in order of precedence by the floating dock and cruisers. The SLC warheads, weighing 225 kg each, had to be adjusted to explode after two hours. Each raider would be provided with £10. Once their mission was accomplished, the crews of the SLCs were to destroy their vessels, if possible, near one of the French warships interned in Alexandria since the surrender of France, then board these ships and declare themselves officers of the Regia Marina in permanent effective service (for this purpose they would have to be provided with the identification card),  refraining from saying anything else about their mission. To maintain contact with Supermarina, Gondar would have used the special code ‘G’.

On Gondar were then embarked the three SLCs destined to force the port of Alessandria and their crews, each composed of two men: the first was formed by the lieutenant Alberto Branzini and the ensign Alberto Cacioppo, the second by the captain of the Naval Engineers Elios Toschi (who, with his colleague and friend Teseo Tesei, had been the inventor of the slow-moving torpedo) and by the diver sergeant Umberto Ragnati, the third by Naval Weapons Captain Gustavo Stefanini and Diver Sergeant Alessandro Scappino. The three SLCs were loaded in La Spezia (where they were immediately placed in the container cylinders), while the crews would board in Messina, where Gondar arrived at 09:00 PM on September 23rd, after leaving La Spezia on the night of the 21st.

In addition to the six men who formed the crews of the SLCs, Commander Giorgini himself went up to Gondar in Messina, as head of the mission, and three reserve operators, in charge of replacing the men of the SLCs in case of need. They were Ensign Aristide Calcagno, Sergeant Diver Giovanni Lazzaroni and Chief Electrician Second Class Cipriano Cipriani.

Toschi and Lazzaroni were veterans of the failed operation of the “G.A. 1”, in which, shipwrecked after the sinking of the Iride, they had helped to save some sailors trapped in the wreck of the submarine.

After disembarking part of the secret archive and replenishing its supplies of fuel and water at night, Gondar set sail from Messina at 07.30 AM on September 24th, 1940, bound for Alessandria. It was planned for the submarine to reach a predetermined point, called “D”, to check that everything was quiet on the surface. If that verification was successful, it would then have continued to a second conventional point, ‘A’, where the SLCs would be released, which would then enter the port of Alexandria. The navigation approaching the target, which took place at night on the surface and during the day submerged to avoid being spotted, was not characterized by any significant events. Several ships were sighted, none of which, however, sighted the Italian boat.

Gondar arrived off the coast of Egypt on the night of September28th-29th, as planned, but the situation was far from calm: a British corvette was sighted, which forced the submarine to dive. After a couple of hours, Gondar resurfaced, with no more ships in sight.

On the night between the 28th and the 29th, the boat had to dive again. Hydrophones reported the noise of at least three turbine-driven ships sailing nearby, and later also the sounds of the engines of other ships moving away. Numerous ships were sighted, at distances between 500 and 2,000 meters: on board it was not known, but it was the Mediterranean Fleet, which went out to sea for operation “MB. 5».

Around 07:00 PM on the 29th, with some delay (but not enough to prevent the SLCs from being released for the attack on the port), Gondar emerged only six miles (for another source, 22 miles) from Alexandria, also to change air and recharge the batteries, but after a few minutes he was reached by a message from Supermarina, ordering Gondar to reach Tobruk and then await further orders.

This was because Supermarina had been informed, while Gondar was sailing towards Alexandria, that the entire Mediterranean Fleet (battleships H.M.S. Valiant and H.M.S. Warspite, aircraft carriers H.M.S. Illustrious, cruisers H.M.S. York, H.M.S. Sydney and H.M.S. Orion and destroyers H.M.S. Hyperion, H.M.S. Hero, H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Imperial, H.M.S. Ilex, H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Juno, H.M.S. Janus, H.M.S. Mohawk, H.M.S. Nubian and H.M.S. Stuart) had left Alexandria on the 28th to provide support for an attempt to reinforce the garrison of Malta by sending 2,000 men  embarked on the cruisers H.M.S. Liverpool and H.M.S. Gloucester; the aforementioned operation “MB. 5». Alexandria had no battleships, aircraft carriers or cruisers left: no valuable targets, and Gondar’s mission had become useless. At 01.55 PM Supermarina had therefore sent the message PAPA ( (Absolute Precedence over Absolute Precedence) no. 28644 to the Naval Command of Tobruk, in which the latter was informed that Gondar had been ordered to reach this base. Marina Tobruk was to inform Commander Giorgini that Operation “G.A. 2” was postponed due to the sudden departure of the main forces, and that Gondar should be ready to leave as soon as the Mediterranean Fleet returned to port.

But the submarine, sailing submerged, had not been able to receive the message until the last moment, when it had surfaced, on the evening of the 29th.

Having received the message, Gondar changed course to reach Tobruk, continuing to recharge its batteries, but at about 20.30 it sighted an enemy ship (according to another source, two) starboard in the bow, at a distance of one and a half kilometers, sailing alongside: it was the Australian destroyer H.M.A.S. Stuart, under the command of the Lieutenant Commander Norman Joseph MacDonald Teacher (who was normally the navigation officer and had just assumed command of the ship – which was supposed to reach Malta for work – replacing the actual  commander, Lieutenant Captain Robinson, who fell ill). H.M.A.S. Stuart, which went out to sea for operation “MB. 5” with the rest of the Mediterranean Fleet, was now returning to Alexandria at 10 knots due to boiler failures (a steam pipe had burst), taking advantage of this to conduct anti-submarine rakes with sonar. The Italian boat immediately dove to a depth of 80 meters, 110 miles by 300° from the lighthouse of Alessandria (i.e., northwest of that base, as well as north of Sollum). On board they arranged for the silent trim, stopping the engines and any other machinery, but shortly afterwards H.M.A.S. Stuart’s Asdic (which, according to one version, had spotted it from the bridge before it dove) spotted it, and the hunt began.

According to an article by Alan Payne and L. J. Lind in the June 1977 Naval Historical Review, it was at 10:15 PM that H.M.A.S. Stuart made contact with Asdic, namely that a submarine, starboard forward 2,700 yards away, was slowly crossing its course from starboard to port. Second Lieutenants J. G. Griffin and T. S. Cree (the latter was the officer in charge of Asdic) and Petty Officers Ronald A. H. MacDonald and L. T. Pike were on sonar duty; The contact was very sharp.

On the submarine Gondar, Brunetti understood from the hydrophones that the submarine had been discovered.

At 10:20 PM (according to Italian sources, 15 minutes after the submarine had submerged) H.M.A.S. Stuart sailed up the course of Gondar and launched a first package of six depth charges, at the same time throwing a calcium fire into the water to illuminate the surface of the sea and facilitate the sighting of any wreckage or fuel slicks.

Aboard Gondar, the explosion of the first depth charges (which, according to a source, occurred while the immersion maneuver was still in progress) knocked out the depth gauges, blew out the lights, and caused the cylinder-containers of the SLCs to flood.

More bomb discharges followed, once an hour (between four and six bombs per discharge), intermittently but regularly. After the first attack, H.M.A.S. Stuart regained contact aft to port, 1,370 yards away, but a defect in the Asdic apparatus made it difficult to maintain contact; fearing that this might cause him to escape his prey, Teacher contacted Alexandria and asked for some other units to be sent to help. A second destroyer, H.M.S. Diamond departed from Alexandria. According to Italian sources, the vessel arrived on the spot at 10.30 PM, together with a “corvette”, but according to British sources, in reality, H.M.S. Diamond arrived on the spot at the end of the hunt, when Gondar was already sinking (or even later), and it was only H.M.S. Stuart that conducted the hunt during the night, even if on Gondar there was the impression (from the hydrophones) of being hunted by three ships,  two of which came later.

At 10:45 PM Lieutenant Cree of H.M.A.S. Stuart reported the position of the target to the bridge, and the destroyer reduced speed to 12 knots, dropped five more depth charges, and fired another charge into the sea, but again no wreckage or fuel was sighted. The effect of this second attack, however, was devastating: the bombs exploded under the submarine, damaging various instruments, other pressure gauges and a fuel tank (which began to leak) and disabling the Gondar’s air purification apparatus, thus reducing the maximum time the submarine could stay submerged. Then, water started seeping into the aft area.

Between attacks, H.M.A.S. Stuart began to cross over the vertical of the Gondar, continuously executing mock attacks at high speed, to unnerve the submarine’s crew. It was probably this set of maneuvers that convinced the men of Gondar that not one, but three enemy ships were hunting them.

At one o’clock in the morning of the 30th, H.M.A.S. Stuart circled the submerged submarine, at a distance of between 1,370 and 18,30 meters, to ascertain its position, then launched a third discharge of depth charges; The fourth discharge followed at four o’clock in the morning, the fifth at 5.30 AM. Between 5:30 and 6:25 AM., H.M.A.S. Stuart carried out a series of mock attacks for demoralizing purposes, then carried out a final bomb drop at 6:25 AM. The first light of day revealed small fuel slicks to the Australian crew, indicating that the submarine had been damaged.

Within a few hours, about fifty depth charges were dropped, all of which exploded very close to Gondar. The crew of the submarine, gathered in small groups of four or five men, could do nothing but listen to the sound of the ship coming and going (or rather, of the ships, since they seemed to be three) and waiting in silence and semi-darkness for the bombs to explode, hoping that they were not too close. It was hot, there was no air, and the floor was strewn with fuel leaking from a damaged tank. Each time the submarine was violently shaken by the explosions, the bulkheads threatened to give way. The night seemed to go on forever.

The concussions caused by the detonations of the bombs also caused various water infiltrations, and gradually knocked out the Gondar’s equipment.

The chief engineer, Lieutenant of the Naval Engineers Vincenzo Cicirello, examined the apparatus for air purification and tried to fix it, but without success. He reported the situation to Commander Brunetti, who shook his head and ordered some air to be released, in the hope of improving the internal situation a little, but nothing changed.

After six hours of immobility, Commander Brunetti made an attempt to get away and escape, correcting his depth from time to time, but the “characteristic noise like a whip, similar to that produced by lead pellets falling on a metal sheet” persisted. The sign that the enemy’s Asdic did not let go. (According to another version, in the interval between two bomb drops, Gondar managed to get away, but, when he thought, he had probably managed to disengage from the enemy, he was again located and bombarded with other depth charges, very well centered).

At a certain point, probably because of the damage suffered, Gondar began to rise involuntarily in depth, reaching a depth of 40 meters. This allowed depth charge discharges to have even more devastating effects.

Five minutes after the water raised by H.M.A.S. Stuart’s last bomb blast (at 6:25 AM) had subsided, the anti-submarine seaplane Short Sunderland Mk I number L2166 (the “U” aircraft of the 230th Squadron of the Royal Air Force), piloted by Captain P. H. Alington and Lieutenant Brand, also arrived from the south. Taking off from Alexandria at 5.30 AM, once on the spot (indicated by the pilot as 31°35′ N and 28°43′ E) the plane circled H.M.A.S. Stuart, made a light signal of recognition and then began to fly over the sea at low altitude, in search of the submarine. An hour later (according to another source, at seven o’clock in the morning), as if that were not enough, the anti-submarine trawler H.M.S. Sindonis also arrived on the scene and joined the hunt.

The Gondar photographed by the crew of the Sunderland
(Imperial War Museum)

Gondar tried in every way to evade the chase, but after hours and hours of bombardment the damage became too serious to be able to hope to survive much longer. The efforts of the chief engineer Cicirello were no longer enough to repair the damage. At seven o’clock, a bomb exploded very close to Gondar and caused a violent change in depth. To counteract the waterways, the internal pressure had been raised to three atmospheres, almost exhausting the available reserve.

It was interesting to note a significant discrepancy between the British and Australian sources. According to Australian Navy sources, while this was happening, H.M.A.S. Stuart meanwhile kept the sonar contact with the submarine, which it never lost, until it emerged. According to Normak Franks’ book “Search, find and kill”, dedicated to the RAF’s successes in anti-submarine warfare, H.M.A.S. Stuart had lost contact when Alington’s Sunderland arrived on the scene. It was the seaplane that found the boat, when the crew spotted air bubbles surfacing a couple of miles from the destroyer. At this point Sunderland dropped a depth charge on the bubble sighted. The crew then spotted another bubble and dropped a second bomb on it, but this time the device did not explode. A third bomb exploded, and this time Gondar had to emerge.

According to Australian sources, at 8:20 AM (9:20 AM H.M.A.S. Stuart time) the Sunderland dropped a cluster of bombs about 2,700 meters deep forward of the Stuart.

In any case, around 8.30 AM Gondar began to take on water more copiously, while it was now impossible to maintain depth. Compressed air reserve was reduced to 30 kg/cm2, the minimum for attempting to surface. Commander Giorgini conferred with the officers and then, believing that the situation was now unbearable and that remaining submerged would have meant sinking at any moment with the total loss of the crew, he ordered Commander Brunetti to surface, abandon, and sink the boat by itself. Giorgini ordered Brunetti not to attempt an attack or launch torpedoes unless the submarine was in a suitable position to launch at the time of coming to the surface. So, it was done. The men put on their life jackets, and at 8.40 AM Commander Brunetti had the diving tank and the double central bottoms blown.

(A source, probably erroneous, gives a rather different version: at eight o’clock in the morning Gondar began to sink uncontrollably due to the damage suffered, so all the tanks were blown to stop the sinking; the submarine stopped at a depth of 155 meters, but then began to rise uncontrollably, with increasing speed, until it came to the surface).

According to some British sources, during the surfacing maneuver the Sunderland dropped a bomb on the air bubble from an altitude of 210 meters that signaled that the submarine was about to surface. This caused Gondar to lose control, which was at that time at a depth of about twenty meters, and which sank again to a depth of 90 meters, and then resumed the surfacing maneuver when all the tanks were blown.

Rising rapidly to the surface, at a speed of about 10 knots, the battered Gondar resurfaced one last time right in the middle of the enemy ships. Her bow came to the surface only 730 meters from the bow of H.M.A.S. Stuart. It was 9:20 AM, 11 hours had passed since the first depth charge attack.

H.M.A.S. Stuart immediately opened fire with all the guns, fortunately not very accurate (the destroyer was estimated to have passed the conning tower from side to side with a cannonade, while others fell all around the submarine), while H.M.S. Sindonis maneuvered to get closer, the Sunderland dropped one or perhaps three bombs, which exploded close to the submarine (Brunetti, in his report, spoke of two bombs, dropped from the Sunderland from about 50 meters above sea level, while the crew was abandoning the unit; they exploded about ten meters forward to port).

The Gondar sinking
(Australian War Memorial)

Gondar’s navigation officer, Ensign Giuseppe Dell’Oro, was instructed by Commander Brunetti to throw the box containing the secret publications into the sea, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. When he opened the hatch to be among the first, the strong pressure inside the submarine, much higher than the external one, threw him into the air, causing him to fall back on deck, wounded. After him, the men began to escape through the hatches of the bow and conning tower, jumping into the water.

On H.M.A.S. Stuart, after firing the first salvo, it was seen that the crew of Gondar was abandoning the unit, so firing ceased, and Commander Teacher ordered a dingy to be put to sea. The distance between the two units was just over 900 meters; some of the Italian sailors swam all the way aboard H.M.A.S. Stuart, while others were picked up by the dingy. They were soaked, dirty, and exhausted.

Commander Francesco Brunetti (in this picture already promoted to Captain)
(Giovanni Pinna Collection)

When almost the entire crew had thrown themselves into the sea, Commander Brunetti and some other men, including sailor electrician Luigi Longobardi, went down to the maneuvering room, opened the air vents of the surface, the double central bottoms and the rapid, to sink the submarine (according to some sources, they also activated a dozen explosive charges for self-destruction),  and then, having climbed back into the conning tower, they left the boat last (according to another version, Brunetti, after opening the Kingstone, climbed into the conning tower and waited for the submarine to sink under him, until he found himself in the water). Captain Giorgini made one last lap to check that there was no one left on board, then jumped into the sea.

Electrician  Luigi Longobardi
(Giovanni Pinna Collection)

Captain Teacher of H.M.A.S. Stuart had hoped to capture Gondar intact and tow it to Alexandria, but when the dingy moved to the side of the dying submarine, her occupants realized that the scuttling procedures had been initiated. Explosive charges exploded shortly after the last man had left the boat. Gradually but rapidly, Gondar settled and slid beneath the waves at 32°02′ N and 27°54′ E (according to Italian sources) or 31°33′ N and 28°33′ E (according to British sources; a dozen miles off Marsa Matruh, and 25 miles off El Daba), in water more than 2,000 meters deep. The bow of the submarine remained above the surface for five or ten minutes, before finally disappearing into the abyss. It was 9:25 AM (9:50 AM for another source) on September 30th, 1940.

The Sunderland, after flying over the sinking boat taking several photos, returned to its base, where it arrived at 10.30 AM.

H.M.A.S. Stuart rescuing some of the crewmembers of the Gondar photographed from the Sunderland

The Italian crew and raiders were rescued and taken prisoner by the British units. H.M.A.S. Stuart recovered 28 men, including Brunetti, Giorgini, Cicirello and a second lieutenant, while another 19 survivors, including Toschi, were recovered by the H.M.S. Sindonis.

Signaller L. E. Clifford later recalled that one of the survivors, while boarding H.M.A.S. Stuart, saw an Australian sailor armed with a rifle with a bayonet and shouted, “No kill”, misunderstanding the meaning of that presence. Commander Brunetti, who spoke fairly good English, stated that he had been forced to surface because the bombs had destroyed the air purification apparatus, it had not been possible to repair it, and the air had become unbreathable.

There was only one victim, the Neapolitan sailor Luigi Longobardi. Lingering on board, with the commander Brunetti and a few others, to provide for the sinking, he threw himself into the sea among the very last one and was probably killed at sea by the explosion of an airplane bomb. He was decorated with the Gold Medal for Military Valor, in memory.

(Strangely, British sources speak of two casualties among the crew of the Gondar, one of whom would have drowned and the other killed by a bomb from Sunderland: but the only one who fell among the crew of the submarine would have been Luigi Longobardi).

The sinking of Gondar was a hard blow for the young I Flotilla MAS: in one fell swoop a submarine SLC carrier, three SLCs, as many trained and capable crews and the commander of the flotilla himself had been lost.

As a result of the loss of the Gondar, moreover, the veil of secrecy that covered the assault craft employed by the 1st MAS Flotilla began to crack. When the submarine surfaced before sinking, in fact, British ships and planes did not fail to notice the unusual cylinders on its deck. The presence on the submarine of so many officers and divers also aroused many suspicions. Upon their arrival in Alexandria, the survivors were immediately interrogated, especially Giorgini, the highest ranking (who on H.M.A.S. Stuart had passed himself off, apparently successfully, as a destroyer commander embarked on Gondar as a passenger). The questions focused mainly on the cylinders and the presence of officers and divers. Giorgini did not answer, but a British Naval Intelligence officer surprised him when he asked him if he was the commander of the I Flotilla MAS based in La Spezia, and if, on the coast between La Spezia and Livorno, officers and non-commissioned officers were trained who would then have to attack British ports and naval bases in the Mediterranean.

According to the aforementioned article by Payne and Lind in the June 1977 Naval Historical Review, it was the commander of the Gondar, questioned by Teacher, who “broke down in tears” and revealed that the submarine was carrying three “human torpedoes” for an attack on the ship in the port of Alexandria.

One way or another, the British already knew something about the Flotilla’s activities, but this would not allow them to stop the attacks on Alexandria, Suda, Gibraltar and Algiers that would be launched in the years to come, once the Flotilla, having recovered from its initial losses and drawing on past experiences, had refined its methods.

On arrival in Alexandria, H.M.A.S. Stuart was given a hero’s welcome, especially – in very colorful terms – by the other units of the Australian destroyer flotilla (H.M.A.S. Vampire, H.M.A.S. Vendetta and H.M.A.S. Waterhen). Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, reported it to the fleet as “an outstanding example of a result obtained through patience and skill in the use of the Asdic (sonar) apparatus”. The commander of H.M.A.S. Stuart was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order for the sinking of the Gondar, while the sonar officers (Second Lieutenants J. G. Griffin and T. S. Cree and Petty Officers Ronald A. H. MacDonald and L. T. Pike) received the Distinguished Service Cross (the two officers) and the Distinguished Service Medal (the two non-commissioned officers).

The men of Gondar first ended up in the prison camp of Geneifa, Egypt, where the survivors of the submarines Berillo, Rubino, Galvani and Uebi Scebeli and other units sunk during the summer of 1940 were already located; later they were transferred to various prison camps in India.

Not everyone resigned themselves to spending the rest of the war behind a fence. Elios Toschi, in particular, after passing through the camps of Ahmednagar and Ramgarh, ended up in Yol, a camp reserved for prisoners who had already tried several times to escape. From there Toschi escaped together with the Lieutenant Commander Camillo Milesi Ferretti, former commander of the submarine Berillo. Their paths diverged and Toschi, who had attempted to cross the Himalayas to try to return to Italy, was recaptured. Fleeing again, Toschi finally took refuge in neutral Portuguese India.

Captain Naval Weapons Gustavo Stefanini, future managing director of OTO Melara, remained a prisoner in Bangalore until 1946; Commander Giorgini also remained in captivity until April 1946, while Commander Brunetti was repatriated in 1944, during the co-belligerence.

After the war, Stefanini returned to the Italian defense industrial scene, becoming CEO of OTO Melara.
He was the ‘father’ of the 76mm gun mount, the most prolific and successful naval gun mount of modern times.
(Naval Historical Society of Australia)

The motivation for the Gold Medal for Military Valor awarded to the memory of the electrician sailor Luigi Longobardi, born in Lettere (NA) on April 22, 1920:

“An electrician embarked on a submarine attacked with depth charges by three enemy ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours, he worked tirelessly in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him with skill and determination. When it became necessary to emerge in order to scuttle the submarine that had been unused by the explosions of the bombs, he gave proof of exceptional courage and a deep sense of duty, remaining at his post until the last possible possibilities in order to contribute to the salvation of the Unit. Throwing himself into the sea in his last moments, he was hit by the explosion of bombs dropped from an airplane and sacrificed his young life for an extreme ideal of his homeland that had kept him on the ship beyond his duty. Eastern Mediterranean, 30 September 1940.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Lieutenant Francesco Brunetti, born in La Spezia on November 20, 1909:

“Commander of a submarine destined to carry out the offensive with special means to an armed enemy naval base, he was attacked with depth charges by three ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours. In difficult conditions due to continuous serious damage suffered by the submarine, he tried by every means to escape the persistent enemy chase until every further attempt at resistance was frustrated, he did his utmost and arranged for the crew to abandon the submarine in a disciplined and rapid manner. Oblivious to the artillery fire and the throwing of bombs by the unit, which it abandoned only when the force of the sea tore it from the bridge. An example of cold blood, skill and a high sense of duty.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Lieutenant Vincenzo Cicirello of the Naval Engineers Machinery Directorate:

“Chief Engineer of a submarine attacked with depth charges by three enemy ships and an aircraft for twelve consecutive hours, in difficult environmental conditions due to continuous serious failures reported by the unit, he worked tirelessly to repair the failures themselves and effectively assisted the commander in prolonging the submarine’s resistance as much as possible. He left the unit only at the command of the commander, showing a cool head, a spirit of sacrifice and a high sense of duty.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valor awarded to Ensign Giuseppe Dell’Oro:

“A course officer of submarines attacked with depth charges… he worked tirelessly to ensure the smooth running of his service. Having been ordered to be one of the first to abandon the unit to throw the box of secret publications into the sea, he managed to carry out the order, despite the fact that when he came out of the hatch he was thrown onto the deck by the strong internal pressure, being injured.”

The motivation for the Silver Medal for Military Valour awarded to frigate captain Mario Giorgini, born in Massa Carrara on March 19, 1900:

“Embarked on a submarine as the leader of an expedition of assault vehicles destined for a risky mission against an enemy base, he gave the commander of the unit, subjected to a long and exhausting hunt by three ships and an aircraft, the solid support dictated by his valid experience and his indomitable courage. After 12 hours of hunting, the unit emerged due to irreparable damage, and ordered its rapid sinking in order to ensure that the disappearance of the hull also that of the treacherous vehicles embarked. As the unit began to sink, he entered the interior rooms to personally supervise the complete evacuation of the crew. An example of serene bravery and of the highest military virtues.”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal4 3,440 534 33120.425.02

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
LongobardiLuigiElectricianElettricista9/30/1940

R. Smg. Durbo

The submarine Durbo was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged). The boat completed 6 missions in the war, covering a total of 2,598 miles on the surface and 976 submerged.

Brief and partial chronology

March 8th, 1937

Set-up in the Odero-Terni-Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

March 6th, 1938

Launched at the Odero-Terni-Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

The launch of Durbo
(From “I sommergibili classe 600 Serie Adua” by Alessandro Turrini)

July 1st, 1938

Official entry into service followed by a training cruise.

Durbo at sea

August 10th, 1938

Durbo was stationed in Leros – an island that for the men of Durbo, and the others who were stationed there, consisted of “only rocks and no fun” – under the command of Maricosom (the command of the Italian submarine fleet), spending a year engaged in exercises between Rhodes and Leros before returning to Italy.

June 9th, 1940

Durbo (Lieutenant Commander Armando Acanfora), which with the twin boats Beilul and Tembien formed the XXXV Submarine Squadron (III Grupsom) based in Messina (or Augusta), left base for an offensive-exploratory mission in the Gulf of Hammamet.

Four hours after departure – it was by then June 10th – Commander Acanfora, while sailing on the surface, opened an envelope and informed the crew that Italy was now at war with France and the United Kingdom.

During this period (from January 22nd, 1940 to shortly after the entry into the war) the second in command of the unit was the Lieutenant Commander Gianfranco Gazzana Priaroggia, future Atlantic ace on the submarine Da Vinci.

June 16th, 1940

At 6.10 AM, an position 34°06′ N and 11°33′ E (in the Gulf of Hammament, northeast of Susa and 44 miles southwest of Pantelleria), while sailing towards its patrol area, Durbo launched a pair of torpedoes against a light unit (perhaps a corvette, or a French destroyer), hearing a violent detonation after two minutes,  But rough seas made it impossible to verify whether the ship was really hit. After the attack, the submarine had to dive to a depth of 70-80 meters and remained motionless, in order to evade the enemy reaction.

Some Italian sources have speculated that on June 16th, Durbo may have torpedoed the French submarine Morse, which disappeared in those days in the waters off Tunisia, but the discovery of the wreck of the French unit off Sfax – the Morse was found already on August 16th, 1940 (the wreck was later recovered in 1956) broken in two,  next to a French minefield that was missing a mine – it actually allowed its loss to be attributed to the collision with a mine of the French defensive barriers.

July 1940

Complete two patrols, with no major events.

September 1940

Durbo carried out a patrol, without results.

October 1940

Durbo completed another mission, also without any events worth mentioning. Some of the summer-autumn patrols were carried out in the waters of Pantelleria, or in the vicinity of Malta.

The Sinking

On October 9th, 1940, Durbo, still under the command of Lieutenant Acanfora, departed Messina, immediately after the end of a British bombardment, to reach the new assigned operational area, about seventy miles east of Gibraltar (between the meridians of Malaga and Almeria), where it arrived on October 12th. Not far away, was operating the twin boat Lafolè. The two submarines, which had left at the same time to patrol the waters east of Gibraltar, at the end of the mission, were supposed to transit through the Strait of Bonifacio and then reach Naples.

On the 12th, Durbo reached its own area off the island of Alboran, south of Malaga and 70 miles east of Gibraltar, and began to patrol it in anticipation of a British convoy that was supposed to enter the western Mediterranean and of which the submarine was supposed to signal the entry into the Mediterranean, however it was not sighted. The days of the patrol passed empty, and they were all the same, without attacks or major events. The submarine spent the day immersed at periscope depth, to avoid sighting, and the night on the surface, to recharge the batteries. The only ships sighted were one or two neutral passenger steamers, probably Spanish, which were allowed to pass.

On the afternoon of October 17th, Durbo sighted a British destroyer, but Commander Acanfora felt that the sea was too rough to attempt an attack. The encounter with the enemy warship, however, put Acanfora on his toes, so that he decided to stay submerged for most of the following night, contrary to what he had done in the previous days.

At 9:30 AM on October 18th, however, the seaplane Saunders Roe A. 27 “London” K 5913 of the 202nd Squadron of the Royal Air Force, piloted by Captain Percy R. Hatfield (later protagonist of the search and identification in the Atlantic of the German battleship Bismarck), sighted air bubbles and a small slick of fuel while flying off the island of Alboran, 65 miles east of the Strait of Gibraltar. Those were the tracks of the Durbo. On board the submarine, in fact, the crew was trying to repair a leak in the compressed air system, which had always caused problems.

Along with another “London” seaplane of the 202nd Squadron, piloted by Captain N. F. Eagleton, Hatfield dropped bombs over the point from which the bubbles and fuel came, then recalled two British destroyers, H.M.S. Firedrake (Commander Stephen Hugh Norris, who would receive the Distinguished Service Order for the action), detached from the escort of convoy “HG 45”, and H.M.S. Wrestler (Lieutenant Eric Lister Jones). One of the two arrived the same morning, followed in the afternoon by the second, spotting a large slick of fuel, the two ships soon made sonar contact.

The bombs dropped by the planes, which exploded while the unit was coming to periscope depth, had not damaged the Durbo, which then dove to a depth of 35 meters, but in the following half an hour the submarine’s crew realized that warships had also arrived, and were now chasing it. At 10:00 AM in the morning, the submarine suffered the first heavy bombardment with depth charges. The first depth charge exploded near the fuel tanks, damaging them and causing a leak that began to come on the surface, marking the position of the Italian unit even more visibly (according to the memory of a survivor, in addition to the diesel tanks, the torpedo room was also damaged). Durbo then descended to 58 meters and tried to get away, but at very low speed, since the previous night the period on the surface for recharging the batteries had lasted less than usual, the electric motors now had little energy to use.

Against the Durbo, which continued to maneuver in every way tring to get away and evade the chase, was unleashed a storm of depth charges not only by the two destroyers, which continued to follow it and bombard it with intense and repeated bomb drops, but also by the two “Londons” of Hatfield and Eagleton (for a source,  probably erroneous, the destroyer H.M.S. Vidette or H.M.S. Hotspur would also have participated in the hunt).

At 1:30 PM the boat was hit by a second violent depth discharge, and the crew was “pleasantly” surprised to see how well the hull was able to withstand explosions. At 4:30 PM Durbo received a third shower of depth charges, this time with devastating effects: all the instruments were put out of action, the pumps were damaged, and the light failed, so much so that the only thing left to illuminate the dark rooms of the submarine were the flashlights of the captain and the chief engineer and a few portable lights supplied to the crew.

The main propeller shafts were deformed, which made it difficult to keep the engines running, reducing their efficiency to a scant 40 revolutions per minute with 1,000 amperes. As if that was not enough, waterways sprang in the aft compartments (aft torpedo room and engine room), and the consequent flooding caused the stern to sink, until it reached an angle of 20 degrees. Durbo descended to a depth of 110 meters, thirty meters more than the test depth. The stern pumps were no longer usable because their motors were already underwater. Chlorine gas was poisoning the air and the pressure of the compressed air had dropped to 40 kg, while the pressure inside the submarine itself was becoming unbearable. The conning tower was also badly damaged.

At 9:00 PM, after eleven hours of hammering, with the boat badly damaged, water continuing to rise, air reserves almost exhausted, and a worrying development of chlorine gas, the crew gathered in the maneuvering room.

There Commander Acanfora, after a few moments of reflection, had to order “ready to surface”; there was nothing more to do. At 9:30 PM Durbo appeared on the surface. The detonations of the depth charges had put the deck gun out of action, so, the boat was not even able to attempt to fight on the surface – with a predictable outcome – the commander had to order to start the scuttling maneuvers and to abandon the ship.

As soon as the first man opened the conning tower’s hatch, however, he was greeted by a burst of machine-gun fire from one of the destroyers, who probably believed that the submarine wanted to engage in surface combat. In the officers’ quarters, the volunteer electrician Armando Albanelli, a nineteen-year-old from Bologna who had joined the submariners because he was looking for adventure, sipped liquor to make his fear go away, as did other members of the crew.

The chief engineer shouted, “Hail to the Duce, long live the king, long live Italy.” The navigation officer went on deck and flashed lights, prompting the British ships to cease fire, after which the crew lined up and began to go out on deck. According to Armando Albanelli’s recollection, Commander Acanfora gave the order “to get out, to make the two boxes with the codes disappear and to open the scuttling valves”, but unfortunately, apparently, the second of the three provisions was not implemented.

One of the last men to abandon the boat, after having opened the seacock valves on the orders of the captain – to avoid the capture and towing of the unit – was Antonio Pisciotta. For unknown reasons his name would not appear on the first list of prisoners, so that in Italy he was reported missing, presumably fallen in action, and his parents received a telegram informing them of their son’s death.

Armando Albanelli, who also went on deck after opening the valves, threw himself into the sea as the others had done before him. The sea space in front of it was illuminated by the searchlights of the enemy ships. Albanelli immediately began to swim towards H.M.S. Firedrake, about thirty meters away, which had already lowered several cargo nets along its bulwarks, so that the castaways could cling to it.

