Pierluigi Malvezzi

The history of the Italian aircraft carriers is one of delayed decisions and postponed opportunities, confrontations, more or less transparent, between the Marina and the Aeronautica, and project after project, none of which was ever realized until the introduction of the Giuseppe Garibaldi in 1985.

World War I and the Birth of the Regia Aeronautica

The first Italian vessel classifiable in any possible way as an aircraft carrier had already entered service during World War I. This was the hydroplane tender Europa, which was the result of the conversion of the merchant ship Quarto, acquired from a German ship owner in 1915, and designed to provide a greater range for reconnaissance and a higher speed than naval units. The alterations to this ship consisted of two hangers built on the bow and stern capable of hosting 8 seaplanes. The ship was not equipped with any machinery capable of launching the planes, which therefore had to be lowered into the water before they could take off. The official classification for this ship was “hydroplanes and submarines support ship”.

The experience of World War I, however, did not convince the higher ranks of the Regia Marina of the usefulness and convenience of inserting one or more aircraft carriers in the order of battle. Several factors influenced this situation, which would drag on until World War II:

The Italian war experience, from a naval viewpoint, was substantially limited to the Adriatic Sea with its short distances, which did not create the need for naval units such as the aircraft carrier.
The institution, in 1922, of the Regia Aeronautica as an independent armed force under the auspices of the fascist Regime, which surely did not assist in any way the process, especially after a rivalry between the two branches became, over time, quite fierce. The Regime’s support for the Aeronautica influenced the process quite heavily, thus eliminating much needed deep and productive collaboration.
The substantial opposition, manifested by the Regime, against the construction of aircraft carriers, despite the many studies and projects (as we will later see), due to the support clearly shown for the Aeronautica, the most “fascist” of all armed forces, to the detriment of the Regia Marina. Also, another consideration was the geographical conformation of Italy, which, it was said, was a natural aircraft carrier stretched out into the Mediterranean thus making the construction of carriers useless.
This last point deserves some further clarification because, under certain conditions, it could have been accepted. The geographical position of the Italian peninsula is effectively very centrally located within the Mediterranean, thus allowing the control of this sea and, if necessary, its separation into two isolated halves. This would have been possible thanks to airports in Sicily and Sardinia which could easily control the areas adjacent to the Western Mediterranean and the access to the Sicilian Channel which is the narrowing which divides the two halves. A similar case could have been made for the eastern part of the Mediterranean, which could be controlled from airports in the Apulie region, and partially from Sicily. If one also considers the Italian control over the Aegean Sea from the Dodecannes island, one might realized that the whole theory was not too far fetched, at least from a geographical viewpoint.

Rota’s project in 1925

Naturally, an argument so presented is only half of one. In fact, to implement what was just said, there are several prerequisites which had to be met and which, as we shall see, were far from being so at the beginning of the hostilities. Foremost, it was necessary to have airplanes with technical specifications commensurate to the requirements for operations at sea. These are long range reconnaissance missions, including scouting and anti-submarine patrol in addition to “classic” attacks against naval targets.

These requirements, in essence, called for the construction of bombers, torpedo bombers, long range reconnaissance planes, and hydroplanes with adequate endurance and defensive armament. It also required fighter planes capable of long escort missions at sea. In essence, it was necessary to build a series of new planes whose foremost characteristic should have been endurance thus allowing for the greatest possible range of action. Instead, the best planes available at the moment were to be utilized, and this does not mean that the aircraft in question were of lesser quality; one only has to see the results obtained by converting the SM-79 to a torpedo bomber.

Another indispensable prerequisite was the creation of an inter-force command center between the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica which would allow, through the implementation of operational procedure and a similar communication system, the expeditious transfer of information and orders thus eliminating delays between the request from the Commander at Sea and the arrival of the air forces sent in his support. This would have allowed the intervention of the air force, within the limits dictated by distance between the fleet and the air bases, in an efficient and timely manner each time a request was generated by the fleet.

Even this aspect was completely neglected. Anything capable of flying was under the direct control of the Regia Aeronautica with the only exception of the hydroplanes INAM Ro-43 aboard battleships and cruisers whose crews were anyway mixed, with the pilot belonging the Aeronautica and the Navigator to the Marina. Naturally, these small single engine byplanes, slow and almost without any armament and with limited endurance were only used for strategic reconnaissance and could not be a substitute for a well trained and coordinated naval aviation unless one or more carriers had been introduced. The consequences were clearly seen at the battle of Punta Stilo, where about one hundred bombers sent to the battle arrived late. Some of them even attacked the Italian ships, mistake this probably justified by the intense anti aircraft barrage generated by the fleet and which, thankfully, did not have any positive effect.

