Many historians divide the period of belligerence in the Mediterranean into the first, second and third convoy battles The first two periods saw two relevant naval engagements, the battles of the Sirte, while during the third period the large vessels of the Regia Marina were held prisoners by the relative safety of the northern Italian ports. During the end of 1941, the darkest days of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the British land forces suddenly routed the Axis defenses in Libya quickly reaching and occupying Benghazi.
R.N. Littorio
On December 16th, a large Italian convoy left Naples and by the time it had reached Sicily it was escorted by the battleship Duilio, the cruiser Aosta, Montecuccoli and Attendolo and a few destroyers. Not too far away, a second group, composed of the battleships Littorio, Doria and Cesare, the cruiser Trento and Gorizia and several destroyers, provided additional support.
R.N. Attendolo
Such a display of force was unnecessarily caused by the mistaken spotting of two British battleships in Malta. On the 17th, a Luftwaffe reconnaissance plane spotted a British formation proceeding from Alexandria toward the central Mediterranean. A battleship, identified as part of the group, was actually a tanker, but the faulty identification was repeated several times.
R.N. Duilio
Both navies were actually simply escorting their convoys, but each thought of the other as in pursuit of a naval engagement. The British were actually trying a double convoy attempt, one eastbound and one westbound. While the British commander Admiral Cunningham ordered the convoy commander Admiral Vian to avoid direct contact, Admiral Iachino was in active pursuit of a direct confrontation.
The distance between the two groups, and some British avoidance maneuvers, did not allow the Littorio group to sight the British until almost dusk. The sighting was aided by the antiaircraft guns of the British forces which were actively trying to repulse an Axis aerial attack. The Littorio opened fire at about 32,000 meters from the British force; too far a distance for the British unit to reply. Admiral Vian immediately attempted a retreating maneuver with the aid of a smoke screen. British units received some direct hits, but they were able to disappear into the darkness of the night.
R.N. Littorio
All Italian convoys made it safely to port, and the British, having entered an Italian mine field, lost their Malta-based cruiser Neptune and the destroyer Kandahar, while the cruisers Aurora and Penelope were severely damaged.
The Neptune was a 7,000-tons (approximate) cruiser with 6″ guns of the same class of the famous Ajax
Overall, for the first time in several months, an Italian operation was completed with success. Although materially the British did not suffer too many losses, the Regia Marina received a much needed boost, especially because, once again, the route to North Africa was open.
These links connect to in-depth articles related to the major naval engagements. Please note that there is a separate section for naval battles. These articles were published by various authors.
The most authoritative book on the role of ULTRA in the Mediterranean conflict, “Il Vero Traditore” (The Real Traitor), written by Alberto Santoni, displays on its jacket the two light cruisers Da Barbiano and Di Giussano: this is not just a coincidence. After the tragic battle of Matapan, the night encounter of December 13th, 1941 was one of the worst disasters of the Italian Navy, and like the famous battle, it was brought about by the treacherous effect of technical superiority. But where at Matapan British intelligence was sketchy, in this case it was lethally accurate.
The R.N. Da Barbiano and R.N. Da Giussano in drydock around 1930
By the end of 1941, the situation in North Africa was near desperate. British forces were advancing under the impetuous operation “Crusader.” Fuel had almost been exhausted; Axis vehicles could not operate, airplanes assigned to the defense of Tripoli could not fly, and the whole war effort appeared near collapse. Once again, the Regia Marina was asked to deliver much needed supplies to the besieged colony. December was a terrible month. With the arrival of force “B” in Malta by November 29, strengthened by the cruisers Ajax and Neptune and the destroyers Kimberly and Kingston, and under the command of Admiral Rawling, the Royal Navy had reasserted control over the Italian supply lines. After the successful arrival of the M\v Veniero, on December 1st, the ships following (Capo Faro, Adriatico, Mantovani) were all sunk with great loss of life and desperately needed supplies. It was then decided to use the battleship Duilio to provide for general coverage in the central Mediterranean, but as soon as the Italian Fleet left, British control was immediately reasserted.
Desperate situations call for desperate measures, and on December 4th, it was therefore decided to use military vessels to deliver supplies to Libya. The cruiser Cadorna was able to deliver personnel and fuel from Taranto to Benghazi on December 11th, two days before the Da Barbiano and Di Giussano had left Palermo for Tripoli. Meantime, the British were perfectly aware of the Italian mission which they were tracking via ULTRA.
After having been spotted by British aircraft, the commander of the formation, Admiral Toscano, ordered a return to port. With a large convoy scheduled to reach Libya on the 14th, the Regia Aeronautica was desperate for fuel. The two cruisers, again loaded with fuel stored on deck in large drums (100 tons of gasoline, 250 tons of diesel fuel, 600 tons of fuel oil, 900 tons of food and 135 military personnel), left port on the 12th. The cruiser Bande Nere, which was scheduled to participate, was left behind due to malfunctions, and the torpedo boat Cigno was sent instead.
Meantime, the destroyers Sikh, Legion, Maori and Isaac Sweers, this last one a Dutch vessel, under the command of Captain Stroke, left force “K” in Gibraltar to reinforce force “B” in Malta. The formation was reported by Italian Cant.Z.1007bis (1), but speed and direction gave Supermarina the erroneous sense that the two Italian cruisers would have enough margin of maneuver to avoid the British. Under the direction of ULTRA, the British formation increased speed and easily reached the Italian ships.
At 3.15 AM on December 13th, with the help of the Radar and completely undetected, the British ships maneuvered and launched an initial salvo of ten torpedoes. The Di Giussano was able to fire three shots before sinking, while the Da Barbiano was turned into a towering inferno, unable to return fire. The Cigno fought back, but to no avail. The British units left as quickly as they had come. The Cigno was able to rescue 500 sailors, while others reached the coast or were later saved by Italian M.A.S.. Over 900 men (2) lost their lives, including Admiral Toscano. The only British mistake was reporting that the Bande Nere was present during the engagement, but this was probably due to the fact that the substitution of the Cigno for the disabled ship was not transmitted over radio dispatch and therefore it could not be intercepted.
(1) James J. Sadkovich “The Italian Navy in World War II” (2) James J. Sadkovich reports 1225. (3) Alberto Santoni, “Il Vero Traditore”
Although in the overall economy of the war in the Mediterranean the action resulting in the destruction of the Tarigo convoy was of minor importance, it is fascinating how, through the years, different authors have given such different historical accounts of these events.
The Tarigo was one of the many convoys organized by the Axis forces in support of the renewed activities of the newly arrived D.A.K. in North Africa. It was named after the destroyer R.N. Tarigo, which was the lead escort. It was a relatively small convoy of four small German ships and one Italian ship escorted by three destroyers.
The destroyer R.N. Tarigo
Discrepancies between historians are to be expected, especially in regard to the war in the Mediterranean where, at times, it appears that they are telling completely different stories. Understandably some of these discrepancies have occurred because of the British government’s rule governing the release of confidential information. As documents were released through the years, more and more was learned, but still some very important folders are beyond the reach of historians.
On the other hand, most Italian documentation was made readily available. Italy had nothing to hide, and actually the search for the truth was part of the national healing process. Italians, perhaps less than the Germans, came out of the war with a general sense of shame, which could only be eradicated by understanding the facts and honoring the fallen. At times, Italy and Italian historians were inclined to write very apologetic accounts of the actions of the Regia Marina, without understanding that there was not much to be apologetic for; the navy had done its best and paid a very high price.
The decision to focus on the Tarigo was easy; the difference in reporting amongst the various authors goes beyond what could be described as personal interpretation and enters the area of fallacious reporting. It therefore makes a good case for comparative history.