H.M.S. Firedrake

Before the waters of the Mediterranean closed forever over the Durbo, a British boarding team composed of H.M.S. Firedrake and H.M.S. Wrestler’s men had time to get on board. Second Lieutenant Peter Louis Meryon (who later received the Distinguished Service Order), of H.M.S. Wrestler, led Sergeant Harold Brown (later decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal) and Sergeant Stoker George Andrews.  They were also H.M.S. Wrestler’s, down the ladder that led to the submarine’s maneuvering chamber, where the water was rising through the specially opened seacock valves. Cutting through the darkness of the room with a flashlight, H.M.S. Wrestler’s three men and Second Lieutenant Basil Wilson of the Firedrake (later mentioned in the dispatches as well as Sergeant Andrews), joined them, and took papers, ciphers, and operation orders – secret documents that should have been destroyed before abandoning ship, according to the instructions – before having to abandon the boat after five minutes.

Durbo sank aft at 7:50 PM (the time zone, different from the one indicating the surface at 9:30 PM, is unclear) on September 18th, shortly after being abandoned by the crew, in position 35°57′ N and 04°00′ W (or 34°54′ N and 04°17′ W according to other sources, probably erroneous, 120 miles east of Gibraltar, and off the island of Alboran), while all 46 men of his crew (5 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers and sailors; by other sources, 48 men in all) were picked up by H.M.S. Firedrake, where they were treated amicably. There were no casualties. The survivors, after receiving dry clothes, food and cigarettes on H.M.S. Firedrake, were disembarked in Gibraltar the same day.

The sinking of Durbo was the only success in anti-submarine warfare achieved by the “London” seaplanes, aircraft by that time outdated and close to replacement.

The capture of the secret documents, unfortunately, had a disastrous outcome in a very short term: the position of other Italian submarines was indicated on them, and just two days later, on October 20th, a group of British destroyers would set a trap for Lafolè, whose close position had emerged from the captured documents. Lafolè was sunk after a hard hunt, leaving only nine survivors.

In Italy, no one knew about the capture of the documents on the submarine Durbo, so ciphers and operation orders were not changed. Also from the documents captured on the Durbo, the British secret services learned the future position of three other Italian submarines in the Aegean Sea: Neghelli was found at dawn on November 25th, 1940 in position 36°30′ N and 26°30′ E, Naiade reached the same point at dawn on the 26th and Atropos was there at dawn on the 27th. Fortunately, no traps could be set up in such cases, and the three boats completed their patrols unaware of the danger they had run.

After arriving in Gibraltar, the survivors of the submarine Durbo were embarked on the troop transport Reina del Pacifico, which transported them to England to captivity at the end of October. Here, for the first 18 months, they were placed in various prison camps, the first of which was set up in the Scottish residence of Glenbranter House (POW Camp 6), but there one of the prisoners, unable to endure the cold and wet Scottish winter, the lack of food and the distance from his family, killed himself.

Later the prisoners were moved to POW Camp 13, in Derbyshire (central England), and then (autumn 1941) to POW Camp 16 near Rugeley.

When the camp became overcrowded, the men of the submarine Durbo, in the autumn of 1942, were transferred to the large transit camp of Lodge Moor (Camp 17), from where they were then embarked on a ship, crossed the Atlantic disembarking at Halifax and finally interned in a prison camp in the United States, in Tennessee, remaining in America until 1946. While in Britain, where supplies were scarce, the prisoners were almost starving, in the United States they were abundantly refreshed, and found much better conditions.

Vittorio Rappini, a radio operator (a seventeen-year-old volunteer who had enlisted in the Navy in search of adventure), during his imprisonment learned that H.M.S. Firedrake, on December 17th, 1942 (more or less at the time of the transfer of Durbo’s prisoners from the United Kingdom to the United States), had been sunk in the Atlantic by the German submarine U 211,  leaving only 26 survivors out of 196 men of his crew:. Recalling the friendly treatment he received from the sailors of the destroyer, Rappini was saddened to learn that almost all of them had died.

As for Antonio Pisciotta, Vittorio Rappini’s family had also received, on November 14th, 1940, a telegram signed by Admiral Guido Cappucci (commander of the Royal Maritime Crews Corps), informing them that their son was missing. Bu then came the news that Vittorio was alive and a prisoner of war, and that he was sending greetings and good wishes, arrived as early as December 27th through the Vatican (from the Apostolic Delegate in London), through the work of Cardinal Giovanni Montini, the future Pope Paul VI.

In 1944, after the armistice between Italy and the Allies, Rappini joined the Italian Service Units, groups of volunteer prisoners employed as a workforce in support of the Allied war effort (Rappini was part of the Italian Service Unit at Fort Meade). Also during his imprisonment, Rappini had the opportunity to learn to speak and write in English, which after the war would allow him to work with the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation program) and later – after an unfortunate attempt to emigrate to Boston – he emigrate to Canada, disembarking in June 1951 at Pier 21 of the Port of Halifax,  the same pier at which he had landed in 1942 as a prisoner, coming from Great Britain and bound for the Tennessee prison camp. Here Rampini found work and a girl who became his wife.

Durbo’s crewmembers in POW Camp 17, Lodge Moor, fall 1942.

Only six months after the sinking, Antonio Pisciotta’s parents, who believed their son to be dead, received a telegram informing them that their son was alive and a prisoner. After the war, in 1951, Pisciotta returned to the United States, to settle there with his wife and three children.

Below, an eyewitness recount from the BBC ”People’s War’ published on 20 May 2004

The date was October 7th. We resumed our anti-submarine patrols on our return to Gib. The next incident I remember was some 10 days later, when we engaged an Italian submarine in company with the destroyers Wrestler and Vidette and eventually sunk the submarine. The original sighting was by the air patrol from Gib. The aircraft dropped bombs and caused the sub. to dive. The destroyers then were called in and we then engaged in a combined operation dropping depth charges in relay. I was in the wheelhouse on duty at action stations and was able to follow the action at first hand. The submarine suddenly surfaced and a short exchange of gunfire ensued. Very soon it was apparent that the Italian crew were abandoning ship. A boarding party was dispatched by one of the destroyers and some papers were recovered before the submarine sank. The next action to involve us was the receipt of a dozen or so of prisoners in our mess deck. A very strange feeling to have them amongst us but very soon we were made aware that they were much relieved to be out of the war They were singing songs to us later in the mess deck and making it so obvious they were no longer a threat. I have in my possession a drawing in pencil made by one of them showing his impressions of the sinking.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal6 2,598 976 34105.124.38

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
6/16/194006:10C.C. Armando AcanforaMediterranean34°06’N-11°33’E TorpedoFailed?Corvette or DestroyerFrance

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate

R. Smg. Dessiè

The submarine Dessiè was an Adwa-class coastal submarine (698 tons displacement on the surface and 866 tons submerged).

The boat completed 27 missions of various types (18 patrols, 1 transport, and 8 transfers), covering a total of 15,193 miles on the surface and 4,263 submerged.

The launch of the submarine Dessiè from a real of the ‘Istituto Luce’

Brief and partial chronology

April 20th, 1936

Setting up at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto.

November 20th, 1936

Launched at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto.

Dessiè, and the twin boat Dagabur, on the slip in Taranto

April 14, 1937

Entry into service. Dessiè was assigned to the XLIII Submarine Squadron, based in Taranto.

The early captains were Lieutenant Gino Birindelli, and later Primo Longobardo, both future M.O.V.M. (Gold Medal for Valor). Birindelli would also reach the top rank in the Navy in the 70s.

August 20th, 1937

Under the command of Lieutenant Mario Muro, Dessiè sailed from Leros to participate in the Spanish Civil War as part of a clandestine mission in the Aegean Sea against the traffic of supplies for the Spanish Republican forces.

August 29th, 1937

The boat returned to Leros, ending the mission without having reaped any results.

1938

Located in Tobruk.

Dessiè in 1938

1940

Transferred to Taranto and later to Augusta.

June 10th, 1940

When Italy entered the war, Dessiè (Lieutenant Commander Fausto Sestini) was part of the XLVI Submarine Squadron (IV Grupsom of Taranto), along with the twin boats Dagabur, Uarsciek and Uebi Scebeli.

August 8th, 1940

Sent on patrol southwest of Crete, between the parallel of Gaudo, the coast of Crete and the meridian of Cerigotto. It was the first war patrol under the command of Lieutenant Commander Fausto Sestini.

August 13th, 1940

In the evening, the crew sighted a fast steamer heading east and chased it on the surface, but was unable to complete the attack maneuver, because the merchant took advantage of its higher speed to escape.

August 16th, 1940

The boat concludes the mission, returning to base.

October 28th, 1940

The boat was among the submarines sent to form a barrier between the Ionian Sea and the Aegean Sea. Even though the Mediterranean Fleet (which operates in that area, going as far west as the Ionian Islands) had gone out to sea, Dessiè, sent south of Crete, did not see anything: the barrier it forms with three other boats (Luigi Settembrini, Ciro Menotti, Tricheco) was in fact too wide.

November 25th, 1940

Dessiè (Lieutenant Adriano Pini) was sent off the coast of Malta to participate in the fight against the British operation “Collar” (transfer of ships from Alexandria to Gibraltar, dispatch of convoys with supplies from Gibraltar to Malta and the ports of the Levant, all with the help of Force H and the Mediterranean Fleet: the inconclusive battle of Cape Teulada would be the result).

November 28th, 1940

At 3.02 AM Dessiè, lying in ambush 50 miles east/southeast of Pantelleria (and west of Malta), sighted in position 36°30′ N and 12°59′ E three major units proceeding in a line with an estimated course of 270° (westward) and speed 20 knots: it was the British 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the heavy cruiser H.M.S. York and the light cruisers H.M.S. Glasgow and H.M.S. Gloucester,  at sea as part of British convoy traffic in connection with Operation Collar. At 3:05 AM the submarine launched two torpedoes from the aft tubes, from a distance of 3,500 meters, against the middle ship (H.M.S. Glasgow), then disengaged in diving. Two loud explosions were heard and then a violent explosion, however, no ship was hit.

December 16th through 25th, 1940

The boat was sent to patrol, along with the submarines Fratelli Bandiera and Serpente, in the waters around Malta.

January 1941

Unsuccessful ambush off the coast of Derna.

May 20th, 1941

Sent to lie in wait between Crete, Alexandria and Sollum, along with numerous other submarines, in support of the German invasion of Crete (Operation “Merkur”).

July 21st and 22nd, 1941

Sent between Pantelleria and Malta, together with three other submarines (Fratelli Bandiera, Luciano Manara and Ruggero Settimo; the boats were deployed twenty miles from each other), in contrast to the British operation “Substance”, consisting in sending to Malta a convoy of supplies – six cargo ships and a troop transport – escorted by the battleship H.M.S. Nelson, the light cruisers H.M.S. Edinburgh,  H.M.S. Manchester and H.M.S. Arethusa and 11 destroyers, and at the same time the return from Malta of six unloaded merchant ships and the military tanker Breconshire, escorted by the destroyer Encounter. Force H, which went out to sea with the battlecruiser H.M.S. Renown, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal, the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione and six destroyers, provided cover for the operation, while units of the Mediterranean Fleet from Haifa and Alexandria carried out diversionary actions. Dessiè did not spot the British convoy.

January 3rd, 1942

Sent to lie in wait south of Malta (the ambush began at noon on January 3rd), in the area between the meridians 23°20′ E and 23°40′ E and the parallels 33°00′ N and 33°40′ N, with the task of sighting and attacking any British naval forces that might take to the sea to oppose Operation “M. 43”,  consisting of sending a large convoy of supplies to Libya. Such a threat would not manifest itself.

June 11th, 1942

The boat was sent, together with four other submarines (Onice, Ascianghi, Aradam and Corallo) to ambush in the triangle between Malta, Pantelleria and Lampedusa in contrast to the British operation “Harpoon” (a heavily escorted convoy from Gibraltar to Malta), as part of the Battle of Mid-June. However, Dessiè did not see any ships.

July 15th, 1942

The submarine Dessiè, along with other submarines, was sent to lie in wait between La Galite, the Isle of Dogs, Cape Bon, and Cape Kelibia to intercept the British fast minelayer H.M.S. Welshman, bound for Malta with urgent supplies. The boat did not spot British unity.

August 11th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Renato Scandola, Dessiè departed from Trapani bound for a sector north of the Gulf of Tunis, to participate in the fight against the British convoy “Pedestal” bound for Malta, an operation that would lead to the largest air-naval battle of the Mediterranean war, the Battle of Mid-August. Dessiè, along with Otaria, Dandolo, Emo, Avorio, Cobalto, Alagi, Ascianghi, Axum and Bronzo, forms a barrage of ten submarines north of Tunisia, between the meridians of the Scogli Fratelli and the Banco Skerki (from the waters east of La Galite to the approaches of the Strait of Sicily), constituting a barrier line of the western entrance of the Strait of Sicily,  north of the La Galite-Banco Skerki junction. The orders were to act with great offensive determination, launching as many torpedoes as possible against any target, merchant, or military, larger than a destroyer. The specific Dessiè ambush area was located 80 miles north of Tunisia, in the Skerki Bank channel.

August 12th, 1942

At 5.22 AM Dessiè dove, entering the assigned area.

At 6:07 PM, a hydrophone picked up an indistinct noise on a 270° bearing, but observation on the periscope revealed nothing. The submarine then maneuvered to get closer to the source of the noise, the rotation of which gave Commander Scandola the impression that it was falling slightly towards the coast. Dessiè took a course perpendicular to the survey, and at 7:00 PM it sighted the treetops and the smoke emitted by the ships of the convoy on the periscope (according to a source, Dessiè would have been guided towards the convoy also by the smoke of the fires of the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Indomitable, severely damaged by Axis air attacks).

At 7:07 PM, Dessiè observed an attack by Italian planes against the convoy, whose ships proceeded in scattered order, zigzagging under the protection of destroyers. At 7:10 PM, Scandola counted 24 ships on the periscope: 14 merchant ships and 10 destroyers. Several large merchant ships were forming a compact nucleus (with a true course of 110° and an estimated speed of 15 knots), while some others continued in scattered order. Three destroyers crossed forward of the larger group, and two others defended the port side towards the stern. Two other destroyers, further north, keep Dessiè on about zero beta.

The sea was very calm, the sun low on the horizon. Dessiè was on an attack course due to an impact of 110°, and at 7.38 PM (in position 37°38′ N and 10°25′ E, 45 miles northwest of Cape Bon), from an estimated distance of 1800 meters, launched at intervals of three seconds the four torpedoes of the forward tubes, with a divergence of two degrees between one and the other. The target was a group of eight large merchant ships (estimated tonnage 10,000-15,000 GRT) very close to each other (to the point that the bow of some “covers” the stern of others), with modern lines (slender bow and cruiser stern) and propelled by turbines.

After launching, Dessiè involuntarily surfaces with the conning tower. Scandola ordered a dive to a depth of 40 meters, and as this happened, the detonations of two torpedoes were heard 1 minute and 40 seconds after the first launch. Continuous explosions could be heard on the hydrophones, which made it impossible to understand if any ship had stopped. Commander Scandola then decided to return to periscope depth, to attack other ships, if possible, with torpedoes from the stern tubes.

At 7:56 PM, while Dessiè was going up, the counterattack of the escort began. Three enemy units, equipped with sonar and probably hydrophones, launch about 120 depth charges in the space of an hour and a half. None, however, exploded close enough to cause damage to the submarine, which was stationary at 90 meters, in silent trim. With each restart of the engines, the hunt resumes with greater intensity.

At 9:20 PM the drops became weaker until they disappeared, and at 9:27 PM the anti-submarine hunt was finally over. Commander Scandola had the impression that the launch of the torpedoes has achieved results, because the counterattack came only after twenty minutes and two of the enemy destroyers always kept in the same sector (the one where Scandola thinks the affected merchant ships were located), moving away from it only to launch the depth charges.

The outcome of the launch of Dessiè is, to this day, still the subject of a debate. Several historians believe it was likely that it was one of its torpedoes that hit the large British motor ship Brisbane Star, of 12,791 GRT, which suffered serious damage (initially immobilized, it soon managed to start up again; a few hours later it was hit by a second torpedo, launched by an aircraft) but it was one of the few merchant ships in the convoy to be able to reach Malta. Some also believe that one or more torpedoes from Dessiè sank the British motor ship Deucalion, of 7516 GRT (which sank in position 37°38′ N and 10°25′ E, five miles east of the Isle of Dogs and 39 miles northeast of Bizerte), already damaged by German air attacks. However, the careful research of the historian Francesco Mattesini, as well as most historians, credits the sinking of the Deucalion to the action of German Heinkel He 111 torpedo bombers alone. Since the moment of the attack of Dessiè also coincided with that of an Italian-German air attack, with torpedo launched by Italian Savoia Marchetti SM aircraft. 79 “Sparviero” and German Junkers Ju 88 and Heinkel He 111, there was also no absolute certainty as to whether the Brisbane Star was hit by a torpedo from Dessiè, rather than by one of the torpedo bombers.

At 10:12 PM, Dessiè came to the surface. At the stern, about a mile and a half distant, two steamers were visible, burned, and near them a dense black cloud in which flashes could be seen, which was believed to be a third steamer, also on fire. The violence of the fires on the steamers leads Scandola to believe that they were all already condemned.  In need of the charge of air and electricity, Scandola decided to leave and return to the site as soon as possible. At 11.50 PM the steamer exploded in the cloud of smoke, hit by torpedoes; with flames blazing even more violently.

August 13th, 1942

At 3:15 AM the last flames of the three steamers were extinguished. Dessiè headed towards this area, crossing the sea strewn with naphtha and wreckage. At 5:36 AM the boat dove, and at 10:47 AM received an encrypted message (064113) ordering the captain to emerge and go to his mopping up area, which he did. At 11:59 AM, three bombers were sighted heading west and 10 km away, flying at an altitude of about 200 meters, thus a crash dive was ordered. An hour later, Dessiè resurfaced, and then dove again with a crash dive at 2.27 PM. At 3.22 PM, the boat returned to the surface, but at 3.37 PM crash-dove again due to the sighting of an aircraft. At 4:12 PM Dessiè came to the surface once again, and after three minutes sighted an immense column of smoke to the south, a sign of a burning ship. At 4:26 PM, two planes were also spotted circling the fire, and at 5:08 PM Dessiè headed in that direction. Aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe continuously flew over the submarine, which exchanged recognition signals with them. At 5:14 PM, Dessiè spotted some boats in the vicinity of the fire. At 5:30 PM, as the fire continues, Scandola concludes that the ship had probably sunk.

At 5:56 PM, another sighting of planes forced Dessiè to dive once again until 6:48 PM, when the boat resurfaced and headed towards the wrecks, to look for something that would allow the identity of the sunken ship to be traced. At 7:20 PM, the submarine went under a lifeboat, but it was empty, as were the nearby boats. However, some objects were recovered, to trace the name of the ship. At 7.30 PM Dessiè moved away at full speed, while the flames floating on the sea were extinguished.

At 7:35 PM, the submarine sighted formations of German bombers, dropping bombs near the fire. The crew lighted two recognition flares and unfurled a second magnitude (large) Italian flag on the bridge, but the bombers – a dozen of them – attack Dessiè anyway. The first, a discharge of bombs fell into the sea forward of the submarine, the subsequent ones frame it from the side. Commander Scandola, three other officers, two non-commissioned officers and two sailors were injured by shrapnel from the bombs, which also caused various damage to the unit. One of the injured, the 23-year-old sailor Antonio Fontana from Syracuse, died on board Dessiè the following day, August 14th, from the severity of his injuries.

At 7:38 PM, after the flagship aircraft had made a reconnaissance tour over the bridge of Dessiè, the bombers left. At 7.40 PM the verification of the damage suffered began (the bombs of the planes caused several failures to the hull and to the on-board equipment, breaking among other things some elements of the accumulator batteries, and thus causing acid leaks), meanwhile taking course for the north-eastern end of the assigned sector. Maricosom was asked to send a torpedo boat to transfer the most seriously wounded. Maricosom responds by ordering the submarine to return to base instead, as the damage caused by the air attack prevents it from diving.

At 9:27 PM, the return telegram was sent. At 11.50 PM, during the return navigation (which had to be conducted by the second in command, as Scandola was injured), some planes launched four flares aft of Dessiè, 2 km away.

August 14th, 1942

At 2:22 AM, Dessiè sent the landing telegram. After passing through the obstructions at eight o’clock in the morning, the submarine moored half an hour later.

November 2nd, 1942

Dessiè sailed from Messina at 9.15 PM bound for Tobruk, for a mission to transport 20 tons of ammunition. The second battle of El Alamein, which would seal the fate of the Axis in North Africa, was raging.

November 5th or 6th,1942

The boat arrived in Tobruk at eight in the morning, disembarked the cargo and left at 16.10 to return to Messina. Following the defeat of the Italian-German armored army, Tobruk fell to the British on November 13th.

November 11th, 1942

The boat arrived in Messina at 8.15 am.

The Sinking

On the morning of November 18th, 1942, Dessiè, under the command of Lieutenant Alberto Gorini, set sail from Messina for a new mission off Bona (now Annaba), Algeria. On November 8th, Operation “Torch” had begun, the Anglo-American landing in French North Africa, and from that day on, droves of Allied merchant ships continued to pour men and equipment onto the coasts of Morocco and Algeria, signing the death warrant for the Axis troops in North Africa, who would soon find themselves caught between two fires in Tunisia: the British advancing from the east and the Americans from the west.

Many Axis submarines were sent to counter the influx of Allied men and materials into Algeria. Many were successful, but almost as many did not return.

Dessiè’s task was an ambush in front of Bona and night offensive bets in the harbor of Bougie and Philippeville. The submarine’s last communication with the base occurred at 7:12 PM on November 27th, 1942, when it regularly responded to a call, after that, Dessiè was never heard from again. Losing all hope, the crew was declared missing on December 23rd, 1942.

The incident became known after the end of the war.

Initially, it was believed that Dessiè had been sunk by depth charges from a Lockheed Hudson bomber of the Royal Air Force’s 500th Squadron, but further research found a version that better matched what was known about the submarine’s disappearance.

At 2:05 PM on November 28th, 1942, Dessiè was spotted proceeding on the surface towards the port of Bona by a British aircraft, which recalled two destroyers, the Australian H.M.A.S. Quiberon and the H.M.S. British Quentin.

In that period, Commonwealth Marine destroyers had undergone a modification to their depth charges, whereas previously they could be adjusted to explode at a maximum depth of 106 meters, they could now be adjusted to a maximum depth of 152 meters by applying a weight, which would have sunk them more quickly. This was because some submarines, subjected to bombardment with depth charges, had managed to elude the hunt by descending to a depth of 150 meters, a depth that until then the British considered impossible to reach and maintain. In addition, the sonars of British ships, due to the “direction” assumed by the sound waves, could not detect the presence of a submarine submerged at 150 meters, if it was 600 meters or more as the crow flies from their position.

H.M.S. Quentin (Lieutenant Captain Allan Herbert Percy Noble), being the destroyer assigned to “primary emergencies”, was the first to be sent to the scene, seven miles northeast of Bona. The boat carried out numerous attacks with depth charges, until it exhausted the entire supply (70 bombs), but without obtaining the slightest sign of damage inflicted on the submarine: no wreckage, not even a drop of fuel. Meanwhile, H.M.A.S. Quiberon (frigate captain Hugh Waters Shelley Browning), as a unit for “secondary emergencies” (in service for a few months, had never participated in a real anti-submarine hunt), was waiting in case its help was needed. The crew had a quiet lunch, then the men off duty went to rest. It was at that point that H.M.S. Quentin, having finished its depth charges, sent orders to H.M.A.S. Quiberon to go and hunt down the enemy submarine.

Leaving the port of Bona, H.M.A.S. Quiberon headed out to sea at high speed, while the crew was sent to the combat posts provided for antisubmarine actions. Speed was then reduced to 15 knots, to check the condition of the sonar.

Arriving in the area, H.M.A.S. Quiberon initially did not detect any echo that could reveal a submarine submerged in a radius of almost two kilometers.  Dessiè was evidently crouched in a silent position, also taking advantage of the great disturbance caused in the mass of water by the depth charges of the Quentin and by its long crossing in the area at 12 knots, w\which confused the echoes that reached the sonar of the Quiberon, disturbing its search.

While H.M.S. Quentin searched the outermost area to make sure there were no other submarines in the area, H.M.A.S. Quiberon meticulously “sifted” the waters where the submarine was supposed to be, carefully examining any “disturbance” in the body of water. Expert Asdic operator Kendall reported each detection and comment to Lieutenant Physician John Hardcastle, who reported them. At one point, Kendall and anti-submarine armament officer Max Darling noticed a close-range bearing slightly different from the others. When Quiberon examined it with ASDIC, there was no echo. Another sound pulse was sent, and again there was no echo: the men of H.M.A.S. Quiberon were reminded of the Admiralty’s note, from a short time before, about submarines avoiding sonar by diving to a depth of 150 meters. It occurred to them that the submarine might be submerged at a deeper depth than the explosions of Quentin’s depth charges.

H.M.A.S. Quiberon

H.M.A.S. Quiberon moved away 1,370 meters, then approached the suspicious point by scanning the bearing that connected it to that position with sonar. This time there was an echo, faint and vague (the disturbances caused by the depth charges and the Quentin’s wakes were still felt, so much so that they hindered the maintenance of contact); It disappeared altogether when the distance became 550 meters. At this point, it was decided to carry out a test launch on H.M.A.S. Quiberon: five depth charges, three from the aft bomb launchers and two from the side bomb launchers. The destroyer then moved away again by 1,370 meters, moving into the least “disturbed” water it could find, returned to approach along the survey and regained contact (very faint, the echo could barely be heard at 1,000 meters away). It was so weak that, if the search speed of 7 knots had been increased to the minimum speed prescribed for the attack, 12 knots, the noise of H.M.A.S. Quiberon’s propellers would have been sufficient to make it lose. At a distance of 610 meters, the echo faded to the point of disappearing (there were still two minutes and 49 seconds left to reach the vertical of contact), but the Australian ship continued on its course. When it reached the vertical of the submarine, H.M.A.S. Quiberon launched five depth charges in the space of ten seconds, all adjusted to explode at the maximum depth, 152 meters.

H.M.S. Quentin

The crew of the destroyer waited, holding their breath, for the 70 seconds it took for the bombs to descend to a depth of 150 meters before exploding. It was impossible to imagine what the men of Dessiè were feeling at that very moment.

The silence was broken by the explosions of the five bombs, in quick succession. The Asdic operator of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, through the hydrophones, distinctly heard a noise as of hammering on metal, perhaps against a watertight bulkhead, then a slight whistle, followed by sounds indicating the breaking and crushing of something, which Kendall likened to eggshells being crushed in a paper bag. Finally, a dull thud, and then nothing, only silence. It was about three o’clock in the afternoon.

What was reported was the description given by Max Darling, Asdic operator of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, in the volume “Lost military ships” of the Historical Office of the Navy, as well as in the book “The Italian war on the sea” by Giorgio Giorgerini, the last moments of Dessiè were instead described differently. The submarine came to the surface, heeled and soared, evidently without control, and then immediately sank again from the stern, erectly. It would then have been located on the seabed, in position 37°04′ N and 07°49′ E (TN or 37°05’N, 07°55’E). The source of this version was unclear, as it was incompatible with the one described by Darling.

Soon after, H.M.S. Quentin appeared in front of H.M.A.S. Quiberon, advancing at 12 knots with the attack flag in the wind, and launched her last depth charge (there was only one left), then moved away again towards the open sea. H.M.A.S. Quiberon, about 730 meters away from the launch site, returned to the scene and saw, three minutes after the explosion of the bombs, a whitish turbulence perturbing the surface of the sea – for an area of two abundant acres – for a couple of minutes, then gradually extinguishing itself within another three minutes. The chief engineer of H.M.A.S. Quiberon believed that it was the gases produced by the explosion of the bombs, and the air contained in the submarine, which had now escaped from the torn hull. Entering the disturbed area in search of evidence of the submarine’s sinking, the destroyer found only air bubbles that continued to surface on the surface, and oil floating on the waves. Samples were collected, which were then analyzed and identified as belonging to four different types of motor oil. The chief engineer commented that they would hardly find more, considering that the submarine had imploded at a depth of 150 meters.

H.M.A.S. and H.M.S. Quentin, having finished their work, arranged themselves in a line and returned to Bona, continuing to scan the sea with their sonar.

Thus ended the life of Dessiè and the entire crew, 5 officers and 43 non-commissioned officers and sailors. They rest, in their “iron coffin,” in position 37°05’N, 07°55’E, 10 (TN, 16) miles north of Bona.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal26 15,193 4,263 173112.464.69

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
11/28/194003.05T.V. Adriano PiniMediterranean36°30’N-12°59’ETorpedoFailedGlasgowLight CruiserGreat Britain
8/12/194219.38T.V. Renato ScandolaMediterranean37°38’N-10°25’EWS21STorpedoSankDeucalionMotor Freighter7516Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
AdellaFilippoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
AlianelliBernardinoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
AluffiFrancescoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
BaldiGiordanoNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
BampaAttilioNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
BaroniMarioNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
BartolettiUgoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
BerlatoGiacomoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
BilardelloGiuseppeChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
BrusadinTeseoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
CaktieriGiovanniJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
CardoneVincenzoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
CarlettiLuigiChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
CingatiGiuseppeNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
ColomboLuigiNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
CoratellaCorradoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
CremonesiCarloNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
CrispinoDomenicoNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
D’angeloMarioNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
Delle NociGiuseppeChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
Di ScalaGaspareNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
EspositoMicheleJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
FontanaAntonioNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
ForesioDomenicoChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe11/28/1942
GambuzzaVincenzoNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
GianelliGuidoEnsignGuardiamarina11/28/1942
GoriniAlbertoLieutenantTenente di Vascello11/28/1942
GuidiAlfredoNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
La MonicaRosarioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
LuganiCesareNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
LugnianiGuglielmoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
MarannaFeliceSublieutenant G.N.Tenente G.N.11/28/1942
MarcianoAlfredoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
MieleFerdinandoSergeantSergente11/28/1942
MinnitiGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
MuraSilvioSublieutenantSottotenente di Vascello11/28/1942
MussiRinoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
OrsiniNelloJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
PaceCatelloChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
PascaliRaffaeleJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
PiccininiGiuseppeEnsignGuardiamarina11/28/1942
PinocchioArnaldoNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
PipitoGiovanniNaval RatingComune11/28/1942
RocchiIvanJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
RossiLicinioJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
SantambrogioAngeloChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe11/28/1942
SavioliBrunoJunior ChiefSottocapo11/28/1942
VianelloMarioNaval RatingComune11/28/1942

R. Smg. Dagabur

The submarine Dagabur was an Adua-class coastal submarine with a displacement of 698 tons on the surface and 866 tons submerged. During the war, it completed 23 patrols (15 offensive and 8 transfer), covering a total of 17,364 miles on the surface and 3,888 submerged

Brief and Partial Chronology

April 16th, 1936

Setting up at the Franco Tosi shipyards in Taranto.

Dagabur still on the slip in Taranto and nearly ready to be launched.

November 22nd, 1936

Launch at the Franco Tosi shipyard in Taranto.

Dagabur soon after the launch in Taranto at the Tosi shipyard
(U.S.M.M.)

April 9th, 1937

Entry into service.

Dagabour near Taranto in 1937
(“I sommergibili italiani” by Alessandro Turrini and Ottorino Ottone Miozzi, USMM)

April 25th, 1937

Placed under Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) and deployed in Taranto, within the XLIII Submarine Squadron (IV Submarine Group). Shortly after completion the boat made a training cruise in the waters of the Dodecanese and Libya.

August 1st, 1937

Dagabur received the combat flag, donated by the city of Ortona. The godmother of the ceremony was Emma Sepe, wife of the prefect of Chieti.

August 12th, 1937

Under the command of Lieutenant Gian Maria Uzielli, Dagabur set sail from Leros to carry out a mission in the Aegean Sea as part of the Italian underwater campaign related to the Spanish Civil War.

August 13th, 1937

During the mission, Dagabur sighted a steamer and fired a torpedo, but failed to hit the target.

August 17th, 1937

The boat returned to Leros, having had to interrupt the mission due to the failure of one of the shafts.

August 30th, 1937

Once the damage was repaired, Dagabur left Leros again under the command of Lieutenant Uzielli to carry out a second mission related to the Spanish war, in the same Aegean area as the previous mission.

During this mission, Dagabur initiated several attack maneuvers, but did not complete any of them, due to the impossibility of identifying the targets with certainty.

September 5th, 1937

The boat returned to base, but in the afternoon of the same day left for the third and last “Spanish” mission, still under the command of Lieutenant Uzielli and always in the same sector of operations.

During the mission, the boat began an attack maneuver, but did not complete it, once again, because of the inability to identify the target with certainty.

September 12th, 1937

Dagabur returned to Leros, concluding the mission.

1938

Based in Tobruk.

1940

Dagabur returned to Italy and was deployed first to Taranto and then to Augusta (Sicily).