In conclusion, the few squadrons placed here and there, should have been instead a much more robust air force, probably with a few hundreds planes of various kind strategically placed in different sectors but with forces sufficient for a massive deployment. Ultimately, none of this was ever accomplished: the Regia Marina had to operate without aircraft carriers and without an air force trained and available. During the conflict, the occasions in which collaboration between the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica worked decently could be counted on a single hand. Let us go back to the aircraft carries:

The Projects

Notwithstanding the evident opposition of the regime to the construction of aircraft carriers, the Regia Marina dedicated resources in support of studies and projects for the entire period preceding the conflict. Specifically, three projects from this period deserve mentioning for the thoroughness of the studies conducted. These projects were presented in 1925, 1928 and 1932 with the last one reintroduced in 1936 after a few variances.

In reality, even since 1921, Lieutenant G. Fioravanzo had presented a project for an hybrid called “antiaircraft cruiser” which was born of the idea of merging on a single naval platform antiaircraft guns and a group of fighter planes. This ship, similar in dimension to the British Hermes, was to displace 10,000 tons and produce a speed of 30 knots while armed with 18 102mm guns of 16 120mm ones. The fighter group was to be composed of 16 fighter planes.

The first project, dating back to 1925, presented a hybrid of about 12,500 tons, half carrier and half cruiser. The landing deck was to be of full length, still leaving enough space at the two extremities for two quadruple 203mm turrets to be used against other ships. These would be complemented by 6 100mm installed on island to the side of the deck and two six-gun 40mm place on the bow and stern. The stern was configured like a slide, thus allowing the deployment and retrieval of reconnaissance hydroplanes of which the ship was to be equipped. In the middle of the landing deck were to be placed the fire control towers along with the three funnels and the mast. These apparatuses were retractable, thus allowing for the entire landing deck to be used for flight operations. The funnels, while retracted, was to discharge through a lateral opening.

In 1928, the same project was updated increasing the displacement to 15,000 tons (thus allowing for a better utilization of the 60,000 tons allotted to Italy by the conference of Washington) and with speed similar to the larger units (battleships and cruisers) then in use. Armament was to be composed by 6 dual 152mm guns and 8 dual 100 mm ones for antiaircraft defense. For armor, the horizontal protection was to be similar to the Trento class, while for the vertical it was planned to have reinforced plates protecting the vital parts of the ship (engines, ammunition depots and gasoline). The air wing was planned at 40 aircraft: 18 fighters, 12 reconnaissance planes and 6 to 12 attack planes. But, as a document from the time says, “the need for this type of ship has not yet been recognized by His Excellency the Minister…”.

The 1932 project called for unit much more conventional of about 15 to 16,000 tons with a full flight deck and an “island” to starboard more toward the bow. Armament, much more adapted for a carrier, was to be constituted by 4 152mm guns and 7 102mm ones and a wing of about 40 to 45 planes. The 1936 project represented and improvement over the preceding one, with displacement around 15,000 tons and armament constituted by three triple 152mm guns in front and behind the “island” and with a large number of anti-aircraft 90mm guns. The wing was to be constituted by 42 planes: 24 fighters and 18 diving bombers-reconnaissance deployable my means of two or three catapults. Armor was to be light, only 60 mm near the most vital parts near the center of the ship and possible near the bow. There was not to be any horizontal protection, impossible to implement which such limiting displacement.

Instead, the ship was to be equipped with underwater protection made out of multiple bulkheads 3 meters apart and creating a second hull, which should have been untouched by eventual damages. The engine was to produces a very high 160,000 HP generating a maximum speed of 38 knots (!). Speed this that was thought necessary for the ship to be effective. However, many noted that if the required speed had bee reasonably kept to 32 knows, the HP requirement would have been cut in half. Hsis would have created less stress on the engine itself, leaving more room for the aeronautical infrastructures, such has hangars, shops, ammo and fuel depot ultimately increasing the operational life of the vessel.

Furthermore, it would have been possible to utilize a diesel engine with the well-known advantages in terms of fuel consumption, reliability and longevity. Regardless, despite the blooming of projects and the favorable opinions expressed by high ranking officers of the Regia Marina, none of these projects ever materialized and the Regia Marina found itself on June 10th, 1940 without an aircraft carrier and, as a matter of fact, without naval aviation.

The war, Matapan and the Aquila

Under these circumstances, all problems came immediately to the surface and, already during the Action of Calabria, it was understood the significance of requesting assistance from land-based wings without any established procedure in regards to shared command and control. If this had not been enough, the Battle of Gavdo and Matapan took care of clearing out, one and for all, any doubt about the usefulness of the aircraft carrier as part of a battle group.

The destruction of three heavy cruisers and their escort by the Mediterranean Fleet was possible thanks to the presence of the radar on the British units. Also instrumental was the timely and meticulous British reconnaissance which kept Admiral Cunnigham always informed of the position and situation of the Italian fleet. Furthermore, the presence of the Formidable allowed for the deployment of a group of torpedo bombers, which, the night of the 28th of March, was able to immobilize the Pola with all the terrible consequences which followed.