The first published report on this action was the one by Captain Mack, the commander of the Malta-based British destroyer force, which decimated the convoy. His May 11th, 1948 report published by the “London Gazette” was later incorporated in Admiral A.B. Cunningham’s “A Sailor’s Odyssey”, published in England in 1951. This report is relatively accurate, but is strictly focused on the night engagement. A.B. Cunningham reveals that the Italian convoy had been sighted by British reconnaissance on April 15th. He continues by saying, “It was a fine clear night with a good moon”. This is the first discrepancy; according to the official Italian report, the weather was actually quite foul and the moon was slightly less than half full. Still, although Cunningham does not say it, British planes were able to fly, while the lone Italian S. 79 sent to defend the convoy had to return to base. Overall, the report is quite accurate, but some of the missing details can be easily explained; after all, it was only a few years after the end of WW II and the cold war was brewing. Perhaps what was not said was that the sinking of the Mohawk was not just “greatly to be regretted” but it was a failure. Considering that the British forces had shadowed the convoy for over 20 minutes and that the position of all ships had been accurately charted by radar, its sinking was very fortuitous for the Axis forces. Another issue which, in later years, would stimulate the interest of several historians, was the acute difference in timing between the report of the Jervis and the Nubian.
The Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare published the beautifully detailed “La Difesa del Traffico con l’Africa Settentrionale” in 1958, later updated in 1973. This book’s section on the Tarigo is very accurate and exquisitely detailed. It incorporates some of the original British logs from the Jervis and the logs confirm the British use of the radar from the Nubian. This book should be used as the base of any re-writing of this story, though it must be kept under consideration that, even by the time of the second edition, news about ULTRA and British intelligence in general were still in the future. From this book we learn new details. The German ships were laden with troops, while the Italian Sabaudia was carrying ammunitions. These ammunitions, as the Jervis report shows, were of German manufacture. The lead escort, R.N. Tarigo, was under the command of ap. Di freg. Piero De Cristofaro. The other two units were replacements of the originally scheduled Strale and Euro. These were the lighter destroyers R.N. Lampo under the command of cap. Di corv. E. Marano and the R.N. Baleno, under the command of cap. Di corv. Arnaud.
The lighter destroyers R.N. Lampo
On April 13th, the Axis was already aware of the arrival of four new destroyers at Malta and in the evening of the same day, the CAT was asked to intervene. Early on the 15th, the convoy had been scattered by bad weather and was about 4 hours behind schedule. Around 1:00 PM a British plane bearing the marking OHSF was sighted by the convoy which gave the alarm to Supermarina. The British plane follows the convoy and around 2:00 PM sends a new signal to base which is intercepted by Supermarina. The Naval high command requests assistance from Superaereo, the Air Force High Command. Of the two S 79’s dispatched by Superaereo only one takes off and at 6:45 PM, Supermarina is informed that, due to the weather conditions, the aircraft had to return to base. Wind is reported at about 80 Km/h. Supermarina then instructs the convoy to change route and, passing buoy 4 of the Kerkenah, to follow the coast line. The convoy will never reach buoy 4 because the British force will reach and destroy it between buoy 2 and 3.
The official Italian report says that on April 27 and May 7, Italian forces under the command of cap. di feg. Eliseo Porta will rescue some important documents from the sunken Mohawk. These rescue attempts were also repeated on June 22nd and 23rd. According to the official Italian report, the only document of value rescued was the “Mediterranean Stationary Order Book”. Other authors contradict this assertion; they actually affirm that documents rescued from the Mohawk were essential to the success of the Xa MAS attach against the port of Alexandria.
The official war records were preceeded, in 1957, by Marc’Antonio Bragadin’s “The Italian Navy in WW II” originally published in Italian in 1948. Bragadin’s relatively long discourse on the Tarigo is full of errors and makes us wonder if his book is not in desperate need of updating, a proposition which the publisher should consider since the work is a milestone. Bragadin reports that the British force was never sighted by the Italo-German reconnaissance, but the official Italian report shows that the CAT (Italian denomination for the Luftwaffe in Sicily) had requested direct intervention.
According to Bragadin, the Italian convoy was attacked from both air and sea, but we have no other confirmation of this fact. Most authors, in addition to the official reports, agree that the convoy was shadowed by British reconnaissance planes, but never attacked from the air. Bragadin also assumes that, in addition to the sunken Mohawk, some other British vessels might have received damage, but there is no other report to corroborate such an assumption. Finally, Bragadin does not mention the use of radar, but on the other hand it describes the rescue operation quite accurately.
In 1964, Donald Macintyre, an author at times forgotten, dedicated several paragraphs to the episode in hib book “The Battle for the Mediterranean”. Macintyre is disingenuous when he says that the British lacked radar. Derek House’s Radar at Sea” published in 1993 clearly shows that three out of the four British destroyers involved in the action were indeed equipped with the latest radar sets. By the time Macintyre wrote his book, it was common knowledge that many nocturnal naval engagements were sought and won by the British, mostly due to their overwhelming technical superiority. Another inaccuracy, later picked up by other authors, was the number of Axis casualties which, although reported at 350, were actually over 700.
In 1976, the famous Italian historian Arrigo Petacco, who specializes in WW II Italian history, wrote in his “Le Battaglie nel Mediterraneo” a quite terse report, which was indeed accurate. Surprisingly, he mentions the name of Lieutenant Ettore Bisagno, the junior officer who, while his ship was sinking, trained the torpedo tube launcher on the enemy, managing to hit and sink the Mohawk. This detail had been previously published by Antonio Trizzino.
What followed is in engaging book written by a Spaniard Naval officer, Louis de la Sierra. His report is long, and in essence accurate, even though he also makes the mistake of reporting that the British did not have radar.. De La Sierra blames the delay of the convoy on bad weather in Naples, while the Italian report refers to foul weather while crossing the Channel of Sicily. He also reports that no Italian plane was sent in support of the convoy, a statement while not literally accurate, fully explains reality. Suddenly, in De La Sierra’s report the weather improves, while the last entry in the Italian report still refers to fog and squalls. De La Sierra continues his misled narration by reporting the accurate time of the first sighting (note, accurate if we refer to the log of the Jervis) as 1:58 AM of April 16th, but referring to it as a “visual” sighting and not as a radar one. What De La Sierra is saying is quite absurd. The moon was from South–SouthEast, which happens to be the same position of the British force and they can see the convoy, but the convoy cannot see them. The opposite would instead be true. The British would move behind the convoy so that the moon would hide them and illuminate the Axis ships.
The Lampo is reported rescued after four months of work, while the Italian report refers to “a couple of months.” Either way, this vessel re-entered service. Also it appears that only the hospital ship Arno was part of the rescuing group and what De La Sierra reports as a second Hospital ship was just a merchant ship. He also reports only 350 casualties. These mistakes probably originate from Macintyre’s bookNevertheless, this book should be taken into consideration because at times it has the interesting interpretation of a sailor who has sailed the same sea, watched the same stars and dreamed the same dreams. His description of naval tactics is also quite enlightening.
What followed is to be considered a milestone of revisionist history. James Sadkovitch’s “The Italian Navy of WW II”, although accused by Green and Massignani of being too apologetic of the Italian navy, provides new, well documented, and revealing facts which had been lost to the general public. He correctly reports the interception of Axis signals by the British. This was not quite the work of ULTRA, but it falls within the general area of intelligence warfare so skillfully fought by the British. This specific aspect of the war was so diligently covered by professor Santoni’s “ULTRA il vero traditore”. There is no apology by Sadkovich, the facts are clearly explained and documented. What is indeed revealing is the description of the effect the destruction of the convoy had on the Italian military and government, especially in terms of access to the Tunisian ports. Not a single detail in Sadkovitch’s report is arguable and it creates a new, and higher, standard for historical reporting.