June 10th, 1940

When Italy entered the war, Dagabur (Lieutenant Domenico Romano) was part of the XLVI Submarine Squadron (IV Grupsom of Taranto), along with the twin boats Dessiè, Uarsciek and Uebi Scebeli.

August 1940

The boat carried out some anti-submarine defensive patrols in the Gulf of Taranto.

Summer 1940 – Early 1941

In the first months of the war, Dagabur carried out mainly defensive missions (mainly anti-submarine patrols) in the Gulf of Taranto, and subsequently offensive patrols along the Libyan and Tunisian coasts, without ever encountering enemy ships. Subsequently, according to a source, Dagabur was assigned to the V Submarine Group of Leros.

December 5th, 1940

The gunnery sailor Tommaso Bellonio, 22 years old, from Ortona, was declared missing in the central Mediterranean.

January 1st though 7th, 1941

Dagabur patrolled the waters of Cyrenaica unsuccessfully.

February 19th, 1941

Sent on patrol south-east of Malta, the crew did not find anything.

March 5th, 1941

Sent in search of a British convoys off Crete, along with other submarines (Ondina, Beilul, Galatea, Malachite, Smeraldo, Nereide, Ascianghi, Ambra, and Onice), in contrast to the British operation “Lustre” (consisting of sending 58,000 men from Egypt to Greece, as reinforcements for Greece, with a series of convoys one every three days, from Alexandria to Piraeus, over the course of a month). The first two convoys of “Lustre” departed on March 6th: cruisers H.M.S. York, H.M.S. Gloucester and H.M.S. Bonaventure with troops from Alexandria to Piraeus (where they arrived on March 7th) and the Sri Lankan and Clan Macauley merchant ships with tanks and supplies, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Wryneck, H.M.S. Nubian and H.M.S. Mohawk, also from Alexandria to Piraeus (where they arrived on March 8th). Dagabur did not spot anything.

End of March 1941

Dagabur (Lieutenant Domenico Romano) was sent to lie in wait on the Alexandria-Cape Krio route (southeastern coast of Crete) along with the submarines Ambra (which was to be positioned 60 miles southeast of Dagabur) and Ascianghi (which was to be positioned 60 miles southeast of Ambra), with which it was to form a barrage.

March 29th, 1941

Dagabur reached the assigned area, between Crete and Egypt. The deployment of the submarines in the eastern Mediterranean (not far away there were two others, Nereide and Galatea) was planned as part of Operation “Gaudo”, an incursion into the Aegean by a large part of the Italian fleet, with the aim of attacking British convoys in that sector. The submarines had an exploratory purpose (to report any sightings of enemy naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean) as well as to support the action of surface forces, but they were not warned of the operation in progress, and of the particular importance of reporting any type of movement detected. The submarines would not obtain the desired result, the British fleet passed through the too wide meshes of the barrage, and of the five boats, only the Ambra would detect some signs of the passage of British ships (engine noises picked up on the hydrophone), but without be able to sight anything.

By the time Dagabur reached its assigned sector, however, Operation Gaudo had already ended in tragedy: the massacre at Cape Matapan had been going on for a few hours.

March 30th, 1941

At 08:27 PM Dagabur sighted at 33°47′ N and 25°24′ E (or 33°30′ N and 25°20′ E), south of Crete (halfway between Crete and Egypt), a unit that was identified – with a certain overestimation in displacement – as a light cruiser of 9,000 tons: it was in fact the British light cruiser H.M.S. Bonaventure (captain H. J. Egerton).  engaged with three destroyers (H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Griffin, and H.M.A.S. Stuart) in escorting a convoy of two merchant ships, “G.A. 8”, sailing from Greece to Alexandria in Egypt.

Being in optimal position and conditions to attack (the beta was quite wide, H.M.S. Bonaventure was sailing at a moderate speed, and its silhouette stood out clearly against the moon near sunset, thus being perfectly distinguishable). At 08.37 Dagabur launched two (or three) torpedoes against the enemy cruiser. Two minutes and 50 seconds after launch, two loud explosions were heard, which lead the commander of the submarine to believe that he had damaged the target. In reality, it does not appear that the Bonaventure was hit (some sources claim that it was “probably” damaged, but there seems to be no evidence to support this thesis). Four hours later (at 2:44 AM on March 31st, in position 33°20′ N and 26°35′ E), H.M.S. Bonaventure was sunk by another Italian submarine, Ambra. On the Italian side, initially, the sinking of the Bonaventure was wrongly attributed to the actions of the Dagabur, rather than to those of the Ambra.

According to a British source, Dagabur also unsuccessfully launched a torpedo against H.M.A.S. Stuart, which was engaged in the hunt with depth charges (the torpedo avoided by the Australian ship, exploded in its wake); however, it seems more likely that this was to be attributed to the Ambra.

June 1941

Dagabur was sent to lie in wait off the Syrian-Palestinian coast, along with Jantina and Ondina, during the British invasion of Syria and Lebanon, controlled by Vichy French forces.

July 1941

towards the end of the month, the boat was sent to the waters of Cyrenaica, to counter the British attempts to resupply the stronghold of Tobruk, besieged by Italian-German troops.

September 7th, 1941

At 01.10 PM Dagabur, sailing on the surface in the Eastern Mediterranean, was sighted in position 32°29′ N and 29°07′ E by the British submarine H.M.S. Torbay (Lieutenant Commander Anthony Cecil Capel Miers), which approached to attack it. The attack maneuver, however, did not go as planned by the British commander (the “trap” planned by Miers after the sighting did not work: perhaps this meant that Dagabur maneuvered differently from what was expected), so that at 01.32 PM H.M.S. Torbay emerged to attack with the gun, opening fire from 1,370 meters away. The first shot fired from the Torbay misfired, and Dagabur disengaged by diving. At 01.37 PM , H.M.S. Torbay also dove, but shortly afterwards lost contact with the Italian submarine.

October 1941

Sent on a mission off the coast of Alexandretta, Turkey.

November 1941

Sent on a mission in the central-eastern Mediterranean, however it did not spot any enemy ships.

December 13th, 1941

Dagabur (Lieutenant Commander Alberto Torri) was sent to patrol the waters south of Crete, along with the submarines Ascianghi and Galatea, to counter a possible exit from Alexandria of the British Force B, to protect the traffic operation “M. 41” (which provided for the dispatch of 3 convoys for a total of 8 merchant ships, with the direct escort of 7 destroyers and a torpedo boat as well as the remote escort of three heavy groups that count in all 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 18 destroyers and two torpedo boats) for the supply of Libya (later aborted as a result of the intense British attacks and the related damage and losses suffered). At the same time, other submarines (Santarosa, Narvalo, Squalo, Topazio and Veniero) were sent off Malta to counter a possible sortie by Force K based there (light cruisers Aurora, Penelope and Neptune and some destroyers).

Force B (light cruisers H.M.S. Euryalus, H.M.S. Naiad and H.M.S. Galatea and destroyers H.M.S. Jervis, H.M.S. Kingston, H.M.S. Kipling, H.M.S. Kimberley, H.M.S. Griffin, H.M.S. Havock, H.M.S. Hotspur, H.M.A.S. Napier and H.M.A.S. Nizam, the last two Australians), under the command of Admiral Philip L. Vian, actually sailed from Alexandria in opposition to Operation “M. 41”, joining Force K which had left Malta to search for Italian convoys in the Ionian Sea. However, the British ships were unable to intercept anything, since the convoys had been sent back, so after hours of fruitless searches they started the return navigation to Malta (Force K) and Alexandria (Force B).

December 14th, 1941

At 07.55 PM, in position 34°01′ N and 26°02′ E, Dagabur, while on the surface, launched two torpedoes against a silhouette which, due to the poor visibility, was not identified with certainty (Commander Torri would later report that “it could have been a cruiser”), after which it immediately disengaged by diving. After one minute and 45 seconds, the crew heard two detonations, so that the Italians mistakenly believed that they had sunk the target. War bulletin no. 561 of the Italian Supreme Command, on December 15th, stated that “The submarine under the command of Lieutenant Commander Torri attacked and torpedoed a British cruiser in the eastern Mediterranean“, and the subsequent bulletin No. 567, of December 21st, added that “Further information received confirms the sinking of the enemy cruiser whose torpedoing in the eastern Mediterranean, by one of our submarines, was announced in bulletin number 561.”

The target of Dagabur’s attack has long been identified by various sources as the British light cruiser H.M.S. Galatea, part of Force B, which was returning to Alexandria after the fruitless search for Italian convoys. H.M.S. Galatea, missed by the Dagabur’s torpedoes (some secondary sources even go so far as to hypothesize that Dagabur may have damaged the cruiser in this circumstance), would instead be sunk four hours later (around midnight), in position 31°17′ N and 29°13′ E (35 miles west of Alexandria), by the torpedoes of the German submarine U 557.

According to more recent research, however, Dagabur’s attack on was not actually directed against H.M.S. Galatea, but against the British submarine H.M.S. Talisman (Commander Michael Willmott), which was also returning to Alexandria. At 07:52 PM on December 14th, Talisman sighted at position 34°05′ N and 25°39′ E (in the Cerigotto Channel, south of Crete) a dark object believed to be a submarine, 730 meters away, at 205° bearing. At 7:55 PM, exactly at the time when Dagabur would launch two torpedoes at H.M.S. Galatea, some sailors in the forward compartments of the Talisman heard the sound of two torpedoes hurtling through the water not far away. A minute later, H.M.S. Talisman opened fire on the Dagabur with its 102 mm gun, and Willmott estimated that the second shot fired hit the cunning tower of the Italian submarine, at a height of about 90 centimeters above the deck. Meanwhile, Dagabur was diving; the distance between the two submarines was only about ninety yards, and when the Talisman passed by at 07:57 PM, the British commander stated that “it was noticed that the hatches [of the Dagabur] were open” while the boat was diving, which led Willmott to believe that the enemy “was diving towards their end” and to claim that the boat had sunk. (According to one source, probably erroneous, in addition to the cannon shots, the Talisman also fired two torpedoes at the Dagabur, without success.) In fact, the Talisman men must have made a mistake in this regard, since Dagabur came out of the fight with only minor damage to the conning tower.

The unfeasibility that the attack of Dagabur was directed against H.M.S. Galatea was demonstrated by the comparison between the position where the attack of the Italian boat took place and that in which the Galatea was sunk by U 557: the two positions are about 250 miles apart, and to cover that distance in four hours the Galatea would have had to travel at the impossible speed of over 60 knots. The position indicated by H.M.S. Talisman, on the other hand, was only about twenty miles from the one indicated by Dagabur (a discrepancy that can be explained by the aforementioned poor visibility, which in addition to determining the identification error of Commander Torri – who mistakenly believed that he had attacked a unit that could have been a cruiser – could have prevented him from accurately calculating the position based on the stars),  and the time matches practically perfectly: 07.55 PM according to Dagabur time, 07.56 PM according to that of H.M.S. Talisman. From this it is almost absolutely certain that Dagabur attacked H.M.S. Talisman and not H.M.S. Galatea. (Thanks to Platon Alexiades for these remarks.)

December 18th, 1941

Dagabur, along with other submarines (Squalo, Ascianghi, Topazio, Galatea, and Santorre Santarosa) was deployed in the central-eastern Mediterranean with exploratory/offensive tasks, in support of the “M. 42” traffic operation, consisting of sending to Libya two convoys with urgent supplies for the Italian-German troops in North Africa (312 vehicles, 3224 tons of fuel and lubricants, 1137 tons of ammunition,  10,409 tons of miscellaneous materials) with the escort of substantial shares of the battle fleet. The operation ended happily with the arrival of the convoys in Libyan ports.

February 13th through 19th, 1942

The boat was sent to lie in wait off the coasts of Syria and Palestine, with no results.

July 15th or 18th, 1942

Dagabur, along with the submarines Axum, Cobalto, Dessiè, Velella, Bronzo, and Malachite (some of which were already present in the area and others sent specifically on July 15th to the waters between La Galite, the Isle of Dogs, Cape Bon and Cape Kelibia following the news of the imminent passage of a fast unit), forms a barrage line off Cape Bon to intercept the British fast minelayer H.M.S. Welshman,  sent to Malta with a cargo of urgent supplies.

According to a source, the submarines also tried to intercept the British Force H (aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle, anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Cairo and H.M.S. Charybdis, destroyers H.M.S. Antelope, H.M.S. Ithuriel, H.M.S. Vansittart, H.M.S. Westcott, and H.M.S. Wrestler) which had gone out to sea for the “Pinpoint” operation, the sending to Malta of Spitfire fighters taking off from the Eagle; but this seems unlikely, since this force went only south of the Balearic Islands, and not as far as Cape Bon.

Despite the dispatch of submarines, H.M.S. Welshman arrived unscathed in Malta on July 16th and returned on the 17th, after delivering her cargo. Of the Italian submarines deployed in the area, only Axum was able to spot it, but its attack was fruitless, also due to the rough seas.

Mid-August

On 4 August 1942 , Dagabur, under the command of Lieutenant Renato Pecori, sailed from Cagliari to reach an ambush area between the meridians 1°40′ E and 2°40′ E, south of the channel between Ibiza and Mallorca and north of Algeria; Initially, the assigned sector was between Menorca and the North African coast, about 50 miles northwest of Bougie, but later on the same day of  August 4th the order came to move further west, north of Algiers and south of the Balearic Islands.

On August 10th, the boat received orders, in case of sighting of enemy ships, to give priority to the signaling of the sighting, and to attack only after having launched the signal of discovery. The battle of Mid-August had begun, and it was necessary that as many submarines as possible could identify and attack the British convoy “Pedestal”, thus it was of paramount importance that any sighting be immediately brought to the attention of all boats who were in the area.

Moreover, since experience had shown that too often reconnaissance planes were intercepted and shot down by fighters on carriers before they could perform their task, the contribution of submarines was particularly important in enabling the commanders to have reliable information on the composition, course and speed of enemy formation, which was essential for coordinating the action of the air and naval forces destined to attack the enemy. convoy, especially air convoys.

The Battle of Mid-August was the consequence of the Royal Navy’s new attempt to supply the island of Malta, besieged by Axis air and naval forces and exhausted after months of bombing and the partial or total failure of the refueling operations attempted in March (convoy “M.W. 10”, culminating in the second battle of Sirte) and June (operations “Harpoon” and “Vigorous”,  culminating in the Battle of Mid-June). The new operation, called “Pedestal”, consisted of a single large convoy which, assembled in the United Kingdom (from where it departed on 3 August 1942), would then cross the Strait of Gibraltar (9/10 August) and then head towards Malta.

All along, as many as 16 Italian submarines and two German U-boats contributed to the formation of a powerful barrage of submarines in the western Mediterranean: seven of them, including Dagabur (the others were Brin, Giada, Uarsciek and Volframio and the German U 73 and U 205), were placed in the waters between Algeria and the Balearic Islands, while the other eleven formed a second group much further east,  north of Tunisia. On August 11th, Allied naval forces were sighted coming from Gibraltar and heading east.

On the night between August 11th and 12th, Dagabur met the British aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious and the destroyers escorting it south of the Balearic Islands: they were the group assigned to Operation Bellows, a sub-operation of “Pedestal”, whose objective was to send to Malta 39 Supermarine Spitfire fighter planes, which were supposed to reach the island (to replenish the squadrons decimated by continuous air attacks) after taking off from the old aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious.

Furious had loaded the 39 Spitfires on the Clyde, UK, from where the boat departed on 4 August along with the light cruiser H.M.S. Manchester and the destroyers H.M.S. Sardonyx (which left the group on the night of 5–6 August) and Blyskawica (the latter Polish). On August 7h, H.M.S. Furious and H.M.S. Manchester had joined convoy WS.21S, with which they had crossed the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 August (H.M.S. Furious was to accompany the convoy only for the distance necessary to reach “flight” range from Malta); the following day, H.M.S. Furious, escorted by the destroyers H.M.S. Lookout and H.M.S. Lightning, had separated from the main group and moved to a fixed point south of the Balearic Islands, about 584 (or 550, or 635) miles west of Malta, where the boat launched 38 of the 39 Spitfires.

The operation had taken place in the early afternoon of August 11th: at noon H.M.S. Furious, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Lookout had detached from the left side of the convoy, and the old aircraft carrier had assumed a favorable position, given the wind conditions, to facilitate the take-off of the planes. The first eight Spitfires took off at 12:29 PM, followed by a second group of eight fighters at 01:09 PM. Six minutes later, however, the German submarine U 73 torpedoed and sunk the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle, and flight operations were suspended until the rescue of her crew was completed, while H.M.S. Furious made emergency approaches to frustrate any further attack attempts. After about an hour and a half, when the rescue was over, H.M.S. Furious had resumed the launches; the last seven planes (in all, the Spitfires had departed into five groups) had taken off at 03:08 PM (or 03:12 PM). One of the fighters had problems with the propeller and had to land shortly afterwards on the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Indomitable, while another disappeared in flight without a trace; the other 36 had all reached Malta, landing at the bases of Luqa and Takali.

At the time of the encounter with Dagabur, the British formation was proceeding at 21 knots on course 262°; It was a dark, moonless night, but with very bright stars. The ships, as always in wartime, proceeded with their lights off.

At 00:54 AM on August 12th, the Type 271 radar of the British destroyer H.M.S. Wolverine (Lieutenant Commander Peter William Gretton), which occupied the “O”/”Orange” position in the formation and was at that moment zigzagging on course 232°, located a submarine that had emerged at a distance of about 4,570 meters, on a 265° bearing: it was Dagabur. According to some sources, the Italian submarine had spotted the force of “Bellows” and was trying to approach on the surface to attack H.M.S. Furious. According to others, the boat was caught on the surface while it was recharging the batteries and could not dive for this reason. Conjecture, in both cases: it is impossible to know the truth.

H.M.S. Wolverine was an Admiralty modified W-class destroyer built in 1918. After being fully refitted, it reentered service in 1939

In any case, H.M.S. Wolverine immediately went on the attack. When distance was reduced to 4,390 meters, the officer on the watch aboard the destroyer ordered it to approach the contact. When Commander Gretton, alerted to what was happening, reached the bridge, distance had been reduced to 4,115 meters. Once distance had been further reduced, to 3,200 meters, Gretton decided to radio H.M.S. Keppel with the conventional message “JOHNNY 284”; when they were close to just 915 meters, H.M.S. Wolverine made the same signal to H.M.S. Malcolm, which was not far back, in a position further back (“P”/”Pudding”). Depth charges were prepared for use on H.M.S. Wolverine, and a cannon (‘B’) was pointed in the direction of the submarine; Gretton’s intention was to ram the enemy, so he did not open fire, but merely held ready to do so if necessary.

H.M.S. Wolverine optically sighted Dagabur at a distance of 640 meters, and when it was at 550 meters Gretton could identify it with certainty as a submarine. He therefore ordered the engines to be brought to maximum speed (an order facilitated by the fact that at that moment three boilers were on and connected) and to pull over to ram it. With the engines propelled at full force, the speed of the destroyer was increased to 26/27 knots, although immediately before the collision it was reduced to 20 knots to mitigate the violence of the impact, which would not have left the ship unscathed either. The signal to prepare for impact (“Crash Stations”) was sounded.

Dagabur, which presumably had not noticed the destroyer that was rushing at it due to the very dark night (not having, like its adversary, a radar that could overcome this problem), was taken completely by surprise. H.M.S. Wolverine rammed it amidships, at the aft end of the conning tower, at a 90° angle to starboard. The impact was terrible, and the Italian submarine capsized and sank instantly in position 37°18′ N and 01°55′ (or 01°58′) E, 40 miles north-northeast of Cape Blanc, south of the Balearic Islands (more precisely, of Formentera) and 50 miles northwest of Algiers.

Commander Gretton later described the impact in a few words: “We climbed onto the conning tower of the submarine and cut it in two.” The commander of H.M.S. Wolverine also recalled that he expected his second in command to compliment the ramming of the enemy unit, and instead he, having sensed the impact but being unaware of what was happening, rushed to the bridge, and asked worriedly “O Lord, what have we hit?”. The roar of the collision was so loud that it could be heard on other ships in the formation: George Amyes, a survivor of H.M.S. Eagle rescued by the destroyer H.M.S. Laforey, recalled that he and other survivors on board the destroyer were trying to sleep when they were suddenly awakened by a tremendous crashing noise, followed by “noises of wild confusion“, so much so that for a moment he thought he had been torpedoed again. The next morning, he saw that the destroyer that should have been on the port side of H.M.S. Laforey was no longer there, while on the starboard side was visible a battered destroyer that was advancing with difficulty: it was H.M.S. Wolverine; Amyes later learned of the ramming of the Dagabur.

The impact had been so violent that H.M.S. Wolverine itself suffered very serious damage to the bow, which came out half-destroyed (the first nine or ten meters no longer existed; fortunately, Gretton later wrote, the bow locker in deformation had bent backwards up to the height of the waterline, so that it had acted as a partial and improvised watertight bulkhead),  and he also had a turbine out of order (the one on the left); At 02:00 AM the destroyer reported that the boat was stationary due to damage sustained in the collision, and Malcolm was detached to assist her.

H.M.S. Wolverine with a temporary repair to the bow

Due to a ruptured steam pipe, the engine room also had to be evacuated. H.M.S. Wolverine then started again, driven only by the starboard turbine, but due to the severity of the damage it had to leave the formation and head on its own to Gibraltar, where it arrived at 12.30 AM on August 13th, escorted by H.M.S. Malcolm (which arrived in port three hours later, while H.M.S. Furious and escort had arrived there since 07.30 PM the previous day). At Gibraltar, H.M.S. Wolverine received a provisional bow for the voyage to the United Kingdom, at Devonport, where the boat was placed in dry dock and underwent more extensive repairs that lasted until December. For the sinking of the Dagabur, Commander Gretton would receive the Distinguished Service Order; For several years after the war, the British commander would remain in the dark about the identity of the submarine he had sunk, which he believed to be a German U-boat.

The crew of H.M.S. Wolverine celebrating the sinking of Dagabur.

According to some accounts, some men from Dagabur initially survived the sinking of the submarine but were not rescued by the British ships. Sub-Lieutenant Robert Michael Crosley, a Fleet Air Arm pilot rescued by Malcolm after the sinking of H.M.S. Eagle (on which he was embarked), described what happened in his memoir “They Gave Me a Seafire“: “That night, August 12th, we tried to sleep a little on deck, but we were so excited by the events of the day that few of us were able to do so. Suddenly, at about one o’clock in the morning, we heard the ship heel from a turn made with the full rudder. Then we saw little blue lights passing us on either side, low on the water. We could hear voices. They looked like they were shouting something as they slipped away. We returned to the previous route almost immediately, without slowing down. Second Lieutenant Godfrey Parish of 801 Squadron went up to the bridge to ask the commander, Commander Campbell, what it was all about. Apparently, the destroyer Wolverine, in front of us and also crowded with survivors of the Eagle, had surprised the Italian submarine Dagabur on the surface and rammed it at full speed, cutting it in two. We had just passed through its wreckage and castaways. Parrish was a little angry that we hadn’t stopped to retrieve them. On the other hand, we were close to the Balearic Islands, and the Spaniards later announced their rescue [this last statement, unfortunately, was not true].”

Sam Moses’ book “At All Costs” also states that Malcolm reported hearing castaways screaming in the water, but did not pick them up, concluding, “They thought it was a German U-boat.”

There were no survivors among the 5 officers and 40 non-commissioned officers and sailors who made up the crew of the Dagabur.

On August 12th, Maricosom informed the submarines at sea of the presence of a large British formation sailing from Gibraltar to Malta, and ordered them to attack it at all costs; That evening, at 07:00 PM, the Submarine Squadron Command ordered Dagabur, Brin, Uarsciek and Volframio to move westwards, informing them at the same time that a part of the British ships (the heavy support force, which was to accompany the convoy only to the mouth of the Strait of Sicily, and then return to Gibraltar) had reversed course. But Dagabur never received these communications: at that moment, Commander Pecori’s submarine was already lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean. On August 17th, still not having heard back from Dagabur, Maricosom repeatedly radioed the submarine, but never received an answer. On September 2nd,1942, the crew of Dagabur was reported missing. It was only after the war that the truth was learned from British sources.

Among the missing was the chief engine engineer second class Federico Ghezzi, from Piacenza. For his family this was the second mourning caused by the war on the sea; less than a year earlier, in September 1941, his younger brother Giacomo, second lieutenant commissioner in the Army, had disappeared in the sinking of the motor ship Andrea Gritti, on which he was serving as a royal commissioner.

Like him, sailor Ugo Di Blasi, from Naples, was declared missing on the Dagabur: in a letter a few months earlier, in May 1942, he had written: “My friends have all disappeared, some hit by enemy bombs, some lost in battles on the sea; I’m amazed I’m not dead yet…”

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal23 17,364 3,888 179118.734.95

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
3/29/194120:27T.V. Domenico RomanoMediterranean33°47′ N-25°24′ ETorpedoDamaged (?)H.M.S. BonaventureLight Cruiser5440Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
AlfieriFrancescoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
BassoPrimoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
BellonioTommasoSailorComune5/12/1940
BertazziAlessandroJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
BrondiBernardoChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe8/12/1942
CampagnaFilippoJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
CanniaMatteoSergeantSergente8/12/1942
CasellaFrancescoSergeantSergente8/12/1942
CatalanoDomenicoSublieutenantSottotenente di Vascello8/12/1942
CavallottiGuglielmoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
CeramiFrancescoJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
CeresoliMarioJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
CesarottiErosJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
CoralloSalvatoreSergeantSergente8/12/1942
De HoffmannGabrieleEnsignGuardiamarina8/12/1942
Di BellaGiacomoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
Di BlasiUgoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
Di LuciaGiovanniNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
EllenaArturoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
FemminoGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
FilippiniRenatoLieutenant Other BranchesCapitano G.N.8/12/1942
GaggiottVincenzoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
GalanoAdamoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
GattiAlfredoLieutenantTenente di Vascello8/12/1942
GhezziFedericoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
GrapputoEvelinoJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
LopsDonatoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
MarciRaffaeleChief 3rd ClassCapo di 3a Classe8/12/1942
MarzocchiGiuseppeChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
MeleBiagioChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
MidiliAntoninoJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
ModicaSalvatoreJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
NapoleoneAnielloNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
OrlandiGiovanniNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
PasqueroGiustinoChief 2nd ClassCapo di 2a Classe8/12/1942
PecoriRenatoLieutenantTenente di Vascello8/12/1942
PiledduEnricoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
RivaAdrianoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
SalemiSaverioSergeantSergente8/12/1942
SalvanelliRenatoEnsignGuardiamarina8/12/1942
SoffiettiRenzoNaval RatingComune8/12/1942
StabileSalvatoreJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
StefaniniGennaroSergeantSergente8/12/1942
TravainGiuseppeChief 1st ClassCapo di 1a Classe8/12/1942
ValloriniNelloJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942
ZaccariaAgostinoJunior ChiefSottocapo8/12/1942

R. Smg. Turchese

Turchese was a coastal submarine of the Perla class with a displacement of 680 tons on the surface and 844 submerged.

During the conflict against the Allies (June 10th, 1940, through September 8th, 1943) the boat carried out 32 patrols (mostly in the Strait of Sicily and along the North African coast) and 26 transfer missions, covering 27,904 miles on the surface and 5255 submerged, as well as 95 outings for training or sea trials. It was thus the second Italian submarine for the number of missions carried out in the 1940-1943 conflict, surpassed only by the old H 2 which, however, was used for “second line” tasks in much less dangerous waters.

Seriously damaged by a British aircraft in an episode of “friendly fire” in the aftermath of the armistice, it was never repaired, remaining unused until the end of the war and was subsequent demolition under the conditions of the peace treaty.

Brief and partial chronology

September 27th or 28th, or 29th, 1935

Setting up at the “Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico” (C.R.D.A.) in Monfalcone (construction number 1143).

Turchese under construction. Note the joining of the sheet metal using large rivets.

July 19th, 1936

Launched at the C.R.D.A. in Monfalcone.

Turchese in Monfalcone after its launch
(Museo della Cantieristica di Monfalcone)

September 21st, 1936

Entry into service.

October 15, 1936

Turchese was placed under Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) and assigned to the XXXV Submarine Squadron, based in Messina (for another source, to the XXXIV Squadron of the III Grupsom, also based in Messina).

Turchese in Messina, Sicily

End of 1936

After completing his initial training, the boat made a long endurance cruise in the Dodecanese.

1937

Turchese carried out a training campaign in the Dodecanese and in the Mediterranean.

1938

Another training campaign in the Dodecanese and in the Mediterranean.

May 5th, 1938

Under the command of Lieutenant Francesco Coelli (1), the submarine Turchese took part in the naval magazine “H” organized in the Gulf of Naples for Adolf Hitler’s visit to Italy. Most of the Italian fleet took part in the review: the battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour, the seven heavy cruisers of the I and III Divisions, the eleven light cruisers of the II, IV, VII and VIII Divisions, 7 “light explorers” of the “Navigatori” class, 18 destroyers (the Squadrons VII, VIII, IX and X, plus the Borea and the Zeffiro),  30 torpedo boats (the Squadrons IX, X, XI and XII, plus the old Audace, Castelfidardo, Curtatone, Francesco Stocco, Nicola Fabrizi and Giuseppe La Masa and the four “escort notices” of the Orsa class), as many as 85 submarines of the Submarine Squadron under the command of Admiral Antonio Legnani, and 24 MAS (Squadrons IV, V, VIII, IX, X and XI), as well as the training ships Cristoforo Colombo and Amerigo Vespucci,  Benito Mussolini’s yacht, the Aurora, the royal ship Savoy and the target ship San Marco.

The Submarine Squadron, under the command of Rear Admiral Antonio Legnani, was the protagonist of one of the most spectacular moments of the parade, in which the 85 boats carried out a series of synchronized maneuvers. First, arranged in two columns, at 1.15 PM they pass opposite direction between the two naval squadrons proceeding on parallel routes. Then, at 1:25 PM, all the submarines made a simultaneous mass dive, proceeded for a short distance submerged and then emerged simultaneously and executed a salvo of eleven shots with their respective guns.

1. Promoted to Commander, Coelli died aboard the Heavy Cruiser Pola on March 3rd, 1941 during the Battle of Matapan.

May 1938

Turchese, part of the XXXIV Submarine Squadron (I Grupsom of La Spezia) along with Medusa, Jasper and Corallo, was among the numerous units (battleships Cesare and Cavour, heavy cruisers Zara, Pola, Fiume, Gorizia, Trento, Trieste and Bolzano, light cruisers Duca degli Abruzzi, Garibaldi, Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d’Aosta, Attendolo, Da Barbiano, Di Giussano, Colleoni, Cadorna, Diaz,  Bande Nere, twenty destroyers of Squadrons VII, VIII, IX and X, 54 submarines of Squadrons XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XXI, XXXIV, XLI, XLII) concentrated in Genoa for another naval review organized on the occasion of Benito Mussolini’s official visit to the city, the first in twelve years.

In his speech to the Genoese on 14 May, Mussolini declared: “… The guidelines of our policy are clear: we want peace, peace with everyone. (…) But peace, to be sure, must be armed. That is why I wanted the whole fleet to gather in Genoa: to show you and the Italians of the two most continental regions, which are Piedmont and Lombardy, what our real strength is on the sea. We want peace, but we must be ready with all our might to defend it, especially when we hear speeches, even from across the Atlantic, on which we must reflect. It is perhaps out of the question that the so-called great democracies are really preparing for a war of doctrines. However, it is good to know that, in this case, totalitarian states will immediately block and march to the end.

The fleet remained in Genoa until the end of the month, open to visits by the civilian population: a total of 650,000 visitors flocked to see it, of which 430,000 were Genoese and 220,000 from the rest of Liguria, Piedmont, and Lombardy.

June 19th, 1938

Turchese received the combat flag in Riposto (TN Near Catania, Sicily), offered by the city, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the battle of the Piave.

The ceremony for the delivery of the battle flag to the Turchese organized by the Fascist Party in Riposto

October 15th, 1938

Turchese was assigned to the submarine Command School.

Spring 1939

Turchese was deployed in Cagliari, as part of the LXXII Submarine Squadron along with Diapro, Coralllo and Medusa.

January 1st, 1940

Lieutenant commander Gustavo Miniero (1), 33, from Gragnano, took command of Turchese.

  1. Promoted to Commander, Miniero died on January 5th, 1942 aboard the submarine Ammiraglio Saint Bon.

June 9, 1940

Under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 10.02 PM to form a barrage on the meridian of Capo Teulada, along with Adua, Axum and Aradam. Turchese, specifically, patrolling 35 miles south of Cape Teulada.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into the World War II, Turchese was part of the LXXII Submarine Squadron based in Cagliari, along with Diaspo, Corallo, and Medusa.

June 13th, 1940

Tuirchse received orders to move to the Gulf of Lion, after which the boat patrolled the waters 15 miles east of Cape Creus until the evening of the 19th, in search of French and British merchant traffic.

June 21st, 1940

At 10:15 AM, the crew sighted three small military units from 20 km away in quadrant 0261, northeast of the Balearic Islands. Approaching up to 14 km, Captain Miniero realized that he was dealing with a large enemy formation thus gave up the chase at 11.48 AM.