The liner Roma

After that terrible day, there was not any hesitation: the Regia Marina had to have an aircraft carrier. In July, the order was given for the conversion of the liner Roma to an aircraft carrier. This liner was chosen in virtues of several factors, which made it a better candidate that other ships. First of all, it was not too old (it was about 15 year old) but still it needed work to remain competitive in its arena, so the ship owner would not create too many difficulties in giving up the vessel. Second, most of the internal structure needed upgrading and it was therefor convenient to do it as part of the transformation. Also, the engine was not any longer adequate and needed work. The hull, on the other hand, was strong and spacious and would have allowed for the installation of the necessary infrastructures required by a carrier.

The Acquila

The transformation work began immediately. The underwater part of the hull was modified with the installation of saddle-tanks to minimize the wake and allow for a better flow of the water around the hull, which was widened about 5 meters. The internal compartments were completely reorganized to allow for the installation for the hangar capable of hosting 30 to 40 planes, and the necessary shops and support systems.

The original four Parsons turbines, capable of 21.5 knots, were completely replaced. Instead were installed four turbines originally planned for the light cruisers “Capitani Romani” class made available by the cancellation of 4 of the original 12 vessels. Each turbine was capable of 50,000 HP, but on this installation they were limited to 37,500, also replaced were the propellers which were designed for this larger, but slower ship.

The superstructure consisted in a multi-desk fore-bridge placed amidships on the starboard, followed by a large funnel to which were directed the exhaust from the boilers. The flight deck was continuos, from bow to stern, and obviously integral part of the hull, but was held by special structures. To the side of the deck were several ledges holding both the ship’s armament and some of the equipment.

Armament was mostly designed for antiaircraft defense and included 8 135/45 guns and 12 65/64 on single mounts placed on the ledges to the side of the deck. Also, defense included 132 20/65 machine guns in 22 sextuple mounting distributed to the sides of the deck and in front and back of the island. As on can see, the armament was quite respectable and surely adequate.

The air wing consisted of 51 aircraft. The type selected (it had been decided not to develop a plane specifically for this use due to the long development times) was the fighter Reggiane RE-2001. It was a single engine single-seater, which had entered service in 1941 and was powered by a 1,175 HP Daimler Benz (build under license by Alfa Romeo) and capable of a maximum speed of 540 Km/h. Armament consisted of two 12.7 mm and two 7.7 mm guns. Also, the plane had a centrally mounted hook for the installation of a bomb (for the utilization of the plane as a bomber). The version embarked had a substantially modified undercarriage, strengthen for the deck landing and also was equipped with stopping hook. The installation of the 51 planes was a classic example of Italian ingenuity since the hangars could only host 36 planes (respectively 26 and 10), the remaining planes were literally hang from the ceiling thus bringing the total capacity to 51. There was also in the planning the construction of a version of the Re-2001 with folding wings. With this model, the ship would have been able to deploy 66 aircraft.

Re-2001

Protection, obviously, was quite limited and was essentially limited to the vital parts. There was no protection for the flight deck, there was no protective belt, but only a light protection around the rudder. Also, some of the bulkheads were filled with concrete to increase protection.

It was destine, however, that Italy would conclude the war without an aircraft carrier. In September 1943 the Aquila, now almost completed and for sea trials, was caught by the armistice in Genoa and was captured by the Germans. It was later damaged during an allied aerial bombardment on June 16th, 1944 and later sunk by Italian insidious weapons on April 19th, 1945. The relict was later rescued and scuttle after the war.

Aquila was not to be alone. In 1942 it was decided to transform into an aircraft carrier the Roma’s quasi-sister ship Augustus. This transformation was to be very limited. The Sparviero (this was the designated name) was scheduled to be a support carrier similar to the allied ships: continuos flight deck, no island, later exhaust, and armed with 6 152 mm and 4 102 mm guns placed to the side of the deck. The ship was to have a wing of about 20 planes.

The wreck of the Sparviero in Genoa after the war

The engine was to be the original diesel one, capable of 18 knots. Work began in November 1942, but was stopped by the armistice the following year at an earlier stage. Practically, the ship had been “shaven” down to the main deck, but none of the structure had been build. This transformation, like the one before, went up in smoke in the nebulous times of September 8th. The Italian Navy had to wait until 1985 before it could receive its first carrier, almost forty years later, when the cruiser-carrier (or light carrier) Giuseppe Garibaldi entered service.

Final Considerations

The history of the Italian carriers during WW II cannot be completed without some final considerations. It was said that if the Regia Marina had had an aircraft carrier it would have been able to fight the Royal Navy on a plain level and that certain events (see Matapan), would have taken a different turn.