In 1993, the widely published author Bernard Ireland summarizes these events in less than a long paragraph managing to squeeze in a few mistakes, such as the Italian vessel which launched torpedoes at the Jervis; it was the Lampo and not the Tarigo. He also reports the Lampo and Baleno as torpedo boats, even though at 1,220 tons they were full-fledged destroyers. Once again the interception is due to “hard steaming” and there is no mention of the radar
In 1998 Green and Massignani wrote another milestone and perhaps the ultimate book about the naval war in the Mediterranean and an expanded report on the loss of the Tarigo convoy. The book, “The Naval War in the Mediterranean”, has an excellent summary of the events and it expands on the Italian attempts to rescue the cipher book left on the sinking Mohawk. According to the authors, documents rescued from the Mohawk (Eliseo Porta was part of the Xa MAS) helped with the attack on the Alexandria, soon to be conducted by the Xa MAS. The book offers additional details such as the plane intercepting the Italian convoy (it was a Maryland). The authors are accurate in reporting that ULTRA did not directly effect the action, and as Sadkowich has done before, they report that the British had indeed intercepted Axis signals.
Conclusions
Should we disregard all previously written books and focus only on the very latest literature? Should we, as Green and Massignani might suggest, disregard Borghese’s book about the Xa MAS? We do not think so. It would be a great tragedy if all the published and unpublished literature on this period were to be disregarded. The understanding of the evolution and interpretation of these historic events is as important as history itself. Ultimately, the continuously evolving historical evaluation of these events keeps them alive today as they were almost 60 years ago.
Unfortunately, badly written books like Bernard Ireland’s “War in the Mediterranean” are still published and sold. Authors like Ireland replaced well-researched history with fallacious narrative at a price of a few guineas. Readers should experience all books, and at the same time be always open minded to the idea that interpretation of historical facts can be less a science than one might expect. Ultimately, the Tarigo action brought about the loss of a few dozen ……….and hundreds of German and British lives and to those soldiers and sailors we owe the respect which can be offered by keeping history alive. In doing so, we celebrate authors like Green and Massignani who strive so much for historical accuracy.
Ultimately, when newer war records are released by the British government, a new generation of historians will update our current understanding of the facts, thus giving us a yet more accurate interpretation of these events and their meaning in history.
At the beginning of 1941, the British government sought to further the already low Italian moral, thus forcing the weaker of the Axis powers to a separate peace. After the successful arrival of the Luftwaffe in Italy in early 1941 and the sinking of the cruiser Southampton, the British were in need of re-establishing their control over the Mediterranean. The same action which saw the destruction of the Southampton, also saw the damaging of the cruiser Gloucester and the carrier Illustrious.
British Commander at Sea: Sommerville Battleship: Renown, Malaya Carrier: Ark Royal Cruiser: Sheffield Destroyer 10
Italian Commander at Sea: Iachino Battleship: Vittorio Veneto, Cesare, Doria Heavy Cruiser: Trento, Trieste, Bolzano Destroyer 10
A new action called for the bombardment of Genoa where the Italian battleships Littorio and Cesare were thought to be undergoing repairs. Even after it was ascertained that the battleships were not in port but were actually being refitted in La Spezia, Genoa was kept as the primary target. The overall command at sea was assigned to Admiral Sommerville, commander of the Gibraltar-based force H. The action was very audacious; it called for a large naval force to sail the 700 miles between Gibraltar and the Ligurian coast to bombard port and industrial facilities.
The battlecruiser HJ.M.S. Renown
The operation was scheduled for the end of January, and on the 31st Force H left Gibraltar. Adverse atmospheric conditions dissuaded the commander from continuing the action, when the ships had already reached Sardinia. The airplanes of the Ark Royal tried, without success, to torpedo the dam on the Tirso River in Sardinia. Again, the British force left port on the 6th of February. On the 8th, alerted by various sources, the Italian fleet consisting of the Vittorio Veneto, Cesare and Doria left La Spezia with the escort of 8 destroyers. Later, three cruisers of the 8th squadron along with two more destroyers joined the search.
Undetected, the British force arrived near Genoa on the 9th and began a naval bombardment, which started at 8:15 AM and lasted one hour and 30 minutes. The Malaya targeted the docks, while the Renown and the Sheffield focused on the industrial area. The Sheffield fired 782 salvos, while the battleships expended 272 15″ shells and over 400 4.5″ shells. Four merchant ships and a training vessel were sunk, while another 18 were damaged. The Italians suffered 144 casualties, many of whom were amongst the local population. The British lost one of the Ark Royal’s Swordfish.
While the British forces were sailing out of the Tyrrhenian sea, Admiral Iachino was steaming on a 330’ course which was going to bring him into contact at around 15:00. Instead, due to faulty instructions from Supermarina, the Italian forces changed direction toward Italy on a 30’course. The Italians were so sure of imminent battle that the Vittorio Veneto even had her 15’ gun loaded. A great opportunity was lost, and the British were completely unaware that they had escaped a possible deadly confrontation. Almost non-existing aerial reconnaissance and erroneous sighting hampered the Italian fleet. At 12.00 o’clock, an Italian airplane sighted the British formation but before it could give its position, it was shot down. Its crew was later picked up by the torpedo boat Masa but only at 17.55 was the alarm finally given: too late for the Italians to catch the fleeing British. So, after having given chase to a French convoy mistaken for the retreating British, the Italian fleet ultimately returned to port.
The material damage was not too serious, but the fact that the British fleet could come to the doorsteps of Italy without been intercepted was troublesome. Ultimately, the bombardment of Genoa was an Italian humiliation, which further destabilized the Fascist Party’s grip on Italy.
It should be mentioned that Antonio Trizzino, in his book Ships and Armchairs (Navi e Poltrone), assert that the principal reason for the British action was the intention of sending a message to the Spaniards in advance of the meeting between Mussolini and Franco which was held in Bordighera, near Genoa, on February 11.
On 11th at 18:00 British cruisers left the main battle fleet (Operation M.B.8 and Taranto’s Night) in the direction of the Strait of Otranto, between Italy and Albania, to intercept naval traffic. After having entered the Adriatic Sea undetected, the British force was able to detect an Italian convoy directed from Brindisi to Valona. The action took place between 1:05 and 1:50 on the 12th of November. The British squadron included the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Sydney escorted by the Tribal class destroyers Nubian and Mohawk under the command of V.A. Sir Henry Pridham-Wippel.
The Italian convoy included the cargo ships Antonio Locatelli (5,691 t.), Premuda (4,427 t.), Capo Vado (4,391 t.) and Catalani (2,429 t.) escorted by the aging torpedo boat Fabrizi, comanded by T.V.c. Giovanni Barbini, and the auxiliary cruiser Ramb 3, commanded by C.F. Francesco De Angelis. The action was swift; once they located the Italian convoy, the British sank all Italian cargoes, despite the heroic fight put up by the Fabrizi which, in the process, was seriously damaged. Less admirable was the behavior of the Ramb 3, which, after the initial exchange of fire, quickly left the cargo ships to their destiny.
The Torpedo Boat R.N. Nicola Fabrizi
Later that day, the Italian torpedo boats Curtatone and Solferino rescued a total of 140 sailors, while the casualties totaled 36 dead and 42 wounded, including the fallen aboard the Fabrizi. Commander Barbini, for the heroic perseverance shown during the action was awarded the Gold Medal for bravery. Italian retaliation was immediate, but the Regia Aeronautica failed to locate the fleeing British fleet and the few Cants which eventually located the British ships were quickly shot down.
On October 8 the full weight of the Mediterranean fleet, four battleships, two carriers, a heavy cruiser, five light cruisers and sixteen destroyers, departed Alexandria to provide distant cover for a Malta bound convoy of four steamers. Hidden in part by heavy weather, the convoy made port on October 11 undetected by the Italians. That same day, however, an Italian civil aircraft flying to Libya reported elements of the Mediterranean fleet about 100 miles southeast of the island where they were loitering, waiting to escort three empty cargo vessels back to Alexandria that night. Supermarina had reservations about this sighting because no military aircraft confirmed it; nonetheless, they dispatched several groups of light units to patrol potential transit areas.