Probably, the units sighted were the French destroyers of the 8éme Division de Contre-Torpilleurs, the fastest warships in the world.

At 10.05 PM Turchese returned to Cagliari, after having covered 1,052 miles.

July 3rd, 1940

The boat sailed from Cagliari at 2.16 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, to lay in ambush in position 37°54′ N and 07°40′ E, forming a patrol line between Bona and Cap de Fer with Aradam (which sailed along with Turchese), Alagi and Axum.

July 6th, 1940

The boat returned to Cagliari at noon, after having covered 262 miles.

July 9th, 1940

Still under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 00.57 for a patrol in position 37°50′ N and 09°40′ E, between the island of Galite and Tunisia.

July 12th, 1940

At 2.25 AM, during the return navigation, the officer of the watch sighted an illuminated ship in position 38°24′ N and 09°19′ E. Turchese approached using the electric motors, to remain silent and avoid revealing its presence. The unknown ship behaves strangely (it seems to be stationary), so much so that it was believed that it is not a neutral ship – as it should be, given the lights on – but an enemy ship engaged in laying mines.

At 3:25 AM, Turchese launched a 533 mm torpedo from the forward tubes from only 500 meters away. The phosphorescent wake pointed straight to the center of the target, but the torpedo passed under the hull without exploding. At 3:26 AM a second torpedo was launched, again 533 mm and again 500 meters, but this too passed under the hull of the unknown ship. Commander Miniero wanted to try again with a third torpedo, and open fire with the cannon, but at 3.35 AM Turchese violently hit a metal object, at 3.38 AM a second collision occurs, more violent than the first. At 4:10 AM, the submarine broke contact and moved away (according to another source, the unknown ship would have been able to disengage thanks to the increased speed). At 11.05 AM Turchese returned to Cagliari, after having covered 354 miles.

August 1st, 1940

Still under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at one o’clock in the morning for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, in position 37°25′ N and 06°30′ E. It was to form a barrage along with the submarines Argo, Scirè, Neghelli, Medusa, Axum and Diaspro, arranged in two lines of three and four units spaced ten miles apart (while the distance between two submarines of the same line was twenty miles) north of Cape Bougaroni. The formation of the barrage was ordered by Supermarina following the report of the exit from Gibraltar of the British Force H (which sailed with the aircraft carriers H.M.S. Argus and H.M.S. Ark Royal, the battlecruiser H.M.S. Hood, the light cruiser H.M.S. Enterprise and the destroyers H.M.S. Faulknor, H.M.S. Foxhound, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Encounter, H.M.S. Gallant, H.M.S. Greyhound and H.M.S. Hotspur for operations “Hurry” and “Crush”, consisting respectively of sending to Malta twelve fighters launched by H.M.S. Argus and an air attack against Cagliari by planes that took off from H.M.S. Ark Royal).

Turchese was part of the line of four units, together with Diaspro, Axum and Medusa (which after two days had to be replaced by the submarine Luciano Manara following a breakdown). Force H, however, would move north of the area where the submarines were deployed, thus they were not able to attack.

August 9th, 1940

Turchese returnd at 11.40 AM to La Maddalena, after having covered 1,342 miles without any noteworthy encounters.

August 23rd, 1940

The boat left La Maddalena at one o’clock in the morning, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to transfer to Pula.

August 28th, 1940

Turchese arrived in Pula at 11.40 AM, after having covered 1,054 miles.

August 30th, 1940

The boat left Pula at 5.45 AM, still under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Monfalcone, where it arrived at 12.30 PM after having traveled 74 miles. There it entered the shipyard for works.

November 9th, 1940

Once the work was completed, Turchese completed a training patrol from Monfalcone, from 9.18 AM to 4.10 PM, covering 40 miles. The commander was still Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero.

November 22nd, 1940

Another training patrol from Monfalcone, from 9.30 AM to 3.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero. The boat traveled 44 miles.

November 24th, 1940

Turchese left Monfalcone at 9.33 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Pula, where it arrived at 4.40 PM, after having covered 74 miles.

November 29th, 1940

Exited Pula for a training patrol from 9.03 AM to 9.53 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, covering five miles.

December 2nd, 1940

The boat left Pula at 9.10 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Miniero, to move to Rijeka, escorted by his twin boat Galatea. During the transfer navigation, it performed a diving test at 60 meters. Turchese arrived in Rijeka at 5.45 PM, after covering 63 miles.

December 5th, 1940

Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, 31, from Milan, took command of Turchese, replacing Lieutenant Commander Miniero.

On the same day, the submarine made an exit from Rijeka, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, from 12.12 AM to 4.35 PM for a diving test at 60 meters, returning to port after covering 18 miles.

December 6th, 1940

The boat left Rijeka at 8.36 AM to move to Pula, where it arrived at 2.36 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, traveling 63 miles.

December 7th, 1940

Engines were fired up, from 14.10 AM to 14.40 AM, to change anchorage, always staying in Pula.

December 9th, 1940

Departure from Pula from 8.05 AM to 5.25 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, escorted by the auxiliary escort ship F 134 Laurana, travrlling 61 miles.

December 11th, 1940

Left port for sea trials from Pula from 8 AM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 57 miles.

December 12th, 1940

Left Pula from 8.20 AM to 2.25 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing travelling 14 miles.

December 13th, 1940

Under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, Turchese left Pula from 8.10 AM to 5.10 PM, along with the submarine Ettore Fieramosca and with the escort of the tugboat Tenace, for torpedo launch exercises with the torpedo boat Audace travelling 57 miles.

December 14th, 1940

Engines were fired up from 2.18 PM to 2.35 PM to change anchorage in the port of Pula.

December 26th, 1940

Turchese left Pula at 7.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Brindisi.

December 28th, 1940

The boat arrived in Brindisi at 2.15 PM, after having covered 370 miles.

December 30th, 1940

Turchese sailed from Brindisi at ten o’clock in the morning for a patrol south of the Otranto Channel and west of Corfu, in position 39°30′ N and 19°10′ E, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico. Together with the submarines Ambra and Filippo Corridoni, it protected traffic between Italy and Albania.

January 9th, 1941

At 7:25 AM, the Greek submarine Triton (Lieutenant Commander Dyonisios Zeppos) unsuccessfully attacked a submarine west of Othoni, in the Otranto Channel. It is possible that the submarine attacked was Turchese, which for its part, however, did not notice the attack.

January 10th, 1941

Turchse returned to Brindisi at 5:30 PM, after having covered 887 miles without any major events, apart from detecting engine noises.

January 22nd, 1941

Departure from Brindisi for sea trials from 9:00 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 18 miles.

January 29th, 1941

Departure from Brindisi for sea trials from 8.42 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 18 miles.

January 30th, 1941

Turchese set sail from Brindisi at ten o’clock, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol off the Albanian coast, within a radius of ten miles from point 39°10′ N and 19°20′ E, to protect traffic between Italy and Albania.

February 10th, 1941

The boat returned to Brindisi at 6:15 PM, after having covered 908 miles without detecting anything more than distant engine noise.

February 21st, 1941

Turchese sailed from Brindisi at 1:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol west of Corfu, within a radius of ten miles from point 39°10′ N and 19°20′ E, again to protect convoys sailing to and from Albania.

March 4th, 1941

The boat returned to Brindisi at 2.50 PM, after having covered 985 miles without major events.

March 15th, 1941

Turchese left Brindisi at 10:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Crotone.

March 16th, 1941

The boat arrived in Crotone at 5.35 PM, after having covered 179 miles.

March 20th, 1941

Turchese left Crotone at 2:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Cagliari.

Some sources erroneously state that on this date Turchese unsuccessfully attacked a destroyer, being bombarded with depth charges, but this is a mistake; There is no record of this incident in the mission report.

March 22nd, 1941

The boat arrived in Cagliari at 5.30 PM, after having covered 485 miles.

Turchese at sea

March 31st, 1941

The boat left Cagliari from 8:00 AM to 12.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials travelling 31 miles.

April 3rd, 1941

Turchese left Cagliari at 12.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol north of Cape Blanc, within a radius of twenty miles from point 37°30′ N and 09°50′ E forming a barrage with its twin boat Corallo.

April 9th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 5.15 PM, after having traveled 552 miles without sighting anything but ships of Vichy France.

April 18, 1941

Turchese left Cagliari at eight o’clock in the evening, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Messina.

April 20th, 1941

The boat arrived in Messina at ten o’clock in the morning, after having covered 360 miles.

April 21st, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, Turchese sailed from Messina at 6.56 PM for a patrol in the Gulf of Sollum and off Marsa Matruh, within a radius of 20 miles from point 32°10′ N and 27°30′ E, along an axis oriented from northeast to southwest.

April 30rd, 1941

At 5:27 PM, Turchese, engaged in hydrophone surveillance while submerged, when it was suddenly shaken by two explosions, which were attributed to aircraft bombs. At 6:42 PM, eight more explosions occurred, and then more until 7:40 PM.

They were not aircraft bombs but depth charges, dropped in position 32°59′ N and 27°52′ E by the British destroyers H.M.S Jaguar and H.M.S. Juno, which wrongly believe that they have sunk the attacked submarine (H.M.S. Juno will have five dead and eleven wounded among the crew due to the premature explosion of a depth charge). To escape the hunt, Turchese descended to a depth of 90-95 meters.

May 1st, 1941

More explosions were heard, but at a great distance.

May 3rd, 1941

Following trouble with the diesel engines, Turchese aborted its mission and headed towards Leros.

May 7th, 1941

Turchese reached Leros at 2.40 PM, after having covered 1,451 miles.

May 26th, 1941

The boat left Leros for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 12.19 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 23 miles.

May 27th, 1941

The boat left Leros from 7.38 AM to 10.43 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials covering 3 miles.

May 31st, 1941

Turhse left Leros at 3:20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for a patrol south of the island of Kupho (southeast of Crete), within a radius of twenty miles from 33°50′ N and 26°00′ E.

June 5th, 1941

At 8:43 PM, twenty miles southwest of Cape Krio, a submarine was sighted two thousand yards away. Captain Di Domenico decided to dive as a precaution, but during the diving phase the boat was identified as Italian. It was in fact Smeraldo, which in turn recognized the other unit as Italian (although it was wrong about the class, believing to be the Fisalia) and carried out the recognition signals. Subsequently, Turchese headed to Taranto due to engine problems.

June 8th, 1941

The boat arrived in Taranto at 2.35 PM, after having covered 1,040 miles.

June 20th, 1941

The boat left Taranto from 2.45 PM to 5.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing covering 2 miles.

June 24th, 1941

Engines were fired up for 10 minutes for a change of anchorage in the port of Taranto.

August 21st, 1941

Departure from Taranto from 11.49 AM to 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for sea trials, with the escort of the auxiliary escort ship F 46 Limbara travelling 29 miles.

August 23rd, 1941

Left Taranto from 2.14 PM to 4.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, for gyrocompass testing covering 2 miles.

August 24th, 1941

Left Taranto for sea trials from 8.42 AM to 5.52 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico. travelling 63 miles.

August 27th, 1941

Left Taranto for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 5.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico travelling 60 miles.

August 29th, 1941

Departure for sea trials from Taranto from 11:00 AM to 6.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, with the escort of the torpedo boat Altair travelling 33 miles.

September 1st, 1941

Turchse left Taranto at 8.55 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo Di Domenico, to move to Messina.

September 2nd, 1941

The boat arrived in Messina at 12.10 PM, after having covered 255 miles.

September 3rd, 1941

The boat left Messina at 7:00 PM to move to Cagliari, still under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico.

September 5th, 1941

The boat arrived in Cagliari at 7.07 AM, after covering 351 miles.

September 9th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 7.30 AM to 1.55 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 26 miles.

September 11th, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 1.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol in position 38°00′ N and 06°00′ E, north of Capo Bougaroni forming a barrage together with Adua and Axum.

September 14th, 1941

Turchese was ordered to move to a new ambush sector, centered on 38°10′ N and 04°00′ E.

September 16th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 9.33 AM, after having covered 685 miles without any major events.

September 22nd, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 7.08 AM to 12.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, along with the submarines Adua and Serpente and with the escort of the torpedo boat Giuseppe Cesare Abba and the auxiliary minelayer R 176 Balear travelling 35 miles.

September 23rd, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 7:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, between Cape Palos and Cape Caxine (south/southwest of Ibiza), in an area bounded by the meridians 00°20′ E and 00°40′ E and the parallels 36°50′ N (or 36°30′ N) and 37°30′ N. It was part of a barrage together with the Adua, in contrast to the British operation ‘Halberd’. As part of this operation, Force H lefty Gibraltar, with the battleships H.M.S. Prince of Wales, H.M.S. Rodney and H.M.S. Nelson, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal and the destroyers H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Fury, H.M.S. Lance, H.M.S. Legion, H.M.S. Lively, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Zulu, Isaac Sweers (Dutch), Garland (Polish) and Piorun (Polish). The formation was divided by the British into various sub-groups, which departed at different times between September 24th and 25th. The purpose was to protect the navigation to Malta of a convoy with supplies (WS. 11X, formed by the military tanker Breconshire and the cargo ships Ajax, City of Lincoln, City of Calcutta, Clan MacDonald, Clan Ferguson,  Rowallan Castle, Imperial Star and Dunedin Star with a combined cargo of 81,000 tons of supplies and the direct escort of the light cruisers H.M.S. Edinburgh, H.M.S. Sheffield, H.M.S. Euryalus, H.M.S. Kenya and H.M.S. Hermione and the destroyers H.M.S. Cossack, H.M.S. Farndale, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Heythrop, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Oribi of Force X), which would take place at the same time as the navigation of another convoy (three unloaded merchant ships,  escorted by a corvette) from Malta to Gibraltar and with a diversionary action by the Mediterranean Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean.

The departure of Force H in several groups, and the routes followed by them until the meeting (which took place on the morning of September 27th, one hundred miles south of Cagliari), deceived the Italian commands, who mistakenly believed that the purpose of the operation was a naval bombardment against targets on the coasts of the Peninsula (as attested by the “Notiziario 73” of “Maristat Informazioni”,  on the morning of September 25th, according to which “The purpose of the mission would be retaliation against the Italian coasts”). To counter this hypothetical bombardment, Supermarina sent four submarines east of the Balearic Islands, three more southwest of Sardinia, three south/southwest of Ibiza and five in the Ligurian Sea. Turchese, Adua, Dandolo, Squalo, Delfino and Fratelli Bandiera were sent north of Cape Ferrat, Narvalo north of Cape Bon.

Turchese, Adua and Dandolo reached the assigned areas only after the British formation has already crossed them. Maricosom, as a consequence, ordered all submarines to move further south, attempting to intercept the British forces (whose real objective was meanwhile understood by Supermarina on the morning of the 27th, when news of the existence of a convoy bound for Malta arrived) during the re-entry phase, communicating at 8.45 PM on the 27th: “Enemy naval force already attacked and damaged by ARMERA (STOP) In search and attack act with maximum commitment and precision to inflict to the enemy further and more serious damage possible (STOP) I am sure that you will prove worthy of the trust that the Navy places in you (STOP)”. But even these new orders will not bring results.

Equally unsuccessful was the departure to sea of the battle squadron under the command of Admiral Angelo Iachino (battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, heavy cruisers Trento, Trieste and Gorizia, light cruisers Muzio Attendolo and Luigi di Savoia Duca degli Abruzzi, destroyers Granatiere, Bersagliere, Fuciliere, Ascari, Lanciere, Cuirassier, Carabiniere, Folgore, Maestrale, Grecale, Scirocco, Vincenzo Gioberti, Nicoloso Da Recco and Emanuele Pessagno).

September 30th, 1941

At 5:03 AM, a message was received reporting the sighting by the Adua, at 3:50 AM, of a group of eleven destroyers, which, however, given their position and course, would pass much further north than the position of Turchese.

At 10.17 AM smoke was sighted from 14,000 meters, in position 36°49′ N and 00°24′ E. Turchese maneuvered to approach, and at 10.39 AM, having dropped the distance to 6,000 meters, managed to distinguish two Arethusa-class cruisers and two destroyers. At 11:10 AM, while Turchese was at a depth of 19 meters, six explosions were detected quite close. Commander Di Domenico decides to descend to 40 meters. At 1:39 PM, the hydrophones no longer picked up any noise.

The destroyers sighted by Turchese were probably the British H.M.S. Legion and H.M.S. Gurkha, which formed the advanced screen of Force H returning from operation “Halberd”. in a few hours they would sink the Adua.

October 2nd, 1941

At 6.50 AM a submarine, probably Italian, was sighted from 2,000 meters away, in position 37°15′ N and 03°12′ E. Given the poor visibility, however, Turchese maneuvers as a precaution to get away.

October 4th, 1941

The boat returned to Cagliari at 10.25 PM, after having covered 1,258 miles.

October 15th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 8.05 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 30 miles.

October 16th, 1941

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 11.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol north of Cap de Fer, together with the submarines Alagi, Serpente, Diaspro and Aradam, in an area between the parallels 37°40′ N and 37°50′ N (for another source, 37°10′ N and 37°20′ N) and the meridians 06°40′ N and 07°20′ E. The five submarines formed a barrage between 37°10′ N and 37°50′ N, each occupying an area of ten miles radius (another source speaks of a much larger barrage in the Strait of Sicily, formed by Ambra, Alagi, Ametista, Corallo, Fratelli Bandiera, Diaspro, Serpente, Squalo, Turchese, Delfino, and Narvalo).

October 21st, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 11:16 AM, after having traveled 552 miles without having sighted anything but ships of Vichy France.

October 27th, 1941

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 1.10 PM to 4.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, with the escort of the Balear travelling 15 miles. At the end of the mission, Lieutenant Di Domenico disembarked and was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Cunsolo, 31, from Petralia Sottana.

November 11th, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Giovanni Cunsolo, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 6.30 PM for a patrol in the “K.1” area, between Cape Bon and Ras Mustafà (more precisely, between the parallel 37°12′ N and the Tunisian coast, and between the meridians 06°20′ E and 06°30′ E) forming a barrage with Alagi, Axum, and Aradam.

November 13th, 1941

At six o’clock in the morning an illuminated merchant ship was sighted, 80 miles by 000° from Cape Blanc. Turchese approached 6,000 meters and sees that the ship is heading towards Bizerte. In the following days, only Italian or Vichy French ships were sighted.

November 14th, 1941

At 3:04 AM Turchese was sighted by the Aradam.

November 17th, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.10 PM, after having covered 672 miles.

December 1st, 1941

Lieutenant Commander Cunsolo left command of Turchese, which was again taken over by Lieutenant Pier Vincenzo De Domenico.

December 18th, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant De Domenico, Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 8.25 PM for a patrol off Cape Bougaroni, in an area bounded by the Algerian coast, the meridian 37°30′ N and the parallels 06°20′ E and 06°30′ E forming a barrage together with Axum, Alagi and Aradam.

December 19th, 1941

At 9.40 AM, a German submarine (possibly U 74) was sighted 3,000 meters away, in position 38°05′ N and 07°47′ E, which made an indecipherable signal. Turchese continued on its course.

December 21st, 1941

At 1.24 AM a steamer, believed to be French, was sighted in position 37°21′ N and 06°22′ E.

December 22nd, 1941

At 2.55 AM another French steamer was sighted, in position 37°32′ N and 06°28′ E.

December 23rd, 1941

At 2:45 PM, ship noises were picked up on the hydrophone, on a 248° bearing. However, their direction varied considerably. Turchese headed towards them, and at 5.05 PM, in position 37°21′ N and 06°26′ E (off Cape Bougaroni), Turchese sighted two cruisers identified as of the Newcastle class and four destroyers believed to be of the Jervis class, sailing southwest at 25 knots, 12 km away; It send the discovery signal. However, it could not get closer than 7,000 meters.

The ships sighted were probably the British light cruiser H.M.S. Dido and the destroyers H.M.S. Zulu, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Arrow, H.M.S. Foxhound and H.M.A.S. Nestor, the latter Australian.

December 25th, 1941

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.30 PM, after having covered 763 miles.

January 1st, 1942

At 8 PM Turchese sailed from Cagliari under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage between 60 and 100 miles south of Malta (line passing through point 35°00′ N and 13°00′ E) together with Alagi, Aradam and Axum, to protect the convoys sailing between Italy and Libya.  Their task was to spot and attack any British naval forces that might take to the sea to counter Operation M. 43, consisting of sending a large convoy of supplies to Libya. In total, as many as eleven submarines (Turchese, Aradam, Platino, Onice, Galatea, Beilul, Delfino, Alagi, Axum, Zaffiro and Dessiè) were deployed in ambush on the probable routes that a British naval formation could take; one group (Turchese, Aradam, Axum, Platino, Onice, Alagi and Delfino) was deployed to the east of Malta, against possible arrivals from this island, another (Beilul, Galatea and Dessiè) further east, between Crete and Cyrenaica, on the route that would follow a formation that takes the sea from Alexandria. The submarines had an offensive-exploratory assignment during the day and a total offensive at night.

Turchese, specifically, was assigned a patrol area bounded by the meridians 14°00′ E and 14°40′ E and the parallels 34°20′ N and 34°40′ N. (Another source speaks of a barrage between Tobruk and Ras Aamer, together with Ametista and Galatea).

No British naval force would be able to attack the convoy, as the Mediterranean Fleet had been reduced to a minimum as a result of the losses inflicted at the end of 1941 by mines, Italian assault craft and German submarines (a situation of which, however, Rome was not aware, so as to lead to extreme precautionary measures such as this deployment of underwater units to protect the navigation of an important convoy such as “M. 43”); The convoy reached its destination unscathed, bringing to Libya 15,379 tons of fuel, 2,417 tons of ammunition, 10,242 tons of various materials, 144 tanks, 520 vehicles and 901 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

January 2nd, 1942

A breakdown forced the boat to divert to Trapani. It enters the port at 4.50 PM, but once the fault was repaired, it left at 7:00 PM and reached the area assigned for the ambush.

January 8th, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 7.40 PM, after having covered 1,027 miles.

January 16th, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 1.45 PM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 14 miles.

January 28th, 1942

The boat set sail from Cagliari at 2.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to patrol the area between meridians 07°00′ E and 07°10′ E and the parallels 37°30′ N and 38°00′ N together with Alagi, Aradam, Axum and Brin (with which it formed a barrage). At 4:46 PM, however, he was called back to base, returning to Cagliari at 7:30 PM, after having covered 46 miles.

February 3rd, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for sea trials from 12.25 PM to 5.35 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico travelling 33 miles.

February 9th, 1942

Turchese sailed from Cagliari at 15.35, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage off Philippeville and north of Cape Bougaroni, together with Aradam and Axum. It patrolled a sector between the meridians 06°00′ E and 06°10′ E and between the parallels 37°30′ N and 38°00′ N.

February 11th, 1942

At 3 PM, a submarine was sighted heading west; it was believed to be the Brin.

February 21st, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 11.10 AM, after having covered 1,143 miles.

February 27th, 1942

At 12.38 PM Turchese set sail from Cagliari, under the command of Lieutenant Di Vincenzo, for a patrol off the Algerian coast, together with Aradam, Axum and Brin. It was assigned a patrol a sector between the meridians 03°40′ E and 04°40′ E and the parallels 37°20′ N and 37°30′ N.

March 4th, 1942

Turchese returned to Cagliari at 4.30 PM, after having traveled 765 miles sighting only ships of Vichy France.

Turchese in 1942.
Erminio Bagnasco & Achille Rastelli noted that the boat in this picture was often identified as the Axum.
The crew in the foreground are those of the torpedo boat of Spica class.
(“Sommergibili in Guerra” Erminio Bagnasco & Achille Rastelli)

March 27th, 1942

The boat set sail from Cagliari at 10.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to form a barrage off Capo Bougaroni together with the Aradam (and, according to another source, Narvalo and Santorre Santarosa). It was assigned a patrol area bounded by the meridians 05°20′ E and 06°20′ E and the parallels 37°10′ N and 37°20′ N; The task of the submarines was to intercept Force H (under the command of Admiral Neville Syfret), which left Gibraltar and headed east, should it go there. However, the British formation, whose purpose is to launch aircraft intended to reinforce the Malta squadrons (this is Operation “Picket II”. The aircraft carriers H.M.S. Eagle and H.M.S. Argus set sail from Gibraltar on March 27th with the escort of the battleship H.M.S. Malaya, the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione and the destroyers H.M.S. Active, H.M.S. Anthony, H.M.S. Blankney, H.M.S. Croome, H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Exmoor, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lightning and H.M.S. Wishart,  launching on March 29th 8 Supermarine Spitfire fighters that reached Malta, while it will not be possible to launch, as planned, 6 Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers).

March 30th, 1942

At 5:12 PM, while Turchese was heading to intercept an enemy cruiser reported at 8:09 PM the previous day southwest of La Galite, an aircraft was sighted 7,000 meters away, in position 37°25′ N and 06°29′ E. The submarine dove. On board, it was believed that the cruiser passed about 10 miles away.

April 1st, 1942

At three o’clock in the morning, a large seaplane, identified as a PBY Catalina, was sighted in position 37°40′ N and 06°26′ E, 1,000 meters away. Turchese dove precipitously as five bombs explode, causing only minor damage.

The attacker was indeed a Catalina, the “J” aircraft (serial number AJ. 160) of the 202nd Squadron of the R.A.F., piloted by Lieutenant I. F. Edgar, which detected Turchese on radar from 8 miles and then also sighted it optically on route 075°, dropping its bombs (eight depth charges, one of which, however, did not drop due to a failure) from an altitude of just over 20 meters while the submarine was diving. Edgar later reported that he had spotted a large patch of naphtha at the site of the attack.

April 2nd, 1942

Turchese reached Cagliari at 9.38 am, after covering 643 miles.

April 4th, 1942

The boat sailed from Cagliari at 1.18 AM, again under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to patrol the “K.1” area north of Cape Bon (bounded by the meridians 11°00′ E and 11°05′ E, by the parallel 37°12′ N and by the Tunisian coast), forming a barrage with the Aradam, which at the same time would patrol the “K.2” area, north of Cape Kelibia,  with the dual purpose of protecting Italian convoys bound for Libya from incursions by British naval forces based in Malta, and to attack any isolated British traffic that might pass through these waters. The Maricosom Operation Order (209/SRP of 3 April, 7.45 PM) establishes: “Confidential personnel (STOP) Executive ambushes Kappa one submarine Turchese and Kappa two submarine Aradam (STOP) Turchese submarine outward route number one (semialt) return route number four with return to Trapani its new location (STOP) Aradam outbound route number one (semialt) return route number five with return to Trapani its new location (STOP) Leave ambush to order (STOP)  Partial modification of the general order of operation Kappa during ambush during daylight hours, remain perched on the bottom without coming periscope altitude for listening to SITES (STOP) instead of sunset day five, arrive on ambush points as soon as possible after performed hidden navigation daylight hours day four”.

April 8th, 1942

At 9:20 PM, a message was received about the sighting of a cruiser and a destroyer sailing westward. Turchese and Aradam were ordered to approach the African coast. Turchese moved to just 2 miles from Cape Bon, but it did not spot anything.

April 11th, 1942

The boat returned to Cagliari at 8.50 AM, after having covered 674 miles.

April 18th, 1942

The boat left Cagliari at 14.05, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to move to Trapani.

April 19, 1942

Turchese arrived in Trapani at 10.40 am, after having covered 181 miles.

April 20th, 1942

At 3.40 PM Turchese, still under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, sailed from Trapani to patrol an area between the meridians 09°20′ E and 09°40′ E and the parallels 38°00′ N and 38°40′ N, in which an enemy naval force was reported. At 1:41 PM, however, the boat was recalled to base, where it returned at 9:55 PM, after having traveled 50 miles.

May 1st, 1942

The boat set sail from Trapani at 7.52 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, for a patrol south of Formentera, in an area between the meridians 01°20′ E and 01°40′ E and the parallels 37°40′ N and 38°20′ N.

May 8, 1942

At 00:10 it was informed of a convoy sailing eastwards, but it was not in a suitable position to attempt to intercept it (it was located at 38°18′ N and 01°31′ E). At eight o’clock in the evening Turchese received orders to move 20 miles to the south.

May 9th, 1942

At 12:43 PM, a Short Sunderland seaplane was sighted from 7,000 meters away, in position 37°27′ N and 01°37′ E.

May 11th, 1942

At 5:00 PM, while in position 37°27′ N and 01°27′ E, Turchese received a signal of discovery relating to a cruiser sighted southwest of the Galite, sailing eastwards. The boat headed to intercept it, but at 8:00 PM received orders to move 40 miles to the south, a position it reached at 11:53 PM. It dove to make hydrophones listening but did not pick up any noise.

May 15th, 1942

At 2.33 PM, in position 38°05′ N and 04°20′ E, the French steamer Île Rousse was sighted, sailing on route 325°.

May 17th, 1942

The boat returned to Trapani at 10.15 AM, after having covered 1842 miles.

May 21st, 1942

The boat set sail from Trapani at 9.08 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico, to move to La Spezia.

May 23rd, 1942

The boat arrived in La Spezia at 9.25 pm, after having covered 400 miles.

May 29TH, 1942

The boat left La Spezia at 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Di Domenico and escorted by MAS 566, to move to Genoa, where he arrived at 1.43 PM, after having covered 56 miles. In Genoa he entered the SHIPYARD for a period of renovation work.

During the works, two changes of command took place: on June 20TH, Lieutenant Di Domenico handed over command to Second Lieutenant Sergio Parodi, 25, from Pistoia, who on July 15TH handed it over to Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, 27, from Udine.

August 6th, 1942

At the end of the work, Turchese left Genoa from 10.10 PM to 4.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials travelling 26 miles.

August 9th, 1942

Departure from Genoa from 9.09 AM to 3.08 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials travelling 47 miles.

August 1th1, 1942

Turchese left Genoa at 9.55 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to La Spezia, where it arrived at 3.46 PM, after having covered 53 miles.

August 14th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 8.10 AM to 1.15 AM and from 3:00 PM to 6.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 45 miles.

August 17th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 10.36 AM to 12.03 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini covering 8 miles.

August 28th, 1942

Departure from La Spezia for sea trials from 2.40 PM to 6.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 25 miles.

August 29th, 1942

Turchese sailed from La Spezia at 8.24 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for an exercise; after a stop in Portovenere from 5.30 PM to 8.06 PM, Turchese went out to sea again to continue the sea trial.

August 30th, 1942

Turchese returned to La Spezia at 00.30, after having covered a total of 81 miles.

September 1st, 1942

Turchese left La Spezia at 11.02 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for sea trials. At 11.45 PM, after covering 6 miles, it moored at the Fezzano buoy.

September 2nd, 1942

Turchese left the Fezzano buoy at seven in the morning for a training outing, after which it returned to La Spezia at 3.50 PM, after having covered 36 miles.

September 3rd, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left La Spezia at 12.26 to move to Trapani, escorted by MAS 509 in the initial stretch of navigation.

At 2:20 PM it was informed by the light cruiser Attilio Regolo of the sighting of an enemy submarine in quadrant 7648.

September 5th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Trapani at 9.30 AM, after having covered 416 miles.

September 8th, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 7.45 AM to 1.06 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 24 miles.

September 11th, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 7.50 AM to 12.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 20 miles.

September 22nd, 1942

Exit from Trapani for sea trials from 8.32 to 11.47, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 18 miles.

October 19th, 1942

After embarking German G7e (TN Electric) torpedoes, Turchese sailed from Trapani at 1.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol south of the Balearic Islands, between the meridians 02°20′ E and 02°40′ E and the parallels 37°40′ N and 38°10′ N.

October 21st, 1942

At 00.40 AM, 1.40 AM, and 2.50 AM Turchese was sighted several times by the submarine Corallo.

At 11:19 AM Turchese sighted an aircraft at 7,000 meters, in position 37°13′ N and 04°46′ E; and dove to avoid an attack.

October 24th, 1942

At 7.50 AM the boat sighted an aircraft at 5,000 meters, in position 38°06′ N and 02°29′ E; again, it dove.

October 25th, 1942

Another sighting of an aircraft, this time at 1.44 PM in position 37°47′ N and 02°29′ E, from 5,000 meters away. Once again, it dove.

October 28th, 1942

At 9:41 PM, Turchese was informed that a British naval force had left Gibraltar that morning: Force H (aircraft carrier H.M.S. Furious, anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Aurora and H.M.S. Charybdis, destroyers H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lookout, H.M.S.  Bicester, H.M.S. Eskimo, H.M.S. Venomous, and H.M.S. Tartar), engaged in Operation “Baritone”, consisting of the launch of 29 Spitfire V fighters bound for Malta. In addition to Turchese, the submarines Brin, Corallo, Emo, Topazio, and Axum are also directed against it, to form a submarine barrage south of the Balearic Islands.

Turchese moved to the southern end of its patrol sector and went into hydrophone listening, but to no avail. None of the submarines encountered the British units, which moved north of Algiers to carry out the launch and then returned to base.

October 29th, 1942

At 11 AM, the boat received orders from Maricosom to move southwest of Cape Palos, but again there were no sightings.