The Acquila at the end of the war

It is opportune to consider a few things. First of all, the number of this fantasy carriers. Considering their cost of this kind of unit, and the shipbuilding capabilities of the Italian industries, it would not be logical to assume that Italy could have had more that one or two units (at the very best three). France, for instance, had only the Béarn plus two more planned. Similarly, it is plausible to assume that these ships would have not been large carriers of the class of the Saratoga or Akagi, but vessel with lesser characteristics as we so in the projects presented between the wars.

With two carriers in service, means that beside some rare exceptions, only one unit would be available while the other is been refitted, worked on or upgraded. Also, considering that these units would have been the primary target of the British forces, it is safe to assume that at least one would have been sunk. So, what could have these few carriers do? Escort the fleet in its rare excursions in pursuit of enemy vessel? Escort convoy to North Africa, thus securing aerial coverage? Both? Antisubmarine patrol? As one can see these are many assignments which two carriers alone cannot accomplish. If they had been with the fleet, maybe at Matapan the three cruisers and the two destroyers would have not been lost. Maybe, the Italian could have destroyed a few British convoys, but the faith on the Italian ones would have not changed.

If the carrier had escorted the convoys, Rommel would have received a greater quantity of supply, but the ultimate faith of the African campaign would have not changed and the fleet would have been left without the assuring eyes of naval aviation. If submarine hunting had been a priority, then it would have been only a fruitless effort not worth the risk of getting a torpedo up the hull.

Ultimately, we are brought to conclude that these two or three carriers which Mussolini’s Italy could have afforded, would have not reasonably changed the course of the events of WW II. Surely, they would have been useful to the naval operations (no doubts here), and could have avoided horrendous episodes (horrendous for the final result, but not for the bravery demonstrated by the Italian sailors), but what would have really served Italy, perhaps more than carriers, would have been a strong naval aviation organized in bases distributed on the national territory and overseas allowing for good coverage of the Mediterranean and a good coordination with the operations of the fleet. This would have allowed an even better utilization of the carriers, thus giving it its maximum value.

Translated from Italian by Cristiano D’Adamo

The ‘Foreign Legion’

Durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale la Regia Marina ha impiegato un certo numero di navi da guerra di provenienza straniera, in genere frutto di catture effettuate in porto a seguito di vittoriose campagne belliche (si pensi alla campagna jugoslava del 1941 o agli eventi del novembre 1942 riguardanti la flotta francese). In genere si trattava di unità relativamente piccole e, magari, di una certa età, ma non sono mancate unità di rilevanti dimensioni e che, per le loro caratteristiche o età, sono state ritenute idonee al servizio di squadra.

Ai fini della nostra analisi possiamo dividere le “straniere” della Regia Marina nelle seguenti categorie:

unità già in servizio all’entrata in guerra dell’Italia;
unità acquisite in seguito ad operazioni belliche (cattura, recupero da affondamento in porto o in acque basse, eccetera);
unità in costruzione per conto di marine straniere ed incorporate nella Regia Marina.

Unità già in servizio all’entrata in guerra dell’Italia
Questa categoria si riduce essenzialmente a due unità, che erano gli incrociatori leggeri Taranto (ex tedesco Strassburg) e Bari (ex tedesco Pillau); si trattava di due incrociatori leggeri ceduti dalla Germania alla Regia Marina al termine della Prima Guerra Mondiale in conto riparazione danni di guerra. Qui non ci dilunghiamo ulteriormente in quanto queste unità (ricordiamo che una terza, l’incrociatore leggero Ancona, ex tedesco Graudenz, era stato radiato nel 1937) sono ampiamente trattate in un’altra pagina di questo sito (NOTA: inserire qui il link alla pagina “Incrociatori ex tedeschi”).

Unità acquisite in seguito ad operazioni belliche
Questa categoria, piuttosto numerosa, comprende essenzialmente unità ex jugoslave, catturate nell’aprile 1941 all’atto dell’occupazione della Jugoslavia da parte delle forze dell’Asse, ed ex francesi, catturate dopo l’occupazione della Francia di Vichy in seguito agli avvenimenti del novembre 1942.