R.N. Camicia Nera
They ordered the largest group, 11th Destroyer Flotilla Artigliere, Aviere, Geniere and Camicia Nera, under Captain Carlo Margottini, supported by the 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla Airone, Alcione and Ariel, under Commander Alberto Banfito to guard the waters east of Malta. Admiral Cunningham, sailing aboard his flag Warspite, established a scouting line of cruisers extending north from his force. The wing ship, light cruiser Ajax, Captain E. D. B. McCarthy, was zig-zagging at 17 knots about seventy miles north of the convoy and about the same distance east, northeast of Malta.
R.N. Artigliere seriously damaged
The weather was moderating from earlier thunderstorms. The moon was up and very bright, just four days short of full. The 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla was proceeding at 17 knots in a long line of bearing with each ship about 5,000 meters or 5,400 yards apart. Alcione saw Ajax first at 0135 hours on October 12 from about 18,000 meters (19,600 yards). Undetected by the cruiser Alcione reported her contact, requested assistance and proceeded directly to the attack. At 0142 Airone, followed shortly thereafter by Ariel, sighted the cruiser and followed their flotilla mate in. Alcione approached Ajax undetected and fired two torpedoes at Ajax’s port side from a range of just 1,750 meters (1,900 yards). She then turned away to attack from another direction.
Her half salvo missed its target. At 0155 Ajax finally spotted two strange vessels silhouetted against the bright moonlight, one on either side of her bow just several thousand yards off. These vessels were Airone and Ariel. One minute later Airone fired two torpedoes from a range of only 2,000 yards. Ariel followed at 0157 with two more. Ajax flashed a challenge, and, receiving an inappropriate reply, increased speed and altered course. The four torpedoes all ran wide, although at this point Ajax was still uncertain whether or not she was under attack.
Airone, closing rapidly, fired off another pair of torpedoes from 750 yards (also wide) and resolved Ajax’s confusion by opening fire. She snapped off four quick salvos hitting Ajax twice on her bridgeworks and once six feet above her waterline, igniting a fire in a storeroom. The range was down to slightly more than 300 yards when Ajax finally returned fire. Her 112 pound shells smashed the Italian torpedo boat and left her dead in the water. The two antagonists were so close, Ajax’s machine guns could sweep Airone’s deck. Ajax reduced speed to 25 knots and shifted heading constantly to avoid torpedoes and gunfire. She fired two torpedoes of her own, one of which might have hit, adding to the misery of Airone’s crew.
With Airone in a sinking condition, Ajax turned the attention of her main batteries to Ariel, returning her fire and quickly scoring one hit from 4,000 yards. This may have penetrated a magazine because Ariel blew up and sank within a few minutes, taking most of her crew with her. The time was 0214. When Alcione finally returned from her extended maneuver she found the British ship gone, Ariel sunk and Airone on fire and slowly following. She could do nothing but rescue survivors, saving 125, about half the complement of the two ships. Airone finally went under at 0235.
Meanwhile, the 11th Destroyer Flotilla, alerted by Alcione’s original message of forty-five prior was hurrying to the battle in an extended column with Artigliere leading followed by Aviere, Camicia Nera and Geniere. Aviere found the British light cruiser first, but Ajax was fully alert and, at 0218, she hit Aviere lightly on her bow before the Italian could fire any torpedoes. Aviere turned and lost contact. Artigliere, the flotilla flagship, came in next. Maneuvering at high speed she fired a single torpedo at Ajax’s starboard side, which missed, and began trading gunfire with the cruiser. Initially the Italian, steaming at a high speed and zig-zagging got the better of the exchange, hitting Ajax four times, putting out her radar and knocking out one of her 4″ secondary battery. The moon had just set; reducing the general illumination and depriving Ajax of the backlight that made the Italian ships, stand out. Not equipped with flashless gunpowder, the repeated flashes from Ajax’s guns blinded her crew with every salvo. Nonetheless, at 0230 Ajax’s gunners finally hit the elusive Artigliere and hit her hard, killing the flotilla commander, Captain Margottini and bringing her to a halt. By 0232 Artigliere was dead in the water and her guns silent. The other two destroyers of the flotilla remained in the offing. Camicia Nera and Ajax exchanged ineffective salvos from about 5,500 yards. Ajax believed she was facing two cruisers, so when Nera disappeared into a smoke screen of her own devise, Ajax used the opportunity to break contact and turn toward the fleet. Geniere, following at some distance, never entered action.
The remainder of Ajax’s squadron concentrated on Ajax’s position, but arrived to late to see any action. Ajax suffered 13 killed and 22 wounded in this action. She expended 490 6″ shells and 4 torpedoes. Ajax’s damage was patched up in a couple of weeks and she was back in action by November 5. Camicia Nere took Artigliere in tow, but she was forced to abandon the damaged ship the next morning when two British cruisers and four destroyers approached. The British heavy cruiser York finished off Artigliere at 0905 with torpedoes. Italian reinforcements of three heavy cruisers and three destroyers sailing from Messina arrived too late to save Artigliere or to engage the York group.
Analysis
This action is worthy of analysis on several levels. English historians almost universally describe how the British Navy established a moral ascendancy or superiority over their Italian counterparts as a result of Calabria. This action, however, the first night action fought between the Italian and British navies, was more important in defining a relationship between the two navies. After Calabria, the Italian Navy never hesitated to deploy their battlefleet (fuel and opportunity permitting) or to seek battle with the British under favorable conditions. Indeed, one reason why Cunningham had four battleships at sea at the time of this action was because: “as four Italian battleships had been sighted at sea on the previous occasion, this time our whole fleet went out to cover the operation.”(1) Whereas Supermarina could consider Calabria a draw, the action of October 12 permitted no such conclusion.
Greene & Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943
In fact, Supermarina must have been severely depressed by the results. The Italian destroyers and torpedo boats were supposed to be highly trained, almost elite units. In their attack on the Ajax they enjoyed every possible advantage. They achieved surprise and aggressively pressed their attacks to close range, but accomplished nothing with their principle weapon, the torpedo. The analysis of Marc’ Bragadin rings true of the conclusions Supermarina must have drawn at the time and is worth quoting at length: “The reports about the battle gave reason for much reflection. The enemy had escaped with only a few hits scored by the guns of the Airone and the Ariel, damage about equal in all to that suffered by the Aviere alone. The Italians, on the other had, had lost a destroyer and two destroyer escorts; yet the Italian ships were among the more efficient in the Navy, and their commanders were outstanding
Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II
Each ship that had come into contact with the enemy had conducted herself gallantly in every respect, even to the point of gaining the enemy’s admiration. But it had to be admitted that the Italians were technically inferior to the British, at least as far as carrying out night encounters at sea was concerned.” (not aware of radar) “the outcome of the encounter with the Ajax was most disconcerting.” (2) Bragadin, with postwar hindsight, concludes that the Type 279 air search radar possessed by Ajax at the beginning of the battle was responsible for the ultimate outcome. “In reality this inferiority was probably to be explained solely by the fact that the Ajax was equipped with radar.” (3) However, the impact played by radar on this action has been downplayed by most historians. James Sadkovich: “The Ajax fired visually because its Type 279 radar could not lay guns, but the Italians were silhouetted against the moon, and radar seems initially to have warned the cruiser of their presence.” (4) Bernard Ireland flatly asserts: “Ajax had not benefited from her radar, which was designed to detect and range aircraft and which, in any case, had been damaged by the shock of gunfire.” (5) At the time the facts of the battle were similar to both sides. From the Italian point of view, two flotillas, one after the other, had attacked a solitary British cruiser aggressively and from close range, and had been roundly defeated, inflicting little damage in return. From the British point of view they had repelled the attacks of four destroyers and two cruisers with “resolution and skill,” (6) inflicting heavy damage on the enemy. Each side drew the opposite conclusion. For the Italians night actions were to be avoided. For the British night actions were to be courted. In a way, both Supermarina and the Admiralty used the results of this action to endorse and confirm prewar decisions they had made regarding nighttime operations. Although the Italian Navy conducted night practices during the twenties, in the next decade “a decision was made for the battle fleet to decline night engagements.” (7) And guns of 8″ and above were not supplied with flashless powder. The Royal Navies, on the other hand trained to fight at night and their doctrine endorsed seeking out and engaging the enemy at night (although, they did not supply even their light forces with flashless powder). These were the lessons drawn from the Action of October 12. But were they the right lessons?
Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani ask the proper question and propose at least a partial answer. “Both British and Italian accounts speak of the ‘great gallantry’ of the destroyers’ crews. But how could at least seven torpedoes, fired from several different directions, fail to hit? Part of the reason was surely the brilliant conduct of McCarthy during the action. Vice-Admiral Pridham Wippell would later say he handled his ship with promptitude, ability and great determination.” (8) McCarthy, without doubt fought a good fight, but the tactics employed by the Italian forces surely had something to do with his success. In brief, the Italians squandered the advantage of surprise, they attacked piecemeal, and they greatly assisted Ajax’s shooting by fighting the battle at far too close a range. In terms of the many other nighttime torpedo actions fought during World War II, particularly the successful ones, the following analysis is relevant: “Commenting on this incident after the war, the German Admiral, Eberhard Weichold, who was liaison officer with Italian HQ in Rome in 1941 and subsequently German C-in-C Mediterranean . . . “attributed the Italian losses without accompanying success to the clearness of the night, and the insufficient number of the boats employed in the tactical execution of the attack.” (9) The 1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla made no effort to concentrate and attack as a unit. Moreover, each of the three Italian torpedo boats had four tubes mounted on the centerline and so were capable of firing full salvos of four torpedoes each. Instead, when each boat attacked, she fired a half salvo. Twelve torpedoes launched simultaneously were always more deadly than penny packets of two launched independently.
All the hits scored by Ajax were made at very close ranges, 4,000 yards and below. In fact, much of the damaged suffered by the light cruiser was self inflicted from firing her guns at a low depression for extended periods of time. Although Ajax was hit seven times in return, the damage a shell from a 3.9″ or 4.7″ gun could inflict on a lightly armored vessel was far less, all things being equal, than the shell from a 6″ gun could inflict on an unarmored vessel. When the destroyers attacked, they merely repeated the mistakes of the torpedoes boats without enjoying the benefits of launching a surprise torpedo attack.
Moreover, with the exception of the unfortunate Artigliere, their attack was not pressed very vigorously. In retrospect, the results of this action, at least from the Italian point of view, indicated the need for more training and a re-thinking of their doctrine. Gallantry was not the primary quality required by the situation. Control and coordination would have served the Italians far better. As it was, Ajax found herself rather like the shooter in a target gallery knocking down the ducks as they appeared in order, one after the other. A far better tactic would have been to attack in masse, using weapons in masse. The results could have, and should have been far different. The tragedy for the Italian Navy was that they drew the wrong conclusion from the results of this action and, in effect, conceded the night to the British.
Primary references:
Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II Greene & Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey Brown, Warship Losses of World War II Rohwer & Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942 Macintyre, The Battle for the Mediterranean Footnotes: 1. Cunningham 278 2. Bragadin 39-40 3. Bragadin 40 4. Sadkovich 88fn 5. Ireland 48 6. Cunningham 278 7. Greene and Massignani 39 8. Greene and Massignani 98 9. Gill 225
This database contains events in chronological order from June 1940 to October 1943.
Date
Event
6/1/1940
Supermarina, the Italian Naval command center is alerted
6/6/1940
Italian forces begin mine-laying operations along the Italian cost.
6/10/1940
Italy declares war on France and Britain.
6/12/1940
The British cruiser H.M.S. Calypso (4,180 t.) is sunk by the Italian submarine Bagnolin under the command of Franco Tosoni-Pittoni 70 miles South of Cape Lithinon, Crete
6/13/1940
The Italian Gunboat Berta is sunk in Tobruk.
6/13/1940
The Italian submarine Finzi sorties into the Atlantic
6/14/1940
H.M.S. Odin is sunk by the Italian destroyers Strale and Baleno 40 miles off Cape San Vito (Taranto)
6/15/1940
French forces bombard Genoa, Vado and Savona
6/14/1940
German forces enter Paris. Spain occupies Tangier.
6/15/1940
The submarine Macallè is sunk in the Red Sea, the first of 90 Italian units to be lost during the conflict and one of ten lost in the month of June along with the Provana, Galileo Galilei, Diamante, Evangelista Torricelli, Galvani, Liuzzi, Argonauta, Uebi Scebeli, Rubino.
6/16/1940
The British Submarine H.M.S. Granpus is sunk by torpedo boats near Augusta (Sicily)
6/17/1940
The French Submarine Morse is sunk off Sfax.
6/17/1940
The Italian submarine Provana is lost with all hands.
6/19/1940
The British Submarine H.M.S. Orpheus is sunk by the destroyer Turbine near Tobruk
6/18/1940
Hitler and Mussolini meet in Munich
6/22/1940
France signs armistice with Germany.
6/23/1940
After a strenuous fight against five British units, four destroyers and a sloop, the Italian submarine Torricelli is sunk in the Gulf of Oden. The British destroyer Khartoum is so badly damaged that it sinks in shallow waters near the island of Perin; it was a total lost.
6/23/1940
The Italian submarine Galvani sinks in the Indian Ocean the Indian Sloop Pathan.
6/24/1940
France signs armistice with Italy.
6/25/1940
At 01:35 AM (European time) France officially surrenders.
6/28/1940
During a troops transfer from Taranto to Tobruk the Italian destroyers Espero, Zeffiro and Ostro are intercepted by five British cruisers. During the engagement, the destroyer Espero is sunk by H.M.S. Sidney, while the other two units safely made it to Tobruk. See “The sinking of the Espero”
7/3/1940
British attack French fleet at Oran, Algeria.
7/5/1940
The Italian destroyer Zeffiro and a merchant ship are sunk in the port of Tobruk by British torpedo bombers from the 813 Squadron of the H.M.S. Eagle.
7/8/1940
Germany launches all-out air blitz on England.
7/9/1940
Battle of Point Stilo (Action off Calabria)
7/10/1940
The destroyer Leone Lancaldo is sunk in Augusta by carrier-based torpedo bombers. The unit will later be rescued and reentered service in November 1942.
7/11/1940
The submarine Marconi torpedoes and sinks the British destroyer Escort en rout to Gibraltar as part of force H.
7/16/1940
The British submarine Phoenix is sunk by the torpedo boat Albatros near Augusta.
7/19/1940
Battle of Cape Spada
7/20/1940
British torpedo bombers Swordfish of the 824 Squadron lauched from the carrier Eagle torpedo and sink the Italian destroyers Nembo and Ostro in the Guld of Bomba.
7/22/1940
British torpedo bombers Swordfish launched from the carrier Eagle torpedo and sink the Italian submarine Iride which was supporting a raid by the 10th Light Flotilla against Alexandria. In the same action a support ship was also lost.
7/24/1940
The Italian Navy offers to send a large number of submarines to participate in the Battle of the Atlantic under German command.
7/26/1940
Germany’s Admiral Karl Doenitz, chief of submarine operations, accepts the Italian offer of transferring Italian submarines to the Atlantic.
8/1/1940
The destroyer Vivaldi rams and sinks the British submarine Oswald in the Strait of Messina.
8/12/1940
The submarine Malaspina sinks the british tanker British Fame.