October 30th, 1942

At 12.52 PM, in position 38°50′ N and 03°16′ E, a steamer was sighted sailing southwards, from 13 km away; Commander Asquini believed that the ship belongs to Vichy France. At 6:00 PM another steamer was sighted heading south, from 11 km away, in position 38°50′ N and 04°02′ E. This was also considered French.

November 1st, 1942

Turchese returned to Trapani at 2.40 PM, after having covered 1823 miles.

November 7th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese sailed from Trapani at one o’clock in the morning for a patrol off Bizerte, in position 37°12′ N and 08°00′ E (for another source, 37°30′ N and 10°00′ E, and shortly after 37°20′ N and 07°50′ E), to counter the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa (operation “Torch”). More than 800 British and American ships of all types are sailing towards the coasts of Morocco and Algeria, to land troops to open a second front in North Africa, at the same time as the breakthrough operated by the British Eighth Army in Egypt, at El Alamein.

Supermarina, informed of the sighting of large Anglo-American naval forces sailing westward from Gibraltar, correctly guessed that the Allies probably wanted to attempt a landing in North Africa, although Turchese did not completely exclude the possibility of a convoy heading to Malta.

In total, Maricosom – on the basis of an order from Supermarina, transmitted at 10.06 PM on November  6th – sent twenty-one submarines to the western and central-western Mediterranean, to counter the enemy operation: twelve submarines of the VII Grupsom (Acciaio, Argento, Asteria, Aradam, Brin, Dandolo, Emo, Galatea, Mocenigo, Platino, Porfido, Velella) were deployed west of the island of La Galite (zone “A”), seven submarines of the VIII Grupsom (Bronze,  Alagi, Avorio, Corallo, Diaspro, Turchese) were sent north of Bizerte (zone “B”), and two others (Axum and Topazio) in an advanced position between Algeria and the Balearic Islands. These positions turned out to be too far from the actual landing zones (Oran and Algiers), but they were not modified, because the German commanders mistakenly believed that the Allies could attempt further landings in Tunisia as well (in which case the Italian submarines would be in an ideal position).

At 3:31 PM Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) informed all submarines lurking in the western Mediterranean of the position of a British naval squadron and an enemy convoy, reported at 10:40 AM. At 8:07 PM the Submarine Squadron Command reported the position of two convoys sighted on two separate occasions, both heading east and consisting of merchant ships escorted by battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and escort ships.

November 8th, 1942

The landings began: 500 Anglo-American transport ships, escorted by 350 warships of all kinds, land a total of 107,000 soldiers on the coasts of Algeria. Since these operations took place in the areas of Algiers and Oran, the Italian submarines were too far east to intervene. Also, since the German commanders believed that the Allies could make further landings further east, towards Tunisia, it was initially decided to leave the submarines where they were.

At 5:58 PM, north of Bizerte, Turchese sighted a submarine that was identified as the Bronzo. Both boats pulled over to get away, to avoid accidents.

November 9th, 1942

At 7.30 AM, in position 37°18′ N and 08°40′ E, a French ship of 2,000 tons was sighted, from 4,500 meters away.

November 11th, 1942

At 16:45 a submarine was sighted in position 37°08′ N and 07°58′ E and was identified as the Aradam.

November 13th, 1942

At 7:45 AM, an aircraft was sighted in position 37°58′ N and 10°06′ E, 4,000 meters away. Turchese dove to escape an attack; then it headed back to the base, passing through the conventional point T.3. The boat arrived in Cagliari at 9.10 PM, after having covered 741 miles.

November 15th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left Trapani at 3 PM to move to Naples.

November 16th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Naples at 3:55 PM, after traveling 220 miles.

November 25th, 1942

Turchese left Naples at 3.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to La Maddalena.

November 27th, 1942

The boat arrived at La Maddalena at 8.30 AM, after having covered 232 miles.

December 2nd, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese set sail from La Maddalena at 3.54 AM for a patrol off the coast of Ajaccio, in a sector between the meridian 08°20′ E, the Corsican coast and the parallels 41°40′ N and 41°55′ N.

Images taken abord the submarine Turchese during war patrols
(Collection Angelo Ortu)

December 3rd, 1942

At 7:02 AM, Turchese sighted two steamers escorted by a torpedo boat off Cape Senetosa, heading north; However, the torpedo boat was identified as an Italian unit of the “Tre Pipe” type, so no offensive action was taken. At 10.10 PM Turchese returned to La Maddalena after having covered 262 miles.

December 6th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, Turchese left La Maddalena at 6.15 PM to move to Cagliari, together with Diaspro and Corallo.

December 7th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Cagliari at 2.40 PM, after having covered 191 miles.

December 9th, 1942

Turchese set sail from Cagliari at 6:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol off the Algerian coast, in the area between meridians 08°20′ E and 08°40′ E and parallels 37°40′ N and 38°00′ N. At 9.45 PM the submarine Galatea was encountered, returning to base, with which the recognition signals were exchanged. Shortly thereafter, Turchese had to turn around to return to base due to engine problems.

December 10th, 1942

Turchese arrived in Cagliari at 12.08 pm, after having covered 86 miles.

December 22nd, 1942

Departure from Cagliari for exercise, from 8.27 AM to 11.27 AN, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini travelling 22 miles.

December 29th, 1942

Turchese left Cagliari at 12.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to Augusta. While sailing, the crew herard bomb explosions in the distance.

December 31st, 1942

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 3:40 PM, having covered 481 miles.

January 4th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 3.37 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, for a patrol southwest of Malta. At 3:52 AM, however, while leaving the harbor in the dark and in poor visibility conditions, Turchese crashed into one of the base’s anti-torpedo obstructions, sustaining such damage that it had to turn back, mooring at Augusta at 8:43 AM after traveling 30 miles. Commander Asquini received a reprimand for what happened, while the navigational officer would be severely punished.

January 5th, 1943

Turchese left Augusta at 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giandaniele Asquini, to move to Messina.

January 6th, 1943

The boat arrived in Messina at 8.15 AM, after covering 74 miles.

January 11, 1943

Turchese left Messina at 6.34 AM, still under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, to return to Augusta, where it arrived at 1.41 PM, after having covered 73 miles.

January 17th, 1943

Turchese sailed from Augusta at 9:55 PM to patrol an area between the meridians 21°00′ E and 21°30′ E, the parallel 34°00′ N and the Libyan coast.

January 20th, 1943

At 5:00 PM, before reaching the sector assigned for the mission, the boat received orders to return to base.

January 22nd, 1943

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 7:11 AM, having covered 704 miles.

February 7th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 4.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, for a patrol off Cape Misrata, between the meridians 15°20′ E and 15°40′ E and the parallels 32°40′ N and 33°30′ N.

February 14th, 1943

Turchese was ordered to move to a new patrol area, between the meridians 15°50′ E and 16°40′ E and the parallels 32°00′ N and 32°10′ N (for another source, between 32°20′ N and 32°30′ N and between 15°00′ E and 18°00′ E).

February 16th, 1943

At 3:56 AM, Turchese received a signal of discovery of a convoy, launched from Axum. The boat changed course to 120° to intercept it, but it did not spot anything.

February 21st, 1943

The boat returned to Augusta at 9:50 AM, after having covered 1,395 miles.

February 26th, 1943

Turchese set sail from Augusta at 4:00 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, to move to Taranto, where he had to undergo a period of refitting.

February 28th, 1943

The boat arrived in Taranto at midnight, after having traveled 297 miles, and entered the shipyard.

April 20th, 1943

Once work was completed, Turchese left Taranto for sea trials from 1:00 PM to 6.30 PM, again under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, covering 8 miles.

April 22nd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 6:00 AM to 5.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 38.5 miles.

April 24th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 2.20 PM to 6.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini navigating 2 miles.

April 26th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 6.30 AM to 2.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 27 miles.

April 27th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 7.35 AM to 1.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 24.5 miles.

April 28th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.46 AM to 5.33 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini, together with the tugboat Gagliardo and with the escort of the auxiliary ship Claretta travelling 20 miles.

April 29th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 5.40 AM to 10.40 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Asquini travelling 21 miles.

April 30th, 1943

Lieutenant Asquini handed over command of Turchese to Aredio Galzigna, 29, from Šibenik.

May 2nd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 12.05 PM to 7.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 27 miles.

May 3rd, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 12.45 PM to 6.50 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 23 miles.

May 6th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.35 AM to 19.45 nAM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 34.5 miles.

May 8th, 1943

Departure from Taranto from 11.35 AM to 5.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, for sea trials together with the gunboat-submarine destroyer Vergada travelling 21.5 miles.

May 10th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 11.40 AM to 6.24 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 28 miles.

May 11th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 7.05 AM to 7.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 32 miles.

May 12th, 1943

Commander Carlo Liannazza, commander of the IV Submarine Group, recommends extending the training period of Turchese, since four of the five officers had recently assigned to the boat, and Commander Galzigna was on his first command.

May 15th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sea trials from 3.35 PM to 1.05 AM on the 16th, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering 34.5 miles.

May 17th, 1943

Departure from Taranto for sonar sea trials from 6.30 AM to 11.20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, together with the torpedo boat Monzambano and the corvette Gabbiano travelling 27.5 miles.

May 20th, 1943

Turchese left Taranto at 6:46 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, to move to Naples.

May 25th, 1943

At 11:35 AM the boat sighted a formation of four-engine bombers flying eastwards, in the Strait of Messina, and dove to avoid them. The planes spotted it and attacked it while it was submerged, forcing it to zigzag at top speed as several bombs fell into the sea about 900 meters aft.

Back on the surface, at 12:09 PM it sighted another formation of four-engine planes flying eastwards. Again, it dove with a crash dive to a depth of 70 meters, while several explosions of depth charges were heard in the distance.

Returning once again to the surface, at 1.34 PM Turchese sighted a third group of four-engine aircraft, this time flying southwards. Again, it dove precipitously, hearing the explosions of nearby bombs (but probably not directed at it) at 1:38 PM and 1:40 PM

May 27th, 1943

Turchese finally arrived in Naples at 6:45 AM, after traveling 644 miles. At 11.32 AM left for Pozzuoli, where it arrived at 12.50 PM, after having covered 8 miles.

May 29th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for sea trials, from 11:00 AM to 3.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling eleven miles.

May 30th, 1943

Turchese left Pozzuoli at 9.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, to move to Naples, where he arrived at 11.10 AM, after having covered 8 miles.

June 1st, 1943

Turchese left Naples at 5.30 PM under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna, for an exercise.

June 2nd, 1943

At the end of the exercise, Turchese returned to Naples at 5.50 AM, after having covered 42 miles. The boat left at 9.35 AM to move to Pozzuoli, where it arrived at 11:00 AM, after having covered 8 miles.

June 3rd, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 9.03 AM to 3.53 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 4th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 2.05 PM to 5.56 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 16th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 4.23 AM to 12.16 PM and from 5.15 PM to 9.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering32 miles in the morning, and 30.5 in the evening.

June 17th, 1943

E Departure xit from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 2.15 PM to 6.45 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 15 miles.

June 18th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 8.34 AM to 12.05 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna travelling 18 miles.

June 19th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 8.20 AM to 10.05 AM and from 7.05 PM to 3.05 AM on June 20th, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering8 miles in the morning, and 34 in the evening.

June 23th, 1943

Departure from Pozzuoli for exercises and tests, from 11.13 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Aredio Galzigna covering 8 miles. At 11.01 PM Turchese left Pozzuoli to move to La Maddalena.

June 26th, 1943

Turchese arrived at La Maddalena at 6.40 AM, after having covered 312 miles, and left at 9.15 AM to move to Santo Stefano, where it arrived at 10.16 AM, after another 4 miles.

June 28th, 1943

The boat left Santo Stefano at 4:57 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, to move to Bonifacio, where it arrived at 7:45 PM, after having traveled 21 miles.

June 30th, 1943

Under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, Turchese sailed from Bonifacio at 10.36 PM for a patrol southwest of Sardinia, between meridians 07°00′ E and 07°40′ E and between parallels 38°00′ N and 38°40′ N.

July 1st, 1943

At 9:15 AM, in position 38°20′ N and 07°28′ E, a large air formation was sighted flying eastwards and the submarine dove to avoid being attacked.

July 2nd, 1943

At 7:58 PM Turchese received orders to go up to the parallel 37°20′ N, between 36°40′ N and 07°40′ E, and then return to the previously assigned sector.

July 6th, 1943

At 12:55 PM Turchese received orders to move 10 miles to the east, and then to reach the parallel 37°50′ N by dawn on the 7th. It then moved westwards, from meridian 08°10′ E to that of Cap de Fer (07°10′ E) on the parallel 37°20′ N, a transfer that took place late due to engine problems, and then returned to the original ambush area at dawn on the 8th.

The assignment was to form a preventive barrage to the south of Sardinia, in contrast to a possible Anglo-American landing (which will then take place in Sicily), together with Giada, Alagi, Argento, Nereide, Nichelio, Platino, and Diaspro.

July 10th, 1943

At 2:15 AM Turchese received the order, issued at 00:15 AM, to execute the “Zeta” plan and reach quadrant 96. At 2:25 PM the boat received a new message, transmitted at 11:41 AM, ordering it to reach zone 172 immediately.

July 11th, 1943

At 00.13 Turchese received an order (transmitted at 10.13 PM the previous evening) to reach zone 83 (east coast of Sicily) passing through point 39°00′ N and 15°00′ E and through the conventional point M 3 (off Capo Vaticano).

At 5:22 AM the boat sighted a twin-engine aircraft flying at low altitude with a south-easterly course, in position 38°20′ N and 09°25′ E, and dovew as a precaution. Back on the surface, at 9.08 AM (in 38°20′ N and 09°25′ E) the crew sighted another plane flying southwards. Again, Turchese submerged; at 8.22 PM (position 38°24′ N and 10°10′ E) a third aircraft was sighted flying southeastwards, and once again the boat dove.

At 9:10 PM, yet another new order was received, transmitted at 6:40 PM to move to zone 81; but at 9.32 the yet another plane was sighted, flying northwestwards, in position 38°25′ N and 10°12′ E, and Turchese dove yet another time.

July 12th, 1943

At 4:28 AM, in position 38°43′ N and 11°35′ E, another plane was sighted: another dive, repeated at 10:50 AM following the sighting of a second aircraft with a westerly course.

July 13th, 1943

Yet another sighting of an aircraft, at 3.50 AM, in position 38°48′ N and 12°30′ E: again, Turchese had to dive.

July 14th, 1943

At 00:07 Turchese received orders from Maricosom to move to the northern half of quadrant 80 but had to abandon the mission due to a breakdown. At 5.13 AM the boat dove following the sighting of an aircraft in position 39°00′ N and 13°20′ E.

July 16th, 1943

The boat arrived in Naples at 6.45 AM, after having covered 1,300.5 miles. At 11.05 AM it left to move to Castellammare di Stabia, where it arrived at 12.50 PM, after having covered 13.3 miles.

July 30rd, 1943

Departure from Castellammare di Stabia for sea trials, from 7.20 AM to 10.15 Am travelling 10 miles. At 8.47 PM, still under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, the boat left Castellammare to move to La Maddalena.

July 31st, 1943

At 2:20 AM, flares were sighted about 2,000 meters away; Turchese dove as a precautionary measure.

August 2nd, 1943

Turchese arrived in La Maddalena at 7.20 AM, after having covered 257 miles, and left at 12.15 PM to move to Mezzoschifo, where he arrived at 1.55 PM, after another 2 miles.

August 3rd, 1943

Turchese left Mezzoschifo at 4.34 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna, to move to Bonifacio, where he arrived at 7.25 AM, after having covered 19 miles.

August 19th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.29 AM to 11.40 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Galzigna travelling 22.5 miles.

August 21st, 1943

Lieutenant Galzigna was replaced in command of Turchese by Eugenio Parodi, 26, from La Spezia.

August 24th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.25 AM to 11.59 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi travelling 26 miles.

August 27th, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.36 AM to 12.22 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi travelling 27.5 miles.

August 31st, 1943

Departure from Bonifacio for sea trials from 7.47 AM to 12.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi travelling 24 miles.

September 2nd, 1943

Turchese sailed from Bonifacio at 5.20 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, to move to Villa Marina (on the island of Santo Stefano), where it arrived at 7.59 AM, after traveling 24 miles.

September 7th, 1943

At 3.15 PM (or 1.15 PM) Turchese (Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi) set sail from Villa Marina together with the similar submarine Topazio, for a patrol in the gulfs of Paola and Gaeta. Both submarines, together with Diaspro and Marea, were to form a barrage in the Gulf of Salerno, in contrast to the imminent Anglo-American landing (operation “Avalanche”). Eight other submarines (Brin, Giada, Galatea, Platino, Nichelio, Alagi, Axum, and Velella) complete the anti-landing screen in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea, along the Tyrrhenian coasts of Campania and Calabria between Paola and Gaeta, while ten (Onice, Settembrini, Vortece, Zoea, Bragadin, Squalo, Menotti, Bandiera, Jalea, and Manara) were deployed in the Ionian Sea along the eastern coasts of Sicily and Calabria.  All executed within the framework of the “Zeta” Plan: Supermarina ordered its activation by Maricosom following the sighting in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea by German air reconnaissance, on the evening of September 7th, of the Allied landing fleet heading towards Salerno.

At 4 PM, off the coast of La Maddalena, Turchese was accidentally targeted by a coastal battery, which fired three salvos without hitting; The shots fell short of about 200 meters.

September 8th, 1943

The armistice between Italy and the Allies was announced: Maricosom ordered all submarines to cease hostilities, immediately dive to a depth of 80 meters and resurface at eight o’clock in the morning of September 9th, and then remain on the surface flying the Italian flag and a black pennant on the periscope, waiting for further instructions. Subsequently, the order was given to head towards Bona, Algeria (for submarines lurking east of Sicily, towards other ports under Allied control such as Malta, Brindisi, and Augusta), keeping the signs of recognition clearly visible.

September 9th, 1943

Interrupted the mission as ordered, Turchese moved from its ambush position south of Sardinia, at 12.21 meeting Topazio (lieutenant Pier Vittorio Casarini) and Marea (sub-lieutenant Attilio Russo), and shortly afterwards the Diaspro (lieutenant Alberto Donato) to form a group. The respective commanders began “discussing” the situation by means of light signals made with the small flashes of light projectors supplied to each submarine (for another version, the “discussion” between the commanders would have taken place by means of megaphones, from their respective cunning towers, given the short distance).

Later, all four of them gather aboard the Diaspro to decide what to do. There are conflicting versions of the outcome of this meeting: according to various authors (including Achille Rastelli and Giuliano Manzari) this first meeting was followed by others on the mornings of September 10th and 11th, and in the end each of the commanders made a different decision. Marea to sail for Bona, Diaspro for Cagliari (assuming there were no German troops), Topazio to the north and Turchese to reach neutral Spain, more precisely the Balearic Islands (which, however, was not confirmed by Turchese’s report, according to which the submarine initially headed towards the 42nd parallel and then towards Bona).

According to the Marea’s report, however, at the end of the meeting the four commanders decided by mutual agreement to aim for Bona, sailing together and waiting for other submarines; the four submarines remained reunited or at least in sight of each other until the evening of the 10th (according to the Marea report, however, the latter and the Diaspro lost sight of Turchese and Topazio as early as 10.30 PM on the 9th, and then lost sight of each other as well). From ten o’clock on September 9th, Turchese sails towards the 42nd parallel.

September 10th, 1943

Turchese and Topazio separated at the Anzio parallel, slightly east of the 11° E parallel. At eight o’clock in the morning, Commander Parodi decided to go directly to Bona.

September 11th, 1943

At 9:27 PM, Turchese was attacked off Bona by an aircraft that was identified as a German Junkers Ju 88 bomber. The bombs that fell closer ended up in the water 6 meters from the bow, portside, exploding underwater at a depth of 10 meters. The explosions cause serious damage to the submarine, knocking out the left diesel engine (for another version, both engines, making it impossible to continue navigation).

The attacking aircraft was not German, but British: a Lockheed Hudson bomber of the 500th Squadron of the Royal Air Force, the “O” aircraft of Second Lieutenant G. M. Shires. Sighting the submarine, and doubtful of its nationality, Lieutenant Shires flew over it twice circling, throwing on the second lap the colors agreed for that day as a signal of recognition. Having received no response, he went on the attack, aiming at the submarine from the opposite direction to that of the Moon (from the starboard bow) and launching a salvo of four depth charges, which fell into the sea astride the cunning tower (according to a source, while the submarine was diving). After the attack, Lieutenant Shires watched the submarine dive astern. Half an hour later, he received orders from the base not to attack unless the boat took hostile action.

September 12th, 1943

In the late afternoon, Turchese encounters a British convoy and was taken in tow by the British armed trawler Stroma.

September 13th, 1943

The damaged Turchese reached Bona at 00:02, in tow of the Stroma, after covering 695 miles. The misunderstanding of which Turchese was the victim extends, with tragic consequences, to Topazio as well. Turchese, in fact, was not the only Italian submarine to be mistakenly attacked by British planes: on the morning of September 12th, Topazio, mistaken by a Bristol Blenheim for a German U-boat, was bombed, and sunk by the latter south of Sardinia.

Most of the crew, fifteen or twenty men, survived the sinking: the British Commands initially sent air and naval vessels to the site to recover them, but recalled them following the news that Turchese had been damaged by an air attack and was sailing towards Bona, mistakenly believing that the submarine attacked by the Blenheim was indeed Turchese.  and that the pilot’s assertion that he sank it was the result of a mistaken appreciation. The result of this incredible sequence of errors and misunderstandings will be that no one will come to the rescue of the castaways of the Topazio, of which there will be, consequently, no survivor.

September 14th, 1943

Still under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, Turchese sailed from Bona at 1.30 PM to Malta, in tow of the submarine Marea and together with the submarines Alagi, Giada, Galatea, Brin, Menotti and Platino, which converged in Bona following the armistice. The group was escorted by the British destroyer H.M.S. Isis.

A few hours after the departure, however, the tow cable snapped, and Turchese had to be towed back to Bona by a British ship, arriving there at 10:00 PM, after having traveled thirty miles. It then remained under repair in Bona, where the work was completed on September 24th.

September 27th, 1943

Turchese left Bona at 5.21 PM, still under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, to move to Malta. After a few hours, however, the engines failed, which forced the boat to be towed back to port.

September 28th, 1943

Turchese returned to Bona at 7.30 AM, after covering 59 miles, in tow of a British unit.

October 1st, 1943

Turchese left Bona in tow at 4.30 PM, to move to Bizerte. The commander was still Lieutenant Parodi.

October 2nd, 1943

The boat arrived in Bizerte at 5:15 PM, after traveling 123 miles.

October 4th, 1943

The boat left Bizerte at 11.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, for the third attempt to move to Malta. This time it was in tow of the British armed trawler Goth, together with the harbor tug C.T. 13, the motor launches ML 480 and HDML 1243 and the armed fishing vessel HMS Tango, in a convoy of three merchant vessels.

October 6th, 1943

Turchese, finally, arrived in Malta at 10.30 AM, after having covered 251 miles. It was the twenty-third and last Italian submarine to reach the island after the armistice. Turchese went to moor in Marsa Scirocco, under the command of the battleship Giulio Cesare, joining the submarines Atropo, Axum, Bandiera, Bragadin, Corridoni, Giada, Marea, Nichelio, Settembrini and Vortece, moored there since September.

November 27th, 1943

Still under the command of Lieutenant Parodi, and once again in tow (this time, of the corvette Chimera), Turchese left Malta at 3.30 PM to return to Italy. It was the last Italian submarine to leave the island. On the same date, the second chief torpedoman Giuseppe Da Rold, 22 years old, from Belluno, died in the metropolitan area.

November 28, 1943

Turchese arrived in Augusta at 9:30 AM, after traveling 117 miles.

December 11th, 1943

Lieutenant Parodi was replaced by Second Lieutenant Giorgio Mogni, 28, from Savignano Irpino.

March 11, 1944

Under the command of sub-lieutenant Giorgio Mogni, Turchese left Augusta in tow of the torpedo boat Monzambano to move to Brindisi.

March 12th, 1944

Turchese arrived in Brindisi at 7.45 PM, after covering 335 miles. There it entered the shipyard for long renovation work (according to another source, it was laid up there).

March 31st, 1944

Sub-lieutenant Mogni was replaced by Lieutenant Commander Renato Frascolla, 33, from Taranto.

September 13th, 1944

Lieutenant Commander Frascolla was replaced by Marco Revedin, 33 years old, from Bologna.

Lieutenant Commander Marco Revedin
(Collection Giovanni Pinna)

November 22nd, 1944

Lieutenant Commander Revedin handed over command of Turchese to Lieutenant Emilio Botta, 26, from Foggia, who held it until the following August.

June 22nd, 1945

Turchese left Brindisi at 6.05 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Emilio Botta, to move to Naples.

June 23rd, 1945

Turchese arrived in Naples at eight o’clock in the morning, after having covered 450 miles. It then remained in the reserve until the end of hostilities.

Turchese (in the background) in disarmament in Taranto in an image taken on February 27th, 1947. In the foreground the oceaning submarine Ammiraglio Cagni, in the third row the Galatea
(From “In guerra sul mare” by Erminio Bagnasco)

February 1st, 1948

Turchese was removed from the Navy rosters, as for the peace treaty requirements, and later demolished.

Another image of the remains of Italian submarines decommissioned in Taranto in February 1947: Turchese is at the far right, in the dock overlooking the Caserma Farinati (Farinati Barracks)
(STORIA militare)

According to Vittorio Iovino, a sailor in the Navy from 1949 to 1951, after the decommissioning Turchese was used for some time as a fuel oil depot, at the same time being used clandestinely for the training of submariners: “the conning tower had been removed and the boat was officially intended as a fuel depot. But we made up for it and built the part of the conning tower with sheet metal so that it would be all efficient to be able to continue going out to sea. The Americans knew everything, but they turned a blind eye, and we were able to go out to sea again for the exercises.” However, there is no trace of such use in any publication, and it seems more likely that Iovino misremembered the name of the submarine in question (two other submarines, Giada and Vortice, were in fact actually used clandestinely for training, while officially they had been downgraded to charging pontoons, in the period between the signing of the Paris peace treaty,  which prohibited Italy from owning submarines, and entry into NATO, following which this clause was allowed to lapse along with many others).

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal58 27,904 5,255 2811184.92

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
7/12/194003:25T.V. Gustavo MinieroMediterranean38°24’N-09°19’ETordepo, Deck GunFailedUnknownShipUnknown

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
Da RoldGiuseppeJunior ChiefSottocapo11/27/1943

R. Smg. Beilul

Beilul was an Adua-class (also known as the “African class”) coastal submarine with a displacement of 698 tons on the surface, 866 tons submerged. During the war, the boat completed a total of 34 patrols, covering a total of 23,305 miles on the surface and 3,321 miles submerged, and spent 234 days at sea.

Brief and Partial Chronology

July 2nd, 1937

The boat was set up in the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

May 22nd, 1938

Beilul was launched at the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards.

The launch of the submarine Beilul

September 14th, 1938

Official entry into active service.

December 12th, 1938

Beilul was placed under Maricosom, the Submarine Squadron Command. After a training cruise in the Dodecanese, it was deployed to the base in Leros.

Beilul in 1935

May 1940

The Beilul (Lieutenant Commander Paolo Vagliasindi, 34 years old, from Randazzo) was assigned to the XXXV Submarine Squadron of the III Grupsom, based in Augusta (Sicily).

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into the World War II, the submarine Beilul formed the XXXV Submarine Squadron (III Grupsom), based in Messina (Sicily), along with the twin boats Durbo and Tembien. Beilul, however, was based in Augusta.

On the same day of the declaration of war, Beilul was sent into an offensive ambush in the Strait of Sicily, between the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

June 19th, 1940

The boat returned to Augusta, without having spotted any enemy units. A short time later, it was transferred to Leros, within the V Submarine Group.

June 29th, 1940

Beilul was sent on a reconnaissance patrol in front of Alexandria to monitor the movements of the Mediterranean Fleet.

July 3rd, 1940

Beilul (Lieutenant Commander Paolo Vagliasindi) sailed from Leros bound for an ambush area located between Derna and Gaudo, on the Alexandria-Cape Kupho junction (Crete), along with another submarine sent to the same area. Tricheco (deployed twenty miles further northeast), would have to provide protection to the navigation of an important convoy bound for Libya, which transit was scheduled for July 8th (operation “TCM”, i.e. “Land, Sky, Sea”: the dispatch to Africa of 2,190 soldiers, 72 M11/39 tanks, 232 vehicles,  5,720 tons of fuel and 10,445 tons of supplies by the steamer Esperia, the passenger motor ship Calitea and the cargo motor ships Marco Foscarini, Francesco Barbaro and Vettor Pisani, with the direct escort of the torpedo boats Orsa, Procione, Orione and Pegaso, the destroyers Maestrale, Grecale, Libeccio and Scirocco and the cruisers Giovanni delle Bande Nere and Bartolomeo Colleoni,  and the indirect escort of the entire Italian battle fleet).

July 7th, 1940

At 11:40 PM (according to another source, at 1:30 AM on the 8th) the submarine Beilul launched a torpedo from close range (less than a 1000 meters), while on the surface, against an enemy destroyer mistakenly identified as H.M.S. Whirlwind, sighted in position 32°40′ N and 28°10′ E (off Crete). Immediately thereafter, Beilul disengaged by diving. A loud explosion was heard on board, and it was therefore believed that the target was either hit or damaged.  In fact, the weapon missed the target. Subjected to heavy hunting with the launch of numerous depth charges, Beilul was damaged and forced to prematurely the assigned area and return to Leros, However, during the return navigation it managed to communicate the sighting of the enemy force (including the position and with a mention of the harsh reaction suffered) to Supermarina.

The destroyer attacked by Beilul was part of the Mediterranean Fleet (battleships H.M.S. Warspite, H.M.S. Malaya and H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle, light cruisers H.M.S. Orion, H.M.S. Neptune, H.M.S. Sydney, H.M.S. Gloucester and H.M.S. Liverpool, destroyers H.M.S. Hasty, H.M.S. Hyperion, H.M.S. Hero, H.M.S. Hostile, H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Ilex, H.M.S. Dainty, H.M.S. Defender, H.M.S. Decoy, H.M.S. Nubian, H.M.S. Mohawk, H.M.S. Janus, H.M.S. Juno, H.M.S. Stuart, H.M.S. Voyager and H.M.S. Vampire), which had left Alexandria between the afternoon and evening of July 7th in three groups (Forces A,  B and C) to support the crossing of two convoys (MS 1 and MF. 1) from Malta to Alexandria (Operation ‘MA. 5») and that, two days later, clashing with the Italian fleet that had gone out to sea to cover the “TCM” operation, would unleash the battle of Punta Stilo.

According to www.naval-history.net, Beilul attacked Force B, consisting of the battleship H.M.S. Warspite (flag ship of Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet) and the destroyers H.M.S. Hero, H.M.S. Hereward, H.M.S. Decoy, H.M.S. Nubian and H.M.S. Mohawk. However, the timing of the attack on the Beilul seems to coincide rather with that of a sighting by the destroyer H.M.S. Hasty of Force C (composed, in addition to H.M.S. Hasty, by  H.M.S. Malaya, H.M.S. Eagle, H.M.S. Royal Sovereign – with Rear Admiral Henry Pridham-Wippell on board –, H.M.S. Hyperion, H.M.S. Hostile, H.M.S. Ilex, H.M.S. Imperial, H.M.S. Dainty, H.M.S. Defender, H.M.S. Janus, H.M.S. Juno, H.M.S. Voyager and H.M.S. Vampire, which sailed from Alexandria at six o’clock in the evening of the 7th),  At 11:59 PM on July 7, the destroyer reported sighting a submarine that had surfaced about a thousand yards (914 meters) away, attacking it with a package of depth charges and mistakenly believing that it was destroyed. An hour later, just before rejoining Force C, H.M.S. Hasty made another depth charge attack on a sonar contact, believing it had damaged yet another submarine.

The Beilul’s signaling, which places the enemy fleet about 150 miles northwest of Alexandria, would also allow air strikes to be launched on the Mediterranean Fleet, which would cause serious damage to the light cruiser H.M.S. Gloucester.

For this action and others that followed, Commander Vagliasindi was awarded the Bronze Medal for Military Valor.

September 17th, 1940

Beilul was sent on patrol north of Crete.

January 1st, 1941

Bailul set sail from Leros for a patrol in the Aegean.

January 9th, 1941

On the evening of January 8th, Beilul lying in ambush north of the Caso Channel, sighted in the moonlight off Crete (in position 35°25′ N and 26°28′ E, north of Kasos and just northeast of the eastern end of the island) a convoy consisting of five merchant ships and three escort units. This was convoy “AS. 10”, formed by eleven British and Greek merchant ships that had sailed from Port Said on February 8th and was headed for Suda (where they would arrive on the 10th) with the escort of five Greek destroyers. (This according to Italian historian Francesco Mattesini; according to the Historisches Marinearchiv it was instead convoy “MW.5C”, which had left Alexandria on January 7th, and arrived in Malta on the 10th and consisted of the military tanker Breconshire and the steamer Clan Macaulay escorted by the anti-aircraft cruiser H.M.S. Calcutta and the destroyers H.M.S. Diamond and H.M.S. Defender).