Le unità ex jugoslave erano le seguenti:

Cacciatorpediniere Dubrovnik, Beograd e Ljubljana, divenuti rispettivamente Premuda, Sebenico e Lubiana;
Le sei torpediniere T 1, T 3, T 5, T 6, T 7 e T 8, che mantennero invariati i loro nomi anche nella Regia Marina;
I sommergibili Smeli, Ostvenik e Hrabri, di cui solo i primi due vennero messi in servizio con i nomi di Antonio Baiamonti e Francesco Rismondo, mentre il terzo venne immediatamente radiato a causa delle sue condizioni di manutenzione;
Le motosiluranti Uskok e Cetnik, divenute MAS 1D e MAS 2D (poi MS 47) e le sei Orjen, Velebit, Dinara, Triglav, Suvobor e Rudnik, messe in servizio come MS 41 – MS 46.
I posamine Galeb, Kobac, Orao, Iastreb, Labud e Sokol, divenuti gli italiani Selve, Unie, Vergada, Zirona, Zuri, Eso.
I dragamine D 2, Maljnska, Mljet, Mosor, Melijne, Marjan, divenuti gli italiani D 10, Arbe, Meleda, Pasman, Solta, Ugliano.
Di tutte queste unità quelle maggiormente interessanti per la Regia Marina erano indubbiamente i tre cacciatorpediniere, che venivano ad arricchire una categoria di naviglio già afflitta da numerose perdite (a fine aprile 1941, cioè dopo meno di un anno di guerra, già 16 caccia, sui 59 disponibili all’entrata in guerra, erano andati persi in azione), e le motosiluranti della classe Orjen, che fornivano su un piatto d’argento la soluzione al problema della realizzazione di una unità sottile di caratteristiche marine e belliche decisamente superiori a quelle dei MAS, che si erano rivelati troppo leggeri e sensibili alle condizioni del mare per un proficuo impiego bellico. Queste sei unità, infatti, avrebbero rappresentato la base da cui partire per la realizzazione del progetto delle motosiluranti del tipo “CRDA 60. Tonn.” (e delle VAS che dalle motosiluranti derivarono); a questo fine, una delle sei venne dislocata per qualche tempo a Monfalcone presso i cantieri CRDA, che ne rilevarono i disegni completi ed i piani di costruzione (per inciso, si trattava di un progetto tedesco precedente quello delle famose S-Boot, da cui differiva per le minori dimensioni ed i motori a benzina anziché diesel).

Quanto alle restanti unità, i sommergibili erano abbastanza moderni ed in buone condizioni (escluso l’ Hrabri, che infatti venne immediatamente demolito), ma la loro limitata profondità di collaudo (solo 80 metri, con un coefficiente di sicurezza di 1,6) non permise il loro inserimento nelle squadriglie operative. Vennero però destinati alla Scuola Sommergibili di Pola, ove svolsero un buon lavoro addestrativo.

Le torpediniere della classe T 1 erano vecchie unità ex austro-ungariche di poco più di 300 tonnellate, e risalenti alla Prima Guerra Mondiale, che vennero impiegate esclusivamente in compiti di scorta costiera. Le rimanenti unità (le altre due motosiluranti, i posamine e i dragamine) erano tutte unità vecchie e di poca utilità, che infatti vennero impiegate prevalentemente in compiti secondari, non possedendo caratteristiche tali da poter affidare loro compiti impegnativi. Da notare che, dopo l’armistizio le unità ex jugoslave sopravvissute alle vicende belliche vennero restituite alla marina jugoslava. Da ricordare infine che venne catturato anche un quarto cacciatorpediniere, lo Split, in costruzione nei cantieri di Cattaro. Nonostante gli sforzi italiani, l’unità non fece a tempo ad entrare in servizio con la Regia Marina (avrebbe dovuto assumere, probabilmente, il nome di Spalato) e venne terminato nel dopoguerra dalla Jugoslavia, con il suo nome originale.

Passando alle unità francesi acquisite in seguito agli avvenimenti di fine 1942, queste erano piuttosto numerose; in particolare si trattava di:

Incrociatori leggeri Jean de Vienne e La Galissoniere che dovevano diventare gli italiani FR 11 ed FR 12;
Cacciatorpediniere Lion, Panthere, Tigre, Valmy, Trombe, Siroco, L’Adroit, Lansquenet, Bison, Le Foudroyant, Le Hardi, che sarebbero dovuti diventare gli italiani FR 21-FR 24 e FR 31-FR 37 nell’ordine;
Torpediniere Bombarde, La Pomone, L’Iphigenie, La Bayonnaise, Baliste, che sarebbero dovute diventare FR 41-FR 45, ma che, per una diversa allocazione fra italiani e tedeschi delle unità catturate, vennero cedute alla marina germanica che le ridenominò TA 9-TA 13;
Corvette La Batailleuse, Cdt. Riviere, Chamois, L’Impetueuse, La Curieuse, Dedaigneuse, che dovevano diventare le italiane FR 51-FR 56;
Sommergibili Phoque, Saphir, Requin, Espadon, Dauphin, Turquoise, Circé, Henry Poincare, che dovevano diventare rispettivamente gli italiani FR 111-FR 118. Una ulteriore unità, il Calypso, non ricevette mai alcuna denominazione ufficiale (peraltro non entrò mai in servizio nella Regia Marina, come la gran parte di tutte le unità ex francesi); anche la sigla FR 118 (denominazione del Poincare) non è mai stata confermata ufficialmente, anche se appare molto probabile;
Posamine Castor e La Coubre (italiani FR 60 e FR 70);
Dragamine Petrel III, Georgette, Chasseur 81, Madonna di Pompei, Meduse, Ravignan, Heron, Pen Men, poi italiani FR 71 e FR 73 – FR 79.