8/19/1940
Italian troops occupy British Somaliland in East Africa.
8/29/1940
Begins “Operation Hats” and M.B.3
9/3/1940
United States trades Britain 50 destroyers for Atlantic bases.
9/13/1940
Italy begins invasion of Egypt.
9/17/1940
Bombardment of Benghazi by the Mediterranean Fleet, including the battleship Valiant and the carrier Illustrious. The Italian destroyer Borea is sunk by torpedo bombers while her twin unit Aquilone is sunk by mines laid by aircraft of the 819 Squadron from H.M.S. Illustrious. During the bombardment of Bardia, the heavy cruiser Kent is severely damaged by an Italian torpedo launcher.
9/22/1940
The Italian Torpedo Boat Palestro is sunk in the Strait of Otranto by the British submarine Osiris.
9/27/1940
Japan joins the Axis.
9/30/1940
During a 10th Light Flotilla mission against Alexandria, the Italian submarine Gondar is detected by a British Sunderland reconnaissance plane of the 230 Squadron and it is sunk by the Australian destroyer Stuart.
10/9/1940
Submarine Malspina, the first of 27 Italian submarines arrives at Bordeaux, France.
10/10/1940
Germany occupies Romania.
10/11/1940
H.M.S. Rainbow was lost to accidental collision with s/s Antonietta Costa in
10/12/1940
Night action off Cape Passero
10/13/1940
During a night action of the South-East coast of Sicily, the Italian torpedo boats Airone and Ariel are sunk by the British light cruiser Ajax. The destroyer Artigliere, seriously damaged, is sunk by the heavy cruiser York.
10/15/1940
The Italian submarine Toti sinks the British sub Triad after a violent gun duel.
10/21/1940
In the Red Sea, a group of Italian destroyers attacks the British convoy BN7. The destroyer Nullo, following a strong reaction from the convoy, is forced to run aground in shallow waters. The follow day, it will be completely destroyed by British planes.
10/28/1940
Starting from Albania, Italian forces attack Greece.
11/12/1940
As part of operation M.B.8, British planes cripple the Italian fleet at Taranto.
11/20/1940
Hungary joins Axis.
11/22/1940
The Italian torpedo boat Cofienza sinks after a collision with the auxiliary patrol vessel Cecchi north of Brindisi.
11/22/1940
Greeks defeat the Italian 9th Army.
11/23/1940
Romania joins Axis.
11/26/1940
The British submarine Regulus is probably lost by aereal attack in the Strait of Otranto, while the Triton is thought to be lost by mine in the same area.
11/27/1940
Encounter of Cape Teulada (Battle of Spartivento)
11/30/1940
At the end of the month, 26 Italian submarines have entered the Atlantic and established the Italian base of Betasom in Bordeaux. In total, 32 Italian vessels will operate in the Atlantic.
12/5/1940
The Italian torpedo boat Calipso sinks 4 miles north of Misurata (Lybia) after hitting a mine laid by the British submarine Rorqual.
12/6/1940
Greeks rout Italians from Porto Edda, Albania.
12/10/1940
The Italian Navy reorganizes; Admiral Riccardi is the new Fleet Commander.
12/9/1940
British strike back at Italians in Egypt. The offensive will end in Febraury 1941 on the El Agheila line.
12/14/1940
The Italian submarine Naiade is sunk near Bardia by the British destroyer Hereward and Hyperion.
12/22/1940
Tobruk falls.
12/23/1940
The Italian torpedo boat Fratelli Cairoli sinks 4 miles north of Misurata (Libya) after hitting a mine laid by the British submarine Rorqual.
1/6/1941
Starts operations Excess designed to bring war materiel to the besiege island of Malta and personnel to Alexandria.
1/10/1941
During an Italian attack against the Excess convoy, the Italian torpedo boat Vega is sunk in the strait of Sicily by the cruiser Bonaventure and the destroyer Hereward. The British destroyer Gallant hits a mine near Pantelleria; towed to Malta, it will never be repaired, and will be definitely lost during an Axis bombardment in April 1942. Axis aerial attacks seriously damage the British carrier Illustrious. After emergency repairs in Malta, on the 23 of January the ship will reach Alexandria.
1/11/1941
During operation Excess, Axis airplanes sink the British cruiser Southampton on its way back to Alexandria. The twin ship Gloucester is damaged, but survives.
1/20/1941
British attack Italians in Eritrea.
1/22/1941
Australian troops belonging to the Western Desert Force occupy Tobruk.
1/22/1941
After a glorious period of service dating back to the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, the old cruiser San Giorgio is scuttle in the harbor of Tobruk.
2/5/1941
British drive Italians from the Sudan.
2/9/1941
Naval bombardment of Genoa
2/9/1941
An English task force including the battleships Renown and Malaya and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal bombards on the city of Genoa. Airplanes from the Ark Royal attack Leghorn and drop mines near La Spezia. An Italian naval group sent to intercept the British does not succeed in establishing contact.
2/13/1941
During the Conference of Merano, Italy Admiral Raeder (Germany) and Admiral Riccardi (Italy) agree on terms of naval collaboration in the Mediterranean. The Italian Navy will receive much needed fuel from the German.
2/25/1941
During escort service in support of a Tripoli-bound Italian convoy, the light cruiser Armando Diaz is sunk by the submarine Upright.
2/27/1941
The auxiliary Italian cruiser RAMB I is sunk near the Maldives Island by the New Zealander light cruiser Leander while attempting to escape Massawa.
3/1/1941
German-occupied Bulgaria joins Axis.
3/21/1941
In three weeks, the British are capable of transporting 60,000 troops to Greece.
3/7/1941
British win Italian Somaliland.
3/25/1941
Yugoslavia joins Axis.
3/25/1941
Italian attack at Suda Bay, sinking of the York.
3/26/1941
The British heavy cruiser York is seriously damaged by an Italian attack in the Bay of Suda.
3/28/1941
Naval battle off Cape Matapan.
3/28/1941
An Italian raid in the eastern Mediterranean develops into the battle of Gaudo and evolves into the battle of Matapan. The Italian cruiser Pola is immobilized by an aerial torpedo attack, and the cruiser Fiume and Zara and the destroyers Alfieri and Carducci sent to her rescue are sunk by gunfire from the battleships Warspite, Barham and Valiant and torpedoes from the destroyers Jervis and Nubian. The battleship Vittorio Veneto is hit by a torpedo but reaches port.
3/30/1941
United States seizes Axis ships in American ports.
3/31/1941
The British cruiser Bonaventure is sunk by the Italian submarine Ambra while in escort service south east of Crete
4/1/1941
During an attack against Port Sudan, the Italian destroyer Leone hits an uncharted rock and it it sunk by her crew.
4/8/1941
Last action of the Italian Navy in the Red Sea. Destroyers Pantera, Tigre, Leone, Manin, Sauro and Batttisti are sunk. Massawa, the last Italian defence, falls.
4/9/1941
Massawua, the last Italian base surrenders.
4/2/1941
With the British occupation of Massawa imminent, the remaining Italian destroyers still seaworthy attempt an attack against Port Sudan. British planes sink the Sauro and the Manin.
4/4/1941
The remaining Italian destroyers in the Red Sea (Tigre, Pantera and Battisti) are seriously damaged by aerial attacks and coastal batteries while approaching Port Sudan. The three units will sink near the Yemeni coast
4/3/1941
British yield Bengasi, Libya, to Axis attack.
4/5/1941
Beginning of the Italian operations against Yugoslavia.
4/6/1941
Germany attacks Yugoslavia, Greece. British take Addis Ababa, Ethiopian capital.
4/8/1941
In Massawa, before being scuttled, MAS 213 torpedoes and seriously damages the British light cruiser Capetown. Four Italian submarines (Archimede, Guglielmotti, Ferraris and Perla) run away and reach the French port of Bordeaux in the Atlantic.