Remaining on the surface, at 00:17 on the 9th, Beilul launched four torpedoes against two of the merchant ships, and then disengaged with the rapid dive and moved away. Two minutes and 55 seconds after the launches, two explosions were heard on board, leading the crew to believe that they had hit two merchant ships, but in reality, no unit had been hit. The escort leader of the convoy, Captain Gregory Mezeviris (embarked on the destroyer Vasilef Georgios), felt three strong vibrations caused by as many explosions, one of which was close to his ship; Rightly believing that these were torpedoes launched from a submarine, the destroyers of the escort responded by launching depth charges, which, however, did not cause damage to the Beilul.

The detection signal launched by Beilul – which reports that it had launched four torpedoes against two steamers of a convoy escorted in the Kasos Channel – reached Rome at 4.30 AM. On the Allied side, the escort leader Mezeviris reported the incident upon arrival at Port Said and was told by British naval officers that the explosions were probably caused by torpedoes that had reached the end of their run, launched from a submarine or torpedo boat hidden near the coast.

January 12th, 1941

The submarine returned to base.

February 9th through 18th, 1941

Patrolling in the Aegean.

March 1941

Bailul was sent to the waters around Crete, along with other submarines, to attack British convoys at sea as part of Operation Lustre.

This operation, decided by the British commanders a few days earlier, consists in sending to Greece, with convoys from Egypt, British reinforcements and supplies to help the Greek army, engaged against the Italian army in Albania and now also threatened by the imminent German intervention on the Bulgarian border, as emerged from the decryptions of “ULTRA”.

“Lustre” began on March 4th with the dispatch of the first ships loaded with reinforcements from Alexandria to Piraeus. Between March and April 1941, with the double dispatch, every three days (from Alexandria to Piraeus and to Volos), of a convoy of escorted merchant ships loaded with materials and a fast convoy of warships used to transport troops (a total of 27 convoys, 15 from Egypt to Greece and 12 on the opposite route), 58,364 or 60,364 men (the 1st Armored Brigade,  the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions) and 8,588 vehicles, armored vehicles and artillery pieces, plus related equipment and supplies. The anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Coventry, H.M.S. Calcutta and H.M.S. Carlisle were available for the anti-aircraft defense of the convoys, while against possible attacks with surface ships a covering force usually composed of a battleship or a cruiser, plus a group of destroyers, took to the sea.

On the Italian side, as many as eleven submarines were sent to the waters around Crete (in the channels to the east and west of the island, as well as to the southeast of it) to hinder, throughout the month of March, the flow of British convoys: in addition to Beilul, also te Malachite, Nereide, Smeraldo, Ambra, Ascianghi, Amfitrite, Galatea, Dagabur, Ondina, and Onice. However, the use of these submarines was unsuccessful (no merchant ships were sunk, although on March 31st Ambra achieved an isolated success by sinking the light cruiser H.M.S. Bonaventure), as were the first air attacks launched by the Regia Aeronautica, on March 6th, against AS convoys 16 and AN. 17 south of the Kasos Channel: The only effect will be to force the escort to consume between 30% and 50% of their ammunition to repel attacks, but no ships were hit. During this patrol, Beilul failed to intercept enemy convoys.

April 10th, 1941

The British codebreakers of Bletchley Park (later to become known as “ULTRA”, a name not yet assumed at the time), probably on the basis of some ciphers captured in the previous months on board a captured Italian submarines (Galileo Galilei) or boarded before the sinking (Durbo, Uebi Scebeli), managed to decipher some Italian communications that allow them to inform the commands of Alexandria in Egypt that the Beilul would leave at three in the morning of the same  April 10th for a new mission, passing through the Kasos Channel. However, the information did not translate into an attack on the submarine.

May 12th through 20th, 1941

Patrol northwest of Alexandria.

September 27th, 1941

On the night of the 27th, during the British operation “Halberd”, Beilul was sent on a defensive patrol in the Ligurian Sea. This operation consisted of sending a convoy to Malta (military tanker Breconshire and cargo ships Ajax, City of Lincoln, City of Calcutta, Clan MacDonald, Clan Ferguson, Rowallan Castle, Imperial Star and Dunedin Star with a total cargo of 81,000 tons of supplies), but the Italian commands, not knowing the real objective of the British, feared instead it could be another naval bombardment against the Italian coasts.  This was why five submarines were sent to the Ligurian Sea (in addition to the Beilul, also the Giovanni Da Procida and the old H 1, H 4 and H 6).

November 1941

According to a source (codenames.info) Beilul was deployed in the central Mediterranean in support of the navigation of the convoy “Duisburg” towards Libya (later destroyed by the British Force K in the night between November 8th and 9th) but failed to sight enemy units. The official history of the U.S.M.M. (Ufficio Storico Marina Militare), however, does not mention the Beilul amongst the submarines sent to the waters of Malta to protect the navigation of this convoy, which would appear to have been only three (Corallo, Delfino, and Luigi Settembrini).

November 25th, 1941

Under the command of Lieutenant Francesco Pedrotti (30 years old, from Genoa), Bailul was sent on patrol 25 miles north of Derna.

November 30th (or 1 December 1st), 1941

Off the coast of Derna, Beilul was attacked and damaged in the evening by a British Short Sunderland seaplane. The timely reaction of the boat’s gunners forced the attacker to flee, visibly damaged and with fire on board, but not before he had damaged the submarine, which had to interrupt the mission due to the damage suffered.

Commander Pedrotto along with two officers at the beginning of a war patrol
(Collection Giovanni Pinna)

For this action, Commander Pedrotti was awarded the War Cross of Military Valor, with the motivation “Commander of a submarine, attacked at night repeatedly, being on the surface, by an enemy bomber, he ordered the immediate and vigorous reaction, maneuvering appropriately and opening fire with machine guns and cannon, frustrating his attack and visibly damaging it in a serious way“.

TN: the Sunderland in question was a Mark I, tail number Mark I T9050, based in Aboukir, Egypt and piloted by Lt. Ross Bohm (Australian) and according to the Operation Record Book of the No. 230 Squadron, the attack took place on the 1st and there was no damage to the aircraft. Below a picture of the aircraft in question.

Short Sunderland Mark I T9050

December 5th, 1941

The boat returned to base.

January 3rd, 1942

Beilul was sent to lie in wait south/southeast of Malta (the patrol began at noon on January 3rd), in the area between the meridians 21°40′ E and 22°20′ E and the parallels 33°20′ N and 34°00′ N, with the task of sighting and attacking any British naval forces that might take to the sea to oppose Operation “M. 43”,  which consisted of sending a large convoy of supplies to Libya. In total, as many as eleven submarines (Beilul, Platino, Onice, Galatea, Delfino, Alagi, Aradam, Axum, Turchese, Zaffiro, and Dessiè) were deployed in ambush on the probable routes that a British naval formation could take. One group (Axum, Turchese, Platino, Aradam, Onice Alagi, and Delfino) was deployed to the east of Malta, against possible arrivals from this island, another (Beilul, Galatea and Dessiè) further east, between Crete and Cyrenaica, on the route that would follow a formation that would have taken to the sea from Alexandria. The submarines had an offensive-exploratory task during the day and a total offensive at night.

No British naval force were able to attack the convoy, as the Mediterranean Fleet had been reduced to a minimum as a result of the losses inflicted at the end of 1941 by mines, Italian assault craft, and German submarines (a situation of which, however, Rome was not aware, so as to lead to extreme precautionary measures such as this deployment of underwater units to protect the navigation of an important convoy such as “M. 43”). The convoy reached its destination unscathed, bringing to Libya 15,379 tons of fuel, 2,417 tons of ammunition, 10,242 tons of various materials, 144 tanks, 520 vehicles and 901 officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers.

February 13th through 1919, 1942

On patrol in the waters of Syria and Palestine, without any success.

May 1942

Patrolling in the eastern Mediterranean.

TN Beilul left Leros on May 23rd and returned on June 6th.

A sample of a report a submarine commander would file upon returning to base. This one is for the patrol Beilul completed in May. These records are available from the U.S.M.M.
(Italian Navy Historical Bureau, or as they call themselves ‘Italian Navy Historical Office’).

June 3rd or 4th, 1942

On patrol off the coast of Cyrenaica, the submarine Beilul (Lieutenant Francesco Pedrotti) attacked two small escorted convoys with the launch of three torpedoes from a great distance, but was spotted by the escort and subjected to heavy, precise and prolonged hunting with depth charges, which causes serious damage and forces it to return to base early. Commander Pedrotti would receive a Bronze Medal for Military Valor for this action (the second obtained during his time in command of the Beilul), with the motivation “Commander of a submarine on a war mission, sighted a convoy strongly escorted by planes and surface units, he boldly went with prompt and decisive action to attack the formation by immediately launching torpedoes. Subjected to violent and prolonged hunting action by the escort ships, he managed with appropriate maneuvers to disengage and bring his unit back to base“.

June 6th, 1942

Beilul arrived in Leros where it remained under repair for several months. According to another source, in the first half of June the Beilul was sent to the waters of Palestine along with Sirena, Ondina and Galatea, and starting on June 12, along with these three submarines and the Germans U 77, U 81, U 205, U 431, U 453 and U 559, it would be sent to Libyan waters to participate in the fight against the failed British operation “Vigorous” which was sending a heavily escorted convoy from Alexandria to Malta during the Battle of Mid-June.

November 1942

Departing from Leros, it carries out a 15-day patrol in the eastern Mediterranean.

January-February 1943

It carried out two patrols lasting a total of 19 days.

March 1943

It carries out a patrol to the east of Cyprus; This was the only mission carried out by an Italian submarine in the eastern Mediterranean in March.

May 25th, 1943

Beilul sailed from Leros (under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Beltrame) for a patrol in the Gulf of Sirte, in a sector between the meridians 14° and 20° E, the parallel 34° N and the Libyan coast.

May 28th, 1943

During the morning, Beilul was strafed by an aircraft and returns fire with its own machine guns. Neither the aircraft nor the submarine were damaged.

May 29th, 1943

Beilul reaches the assigned sector.

May 31st, 1943

At 10:35 PM, in position 32°00’ N and 17°30′ E, Beilul sighted two patrol boats engaged in anti-submarine search, and disengaged by diving.

June 13th, 1943

The boat returned to base without having spotted enemy traffic and after having suffered intense search and anti-submarine hunt on several occasions.

June 25th, 1943

Beilul left Leros for a new patrol south of Crete, straddling the 25th meridian east. The mission lasted until the first ten days of July; No attacks were conducted, while there was intense anti-submarine air activity.

July 10th, 1943

On her way back to Leros, Beilul was ordered to head towards the south-eastern coast of Sicily, where the Anglo-Americans had landed: together with nine other submarines, the boat would have to counter the landings.

(According to another source, Beilul sailed from Pozzuoli on July 11th together with the submarines Ascianghi and Nereide, bound for the waters of the east coast of Sicily to counter the Anglo-American landing forces that the previous day had started the invasion of the island. According to yet another source, Beilul was sent to those waters, along with other submarines, as early as the evening of July 9th, following the sighting of the Allied landing fleet by two planes of the Luftwaffe. According to “I Sommergibili Italiani 1940-1943” by Erminio Bagnasco and Maurizio Brescia, however, Bailul was on patrol north of Cyrenaica, as part of a mission that began on June 25th, and was diverted to the landing area on July 10th).

July 12th, 1943

Having reached the assigned area off Capo Passero, after a few hours – at 9.45 PM –Beilul (Lieutenant Pasquale Beltrame, 30 years old, from Savona), while patrolling on the surface, sighted in position 36°54′ N and 15°35′ E three Jervis-class destroyers sailing in formation. Judging the situation to be favorable for an attack, Commander Beltrame maneuvered to approach. At 9:55 PM, having reached a distance of 1,500 meters, Beilul attacked with the launch of three torpedoes (the enemy formation appeared very compact), and then disengaged by diving. The weapons did not hit the target (although after two minutes and 15 seconds, the time scheduled for the torpedo run, two loud detonations were heard on board, making the crew believe that they had damaged a destroyer), and the submarine managed to get away unscathed (according to another source, this action would have occurred on June 12th, 1943, instead of July 12th).

For this action, Commander Beltrame was decorated with the Bronze Medal for Military Valor, with the motivation “Commander of a submarine animated by a constant fighting will and a high sense of duty, during a long war mission, sighting an enemy formation, he went on the attack with determination and skill torpedoing two destroyers. He disengaged himself from the enemy reaction with perfect maneuvering, continuing the mission.”

The presumed success of this attack was announced in War Bulletin No. 1154 of July 14: “… another underwater unit, commanded by Lieutenant Pasquale Beltrame from Savona, launched a salvo of torpedoes against a formation of destroyers, two of which were hit…».

July 16th, 1943

At 10:17 PM, Beilul, while sailing on the surface – on its way from Leros to Taranto – using diesel engines, which were generating too much smoke, was sighted in position 39°19′ N and 17°40′ E by the British submarine H.M.S. United (Lieutenant John Charles Young Roxburgh). Since the newcomer was in an ambush zone assigned to the submarines H.M.S. Trooper and H.M.S. Tactician, H.M.S. United’s commander was uncertain whether the other boat was friend or foe and decided not to attack. Even the Beilul sighted H.M.S. United, and the captain of the Italian boat did not know if the other submarine was friend or enemy as well. Therefore, Beltrame decided to move away prudently, also switching from diesel to electric propulsion, because the excessive amount of smoke emitted by its engines made it too easily visible to any enemy units.

July 17th, 1943

Bailul returnrd to base.

Mid-August 1943

Bailul entered the shipyard in Monfalcone for a long period of major maintenance and modernization works.

September 8th, 1943

On the date of the armistice, Beilul was formally part of the V Submarine Group of Leros, Along with Onice, Sirena and Ametista. For various reasons, however, none of the submarines was in Leros at the time of the armistice (three out of four were deployed in Italy, while the Onice was transferred to Taranto and deployed in the Ionian Sea in contrast to the Anglo-American landing forces).

Epilogue

The announcement of the armistice of Cassibile, on September 8th, 1943, surprised the Beilul (Lieutenant Pasquale Beltrame) in dry dock in the CRDA workshops in Monfalcone. There were many units under construction or repair in that important shipbuilding center: under repair there were the submarine Beilul, and Argo, the MAS 518, 550 and 554 and the motor torpedo boats MS 41 and MS 76. In various stages of construction there were the corvettes Egeria, Euridice, Tersicore e Melpomene, the submarines Cromo, Ferro, Piombo, Potassio, Rame, Zinco, Bario, Litio, Sodio, R 7, R 8 and R 9, the pocket submarines CM 2 and CM 3, the minesweepers RD 115, RD 116, RD 117, RD 118, RD 119, RD 120, RD 121 and RD 122,  the military tugs San Biagio, San Cesario and Sant’Antonio and seven merchant ships, including the passenger ship Ausonia (in the process of being converted into a hospital ship) and the tanker Antonio Zotti. Two other submarines, the Nautilo and the “pocket” CM 1, were at an advanced stage of fitting out, the first having recently entered service, the second not yet officially having entered service.

In Monfalcone, since there was no real Navy Command but only a detached section of the Naval Engineering Office of Trieste, the role of Navy commander was held by the most senior officer of the Submarine Group under construction, under which were Beilul, Argo, Bario, Cromo, Ferro, Litio, Nautilo, Piombo, Potassio, Rame, R 7, R 8, R 9,  Sodio, Zinco, CM 2 and CM 3. The oldest officer, on September 8th, was Lieutenant Commander Alberto Campanella, commander of the Nautilo. Monfalcone’s defenses, however, were limited to only seven anti-aircraft batteries armed by the Navy, three fixed and four movable.

Captain Lorenzo Stallo, commander of Marina Trieste, ordered all ships capable of going to sea to set sail to avoid capture. On the morning of September 9th, Nautilo and the CM 1 departed from Monfalcone for Venice. The crews of Beilul and Argo had also embarked on the former, the latter being immobilized and unable to take to sea. However, they did not go far, because the Nautilo, immobilized in Venice (where it had arrived at four o’clock in the afternoon of the same day September 9th) by a breakdown, was captured there by the Germans together with the entire crew.

The Nautilo departed and the most senior officer in Monfalcone remained the major of the Naval Engineers, Oreste Bambini. After getting in touch with the Territorial Command of the Army, Bambini had the two MAS capable of moving (518 and 554) set sail and sabotage both the units that could be prepared in less than three months (as ordered by Supermarina) and the anti-aircraft batteries. Hundreds of shipyard workers enlisted as partisans in the newly formed “Proletarian Brigade”, and faced the German invaders, together with officers and soldiers of the Royal Army and Slovenian partisans, intending to resist, in the series of clashes  which lasted from September 11th through 26th and ended with the destruction of the Brigade by the overwhelming opposing forces – which would become known as the Battle of Gorizia.

The ships under construction at Monfalcone, including Beilul, all fell into German hands when German troops (probably the 211th Grenadier Regiment of the 71st Infantry Division, coming from Trieste) occupied the shipyard, between September 10th and 11th. According to some sources, Beilul, before its capture, was sabotaged by the crew on September 9th.

The sailor of the submarine Beilul Mario Isidoro Nardin, twenty years old, from Trieste, surprised in Monfalcone by the armistice, went to Verona in the company of five other submariners. Finding the city already occupied by the Germans, while the commander had scuttled the submarine, Nardin and his companions were sent back to Trieste and after initial uncertainties and a meeting with the head of the Fascist Party, they enlisted in the X Flotilla MAS, which sided with Germany and the Italian Social Republic. Nardin became a “Gamma man,” an assault diver. After surviving the conflict, in the post-war period he would put into practice his skills in the field of recovery of war relicts, between Caorle and Venice.

Commander Beltrame also appeared to have joined the Italian Social Republic, assuming command of the Plant Protection Company in Bassano del Grappa (Wack Kompanie 1009 Bassano in German documents) until December 1943, with the rank of captain. This company, composed of 148 men (two officers, 23 non-commissioned officers, 133 soldiers), formally under the prefecture of Vicenza but de facto under direct German control (Platzkommandantur of Vicenza), had the task of protecting the telegraph, telephone, and railway networks as well as ammunition depots, the old Fort Tombion (used as an explosives depot) from sabotage and attacks by the partisans., the Asiago airport and the Isotta Fraschini plant in Vicenza. Beltrame survived the war.

The twenty-three-year-old midshipman Mario Falchi Cavallini, embarked on the Beilul since the previous May (it was his first embarkation, once he had left the Naval Academy and completed the course at the Submarine School in Pula), was on leave in Lugo di Romagna at the time of the armistice (he had left Monfalcone just two days earlier). Having abandoned the idea of reaching Beilul after learning that the shipyard had already been occupied by the Germans, on the morning of September 9th he went to Rimini, from where he took a train to Rome and then from there to Pescasseroli, in Abruzzo, where he arrived on September 11th. Walking southwards, determined to reach the territory that remained under the control of the royal government, after eight days of walking he met a Canadian detachment north of Foggia and thus crossed the lines (“lines that in reality, at the end of September did not exist”, he would later recall). Placed at the disposal of the Naval Command of Taranto from October 1st, 1943, in the middle of the month Falchi Cavallini was given command of the pocket submarine CB 11 (which, however, he assumed only on the following December 11th), until the late spring of 1944, when he was transferred to the torpedo boat Clio. After the war, Falchi Cavallini would continue his career in the Navy, until he became an admiral. He died in 2015, at the age of 95.

The 21-year-old sub-chief radio telegraphist Alessandro Bianchet, from Belluno, was not so lucky. Captured by the Germans, he died in captivity in Yugoslavia November 10th, 1944. It appears to have been the only crew member of the Beilul killed during the entire conflict (this is what appears in the Register of the Fallen and Missing of the Navy in World War II and in the Register of the Fallen IMI).

At first, the Germans decided not to complete the work in progress, degrading Beilul to the role of a fuel barge, but after a short time, probably due to the destruction of submarines they were suffering in the Mediterranean, they changed their minds and decided to put it back into service. Unlike the other Italian submarines captured by the Germans, however, Beilul was not incorporated into the Kriegsmarine, but ceded to the National Republican Navy, the small Navy of the Italian Social Republic. In fact, it was the largest submarine assigned to this armed force, whose underwater component was otherwise composed exclusively of pocket submarines.

From the French base of Betasom (Bordeaux) and from the Polish base of Marigammasom (Danzig, where at the armistice the crews destined to arm nine U-boats transferred by the Kriegsmarine to the Regia Marina) were in training between March and April 1944, an Italian crew was sent to Italy, destined to crew Beilul as soon as it was ready. Lieutenant Mario Rossetto, former commander of the submarine Finzi in the Atlantic and then of the ex-German S 6 in Danzig, where he was surprised by the armistice, following which he had decided to join the Italian Social Republic, was appointed to Bailul’s command. Sub-lieutenant Manlio Massi was appointed as second commander, and Captain Angelo Vivo Leo was appointed chief engineer; the other officers assigned to Beilul were Lieutenants Alfio Petralia (a veteran of the Atlantic, like Rossetto), Paolo Di Natale (also, like Rossetto, from Gdansk) and Antonio Galante and Ensign Ciuk. The crew was accommodated in the “Ammiraglio Legnani” barracks in Trieste, named in memory of Admiral Antonio Legnani, the last commander of the Italian submarine fleet (from December 1941 to the armistice) and the first commander of the National Republican Navy, who was killed in a car accident in October 1943.

But just when the work had been almost completely completed, on May 25th, 1944 (another source, probably erroneous, speaks of May 10th), Beilul, now ready to return to service, was hit by bombs and sunk during a raid by the Royal Air Force on the port of Monfalcone. The damage suffered was such that it was considered irretrievable.

Monfalcone, Italy. C. 1945-04. The attack on shipbuilding yards at Monfalcone in north-east Italy by RAF Liberator aircrafts
(Australian War memorial)

The same attack also destroyed three other units being fitted out in Monfalcone on behalf of the Kriegsmarine: the transport submarine UIT 4 (formerly R 7), the pocket submarine UIT 8 (formerly CM 2) and the corvette UJ 204 (formerly Euridice). The transport submarine UIT 5 (formerly R 8), also under construction, and several motor rafts were also damaged.

The crew destined for Beilul was therefore disbanded and its members, together with personnel from other departments, went to form the crews of the pocket submarines of the CB Group (or I Grupsom “Comandante Longobardo”) based in Pula, the “San Giusto” Battalion of the X MAS Flotilla and the Service Department of the “Legnani” Barracks. Their subsequent fate, in the context of the bloody Yugoslav occupation of Venezia Giulia at the end of the conflict, was often dramatic. Lieutenant Galante, destined to command a CB, was captured by Yugoslav partisans in May 1945, following the occupation of Pula, and never seen again. Two other members of the crew, the sub-chief electrician Giuseppe Makuc and the sub-chief naval engine engineer Caputo, were assigned to the crew of CB 21. On April 29th, 1945 this mini-submarine was rammed and sunk off Pula by a German Kriegstransporter, with the death of Makuc – who was trapped below deck and sunk with the submarine – and the serious wounding of Caputo, who was rescued but had his arm mangled by the hatch.

Lieutenant Rossetto fared better: transferred to the X MAS in La Spezia, he survived the turbulent period of the immediate post-war period unscathed and left the Navy in 1947, despite having been acquitted of all charges for his membership in the RSI and having been reinstated in his role. He became a director of Saipem (ENI group) and died in 2015, at the ripe old age of one hundred.

According to some sources (including “Italian Ships and Sailors in the Second World War” by Erminio Bagnasco), after being sunk in the bombing, the Beilul was subsequently brought back to the surface by the Germans, only to be sunk again by them (probably, scuttled) at the time of their retreat, at the beginning of May 1945. When the Allies arrived in Monfalcone, Beilul was just one of the many wrecks that dotted the stretch of water in front of the half-destroyed shipyard. In those waters lay completely or partially sunk also the corvettes UJ 203 (formerly Tersicore) and the submarines Argo, UIT 4 (formerly R 7), UIT 5 (formerly R 8), UIT 6 (formerly R 9), UIT 7 (formerly Bario), UIT 8 (formerly Litio), UIT 9 (formerly Sodio) and UIT 18 (formerly CM 2), as well as the beached or half-sunk hulls of six fast minesweepers.

The relict of Beilul was raised to then be sent to the scrapyard – 1947

Formally decommissioned from the Navy on February 27th, 1947, Beilul was salvaged in the summer of 1947 and scrapped that same year.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal34 23,305 3,321 234113.794.74

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
7/7/194023.41C.C. Paolo VigliasindiMediterranean32°40’N-28°10’ETorpedoFailedHMS Hasty DestroyerGreat Britain
1/9/194100.17C.C. Paolo VigliasindiMediterranean35°25′ N-26°28′ ETorpedoFailedVasilef GeorgiosDestroyer1371Greece
6/3/1942T.V. Francesco PedrottiMediterraneanTorpedoFailedEscort UnitsUnknown
6/12/194321.55T.V. Pasquale BeltrameMediterraneanCapo PasseroTorpedoFailedEscort UnitsUnknown

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
BianchetAlessandroJunior ChiefSottocapo11/10/1944

R. Smg. Jalea

Argonaut Class coastal submarine (650 tons surface displacement and 800 tons submerged displacement). Together with her sister ship Jantina, it differed from the other units of the class because of different engine apparatus (FIAT diesel engines and CRDA electric motors, while Salpa and Serpente had Tosi diesel engines and Marelli electric motors, and Argonauta, Medusa and Fisalia had both diesel and electric engines made by CRDA).

Jalea (left) and Jantina (right) under final fitting in Muggiano, La Spezia
(From “I sommergibili italiani tra le due guerre mondiali” di Alessandro Turrini)

In peacetime the boat carried out intense training activities in the Mediterranean, and in 1936-1937 participated clandestinely in the Spanish Civil War with three patrols. In the initial phase of World War II, it was employed in offensive patrols in the eastern Mediterranean, without encountering enemy units. In March 1941, along with the twin boat Serpente, being the oldest and most worn-out coastal submarines of the Regia Marina (except for the obsolete H of the Great War), the boats were assigned to training tasks at the Submarine School of Pula, where they remained until August 1943.

Jalea and Jantina under final fitting in Muggiano, La Spezia
(From “I sommergibili italiani tra le due guerre mondiali” di Alessandro Turrini)

There, Jalea alternated training activity with anti-submarine patrols in the Upper Adriatic, especially after the tragic sinking of twin boat Medusa by the British submarine Thorn (TN January 30th, 1942). Thereafter, Jalea briefly returned to “front-line” deployment, which was soon interrupted by the armistice. Overall, in the period between June 10th, 1940, and September 8th, 1943, Jalea carried out 22 offensive/exploratory missions and eleven transfer missions, covering 8,437 nautical miles on the surface and 2,822 submerged and spending 114 days at sea, and 147 training sorties for the Submarine School in Pula, covering 8,316 nautical miles.

During the co-belligerence period, Jalea was initially destined, like other submarines, for training use in Bermuda, which it had to give up due to breakdowns that took place during the transfer voyage. The boat was employed in the training of British ships and aircraft in Gibraltar, participating in 48 exercises between January and May 1945. Overall, from September 8th, 1943, to the end of the war, the vessel completed 18 transfer missions, 49 training trips and 7 sea trials covering 13,386.8 nautical miles.

It was the only unit of its class to survive the conflict.  The submarine’s motto was “Aude et vinces” (dare and you will win).

Brief and Partial Chronology

January 20th, 1930

Set-up began at the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyards (La Spezia).

June 15th, 1932

The submarine was launched at the Odero Terni Orlando del Muggiano shipyard (La Spezia) and placed under the Command in Chief of the Maritime Military Department of La Spezia for outfitting and testing.

March 16th, 1933

Jalea entered active service and was initially assigned to a “mixed” squadron (i.e., made up of submarines of different classes) based in La Spezia.

1933

The boat completed several cruises in Italian waters.

1934

Departing from La Spezia, the home port, Jalea made a training cruise that took the vessel to Piraeus, Alexandria, Tobruk, Benghazi and Tripoli.

August 28th, 1936

Lieutenant Teseo Tesei, inventor of the Slow Running Torpedo and future Gold Medal for Military Valor, embarked on Jalea as chief engineer. Tesei remained on Jalea until April 16th, 1937, leaving a diary relating to the second “Spanish” mission.

Lieutenant, Naval Engineering, Teseo Tesei

December 9th, 1936

As part of the I Submarine Group of La Spezia, Jalea sailed to La Maddalena (from Cagliari) under the command of Lieutenant Commander Silvio Garino for a clandestine mission in Spanish waters, off the coast of Barcelona, in support of the nationalist forces in the ongoing civil war in the Iberian Peninsula.

For several weeks, some Italian submarines had begun to operate secretly in support of Francisco Franco’s forces, but the turning point in their use came on December 6th, following a meeting held at Palazzo Venezia with the participation of Mussolini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano, the Undersecretaries of State for War (General Alberto Pariani),  the Navy (Admiral Domenico Cavagnari) and the Air Force (General Giuseppe Valle), the head of the SIM (General Mario Roatta, who is also the commander of the Italian military mission in Spain) and the German Abwehr (Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who participated in the meeting representing the German armed forces).

Opportunely hinted at by Roatta, who in the previous weeks had written from Spain that even if the Nationalists succeeded in conquering Madrid (where they were encountering difficulties due to the fierce resistance of the Republicans: the capital in fact did not fall until March 1939) the Republican resistance would continue elsewhere, and that the only hope for a quick nationalist victory – unless large Italian-German units were sent to Spain – was to cut off the flow of arms and Soviet supplies to the Republicans by sea.

Mussolini said that “At this moment we must make a real ‘race to the sea’. It is my conviction that the solution to the Spanish situation can be achieved by sea. That is, on the day when we have blockaded the red ports of the Mediterranean, the Government of Valencia will realize that the game is lost. It must be borne in mind that, in both Italy and Germany, it would take two months for the training of large units. In this period, above all, it will be necessary to make any traffic in the Mediterranean in the direction of Spain impossible, using aviation and submarines in the most effective way.” The vision of Roatta and Mussolini was also shared by Admiral Canaris, and moreover Hitler himself believed that rather than starting a dangerous “race” with the Soviet Union for the sending of reinforcements to the opposing factions, which would leave Germany unguarded and increase the risk of an expansion of the conflict (at a time when German rearmament was still far from reaching a satisfactory level),  It was better to stop the flow of Soviet supplies by sea to the Republicans, although he leaned more towards diplomatic action to achieve this.

Francisco Franco, head of the nationalist faction, had also insisted on a naval blockade of Republican ports. It was therefore decided to increase the number of submarines operating in Spanish waters from two to eight, with the aim of torpedoing all ships sailing in Spanish territorial waters to block the shipment of weapons to Republican ports; Ciano has proposed that at least one submarine be sent to lurk in front of every Republican port.

The only objections were those made by Admiral Cavagnari, who pointed out the difficulty of identifying the ships sighted as being in the service of Republican Spain, and the risk of serious international accidents in the event of error. To avoid such incidents, submarine commanders were given strict orders not to carry out attacks outside the limits of the assigned ambush zones, and to torpedo only ships identified with certainty as Republican or Soviet, as well as those sailing with darkened lights in their ambush sectors. Since it was difficult to establish with certainty the nationality of the ships sighted (many Republican ships resort to false flags in an attempt to break the blockade), these rules of engagement would result in very modest outcomes in terms of sinkings.

Also, on board Jalea , there was an officer of the nationalist Spanish Navy, the Lieutenant Gonzalo Diaz, who would pretend to be the commander of the submarine if the submarine were to be forced to surface in the presence of neutral ships, to avoid being recognized as Italian (Italy, in fact, had not declared war on the Spanish republic,  and the use of its submarines against the Republican navy was therefore completely illegal). Diaz was also expected with helping to recognize the coastline and the ships sighted.

December 14th, 1936

Jalea had to return to La Spezia due to a breakdown and rough seas, without having reached the ambush area. The boat spent 78 hours on the surface and 106 hours submerged.

December 20th, 1936

After repairing the damage, Jalea left Cagliari for another “Spanish” mission in front of Barcelona, still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Garino and with Lieutenant Diaz on board.

Lieutenant Commander Silvio Garino

December 22nd, 1936

At 7.13 AM a steamer was sighted, and Jalea dove to a depth of 20 meters, sailing at 3 knots and occasionally climbing to periscope depth to look. In the late afternoon, a large British corvette, sailing towards France, passes by the bow of the submarine, 6-7 km away. At 6 PM, Jalea surfaced to recharge the batteries; course 0°, and Cape Crens was passed. Shortly after 8 PM, the Franco-Spanish border was crossed.

Lieutenant Commander Silvio Garino aboard the Jalea with other officers

During the night, numerous merchant ships were sighted, but it was not possible to attack because it was not possible to establish their nationality with certainty.

December 23rd, 1936

At 6.30 AM, Jalea dove again to a depth of 24 meters; Several fishing boats passed around. When two of them moved to the side of Jalea a few hundred meters away proceeding at low speed, fearing that they were requisitioned units and employed in an anti-submarine rake, Commander Garino decided to descend to a depth of 40 meters. In the early afternoon, Jalea returns to periscope depth, and it was possible to observe Barcelona. At 6:20 PM, the boat resurfaced.