A queste unità andrebbero poi aggiunte alcune altre unità ausiliarie e di seconda linea, petroliere, trasporti, unità per servizi vari, eccetera. Come si vede dalla Francia vennero acquisite un bel po’ di unità (per la precisione due incrociatori leggeri, undici cacciatorpediniere, undici navi scorta, nove sommergibili e dieci fra posamine e dragamine). Di questo nutrito gruppetto, tuttavia, ben poche prestarono servizio nella Regia Marina e, comunque, per un periodo limitato a pochi mesi; esattamente furono quattro cacciatorpediniere, due corvette, un solo sommergibile, un posamine e un dragamine.

Anche qui le unità più utili si rivelarono i cacciatorpediniere che andarono ad alleviare, seppure di poco, la ormai grave carenza di navi scorta per la squadra navale di cui soffriva nel 1943 la Regia Marina. Teniamo comunque conto che nessun caccia ex francese divenne pienamente operativo prima di marzo-aprile 1943, per cui il loro apporto alle operazioni navali italiane fu veramente minimo. Le navi scorta non furono praticamente utilizzate, in quanto le torpediniere vennero cedute alla marina tedesca (che utilizzò comunque quelle rimesse in efficienza nel Mediterraneo per la difesa delle correnti di traffico dell’Asse), e delle corvette ne vennero ripristinate ufficialmente due, ma le loro condizioni erano comunque talmente precarie che era più il tempo che passavano ai lavori di manutenzione di quello trascorso in mare, in missione di guerra.

I sommergibili, tranne l’FR 111, non riuscirono a vedere un solo giorno di servizio sotto bandiera italiana e vennero in genere autoaffondati negli stessi porti dell’Africa Settentrionale in cui erano stati catturati, oppure all’atto dell’armistizio nei cantieri italiani dove erano in corso i lavori di ripristino.

Purtroppo le unità ex francesi costarono notevolissime risorse in termini di impegno di uomini e mezzi ma, per mancanza di tempo, i risultati ottenuti come numero di unità rimesse in servizio furono molto al di sotto di quello che lo spiegamento di uomini e mezzi avrebbe potuto far sperare. Si pensi che gli italiani costituirono un ente apposito che si sarebbe dovuto occupare del recupero e ripristino delle unità francesi catturate a Tolone e suscettibili di reimpiego, e quest’ente (Ente Recuperi Italiani a Tolone) entro giugno 1943 aveva recuperato a Tolone tre incrociatori, una nave trasporto aerei e undici cacciatorpediniere (solo per citare le unità maggiori); purtroppo molto di questo naviglio, a causa delle condizioni in cui versava, venne direttamente avviato alla demolizione per il recupero di quel poco di materiali strategici (comunque utilissimi allo sforzo bellico italiano) che si potevano riutilizzare; quanto al resto non vi fu, come visto, il tempo materiale di rimetterlo in servizio. In definitiva la maggior parte del naviglio catturato e suscettibile di riutilizzo, all’atto dell’armistizio del settembre 1943 venne catturato dai tedeschi nei cantieri in cui venivano effettuati i lavori. Uno sforzo immenso per un risultato davvero minimo!

Unità in costruzione per conto di marine straniere ed incorporate nella Regia Marina
Le uniche unità appartenenti a questa categoria furono i due incrociatori antiaerei Etna e Vesuvio. Questi erano stati ordinati dalla marina del Siam (con i nomi di Taksin e Naresuan) come una versione ridotta degli incrociatori leggeri italiani del tipo Montecuccoli. Impostati nel 1938, la loro costruzione continuò sotto controllo straniero fino alla fine del 1941, dopo di che le due unità vennero requisite dalla Regia Marina che ne ordinò il completamento come incrociatori antiaerei, da utilizzarsi per l’accompagnamento e la scorta antiaerea dei convogli. Sarebbero stati dotati inoltre di ampi locali che avrebbero consentito loro il carico diretto di 400 m3 di materiali o di un contingente di truppa equipaggiata. Problemi di scarsità di maestranze e di materie prime, tuttavia, impedirono il loro completamento in tempi rapidi (nonostante fossero un tipo di nave che avrebbe potuto dare un significativo contributo alla quotidiana battaglia dei convogli per la Libia); all’atto dell’armistizio, infatti, il loro grado di allestimenti era circa del 65%. Così anche queste belle unità rientrarono nel numero delle navi italiane incompiute di quel tragico periodo.