4/9/1941
United States occupies Greenland.
4/12/1941
British lose Bardia, Libya.
4/16/1941
Sinking of the Tarigo Convoy
4/17/1941
An Italian convoy transporting troops to Northern Africa, and composed by five merchantmen and escorted by the destroyers Tarigo, Lampo and Baleno is intercepted by the British destroyers Janus, Jervis, Mohawk and Nubian near Kerkennah and attached with the help of the radar. The merchantmen are all sunk along with the destroyers Tarigo and Baleno. The Lampo, seriously damaged is run aground in shallow waters and later recovered. The British destroyer Mohawk is hit by a torpedo from the sinking Tarigo, and it is later scuttled by her crew due to the heavy damage suffered.
4/17/1941
Yugoslavia surrenders.
4/18/1941
Britain occupies Iraq.
4/19/1941
In two distinct operations, the carrier Ark Royal launches 32 Malta-bound fighters.
4/21/1941
The British battleships Warspite, Valiant and Barham bombard Tripoli.
4/27/1941
During the English evacuation of Greece the destroyer Diamond and Wryneck are attacked and sunk by Germans airplanes near Point Malea, south-east of Greece.
4/30/1941
British forces leave Greece.
5/2/1941
While returning from an incursion against Italian traffic, The British destroyer Jersey hits a mine and sinks near La Valletta
5/8/1941
Units of the Mediterranean Fleet bombard Benghazi.
5/12/1941
Operation Tiger is happily concluded. A convoy of five English merchant ships crosses Mediterranean from east to west and brings reinforcements to the troops fighting in the. A merchant ship is sunk, but the others four reach their destination transporting 238 tanks and 43 fighter planes.
5/16/1941
Iceland ends Union with Denmark.
5/19/1941
British complete occupation of Ethiopia.
5/15/1941
Battle for Crete. The British will loose the cruisers Fiji, Gloucester and Calcutta and the destroyers Juno, Greyhound, Kelly, Kashmir, Hereward and Imperial.
5/20/1941
German paratroops invade Crete.
5/21/1941
The Italian destroyer Mirabello is sunk by mines laid by the British cruiser Abdiel near the western cost of Greece.
5/21/1941
The British destroyer Juno is sunk by Germans airplanes southeast of Crete. In the same action the light cruiser Ajax is also hit. Later in the day, the same Ajax with others two cruisers and two destroyers disperses a German convoy of small transports which was bringing reinforcements to Crete. The decisive action of the torpedo boat “Lupo”
5/22/1941
Heavy German aerial attacks seriously damage the battleship Warspite and the light cruisers Naiads and Carlisle. Later the destroyer Greyhound and the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji are sunk by aerial attacks.
5/23/1941
The destroyers Kashmir and Kelly are sunk berial attacks near Crete.
5/24/1941
Battleship Bismarck sinks the British battlecruiser Hood
5/24/1941
The British submarine Upholder attacks a Libya-bound Italian convoy and sinks the 18,000-ton passenger ship Conte Rosso.
5/25/1941
The sloop Grimsby and a transport ship are sunk north east of Tobruk.
5/26/1941
10th Light Flotilla Attack against Malta
5/27/1941
Failed Italian attempt to attack Malta by the 10th Light Flotilla. A group of insidious weapons, escorted by the torpedo boat Diana and by MAS 451 and 452, are discovered during their approach to Malta; Shore guns and aerial attacks bring about to the destruction of most weapons and the sinking of the two MAS. The Diana makes it to safety.
5/27/1941
British fleet and air units sink Bismarck.
6/1/1941
British evacuate Crete.
6/8/1941
British and Free French invade Syria.
6/14/1941
United States freezes German and Italian assets in America.
6/15/1941
Meeting between Admiral Doeniz and Perona. End of joint German Italian submarine operations in the Atlantic.
6/22/1941
Germany invades Soviet Union. Italy declares war on Soviet Union.
6/26/1941
Finland enters war against Soviet Union.
7/7/1941
United States occupies Iceland.
7/14/1941
Vichy French sign armistice.
9/18/1941
During an attack to an Italian convoy directed in Libya, the English submarine Upholder sinks the two 19.500 tons passenger ships Neptunia and Oceania.
9/24/1941
Operation Halberd. A British convoy composed of nine transports sets sail from Gibraltar to Malta, under the escort of three battleships, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and of five cruisers. The Italian fleet goes out to intercept the convoy but doesn’t succeed in establishing contact. The convoy arrives to Malta on the 28 having lost only a transport for aerial attack. On the 27th, the battleship Nelson is damaged by an Italian torpedo bomber south of Sardinia.
9/27/1941
In the United States, the Patrick Henry is launched. This is the first merchant ship of the Liberty class of which around 2600 will be build.
9/30/1941
During operation Halberd the British destroyer Gurkha and Legion sink the Italian submarine Adua.
10/9/1941
Turkey signs trade treaty with Germany.
10/20/1941
The Italian torpedo boats Aldebaran e Altair sink the gulf of Athens on mines layed by the British submarine Rorqual
10/25/1941
The British cruiser Latona is sunk north of Bardia by a group of German Stukas (Ju-87), while returning from mine laying mission.
10/31/1941
U-boats sink United States destroyer Reuben James off Iceland.
11/9/1941
An Italian convoy directed to Northern Africa (convoy ” Duisburg “) and composed by seven merchantmen and escorted by six destroyers, with a group of cruisers in distant coverage, is attached by Force K. With the help of the radar, Force K succeeds in sinking all the merchantmen and the destroyer Fulmine. Later, while rescuing survivors of the shipwrecks, the destroyer Libeccio is torpedoed and sunk by the British submarine Upholder.
11/13/1941
The British aircraft carrier Ark Royal, returning from a mission delivering fighters to Malta, is torpedoed by the German submersible U-81, which had recently entered the Mediterranean. The ship will sink later in the day not too far from Gibraltar.
11/25/1941
The battleship Barham, during an hunting cruise against Italian traffic bound to North Africa, is struck by three torpedoes launched by the German submersible U-331 and sinks north of Sidi El Barrani.
12/1/1941
The Italian destroyer Da Mosto is intercepted and sunk north of Tripoli by the Force K composed of the light cruisers Aurora and Penelope and a destroyer. In these days, Force K is strengthened by two new cruisers, the Ajax and the Neptune, and two destroyers.
12/7/1941
Japan attacks the USA. Canada declares war on Japan. Dutch Indies declares war on Japan.
12/8/1941
United States, Britain declare war on Japan
12/9/1941
China declares war on Japan, Germany, Italy. Thailand surrenders to Japan.
12/11/1941
Germany and Italy declare war on United States. The United States declares war on Germany and Italy.
12/11/1941
The English submarine Truant torpedoes and sinks the Italian torpedo boat Alcione near Crete. The same day, the destroyer Farndale sinks near Bardia the submarine Caracciolo, which was engaged in a transport mission.
12/13/1941
Cape Bon
12/13/1941
The Italian light cruisers Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, assigned to an urgent restocking mission to Northern Africa, are intercepted near Cape Bon by four destroyer (the British Legion, Maori e Sikh e the Dutch Isaac Sweers) and sunk by torpedo and gunfire.
12/14/1941
While escorting a Libyan-bound convoy, the battleship Vittorio Veneto is struck by a torpedo launched by the British submarine Urge, but is capable of returning to port. The German submarine U-557 sinks the British cruiser Galatea.
12/17/1941
First battle of Sirte
12/18/1941
First Battle of the Sirte. An inconclusive clash between an Italian squadron escorting a convoy, and a British force escorting the fast transport Breconshire directed to Malta. The battle consisted into a short exchange of volleys at a great distance without remarkable consequences for the two contenders. The two fleets returned to their respective harbors on the 18, and the Italian convoy succeeded in reaching Libya.