December 24th, 1936

At 6.08 AM, Jalea dove. At 12:15 a destroyer was sighted, and the submarine maneuvered to attack, but the attack had to be abandoned when the destroyer was recognized as British, with the initials H 31 (H.M.S. Griffin). Later, a sailing ship left Barcelona; Fishing boat traffic also continued. At 7 PM Jalea surfaced.

December 25th, 1936

At five o’clock in the morning, Jalea attacked the Republican steamer Ciudad de Barcelona off Cape San Antonio. The ship was entering the harbor with darkened lights and had turned them on at the last moment. At 5:18 AM, two torpedoes were launched, the first 533 mm and the second 450 mm, and two minutes later Jalea submerged. Two explosions were heard, and on board it was believed that the first torpedo had missed its target and exploded on the coast, while the second was a hit. Neither of the two torpedoes hit, and the ship managed to reach Alicante.

At 7.30 AM, periscope observation was performed, but there was fog. Floodlights could be seen intent in research. An hour later, another observation, but visibility dropped drastically. In the afternoon, H.M.S. Griffin left the port. At 7:30 PM, Jalea emerged.

December 26th, 1936

Jalea headed towards Tarragona. At two o’clock in the morning, the diesel propulsion engine was stopped and, continuing the charge, while diesel-electric propulsion proceeds, at four knots. At three o’clock in the morning, in sight of Tarragona, many fishing boats were sighted towards the bow. First Jalea reversed course, then approached up to a mile from the coast, then headed again for Tarragona. About four o’clock in the morning a darkened merchant ship was sighted at anchor outside that port: Jalea went to attack on the surface. However, when it was a thousand meters away, the crew spotted a fishing boat and had to dive. At 7:07 AM, when the hydrophones no longer pick up the noise of the trawler’s engine, Jalea returned to the surface, with the cunning tower just out of the water, and Captain Garino climbed onto the bridge. The ship sets sail and tries to enter the port. At 7:25 AM, two 533 mm torpedoes were launched from tubes 3 and 4, but both weapons missed their targets, and at 7:30 AM Jalea submerged again.

The ship attacked was the liner Villa de Madrid, sailing from Marseille to Alicante (various sources mistakenly place the attack off the coast of Barcelona, at the entrance to the port of that city or off Cullera). One of the torpedoes ended up, unexploded, on the nearby beach of Prat da Llobregat, near the lighthouse. Recovered by the Republicans and examined on board the cruiser Mendez Nuñez, it was shown to the foreign press as unequivocal proof of the Italian involvement in the conflict (it was in fact a Whitehad torpedo, produced in Rijeka and in use by the Italian Navy). This unleashed a wave of indignation in the international press. Italian diplomats abroad were ordered by Palazzo Chigi to react to the accusations by showing “always ignorance or the deepest surprise”, but by now the nationality of the “unknown” submarines operating in Spanish waters has become public knowledge.

In the late afternoon, Jalea unsuccessfully chased a steamer which, alerted by an aircraft as it was entering port, had fled. The submarine experienced air leaks and handling problems.

At 7 PM it resurfaced, and began charging the batteries. At 9.15 PM, Jalea returned to the depths and went south of Cape Salon, half a mile from the shore, hoping that the ship would pass between the moon and the submarine. Realizing that he was being chased by the submarine proceeding at eleven knots, however, the merchant ship turned off all the lights and sailed away at low speed, thus managing to lose its tracks.

At 10:15 PM Jalea left the coast to dive, and at 11 PM it emerged, charged its batteries, and headed for Barcelona.

December 27th, 1936

At 6.30 AM Jalea dives. At eight o’clock, in front of Barcelona, a buoy with a flag is sighted. Around noon, a merchant ship was sighted, and an attack maneuver began, which had to be aborted when the ship’s flag was recognized as Dutch. Once the fog has fallen, Jalea settled on the seabed at a depth of 65 meters, four miles from the coast. At 8:30 PM, the submarine emerged. In the late evening, route to Porto Rosas.

December 28th, 1936

At one o’clock in the morning a turn is made on the starboard side, to get away from the coast. A large warship was sighted at the stern – the displacement was estimated at 800-10,000 tons – which proceeded at high speed, but it did not notice the presence of the Italian boat. At 7.20 AM Jalea submerged, but at 8.40 AM a rudder failure forced it to settle on the seabed, at a depth of 46 meters. At 11.50 AM, after repairing the damage, the submarine returned to periscope depth. At 7.05 PM, surfaced and made way toward Barcelona.

December 29th, 1936

At 6:42 AM, Jalea dove near the southern edge of its ambush sector. For a few hours it proceeded at periscope depth performing hydrophone listening, after which at eleven o’clock it set course for Tarragona. At 12:10 PM it emerged and switched to diesel propulsion. At 1:05 PM, two steamers were sighted, and a rapid dive was ordered. The submarine proceeds at half speed, and at 5 PM it arrived four miles from the coast, surrounded by fishing boats, some of which were no more than 150 yards away. At 6.50 PM, it surfaced to recharge the batteries.

December 30th, 1936

Shortly after midnight, a large black mass was sighted towards the stern with the lights off, and a rapid dive was ordered. In his haste, the electrician on call forgot to close the ventilation ducts, from which water started pouring into the submarine: “full air to all the tanks!” was ordered and the submarine returned to the surface. It was thus ascertained that the black mass belonged to a large sailing ship completely obscured. Water entering the ventilation duct had come into contact with the stern battery, causing chlorine gas to be released, which forced personnel to wear gas masks and work through the night to repair the damage. Initially, Jalea headed towards La Spezia, but after about ten miles the chief engineer Tesei assured Commander Garino that the damage had been repaired, and the submarine reversed course to return to the ambush area.

At 7.05 AM Jalea submerged, but the buoyancy pump failed. Once the submarine was placed on the seabed at 45 meters, the fault was repaired. In the afternoon, another aborted attack maneuver against a suspicious steamer, which did not fly a flag and had to be allowed to pass as it was impossible to identify it with certainty. The boat proceed at a depth of 20 meters until 6.50 PM, when the surface maneuver was ordered.

December 31st, 1936

At 6.30 AM, Jalea returned underwater in front of Barcelona, and then spent the morning sifting through those waters. At 12.20 the submarine went to periscope depth, and sighted portside a large French destroyer, so it returns to the depths. At 1.03 PM, again at periscope depth: on the ascent, however, Jalea crashed – at a depth of 12 meters – against the hull of the destroyer, destroying the exploration periscope. It returns to a depth of 40 meters, then descends to the seabed at 53 meters. A course of 80° was taken for La Spezia and at 7 PM the surfacing maneuver was ordered. At 8 PM the portside engine failed.

January 1st, 1937

In the afternoon, the “stump” of the destroyed periscope was cut out.

The crew of the Jalea in summer uniform
(From “Oltre la divisa”, by Antonio Dosi)

January 2nd, 1937

At 7.30 AM, Jalea ended its mission by arriving in La Spezia, after spending 164 hours on the surface and 127 submerged. It carried out a total of four attack maneuvers, two of which were aborted, against merchant ships passing through the area, without success, and encountered rough seas during the mission.

August 5th, 1937

Still part of the I Grupsom in La Spezia and under the command of the Lieutenant Commander Silvio Garino, Jalea departed from Naples, for another mission to counter the traffic of supplies to the Spanish Republican ports, in the area off Cartagena. On board again there was Lieutenant Commander Diaz; to prevent recognition, Jalea was painted black and the name letters on the hull and cunning tower were removed.

August 12th, 1937

At 9.25 AM Jalea sighted the destroyers Churruca and Almirante Antequera (another source speaks of the Alcalá Galiano), of the Spanish Republican Navy, leaving Cartagena. The two units were to take over the escort of the tanker Campillo, sailing from Alicante to Cartagena. Having correctly identified the two destroyers as Churruca-class units, Jalea maneuvered quickly to get into launch position and then launched two torpedoes, one 533 mm against the first destroyer and one 450 mm against the second (according to another source both torpedoes were 450 mm; for another reason both weapons were launched against the lead destroyer). The first of the weapons hit the Churruca (Lieutenant Manuel Nuñez Rodriguez; on board there is also a Soviet “consultant”, S. D. Solouchin) amidships, at boiler rooms 2 and 3, killing three men and wounding nine (one of whom later died). The second narrowly misses it, passing it aft. After launching, Jalea accidentally surfaced and was thus spotted by the Churruca, whose crew thus had the opportunity to notice that it was a foreign submarine. However, there was no reaction from the Almirante Antequera or other republican units. (According to another source, the attack took place off the coast of Tarragona.)

The damaged Churruca, which was immobilized, was taken in tow by the patrol unit Rafael Arcangel, but the tow cable broke twice. It was eventually towed to Cartagena by the tugboat Gaditano (another source claims that the Churruca was towed to safety by Alcalá Galiano), but the damage suffered – a seven-by-two-meter gash on the left side and three boilers out of order – put it out of action for the rest of the war. For this attack, Commander Garino was awarded the Silver Medal for Military Valor by the Italian authorities (motivation: “Commander of the submarine Jalea, in two war missions on the Spanish coasts he demonstrated on various occasions to possess a very high aggressive spirit and uncommon expertise. After a long and tenacious ambush, he resolutely attacked the red destroyer Churruca with torpedoes in the waters of Cartagena, which was hit and seriously damaged”) and the Spanish Military Medal by the Francoist ones.

Commander Garino receives the Silver Medal for Military Valor from Victor Emmanuel III in Rome (at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier) on the occasion of the Navy Day, June 10th, 1939. On the left, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, reads the motivation (from “La guerra civile spagnola e la Regia Marina italiana”

The Spanish Civil War and the Italian Royal Navy, by Francesco Mattesini)

August 21st, 1937

Jalea concluded the patrol by returning to Cagliari, after a mission during which it spent 222.35 hours on the surface and 127. submerged and encountered good seas, covering 1,781 nautical miles on the surface and 231 submerged.

In addition to the torpedoing of the Churruca, it had initiated four attack maneuvers against suspicious merchant ships transiting in its area, but had always aborted them before launch due to the impossibility of identifying them with certainty.

1938

Jalea was assigned to the Submarine Group of Leros. Both Jalea and the twin  boat Jantina spent most of the period immediately preceding World War II in the Dodecanese.

1939-1940

The commanders of Jalea were first Lieutenant Commander Primo Longobardo and then the Lieutenant Salvatore Todaro, both destined to make a name for themselves in the Atlantic shortly thereafter, and to be decorated – in memoriam – with the Gold Medal for Military Valor.

April 25th, 1940

Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, 32, from Como, took command of Jalea.

May 10th, 1940

Jalea , along with the submarines Ametista, Jantina, Delfino and Zaffiro, left Messina to move to the island of Leros, the main naval base of the Dodecanese. The transfer of the five submarines was arranged to reinforce the underwater forces deployed in the Dodecanese (Tricheco, Squalo and Narvalo), in preparation for the now imminent war. A few days later, the five boats crossed the Aegean and reached their destination. Jalea, Jantina, Ametista, and Zeffito form the LII Submarine Squadron (V Grupsom), based in Leros.

June 9th, 1940

At 7.45 AM Jalea (Lieutenant Sandro Cetti) sailed from Portolago (Leros) for a patrol in position 35°08′ N and 26°58′ E, in the Channel of Caso and south of Caso where it would form a barrage together with its twin boat Jantina and the larger Delfino.

June 10th, 1940

Italy entered World War II.

June 11th, 1940

At 8:10 AM, an anti-submarine vessel attacked Jalea in the Kasos Channel with the launch of three depth charges. The submarine retreats to the southeast, and at 10:30 AM heard the explosion of a fourth depth charge. However, it did not appear that Allied anti-submarine units were present in the area.

June 14th, 1940

Jalea returned to Portolago at 4.15 PM, after covering 579 miles.

June 29th, 1940

Under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, the boat set sail from Portolago at 9.30 AM for a patrol in the Caso Channel, in position 35°10′ N and 26°40′ E.

July 9th, 1940

Jalea returned to Portolago at 9.55 AM, after having covered 811 miles.

August 5th, 1940

Jalea set sail from Portolago at 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, for a patrol in the Karpathos Channel, north of the Channel between Rhodes and Karpathos (according to another source, probably erroneous, north of Crete).

August 17th, 1940

Jalea returned to Portolago at 6.52 AM after having covered 1116.5 miles without any major events.

September 7th, 1940

Jalea left Portolago at 6 PM to move to Taranto, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti.

September 12th, 1940

Jalea arrived in Taranto at 4.25 PM, after having covered 640 miles.

October 22nd, 1940

Departure from Taranto for exercise from 8.40 AM to 6.15 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti. Jalea traveled 61 miles.

Other pictures of the Jalea
(From “Oltre la divisa” by Antonio Dosio)

November 10th, 1940

Jalea sets sail from Taranto at 9.30 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, to carry out hydrophone surveillance in the Gulf of Taranto.

November 11th, 1940

Jalea returned to Taranto at 9.30 AM, after having covered 181 miles.

November 12th, 1940

Jalea departed Taranto at four o’clock, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, to carry out hydrophone surveillance in position 39°39′ N and 18°53′ E, fifteen miles by 118° from Torre Scanzano.

November 13th, 1940

Jalea returned to Taranto at 1.30 PM, after having covered 181 miles without detecting anything.

November 14th, 1940

Jalea left Taranto at seven o’clock, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, for a patrol west of Corfu, within a radius of five miles from point 39°39′ N and 18°53′ E, to protect convoys with supplies sailing towards Albania.

November 22nd, 1940

Jalea returned to Taranto at 3.30 PM, after having covered 519.5 miles.

December 1st, 1940

Jalea left Taranto at nine o’clock, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, for another patrol south of the Otranto Channel, in position 39°40′ N and 19°10′ E (southwest of Corfu), to protect the convoys to Albania, together with the submarine Giovanni Da Procida.

December 11th, 1940

Jalea returned to Taranto at 2.35 PM, after having covered 638 miles.

December 26th, 1940

Jalea departed Taranto at 11.09 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, for a new patrol south of the Otranto Channel to protect traffic with Albania, starting from point 38°40′ N and 20°00′ E and going up to ten miles to the east.

January 5th, 1941

Jalea returned to Taranto at 1.30 PM, after having covered 1006.5 miles without major events.

January 19th, 1941

Departure from Taranto for exercise from 14.35 to 15.40, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti. Jalea navigated only three miles.

January 21, 1941

Jalea departed Taranto at 8.05 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti, for a patrol south of the Otranto Channel, in position 38°40′ N and 19°40′ E, again to safeguard the convoys with Albania. It formed a barrage in the Lower Adriatic and northern Ionian Sea together with the submarines Ambra, Turchese, Tito Speri, Filippo Corridoni, Domenico Millelire, Ciro Menotti and Dessiè.

January 31st, 1941

Jalea returned to Taranto at 4:30 PM after having travelled 663 miles without detecting anything except engine noise and explosions in the distance.

February 1st, 1941

Departure from Taranto for exercise from 14.30 to 16.50, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti. Jalea covered only 4 miles.

February 26th, 1941

Exit from Taranto for exercise from 8.30 AM to 4.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti and with the escort of the minesweeper RD 16. Jalea traveled 36 miles.

February 27th, 1941

Exit from Taranto for exercise from 9.10 to 10.34, under the command of Lieutenant Sandro Cetti. Jalea travelled two miles.

February 28th, 1941

Lieutenant Cetti left the command of Jalea, which was taken over by the Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero, 34, from Gragnano (Naples).

March 6th, 1941

Exit from Taranto for exercise from 8.40 AM to 5.10 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero and with the escort of the minesweeper RD 30. Jalea traveled 44 miles.

Jalea (center), Onice (left) and Ametista (right) docked in Civitavecchia
(From“Oltre la divisa” byAntonio Dosio)

March 10th, 1941

Jalea left Taranto at 9.25 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero, for a patrol in the Gulf of Taranto.

March 11th, 1941

Jalea returned to Taranto at 10.45 AM, after having covered 87 miles without sighting anything.

March 15th, 1941

Departure from Taranto for exercise from 3.10 PM to 4.40 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero. Jalea covered four miles.

March 16th, 1941

Jalea left Taranto at 9.10 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero, to move to Pula, where it was assigned to training: the boat had worn out engines and other equipment, and no longer suitable for “front line” service. On the way, it encounters an Italian convoy.

March 18th, 1941

Jalea arrived in Pula at 10:48 AM, after traveling 534 miles. It then passed under the XII Submarine Group, composed of the units employed in the training of the students of the Submarine School of Pula.

From March 25th to April 1st, 1941

Several trainings patrols.

April 4th, 1941

Jalea sailed from Pula at 16.10, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gustavo Miniero, for a patrol off Punta Planca and Šibenik, along a northwest-southeast oriented line at 43°24′ N and 15°48′ E (or 41°50′ N and 18°25′ E) to replace the Medusa, which had returned due to damage. The purpose of the mission was to protect traffic with Albania.

April 13, 1941

Jalea returned to Pula at 1:25 PM, after covering 827 miles.

April 15, 1941

Departure from Pula for exercise from 8.50 to 9.15, under the command of Lieutenant Gustavo Miniero.

May 4th, 1941

Jalea enters the shipyard in Pula for a period of work.

May 17th, 1941

Change of command during the works: Lieutenant Miniero was replaced by his peer Vincenzo D’Amato, 31 years old, from Bari.

Lieutenant Vincenzo D’Amato

May 28, 1941

Left the shipyard at the end of the works.

June 14, 1941 – January 28, 1942

A large number of training patrols.

February 1st through 14, 1942

More repair works in Pula. During this period, Commander Riccardo Boris, 35 years old, from Borgo San Martino, was interim commander. At the end of the repair work, on February 14th, the command was assumed by the Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini, 31 years old, from Rome, except for the transfer trip from Pula to Porto Baross, in which Jalea was commanded by Lieutenant Teucle Meneghini, 34 years old, from Pitelli.

Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini in a post-war picture

February 25th, 1942

It left Pula at 7.40 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Teucle Meneghini, to move to Porto Baross together with the submarines Velella and Vettor Pisani, the Audace and the submarine support ship Quarnerolo. The small convoy arrived in Porto Baross at 2:50 PM, after a journey of 60 miles.

From March 7th, through May 15th, 1942

Several training patrols from Porto Baross.

Jalea during a test dive in Pula
(From the magazine STORIA militare)

May 16th, 1942

Still under the command of Lieutenant Commander Roselli Lorenzini, Jalea left Porto Baross at 1.30 PM to move to Pula, where it arrived at 7 PM, after having covered 58.9 miles.

May 17th, 1942

Commander Roselli Lorenzini disembarks, replaced by Lieutenant Commander Guido D’Alterio, 33, from Naples.

From May 19th through October 3rd, 1942

Several training patrols from Pula.

Some pictures taken on the Jalea by the second lieutenant Vittorio Villa during an outing in the waters of Rijeka in April 1942
(Graciously provided by his son Alberto Villa)

October 11th, 1942

Lieutenant Commander D’Alterio was alternated at the command of Jalea by his peer Alberto Torri, 35 years old, from Gallarate.

From October 17 through June 14, 1943

Several training patrols from Pula.

Other images taken by Vittorio Villa during the Jalea’s outings in the waters of Rijeka in April 1942: chief gunner Rosselli with Lieutenant Esposito…

 Lieutenant Bernardin, a saboteur of  the Reggimento “San Marco”
(Photo Vittorio Villa).

June 15th, 1943

Lieutenant Commander Torri left command of Jalea replaced by Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, 30, from Taranto.

From June 16th through July 15th, 1943

Several training patrols from Porto Sauro and Pula.

Sublieutenant, Naval Engineering, Francesco Del Rio aboard Jalea in 1942

July 15th, 1943

Jalea left Pula at 00.13, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, to move to Brindisi, where became part of the IX Submarine Group, based there, together with Squalo, Fratelli Bandiera and Luciano Manara.

July 18th, 1943

Jalea arrived in Brindisi at 7.10 PM, after covering 385 miles.

August 5th, 1943

Departure from Brindisi for sea trials from 2.20 PM to 5.54 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli travelling 22.2 miles.

August 9th, 1943

Jalea left Brindisi at 8.40 PM to move to Taranto, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli.

August 12th, 1943

Jalea arrived in Taranto at 7.17 AM, after having covered 328 miles.

Jalea with the new mimetic pattern
(From the magazine STORIA militare)

August 15th, 1943

Jalea set sail from Taranto at 5.13 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, for a patrol off Capo Spartivento, between point 37°44′ N and 16°00′ E, point 37°44′ N and 16°36′ E and the coast of Calabria.

August 22nd, 1943

At three o’clock in the morning intense anti-aircraft fire was observed in the direction of Crotone, and almost at the same time news arrived of the sighting of an enemy naval force off Capo Rizzuto, with a 45° course. Commander Gigli decided to try to intercept it.

Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli in a post-war picture
(U.S.M.M.)

At 4:33 AM, in position 38°48′ N and 17°11′ E, two fast units (perhaps motor torpedo boats) were sighted at a distance of 1,000 meters heading at full force towards Jalea , which dove to escape an attack.

At 6.12 AM, in position 38°53′ N and 17°28′ E, three motor torpedo boats were sighted sailing towards Crotone.

August 23rd, 1943

Jalea returned to Taranto at 6.40 AM, after having covered 688.2 miles.

September 7th, 1943

Jalea left Taranto at 1.15 PM (for another source, 2.37 PM), under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, for a patrol off the coast of Crotone.

Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command), having received news of the sighting of the Anglo-American invasion fleet heading towards the coasts of southern Italy (these are the ships destined for the “Avalanche” operation, the landing in Salerno), gave the go-ahead for the “Zeta” Plan (drawn up since 23 March 1943 for the protection of the coasts of Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia with the large-scale use of the remaining underwater forces,  modified several times and issued on 2 July): the mass deployment of submarines in those waters, to counter the Allied landings.

As part of the “Zeta” Plan, Jalea was sent to form a barrage in the Ionian Sea (between the eastern coasts of Sicily and Calabria and Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in Puglia) together with seven other submarines (Squalo, Marcantonio Bragadin, Fratelli Bandiera, Zoea, Luigi Settembrini, Onice and Vortice). Onice, Vortice, Settembrini and Zoea had already been deployed there previously.  while Jalea, Squalo, Bandiera and Bragadin extend this pre-existing barrier to the Gulf of Taranto. Eight other boats (Brin, Jaspro, Topaz, Alagi, Marea, Galatea, Velella, Platino and Nichelio) were deployed in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea to cover the coast between the gulfs of Paola and Gaeta, while two others (Giada and Turquoise) were sent to the west of Sardinia.

While this was happening, the armistice between Italy and the Allies had already been signed four days prior. However, it remained covered by the utmost secrecy, everyone was kept in the dark except for a small circle headed by Pietro Badoglio and Vittorio Emanuele III. The commander of Maricosom participated to the meeting organized by Admiral Raffaele De Courten, Chief of Staff of the Navy, to explain to the senior commanders the provisions of Memo No. 1, sent to him on September 6th by the Supreme Command, and in which orders were given for an imminent reversal of alliances. The deployment of submarines in the waters of Southern Italy was agreed with the Allied commands in order not to arouse the suspicion of the Germans. The crews are obviously not aware of it, and the crew of the submarine Velella paid with their lives for this absurd situation, torpedoed on September 7th by the British submarine Shakespeare.

September 8th, 1943

The announcement of the armistice between Italy and the Allies surprised Jalea in the Ionian Sea.

At 7:50 PM, eight minutes after the EIAR announced the news to the nation (the Allies announced it at 6:30 PM, via Radio Algiers), Maricosom issued the message to all submarines at sea: “On receipt of this order, assume a task exclusively I repeat exclusively exploratory,” followed at 9:10 PM by “Upon receipt of this message, cease all hostilities to the accused received.” At 9:50 PM, Maricosom ordered all submarines: “Dive immediately to a depth of 80 meters STOP At 8 AM on the 9th, emerge remaining on the surface with the national flag on the shore and a black pennant at the bow periscope STOP You will receive further orders STOP Acknowledge receipt.”

September 9th, 1943

At 8.20 AM Jalea met the submarine Ciro Menotti (Lieutenant Giovanni Manunta); the two commanders discussed what to do, after which Menotti decided to head for Syracuse (but along the way it would be intercepted by the submarine HMS Unshaken and diverted to Malta), while Commander Gigli opted to return to Taranto. Later it is diverted to Gallipoli.

September 10th, 1943

Jalea arrived in Gallipoli at 9:35 PM, after covering 297 miles.

September 11th, 1943

Jalea left Gallipoli at 3.55 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, to move to Taranto, where he arrived at 10.03 AM, after having covered 56.6 miles.

September 12th, 1943

Jalea left Taranto at 9.46 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Pasquale Gigli, to move to Malta, together with the submarines Atropo and Fratelli Bandiera and with the escort of the Italian destroyer Augusto Riboty and the British H.M.S. Troubridge (according to another version, the latter would have met the Italian units at 1.20 PM on the 13th, then guiding them to Malta).

September 14th, 1943

Jalea arrived in Malta at 5.40pm, having covered 310.2 miles. Jalea, Atropo, and Fratelli Bandiera were the first Italian submarines to arrive in Malta, with the exception of the Ciro Menotti, which had preceded them on September 12th. Many more will follow in the following days.

September 21st, 1943

Jalea was temporarily stationed in the berth of San Paolo (Malta), together with ten other submarines (Alagi, Brin, Galatea, H 1, H 2, H 4, Onice, Ciro Menotti, Squalo and Zoea), under the “dependence” of the seaplane support ship Giuseppe Miraglia (this is the “San Paolo Group”, one of the two groups into which the Italian submarines arriving in Malta were divided:  the other, called “Gruppo Marsa Scirocco”, is located in that locality under the command of the battleship Giulio Cesare).

October 5th, 1943

During the internment in Malta, Lieutenant Gigli left command of Jalea, which was temporarily taken over by Ensign Emilio Catalano.

November 21st, 1943

Jalea left Malta at 4:55 PM, under the command of Ensign Emilio Catalano, to return to Italy. (According to another source, probably erroneous, Jalea would left Malta as early as October 13th, together with the submarines Alagi, Atropo, Fratelli Bandiera, Marcantonio Bragadin, Brin, Filippo Corridoni, Galatea, H 1, H 2, H 4, Ciro Menotti, Luigi Settembrini, Squalo and Zoea).

November 22nd, 1943

Jalea arrived in Augusta at 11:20 AM, after traveling 108 miles. On the same day, Ensign Catalano left command, which was assumed, for the period of subsequent works, by the captain of the Naval Engineers Nireo Bassetti, 30 years old, from Sarsina.

November 23rd through January 19th, 1944

Renovation works in Augusta.

January 19th, 1944

At the end of the works, second lieutenant Arturo Spina took command of Jalea for a few days, and on January 23rd handed it over to lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, 27, from La Spezia.

January 27th, 1944

Jalea left Augusta at 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Eugenio Parodi, to move to Taranto, together with the destroyer Grecale, the torpedo boats Sirio and Cassiopea and the corvettes Urania and Sibilla.

January 29th, 1944

The convoy arrived in Taranto at 8.45 AM, after having covered 263 miles. Jalea then started a period of maintenance work in Taranto.

May 3rd, 1944

The first-class gunner Raffaele Zazzetta, 58 years old, from Grottammare, died in the metropolitan area. He would be the only member of Jalea’s crew to have died during World War II.

May 7th, 1944

Lieutenant Parodi handed over command of Jalea to Giuseppe Ridella, 25, from Ferrara, who held it until August 1945.

From May 8th through May 30, 1944

Several sea trials and short patrols from Taranto.

June 10th, 1944

Jalea left Taranto at 5.11 PM to move to Augusta, together with the submarine Onice and with the escort of the torpedo boats Calliope, Fortunale and Monzambano and the corvettes Folaga and Danaide.

June 12th, 1944

The convoy arrived in Augusta at 11:30 AM, having covered 259 miles.

June 13th, 1944

Jalea (Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella) and Onice left Augusta at 17:52 for Gibraltar.

June 19th, 1944

The two submarines arrived in Gibraltar at 8:32 PM, after having covered 1,084 miles.

June 25th, 1944

Jalea (Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella) made a sortie from Gibraltar from 9.23 to 11.26 for diving tests traveling 14 miles.

June 30th, 1944

Jalea (Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella) and Onice (Lieutenant Ferdinando Boggetti) set sail from Gibraltar at 10.10 AM bound for Bermuda, where they were to be used for the training of Allied anti-submarine units. They are escorted by the U.S. destroyer U.S.S. Fessenden.

July 3rd, 1944

Jalea was forced to reverse course due to engine failures, escorted by the British destroyer H.M.S. Antelope (according to another version it was H.M.S. Fessenden, which would then return to take over the escort of the Onice).

July 4th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Gibraltar at 12.18 PM, having covered 699 miles.

September 10th, 1944

Departure from Gibraltar from 9.10 AM to 5.12 PM for sea trials, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella.

September 15th, 1944

Jalea left Gibraltar at 8.52 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Algiers, escorted by the destroyer Legionario.

September 17th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Algiers at 11:51 AM, having covered 452 miles; at 7.15 PM he left for Taranto, still escorted by the destroyer Legionario.

September 21st, 1944

Jalea arrived in Taranto at 9.20 PM, after having covered 884 miles.

October 16th, 1944

Departure from Taranto from 6.51 AM to 2.27 PM for sea trials, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella travelling 63 miles.

October 29, 1944

Jalea sailed from Taranto at 7.30 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Augusta, together with the submarine Fratelli Bandiera and with the escort of the torpedo boat Animoso.

October 30th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Augusta at 1:24 PM, having covered 246 miles.

November 3rd, 1944

Jalea left Augusta at 6.24 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Valletta, together with the Bandiera and with the escort of the British armed fishing boat Stroma.

November 4th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Valletta at 2.25pm, having covered 218 miles.

November 7th, 1944

Jalea left Valletta at 6:19 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Port Said. Together with Jalea, the submarine Fratelli Bandiera also set sail for the same destination but had to turn back due to a breakdown.

November 12th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Port Said at 10:40 AM, having traveled 1,019 miles.

November 14th, 1944

Jalea left Port Said at 6:01 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, bound for the Great Bitter Lake, where the boat arrived at 12:12 PM on the same day, after traveling 52 miles.

The battleships Italia and Vittorio Veneto have been interned in the lake for months, according to what the Allies decided after the armistice. The chief electrician Ivano Leonardi, who was embarked on the Italia, remembered the arrival of Jalea in his diary: “A submarine looms on the horizon, gradually it got closer and closer and then performed the maneuver and docks under our edge on the left side of the ship. A rumor ran through the corridors that it was the submarine Jalea; I picked up this news too, and then I immediately went on deck to make sure, with my own eyes, if it is really was my old and dear Jalea. In fact, when I get up, I got closer and sow the bow; I immediately recognize it to be a small coastal boat and of Jalea type, but, having noticed the modifications, even if relative, of the superstructures, I was still not well convinced that it really was it, that old hull that had seen me participate in so many battles. I asked someone on board, and they answered me again with the same clarification and then what do I do? My gaze turns towards the stern of the submarine, and I try to catch a glimpse of some letters; from that moment on, I had no more doubts: the two well-known letters were marked on it: JA. While I felt a great emotion, I looked point by point all over the deck of the boat to find in everything the expression of my satisfaction in seeing the JA again after such a long time. And here my mind went back to the past, to those years of my youth when, moored in a quay of the great military port so dear to me (the arsenal of La Spezia), Jalea was part of my life, when, almost every day, we went out to sea in those surroundings known to the whole great family of sailors,  and then to all the vicissitudes passed with the thousand and one dives made in the blue sea of our peninsula. All this reminded me of my dear submarine that kept me with it for over 7 years of my military life, continuously from 1932 to 1940.”

December 1st, 1944

Jalea left the Great Bitter Lake at 7:44 AM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to return to Port Said, where she arrived at 3:12 PM, after traveling 52 miles.

December 3rd, 1944

Jalea left Port Said at 14:12, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Valletta.

December 8th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Valletta at 2.22pm, having covered 1021 miles.

December 21st, 1944

Jalea left Valletta at 4.20 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to move to Gibraltar, escorted by the British armed fishing boat Pirouette.

December 26th, 1944

Jalea arrived in Gibraltar at 8.10 AM, having covered 1,033 miles. There it began training for British anti-submarine units, also embarking Royal Navy personnel.

From January 3rd through May 7th, 1945

A long list of training patrol with British ships and airplanes.

June 4th, 1945

Jalea left Gibraltar at 2.45 PM, under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Ridella, to return to Italy. It sailed together with the submarine Nichelio and with the escort of the corvette H.M.S. Cormorant.

June 10th, 1945

Jalea arrived in Taranto at 8.45 AM, after having covered 1,325 miles. The war was over for the boat, which was being laid up for decommissioning.

February 1st, 1948

Removed from the roster of the navy according to the provisions of the peace treaty, and later demolished.