Conclusioni

Come abbiamo visto la Regia Marina, nella seconda guerra mondiale, ebbe l’occasione di mettere le mani su un discreto bottino di guerra, in termini di unità navali catturate; purtroppo di questo bottino (secondo solo a quello che fecero i tedeschi, ma superiore a quello delle nazioni alleate) potè utilizzare ben poco, perché venne a mancare il tempo per poter ripristinare queste navi. Ricordiamo, a ogni buon conto, che la stragrande maggioranza venne catturata dopo autoaffondamenti, o atti di sabotaggio, tesi ad impedire un utilizzo (perlomeno un immediato riutilizzo) delle unità navali stesse. Vennero spese tante risorse preziose (soprattutto tenendo presenti le difficoltà in cui già si dibatteva l’Italia alla fine del 1942) senza purtroppo conseguire risultati apprezzabili. Una ulteriore conferma, se mai ce n’era bisogno, della drammatica insufficienza e impreparazione in cui versava l’Italia in generale, ed il suo apparato industriale in particolare, alla vigilia della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Una insufficienza ed impreparazione che avrebbero dovuto consigliare molta prudenza al momento di decidere se entrare in guerra o meno.

During World War II, the Regia Marina utilized, for minesweeping activities, mainly ships dating back to World War II or immediately after. We are referring to 38 “RD” class minesweepers (where RD stands for “Regio Dragamine” or “Rimorchiatore Dragamine, Italian for Royal Minesweeper or Tug-Minesweeper) built from 1916 through 1926, and 13 minelayers, two of which were originally German and 3 Austro-Hungarian.
The RD class minesweepers weighed about 200 to 220 tons, and were built from a variety of shipyards for a total of slightly less than fifty units. Obsolescence reduced the total number to 38; still they were the most homogeneous group of minesweepers employed by the Regia Marina

The minelayers included two ex-German “M” class minesweepers built during World War I and handed over to Italy as part of war reparations. In addition, the navy utilized 3 former Austro-Hungarian ships displacing little more than 100 tons, and originally laid down in 1917 in the Fiume’s shipyard and completed after the war on behalf of the Regia Marina. In the 1920’s, Italy built 10 more ships, but two Ostia-class minelayers, the Dardanelli and the Milazzo, were sold to Venezuela in 1938.

In 1931 the Regia Marina acquired four German-built high-sea fishing boats, which were named Berta, Biglieri, Matteucci and Sonzini. They were used as minelayers until 1938 then the Matteucci was re-rated as a transport and the other three as gunboats.
In 1938, three new ships were built: the prototype D 1 (or RD 1) and the Vigilante and Vedetta, but none of them was selected for large scale production in preparation for the quickly approaching world war. During the war, some units of foreign origin were incorporated into the Regia Marina, mainly of Yugoslavian (six minesweepers and six minelayers) and French (nine sweepers and one minelayer) origin. They were small, over-aged, and of minimal use, so they were scarcely used, and, after Italy’s armistice, the surviving vessels were returned to their original navies.

Six VAS class motor anti-submarine launches (from VAS 231 to VAS 236) were adapted as fast coastal minesweepers by removing all the anti-submarine armament and by fitting sweeping gear. Moreover, a new class of coastal minesweepers was included in the new construction programs; they had no names, but were numbered DV 101 through DV 149 and were known as “Dragamine di Vigilanza” (surveillance minesweepers).

None of these units entered service with Regia Marina. The Germans, who were able to complete and utilize some of them, captured the ones already laid down. The Regia Marina did not build any minelayers during the war, probably due to the fact that all Italian warships (cruisers and smaller vessels) were equipped with mine rails. It made no sense to build dedicated minelayers when most Italian warships could effectively lay down a minefield, and in fact the majority of Italian minefields were laid down by regular warships and not minelayers.

The origins

The end of the Great War saw the Regal Marina come out of it with a new weapon: the MAS (Motoscafo Anti Sommergibile – Anti Submarine Motorboat). This weapon had given to the Italian Navy the most glamorous successes, such as the sinking of the battleships SZENT ISTVAN and WIEN, respectively, by MAS 15 and 9. By the end of the conflict, 422 MAS had been ordered; of these 244 were already in service, others would be completed in the postwar period, and many were canceled or sold to private individuals or completed as civil boats.

Between the two wars

The end of the war, however, didn’t interrupt the development of this weapon, which had revealed itself so effectively. Various prototypes were experimented with employing engines of various types, and finally, the much sought after high speed of attack was attained (the MAS during the Great War stayed, in general, well below the 30 knots of maximum speed).

The general design, however, remained the same as the MAS of the First World War. In 1931/32 the shipyard Baglietto, exploiting the experience acquired during the production, in 1926, of a unity for the French Navy in collaboration with the shipyards “Loire “, realized a prototype, the MAS-431, that summarized the best of the experiences gathered up to that moment.

Propelled by two gas engines FIAT of 1500 HP and equipped with a step hull (rédan), this vessel during tests reached about 45 knots of maximum speed in calm waters, with an excellent maneuverability, good seafaring and sturdiness. Another prototype built in the second half the 30s, but which didn’t give satisfactory results, was the STEFANO TURR. It was a large boat of over 60 tons of displacement that, besides dimensions notably superior to those of the MAS of the period, had the peculiarity of having four fast diesel engines, rather than gasoline ones. This experiment was an attempt to resolve the problem of gasoline flammability in the case, for instance, of hits aboard the vessel.

Unfortunately, the installed FIAT engines never gave satisfactory results in terms of reliability, so much that the unit, which had foreseen, of quite a few years, many characteristics of the best MS built during the war by the Germans, was removed from service and demolished in 1941. Failing this experiment, and with the international situation starting to deteriorate, the Regia Marina chose to lean toward the MAS derived from the prototype Baglietto. From 1936 to 1941, four series of MAS were built starting from the 431. The first series comprised 26 units, the second 25, the third 14, and the fourth 11. The base characteristics of these 76 MAS didn’t vary much between the several series. Displacement was of 23 to 30 tons, the engine was the excellent Isotta Fraschini Ace 1000 in various versions with a power output of 2000/2300 HP, and a maximum speed around 40-42 knots at full load. These MAS were equipped with two 450-mm torpedo launchers. The anti-aircraft armament had one or two guns with caliber ranging from 13,2 to 20 millimeters.

The war

The war employment of the MAS showed, nevertheless, some defects mainly caused by the search, at all the costs, for very elevated maximum speeds. The price paid was in terms of unsatisfactory seaworthiness, especially in the case of less than ideal sea conditions. This was caused by the excessive lightness of the construction, and from the type of step hull adopted, which was designed to attain very elevated speed, but at the expense of seaworthiness. As a matter of fact, the MAS were notably difficult to operate in the case of rough seas, with serious risks to the safety of the crews.

In April 1941, while possible solutions to the problem were studied, the capture of what remained of the Yugoslav fleet provided the solution on a silver plate. Besides the other material, six torpedo boats of German construction were captured in the port of Cattaro. They were all of the type Ss 1, built by the shipyard Lurssen. These units, of about 65 tons, immediately proofed themselves in conformity with the requirements of the Regia Marina. In fact, the shape of their hulls allowed them to properly maintain high speeds even under not-too-ideal sea conditions. The shipyard CRDA of Monfalcone was therefore given the task to redraw the blueprints of these units and from these derive a new Italian project for a MS.

Thus was born the MS “CRDA 60 t.” which replicated, with minimal changes, the original German model. The model was immediately reproduced in a first series of 18 units, which entered service beginning in April 1942. This first series was followed by a second one of as many, of which the last unit was not delivered because of the armistice of 8th September. The MS of this type, even though inspired by an outmoded German model, was better fit for the long patrols in the Mediterranean than the MAS. Although not as fast, they surely had better seaworthiness and, due to the greater dimensions, they were more comfortable, better armed, and with greater range.

On the same hull of the ex-German MS, a small unit for anti-submarine patrol and coastal escort called “Vedetta Anti Sommergibile” or VAS was designed. Not as fast as the M.S, it had a powerful (for its dimensions) antisubmarine arsenal. The VAS was built in 45 units (of the 48 ordered) starting in 1942. Later, a new model was studied with a displacement around 90 tons, instead of the 68-70 of the first series. Six of the twelve units originally ordered were built.

These were the last units placed into service by the Regia Marina during World War II. The building programs of 1943 and 1944 foresaw the construction of quite a lot more units: 44 MS of the type “CRDA 60 ts.” in two following series, 30 MAS, 9 units derived from the German MS of the type S-26.

Some of these units had to be completed as gunboats, replacing the torpedoes with 37/54 guns and quadruple 20mm guns, to oppose, as much as they could, the fast Anglo-Americans units which usually mounted a superior armament. Besides these units, another two series of VAS were programmed: 12 ordered from Italian yards, and as many to be built by shipyards of occupied France. All these units belonged to the 90-ton type.

The successes

The MAS and the MS achieved notable successes during the war. It must be noted that, besides the sinking of numerous merchant ships, these units sunk the largest warship sunk by a torpedo boat in the period 1939/45. This was the English light cruiser MANCHESTER , sunk during the Battle of Mid-August by MS 16 and 22.

It also must be noted the sinking of the English destroyer LIGHTNING (Algerian coasts, March 12th 1943), the Russian submarine EQUOKA (Black Sea, June 19th 1942), and the serious damages to the English cruisers CAPETOWN (MAS 213 April 8th 1941) and Russian MOLOTOV. (MAS 568 and 573 August 3rd 1942).