Jalea, second from the left, laid up in Taranto along the Onice, Diaspro and H2
(Photo Giorgio Parodi)

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Coastal33 8,437 2,822 11498.764.12

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
8/22/194304:33T.V. Pasquale GigliMediterranean38°48’N-17°11’ENoneAbandonedMotor torpedo boatsUnknown

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
ZazzettaRaffaelefirst-class gunnerCannoniere 1a Classe5/3/1944

R. Smg. Squalo

Squalo was a medium range submarine, leader of the eponymous class (displacement of 937.65 tons on the surface and 1,146.87 tons submerged; other sources speak of 870 or 933 tons on the surface and 1,142.87 submerged, or of standard displacement of 857 tons and in normal load of 920 tons on the surface and 1,125 submerged).

Squalo still on the slip in Monfalcone
(Istituto Luce)

Designed by the general of the Naval Engineers Curio Bernardis, the Squalo class belonged to the single-hulled type with double central bottoms, resistant external hulls (called “Bernardis”, being the main proponent of this type of submarine in Italy) and represented the third stage of the evolution of this type, after the Pisani and Bandiera classes. These three classes had indeed been ordered almost simultaneously, with the Bandiera and Squalo were set even before the completion of the Vettor Pisani, from which they derived, and therefore before being able to fully verify the qualities of the “progenitor” class, which later turned out to be mediocre; the result was that the Bandiera and Squalo had to be modified during construction, to attempt to overcome the drawbacks of the type.

R. Smg. Squalo (Royal Submarine Squalo – (Shark))
Here with the modified bow nicknamed “big nose”
(Photo provided by. Marcello Risolo)

Therefore, having been set up too prematurely (when the construction of the Bandiera had only begun six months earlier), before having tested the actual performance of the previous classes, and despite the modifications necessarily applied during construction, the submarines of Squalo class continued to suffer from the same basic problems that had afflicted the Pisani and Bandiera classes. These problems, immediately highlighted during the sea trials, were a problematic stability issue both on the surface and underwater, which forced the application of external saddle tanks, and seakeeping problems (in particular, tendency to slip into the sea from the bow) that forced the bow to be modified shortly after completion, raising it to insert a self-filling box with the aim of counteracting pitching (giving the class the characteristic “nose” of medium-cruise submarines designed by Bernardis). These modifications (especially the counter-hulls) affected the maximum speed the class, just like on the Pisani and the Bandiera, reducing it by about one and a half knots compared to the design specifications and limiting it to 15 knots on the surface against the 17-18 knots of the more successful later classes.

Squalo with the original bow

All things considered, the Squalo class was basically a repetition of the previous Bandiera class, with some improvements that made it more efficient and reliable, so much so that it is believed that with this class the “experimental” period of submarine design in the Italian Navy had come to an end. The similarity between the two classes was such that the Squalo class is sometimes referred to as a “second series” of the Bandiera class, since the modifications received by Squalo class during construction not being such as to represent a significant difference between the two classes. The main differences were the slightly smaller displacement of the Squalo class (by a few tons), the main size, the shape of the conning tower and the arrangement of the machine guns.

Despite the above-mentioned flaws, the performance of the “Squalos” was rated as good overall; in particular, the submarines of the class showed good characteristics during the deployment in the Red Sea in the period 1936-1938, where despite the difficult conditions of that theater they always remained in excellent conditions of efficiency. The Squalo class benefited from a more accurate set-up and the exploitation of the advantages of mass production, making the most of the design and construction experience of the previous Pisani and Bandiera. They were thus the first “Bernardis” to be judged favorably, and in 1940, despite already having a decade of service behind them, they were considered as still having a fair war value. The historian Giorgio Giorgerini wrote in his “Uomini sul fondo” (“Men on the bottom”) that “at last satisfactory submarines were obtained (…) On the whole, they performed well and demonstrated, in the pre-war period, that they could operate efficiently in the harsh conditions (…) of the Red Sea. In war they could be employed in offensive tasks as well as transport“; on the other hand, Bagnasco and Brescia in “Sommergibili Italiani 1940-1943” (“Italian submarines 1940-1943”) state that the performance of Squalo class was not dissimilar to that of the Bandiera, which in turn was judged, after the aforementioned modifications, “acceptable, even with a maximum speed contained in relation to the installed power”.

The propulsion system for surface navigation consisted of two two-stroke, six-cylinder, reversible diesel engines FIAT Q 426 of 3,000 HP (1,500 per engine; 2,208 kW overall) that allowed a maximum speed of 15.1 knots, with a range of 1,820 nautical miles at this speed and 5,650 miles at 8 knots. The propulsion for underwater navigation consisted of two 1,300 HP CRDA electric motors (650 HP per engine) that made it possible to reach 8.2 knots, with a diving range of seven miles at this speed (autonomy actually lower than that of the previous Pisani and Bandiera: these two classes had in fact a diving range of 8.8 miles at 8.2 knots) and one hundred miles at 3 knots. The batteries were composed of two sections of 56 batteries each, capable of producing 4,270 amperes in one hour, 6,380 in three hours, 8,400 amperes in ten hours and 9,350 in twenty hours (in truth, inferior performance to those of the previous Pisani and Bandiera classes).

Details of the stern section
(Istituto Luce)

The armament consisted of eight 533 mm torpedo tubes (four at the bow and as many at the stern) with a reserve of twelve torpedoes (half at the bow and half at the stern), a 102/35 mm Schneider-Armstrong 1914-1915 gun with a reserve of 150 rounds (initially in a shielded ready-use stowage that formed a continuation of the conning tower, which proved impractical and was soon replaced by a more traditional “in the open” arrangement),  and two single 13.2/76 mm machine guns with a supply of 3,000 rounds. The testing depth was 90 or 100 meters.

While in 1942 Delfino and Narvalo underwent work to reduce the voluminous conning tower, to better adapt it to the conditions of the war in the Mediterranean, Squalo kept its original version – the only modification was the shortening of the periscope jackets – until its decommissioning and demolition.

During World War II, Squalo completed 28 offensive/exploratory patrols and 14 transfers from June 10th, 1940 to April 30th, 1942, covering a total of 18,800 miles on the surface and 2754 submerged, and spending 170 days at sea. From 1 May 1st, 1942 to 1943 it carried out 121 training sorties for the Submarine School in Pula, as well as some anti-submarine patrols in the Upper Adriatic (the latter, unlike the training outings, are part of the aforementioned 42 missions in total). During the co-belligerence between Italy and the Allies (September 1943-1945) the boat carried out training activities for the benefit of Italian anti-submarine units.

Squalo ‘s motto was “Coeco sub gurgite unum sidus Italia” (“From the blind whirlpool I see only one star, Italy”).

Brief and partial chronology

October 10th, 1928

Laid out in Shipyard of Monfalcone (Trieste) (construction number 207).

January 15th, 1930

Launched at the Shipyard in Monfalcone (Trieste).

October 6th, 1930

The boat entered service (other source gives the date of October 10th) and was assigned to the II Submarine Squadron of medium range, based in La Spezia, which it formed together with the simil;ar boats Tricheco, Narvalo and Delfino.

1932

Squalo carried out training cruises along the Italian coasts, in addition to the usual periodic training trips.

Mid-thirties

Sailor Pietro Venuti, future Gold Medal for Military Valor, served aboard the Squalo .

1934

The submarine was transferred to Naples, and it formed the IV Submarine Squadron along with the three boats of the same class.

1935-1936

Squalo alternated periods of deployment in Italian bases with long stays in Tobruk.

December 14th, 1936

Lieutenant Ugo Botti took command.

1936-1938

Squalo was in Massawa (Eritrea), in the Red Sea, until spring 1938. During this two-year period, Squalo was used for training in the waters of Italian East Africa (AOI), in order to ascertain whether the units of the class were suitable for activity in warm seas. The results were judged to be positive. (According to another source, Squalo was sent to Massawa only in 1937, along with the Dolfino, replacing Narvalo and Tricheco who had been stationed there in 1936).

The submarine Squalo (center) together with its twin boat Delfino (right), the submarine Fratelli Bandiera (left),  and the colonial ship Eritrea (left) in Massawa

(Photo Coll. Guido Alfano)

1938

Back in Italy, the boat formed the XXXIII Submarine Squadron (III Grupsom), based in Messina, along with Delfino, Narvalo and Tricheco. The submarines of the Squadron were sent in turn to the Upper Adriatic for work and verifications carried out in the torpedo factory in Rijeka.

May 5th, 1938

Squalo took part in the naval parade “H” organized in the Gulf of Naples for Adolf Hitler’s visit to Italy. Most of the Italian fleet took part in the review: the battleships Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour, the seven heavy cruisers of the I and III Divisions, the eleven light cruisers of the II, IV, VII and VIII Divisions, seven “light explorers” of the Navigatori class, eighteen destroyers (the Squadrons VII, VIII, IX and X, plus the Borea and the Zeffiro),  thirty torpedo boats (the Squadrons IX, X, XI and XII, plus the old Audace, Castelfidardo, Curtatone, Francesco Stocco, Nicola Fabrizi and Giuseppe La Masa and the four “escort notices” of the Orsa class), as many as 85 submarines of the Submarine Squadron under the command of Admiral Antonio Legnani, and 24 MAS (Squadrons IV, V, VIII, IX, X and XI), as well as the training ships Cristoforo Colombo and Amerigo Vespucci,  Benito Mussolini’s yacht, the Aurora, the royal ship Savoy and the target ship San Marco.

Squalo during the naval parade “H”
(From“I sommergibili italiani” di Mario Paolo Pollina, USMM)

The Submarine Squad was the protagonist of one of the most spectacular moments of the parade, in which the 85 boats carry out a series of synchronized maneuvers: first, arranged in two columns, at 1.15 PM they pass opposite direction between the two naval squadrons proceeding on parallel routes; Then, at 1:25 PM, all submarines made a simultaneous mass dive, proceeded for a short distance in immersion and then emerged simultaneously and executed a salvo of eleven shots with their respective guns.

March 19th, 1939

Squalo collided with the submarine Santorre Santarosa, which suffered damage to the propeller shaft and the breakage of the horizontal rudder guards. This was followed by a period of work in drydock.

1940

Stationed in Leros, and under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Migeca, Squalo became part of the LI Submarine Squadron (V Grupsom of Leros), again along with Delfino, Narvalo and Tricheco.

June 10th, 1940

Upon Italy’s entry into World War II, Squalo was part of the LI Submarine Squadron based in Leros, with Delfino, Narvalo and Tricheco. Under the command of Lieutenant Giuseppe Migeca, it carried out its first war patrols in the eastern Mediterranean, without encountering enemy units. Subsequently, (1941-1942) it was used for ambush missions in the Strait of Sicily.

June 1940

After the outbreak of war, Squalo was sent to lie in wait in the North Aegean, off the Dardanelles.

September 17th, 1940

The boat was sent to patrol the waters north of Crete, along with the submarines Beilul, Delfino and Narvalo: It did not encounter British ships.

April 1941

In the second half of the month, Squalo was sent to lie in wait off the Egyptian coasts (Gulf of Sollum and Marsa Matruh).

May 20th, 1941

Squalo was sent to the waters between Crete, Sollum and Alexandria (Egyp)t, together with numerous other submarines (Uarsciek, Walrus, Topaz, Fisalia, Adua, Malachite, Dessiè, Sirena and Smeraldo), to support the German assault against Crete (Operation “Merkur”). During this mission, the crew spotted a British naval formation from a great distance but was unable to attack.

July 23rd, 1941

Squalo, under the command of Lieutenant Ludovico Grion, was sent to lie in wait in the waters of Cyrenaica, off Ras Azzaz (about fifty miles east of Tobruk),

July 24th, 1941

In the evening, Squalo sighted from a short distance, north of Ras Azzaz and northeast of Tobruk, a unit that was identified as a British tanker ” type War…” of 10,000-11,600 GRT (probably with a strong overestimation of the tonnage), sailing on a westerly course (it was probably a unit used to supply the garrison of Tobruk, surrounded and besieged by Axis troops for more than three months).

At 11.01 PM, in position 32°20′ N and 24°53′ E, Squalo launched two torpedoes from about 1,000 meters against the enemy ship. On board the submarine two loud explosions are heard after the expected torpedo travel time, and it was therefore believed to have damaged it, but when shortly after Squalo emerges to better ascertain the result of the attack the ship, helped by the darkness and mist, had disappeared. There is no evidence from the British side of this attack; The identity of the attacked ship also remains a mystery.

July 30th, 1941

Sighting two British destroyers south of Crete, Squalo tried unsuccessfully to attack them, after which it is was then subjected to anti-submarine hunting with abundant launch of depth charges, from which, however, it managed to escape without being damaged, thanks to the shrewd evasive maneuvers ordered by Commander Grion.

Squalo and other submarine in a picture probably dating to before the conflict

For the alleged torpedoing of the tanker, Commander Grion would be decorated with the Bronze Medal for Military Valor (“Commander of a submarine, during a war mission, conducted with high fighting spirit and serene daring, torpedoed an enemy armed tanker of 11,000 tons, causing its probable sinking. He then decisively attacked a section of destroyers and, subjected to violent hunting, with skilful maneuvers managed to disengage”). For a similar reason, 24 other members of the crew of Squalo would receive the War Cross for Military Valor (chief engineer, captain of the Naval Engineers Silvano Lupidi; second commander, sub-lieutenant Gennaro Savino; midshipman Aurelio Schiano di Pepe; sub-lieutenant of the Naval Engineers Bruno Miani; aspiring midshipman Antonio De Natale; chief torpedoman first class Pio Albalunga; chief mechanic first class Mario Pieresca; chief of the engineers), second-class mechanic Nazzareno Storani; third class helmsman, Ottorino Marzotto; chief torpedoman third class Adolfo Botti; Chief Mechanic Third Class Mario Guida; second chief radio telegraphist Achille Mariotto; sergeants electrician Angelo Callinella and Carlo Stradella; under-helmsman Giusepep Sanalitro; sub-chief gunner, gunner, Domenico Arena; sub-chief radio telegraphist Luigi Baldessari; second chief torpedoman Rosario Onorato; sailor Giovanni Velotti; torpedoman Vincenzo Iandolo and Armando Scaranari; stokers Antonio Pacor, Ettore Capridossi and Umberto Cassani).

August 24, 1941

Squalo and the submarines Tricheco, Topazio and Fratelli Bandiera formed a barrage in the Strait of Sicily together with 13 MAS, to intercept an alleged British convoy sailing from Gibraltar to Malta, following the sighting of large British naval forces (Force H with the battleship H.M.S. Nelson, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Ark Royal, the light cruiser H.M.S. Hermione, the destroyers H.M.S. Encounter,  H.M.S. Fury, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Foresight and H.M.S. Nestor) had set sail from Gibraltar (August 21st) and headed east. In reality, there was no convoy: the British have launched Operation “Mincemeat”, which consists of sending the fast minelayer H.M.S. Manxman (which left alone on August 22nd so as not to attract attention) off the coast of Livorno, to lay minefields in those waters, and in air attacks launched by H.M.S. Ark Royal against targets in Sardinia (industrial plants and cork forests in the northern part of the island),  in order to dissuade Francisco Franco’s Spain from entering the war on the side of the Axis, showing the Royal Navy’s ability to strike the enemy even at home.

September 26th, 1941

Squalo patroled the waters north of Capo Ferrat and southwest of Sardinia together with Delfino and Fratelli Bandiera, as part of the fight against the British operation “Halberd”, which began on September 24th. The main purpose of the latter was to send to Malta a convoy of supplies (military tanker Breconshire and cargo ships Ajax, City of Lincoln, City of Calcutta, Clan MacDonald, Clan Ferguson, Rowallan Castle, Imperial Star and Dunedin Star, with a total cargo of 81,000 tons of materials), with the direct escort of Force X (formed by the light cruiser cruisers H.M.S. Kenya,  H.M.S. Edinburgh, H.M.S. Sheffield, H.M.S. Euryalus and H.M.S. Hermione and the destroyers H.M.S. Cossack, H.M.S. Farndale, H.M.S. Foresight, H.M.S. Forester, H.M.S. Heythrop, H.M.S. Laforey, H.M.S. Lightning, H.M.S. Oribi and H.M.S. Zulu) and also the indirect support, in the first part of the voyage, of Gibraltar’s Force H, three battleships (H.M.S. Rodney, H.M.S. Nelson and H.M.S. Prince of Wales), an aircraft carrier (H.M.S. Ark Royal), five) and nine destroyers (the British H.M.S. Duncan, H.M.S. Fury, H.M.S. Gurkha, H.M.S. Lance,  H.M.S. Legion, H.M.S. Lively, Poland’s Garland and Piorun and the Netherlands’ Isaac Sweers).

In addition, secondary operations included the “Halberd” scheme which also include the dispatch of a convoy of three unloaded merchant ships from Malta to Gibraltar (which departed in the night between September 26th and 27th and escorted only by a corvette) and an exit to sea from Alexandria of a portion of the Mediterranean Fleet, for diversionary purposes, all with the protection of eight submarines of the 8th and 10th Flotilla deployed in the areas most likely to pass through the Italian fleet. The main convoy and its escort forces sailed from Gibraltar between September 24th and 25th, regrouping on the morning of the 27th about a hundred miles south of Cagliari.

On the Italian side, however, the real objective of the British was unknown: the Italian commands, given that the reconnaissance had sighted Force H but not the convoy headed for Malta (Supermarina received the first news of the enemy operation at 11.10 am. on September 25th, when it was informed by “Maristat Informazioni” that “N.B. NELSON left yesterday at 6.30 PM for the west with 4 CC. TT. STOP RODNEY raised the ensign admiral alt During the night all Gibraltar naval forces departed with numerous CC escorts. TT. presumably for the Mediterranean STOP The RODNEY would be joined by the NELSON group with the type BELFAST alt Purpose of the mission would be retaliation against the Italian coasts”), thinking that the British intend to launch an air-naval bombardment against the Italian coasts, and at the same time supply Malta with aircraft, while the hypothesis (much more probable) of sending a convoy to Malta was omitted.

In particular, Supermarina assumed that the British wanted to hit population centers in Sardinia in retaliation for the attack conducted a few days earlier (September 20th, 1941) by the X Flotilla MAS against the Gibraltar base, in which the tanker Fiona Shell was sunk and the large motor ship Durham and the military tanker Denbydale were seriously damaged.

And it was precisely with the idea in mind to counter a probable attack against the Italian coasts (“to intervene both in the event that the enemy forces had acted at dawn against Genoa, and in the event that they had acted against Sardinia or in any case were towards the south”) that it was decided to deploy fifteen submarines in various points of the Mediterranean, three of which (Squalo,  Delfino, Fratelli Bandiera) were sent to the southwest of Sardinia.

On the morning of September 27th, Supermarina was finally informed of the presence at sea of a British convoy bound for Malta, but by then the British ships had already passed through the ambush sectors assigned to the various submarines, even before the latter reached them. The Submarine Squadron Command (Maricosom) then ordered all submarines to move further south, trying to intercept the British ships during the return voyage, also communicating on the evening of the 27th: “Enemy naval force already attacked and damaged by ARMERA (TN Air Force) STOP In the search and in the attack act with the utmost commitment and precision to inflict on the enemy further and more serious damage possible STOP I am sure that you will show yourselves worthy of the trust he places in you the Navy.” Squalo, for its part, won’t spot anything. On the other hand, five other submarines would be sighted by the enemy forces, of which two (Dandolo and Aradam) will succumb to attack, two (Diaspro and Serpente) attacked unsuccessfully and the fifth, the Adua, would be sunk with all the crew after an unsuccessful attempt to attack a group of destroyers.

The Italian surface fleet, which went out to sea with two battleships (Littorio and Vittorio Veneto), five cruisers (three heavy, Trento, Trieste, and Gorizia, and two light, Muzio Attendolo and Duca degli Abruzzi) and 14 destroyers, returned to base when aerial reconnaissance indicated that Force H was numerically more powerful. The only damage to the British would be inflicted by the Regia Aeronautica, whose torpedo bombers will manage to seriously damage the battleship Nelson and sink the motor ship Imperial Star. Nevertheless, ‘Halberd’ will end on September 30th with all objectives achieved.

September 29th, 1941

Squalo was unsuccessfully subjected to depth charge hunting by British destroyers off Malta.

October 7th, 1941

The sailor Battista Mazzucchelli (21 years old, from Monte Isola) died on board Squalo in the Central Mediterranean. He was the only one of Squalo’s crew to have fallen during the war.

October 17th, 1941

The boat patrolled the waters of Cape Bon together with the Narvalo, forming a barrier in the Strait of Sicily together with the submarines Ambra, Ametista, Corallo, Diaspro, Alagi, Fratelli Bandiera, Serpente, Turchese, Narvalo, and Delfino. However, this barrier did not succeed in hindering the transfer from Gibraltar to Malta of the newly formed British Force K (light cruisers H.M.S. Aurora and H.M.S Penelope and destroyers H.M.S Lance and H.M.S Lively), in charge of attacking the Axis convoys sailing between Italy and North Africa: the British ships reached Valletta unharmed on October 21th.

November 10th, 1941

The boat was sent to patrol the waters east of Gibraltar together with the submarines Turchese, Fratelli Bandiera, Aradam, Onice and Narvalo (according to “Sommergibili italiani 1940-1943” (“Italian submarines 1940-1943”), however, Squalo was sent east of Malta together with Delfino, Tricheco and Luigi Settembrini).

November 22nd and 23rd, 1941

Squalo (Lieutenant Ludovico Grion) was sent to lie in wait south of Capo Passero and east of Malta, to cover the traffic with Libya, together with the twin boats Delfino and Tricheco and other submarines (Corallo and Luigi Settembrini). Its assignment was to spot and report (and if possible attack) any exits at sea by Force K (light cruisers H.M.S Aurora and H.M.S Penelope and destroyers H.M.S Lance and H.M.S Lively) based on the island, already author, on November 9th, of the destruction of the large convoy “Duisburg”, being in progress a large traffic operation towards North Africa. (According to a source, the German B-Dienst reported the departure from Malta of Force K, which had gone out to sea to attack the Italian convoys). Squalo, however, did not spot enemy ships.

November 27th, 1941

Squalo patrolled the waters of southeastern Sicily together with Delfino.

December 13th, 1941

Squalo was sent to patrol the waters south of Malta, together with the submarines Narvalo, Topazio, Veniero and Santarosa, to counter a possible exit into the sea of Force K (light cruisers H.M.S Aurora, H.M.S Penelope and H.M.S Neptune and some destroyers), to protect the operation “M. 41” (which provided for the dispatch of 3 convoys for a total of 8 merchant ships, with the direct escort of 7 destroyers and a torpedo boat as well as the remote escort of three heavy groups and the support of a total of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 18 destroyers and two torpedo boats) for the supply of Libya (later aborted as a result of the intense British underwater attacks and the related damage and losses suffered). At the same time, other submarines (Ascianghi and Dagabur) were sent off to the coast of Alexandria to counter a possible sortie by Force B, which was based there.

Force K, under the command of Commodore William Gladstone Agnew, sailed from Malta in opposition to Operation M. 41, joining Force B (light cruisers H.M.S Euryalus, H.M.S Naiad and H.M.S Galatea and destroyers H.M.S Jervis, H.M.S Kingston, H.M.S Kipling, H.M.S Kimberley, H.M.S Griffin, H.M.S Havock, H.M.S Hotspur, H.M.A.S Napier and H.M.A.S Nizam, the last two Australians) which had left Alexandria to search for Italian convoys in the Ionian Sea. However, the British ships were unable to intercept anything, since the convoys was ordered back, so after hours of fruitless searches they embarked on the return navigation to Malta (Force K) and Alexandria (Force B).

December 17th, 1941

Squalo, together with other submarines (Ascianghi, Topazio, Santarosa, Galatea and Dagabur) was deployed in the central-eastern Mediterranean (east of Malta and south of Crete) with exploratory/offensive tasks, in support of the “M. 42” traffic operation, consisting of sending two convoys to Libya with urgent supplies for the Italian-German troops in North Africa (312 vehicles,  3224 tons of fuel and lubricants, 1,137 tons of ammunition, 10,409 tons of miscellaneous materials) with the escort of substantial shares of the battlefleet.

On the afternoon of December 17th, Squalo , lying in ambush off Malta, sighted two British cruisers leaving Valletta, and at 6.15 PM (or 6.45 PM) launched a signal of discovery with which it communicated its sighting, adding that the enemy ships had assumed a course of 140° and a speed of 28 knots (Squalo’s commander’s appreciation of course and speed proved to be quite accurate,  as well as the estimation of the enemy’s position at the time of sighting). The sighting was promptly communicated to Admiral Angelo Iachino, commander of the Italian naval squadron at sea in support of the “M. 42” operation. The ships sighted by Squalo are actually a cruiser, H.M.S Neptune, and two destroyers, H.M.S Kandahar and H.M.S Jaguar: they are part of the notorious British Force K and set sail from Malta at 3 PM to try to intercept the Italian convoys, with the order to reach point 32°40′ N and 16°06′ E at 11:00 PM and start from that point,  together with the rest of Force K (H.M.S Aurora, H.M.S Penelope, H.M.S Lance, H.M.S Lively) and in cooperation with Vickers Wellington reconnaissance aircraft, the search for the Italian convoy bound for Tripoli.

Operation M. 42, which gave rise to the brief and inconclusive clash that became known as the First Battle of Sirte, ended happily with the arrival of the convoys in Libyan ports. Force K will end up on an Italian minefield off Tripoli, suffering the loss of the H.M.S Neptune and H.M.S Kandahar and the severe damage to the light cruiser H.M.S Aurora.

December 19th, 1941

Squalo was unsuccessfully subjected to depth charge hunting by British destroyers off Malta.

January 22nd through 25th, 1942

The boat was sent between Malta and the Strait of Sicily, along with the submarines Narvalo, Topazio, Santorre Santarosa, Platino and Corallo, to cover the “T. 18” trafficking operation, which sought the sending to Libya of an important convoy with supplies (15,000 tons of materials, 97 tanks, 271 vehicles and 1467 soldiers). An attack by British torpedo planes caused the loss of the troop transport Victoria, which sank with the death of three hundred men, while the other motor ships reached Tripoli unscathed and contributed, with their cargo, to feed the Italian-German counter-offensive that would lead in the following months to the reconquest of Cyrenaica, lost back in December during the British offensive called “Crusader”.

May 1st, 1942

The boat was assigned to the Submarine School in Pula for training duties.

Squalo in Trapani, Sicily. Probably in late January 1924
(From the magazine “Storia Militare”)

May 1942 – July 1943

The boat operated as part of Submarine School of Pula, carrying out a total of 121 training outings as well as some anti-submarine ambushes in the Upper Adriatic.

August 1942

The boat carried out a protective ambush in the Upper Adriatic.

November 1942

Squalo completed another protective ambush in the Upper Adriatic.

July 1943

Faced with the precipitation of events – Sicily invaded by Anglo-American forces, the Italian submarine fleet decimated by increasingly heavy losses – Squalo left the Submarine School in Pula and was “recalled” to “front line” service.

September 3rd, 1943

The boat left Brindisi at 10.10 PM to relocate to Taranto.

September 5th, 1943

Squalo arrived in Taranto at 7.50 AM.

September 7th, 1943

Squalo (Lieutenant Carlo Girola) sets sail from Taranto at 2.37 PM to reach an ambush sector in the Ionian Sea. Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command), having received news of the sighting of the Anglo-American invasion fleet heading towards the coasts of southern Italy, gave the go-ahead for the “Zeta” Plan (drawn up since March 23rd, 1943, for the protection of the coasts of Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia with the large-scale use of the remaining underwater forces, modified several times and issued on July 2nd). It consisted in the mass deployment of submarines in those waters, to counter the Allied landings.

As part of the “Zeta” Plan, Squalo was sent to form a barrage in the Ionian Sea (between the eastern coasts of Sicily and Calabria and Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in Puglia) together with seven other submarines (Fratelli Bandiera, Marcantonio Bragadin, Jalea, Zoea, Luigi Settembrini, Onice and Vortece): Onice, Vortice, Settembrini and Zoea had already been deployed there previously, while Squalo, Bandiera, Jalea and Bragadin extend this pre-existing barrier to the Gulf of Taranto. Eight other boats (Brin, Diaspro, Topazio, Alagi, Marea, Galatea, Velella, Platino and Nichelio) were deployed in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea to cover the coast between the gulfs of Paola and Gaeta, while two others (Giada and Turchese) were sent to the west of Sardinia.

While this was happening, the armistice between Italy and the Allies had already been signed four days prior; but it remains covered by the utmost secrecy, everyone was kept in the dark except for a small inner circle headed by Pietro Badoglio and (TN King) Vittorio Emanuele III. The commander of Maricosom participated to the meeting organized by Admiral Raffaele De Courten, Chief of Staff of the Navy, to explain to the senior commanders the provisions of Memo No. 1, sent to him on September 6th by the Supreme Command, and in which orders were given for an imminent reversal of alliances. The deployment of submarines in the waters of Southern Italy was agreed with the Allied commands in order not to arouse the suspicion of the Germans. The crews were obviously not aware of it, and that of the Velella (commanded by Mario Patanè, the previous commander of the Topazio) would pay with their lives for this absurd situation, torpedoed on September 7th by the British submarine Shakespeare.

September 8th, 1943

The announcement of the armistice between Italy and the Allies surprises Squalo on an offensive mission in the Ionian Sea (other sources, probably erroneous, state that it was in the Lower Tyrrhenian Sea or in the Strait of Sicily).

At 7:50 PM on September 8th, eight minutes after the EIAR (ITN Italian State Radio) announced the news to the nation (the Allies announced it at 6:30 PM, via Radio Algiers), Maricosom issued to all submarines at sea the message “On receipt of this order assume a task exclusively I repeat exclusively exploratory”, followed at 9.10 PM by “Upon receipt of this message cease all hostilities to the accused received”. At 9:50 PM, Maricosom ordered all submarines: “Dive immediately to a depth of 80 meters STOP At 8 AM on the 9th, emerge remaining on the surface with the national flag on the shore and a black pendant at the bow periscope STOP You will receive further orders STOP Acknowledge receipt.”

Commander Girola dello Squalo decided to consult with the commanders of the Bandiera (Lieutenant Commander Scarelli) and the Bragadin (lieutenant Alpinolo Cinti), lurking in contiguous areas. Girola and Cinti decide to reach Augusta, a Sicilian port under British control, while Scarelli sets course for Taranto.

September 10th, 1943

Commander reached the port of Augusta, where he surrendered to the British.

The Italian submarines moored in Lazaretto Creek (Marsa Muscetto), Malta

September 16th, 1943

Squalo left Augusta at sunset, along with five other submarines (Settembrini, Bragadin, Vortice, Onice, Zoea), to reach Malta, where almost all the Italian fleet had converged. Immediately outside the port of Augusta, the submarines dove, to avoid the risk that allied units, spotting them, could accidentally attack them considering enemies. They have been given instructions on approach routes that are supposedly free of mines (but there was no absolute certainty that there are none, as a German minefield was discovered again on September 6th).

September 17th, 1943

After submerging from Augusta to off the Maltese coast, Squalo and the other submarines resurfaced southeast of Malta in the afternoon, and reached the island at 6.35 PM, then moored in the innermost part of the anchorage of Lazaretto Creek (Marsa Muscetto). A total of sixteen Italian submarines gathered here.

The Shark at anchor in St. Paul’s Bay, Malta, September 22nd. 1943
(Imperial War Museum)

September 21st, 1943

Following the division (motivated by logistical reasons) into two groups of the Italian submarines located in Malta, Squalo was transferred to the mooring of San Paolo/Sliema (Malta), together with ten other submarines (Brin, Alagi, Galatea, H 1, H 2, H 4, Onice, Menotti, Jalea and Zoea), “relying” on the support ship Giuseppe Miraglia.

October 13th, 1943

Following Italy’s declaration of war on Germany, Squalo and almost all the Italian submarines in Malta (Brin, Bandiera, Settembrini, Jalea, H 1, H 2, and H 4; some others were sent to Haifa) left the island to return to Italy.

November 20th, 1943

Squalo reaches Augusta.

1944-1945

During the co-belligerence between Italy and the Allies, until the end of the conflict, Squalo (initially under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Fellner and then of Sub-Lieutenant Fernando Ubaldelli) was intensively used in anti-submarine exercises for the training of both Italian Navy and Allied Marine units, based in Taranto and Augusta.

Squalo in Taranto (probably in 1944) docked next to the Ciro Menotti, at the time already out of commission

At the end of the war, it was laid up for decommissioning.

February 1st, 1948

The submarine was removed from the roles and set to the scrapyard.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

TypePatrols (Med.)Patrols (Other) NM Surface NM Sub. Days at SeaNM/DayAverage Speed
Submarine – Medium Range42 18,800 2,754 170126.795.28

Actions

DateTimeCaptainAreaCoordinatesConvoyWeaponResultShipTypeTonnsFlag
7/24/194123:01T.V. Ludovico GrionMediterranean32°20’N-24°53’ETorpedoFailedUnknownTankerUnited Kigdom

Crew Members Lost

Last NameFirst NameRankItalian RankDate
MazzucchelliBattistaNaval RatingComune7/31/1941