12/18/1941
Italian frogmen sink the battleships Valiant and the Queen Elizabeth in Alexandria
12/19/1941
Hitler takes personal command of German army.
12/18/1941
Italian insidious weapons of the 10th Light Flotilla, transported by the submergible Scirè, penetrate the harbor of Alexandria and mine the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant and an oil tanker. The two battleships are sunk to the bottom: the Valiant will require around six months of work before reentering service, while the Queen Elizabeth will not be ready until the second half of 1943.
12/19/1941
Force K, which had left Malta to meet a n incoming British convoy, runs into an Italian minefield. The consequences are deadly; the cruiser light Neptune and the destroyer Kandahar sink. The light cruisers Aurora and Penelope are damaged; the first one more seriously than the second. Force K practically ceased to exist!
1/1/1942
Twenty-six nations sign the United Nations Pact.
1/21/1942
Axis advances into Cyrenaica.
1/29/1942
Axis takes Benghazi, Libya, after 200-mile drive.
2/12/1942
The destroyer Maori is sunk in Malta after heavy German aerial attacks.
3/23/1942
Second Battle of Sirte
3/24/1942
The British attempt to send four merchant ships from Alexandria to Malta; an Italian group goes out in pursuit of the British, but the engagement is not decisive. Nevertheless, the convoy is delayed enough to be later attached by Axis planes which sink all transports, two at sea and two just after they had entered Malta. Also lost on the British side the destroyer Southwold, sunk on the 24th, and the destroyer Legion sunk on the 26th. along with the submergible P-39.
3/25/1942
During the second battle of Sirte, the Italian destroyers Lanciere and Scirocco are sunk by a powerful tempest.
3/23/1942
Sinking of the ship Galilea with the loss of almost 1,000 Italian troops.
3/28/1942
British Commandos raid U-boat base at St.-Nazaire
4/1/1942
The Italian light cruiser Giovanni dalle Bande Nere is torpedoed north of Sicily by the British submarine Urge.
4/1/1942
The British submarines P-36 and Pandora are sunk in Malta by heavy bombardments. Other submarines are damaged.
4/1/1942
The Greek submarine Glavkos is sunk in Malta by Axis airplanes.
4/4/1942
The British destroyer Gallant, already damaged in January 1941 and since in a dry dock in Malta, is completely destroyed by Axis airplanes.
4/5/1942
The British destroyer Havock, while escaping Malta, runs aground near Cape Bon and it is later destroyed by an Italian submarine.
4/6/1942
The British destroyer Kingston is sunk during an aerial bombardment in Malta.
4/11/1942
The British submarine Urge leaves Malta for Alexandria but it never arrives at the Egyptian base.
4/27/1942
The U.S.S. Wasp launches 50 Spitfires destine to the defense of Malta. Immediately after landing, most of them are destroyed by heavy Axis bombardments.
5/8/1942
Axis open spring offensive in Crimea.
5/8/1942
The British submarine Olympus, while escaping Malta, is sunk my a mine near Porto Grande..
5/8/1942
The carriers U.S.S. Wasp and H.M.S. Eagle launch 60 Spitfire for Malta.
5/9/1942
The British destroyers Jackal, Jervis, Kipling and Lively leave Alexandria in pursuit of a Benghazi-bound convoy. After having been detected by German planes, Kipling and Lively are sunk north of Sidi-elBarrani, while the Jackal is scuttle by her crew. Only the Jervis will make it back to base.
5/11/1942
Mexico declares war on Axis.
5/22/1942
The Italian destroyer Emanuele Pessagno, while escorting a Libya-bound convoy, is torpedoed and sunk north-west of Benghazi by the British submarine Turbulent.
6/8/1942
The Italian destroyer Antoniotto Usodimare, while escorting a convoy in the Sicilian Channel, is tragically sunk by the Italian submarine Alagi.
6/12/1942
An English convoy composed of 11 ships sets sail from Alexandria bound for Malta, escorted by admiral Vian’s naval group (7 cruisers and 17 destroyers), giving life to operation Vigorous. The intervention of an Italian naval group with two battleships, cruisers and destroyers forces the convoy to reverse its route with rather consistent losses. The light cruiser destroyer Nestor on the 16th and the destroyer Airedale along with two merchant ships. The light cruisers Birmingham and Newcastle are also damaged . The Italians loose the heavy cruiser Trento immobilized by a torpedo bomber and later sunk on the 15th by the British submarine Umbra. The battleship Littorio is also damaged by an aerial torpedo, but it reaches port.Hermione is torpedoed and sunk on the 16th by the German submarine U-205, the destroyer Hasty is sunk on the 15th by the German torpedo-boat S-55. Also sunk the
6/12/1942
Operation Harpoon takes place at the same time that Vigorous is unfolding. Six heavily escorted merchant ships attempt the crossing from Gibraltar to Malta. After the heavy units had reversed course, the convoy was only protected by the light cruiser Cairo and five destroyers. The convoy is attached by Axis airplanes and then by an Italian naval group (light cruisers Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia and five destroyers). Four merchant ships are sunk along with the British destroyer Bedouin and the Polish Kujawiak.
6/14/1942
Battle of Mid-June (Operation Harpoon)
6/15/1942
Axis forces enter Egypt.
6/1/1942
British 8th Army halts Rommel’s drive at El Alamein.
7/9/1942
The Italian submarine Perla is captured near Beirut by the British corvette Hyacinth.
7/10/1942
During the preparation of an attack of 10th Light Flotilla against Haifa, the Italian submarine Scirè is intercepted and sunk by the armed trawler Islay.
8/10/1942
Another British attempt to supply Malta gives origin to Operation Pedestal: fourteen merchant ships set sail from Gibraltar with the close escort of 4 light cruisers and twelve destroyers and the distance coverage of three aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers and twelve destroyers. Furthermore, the aircraft carrier Furious will launch 38 Spitfires toward Malta. The Axis attacks are exclusively entrusted to airplanes and light units. The losses for the British are heavy: the aircraft carrier Eagle is sunk on the 11th near Algiers by U-73. The cruisers Cairo is sunk by the Italian submarines Axums and Dessié on the 12th northwest of Cape Bon. The cruiser Manchester is sunk on the 13th by the Italian MS-22 near Cape Bon. The destroyer Foresight is sunk on the 12th by Italian torpedo bombers near the Tunisian coast.; Also sunk are nine of the fourteen merchant ships. The aircraft carrier Indomitable damaged along with the the light cruisers Nigeria and Kenya, but five merchant ships arrive in Malta with the precious cargo.
8/10/1942
The Italian lost the submarine Cobalto (rammed on the 12th by the destroyer Ithuriel) and Dagabur (rammed by the destroyer Wolverine on the 11th). Also, the submarine Unbroken succeeds in torpedoing and damaging rather seriously the Italian cruisers Bolzano and Attendolo. The first one will not reenter service.
8/10/1942
Brazil declares war on the Axis.
8/11/1942
Germany annexes Luxembourg.
8/30/1942
U-156 sinks the 16,695-ton British Liner Laconia carrying 1800 Italian prisoners of war. The British had locked the doors in the bulkheads; very few Italians survive.
9/13/1942
Operation Agreement. The British attempt the landing of commandos in the area of Tobruk-El Alamein along with a concurrent attack of the Long Range Desert Group, with the support of naval unity from Alexandria. The operation fails with heavy losses: the anti-aircraft cruiser Coventry and the destroyer Zulu are sunk on the 14th by Axis aerial attacks, while the destroyer Sikh is scuttled the same day after having been seriously damaged the evening before by fire from coastal batteries.
9/17/1942
Admiral Doenitz orders the rescue of the survivors of the Laconia. The order is revoked after an American Liberator bombs one of the rescuing u-boats.
9/23/1942
British open assault against Afrika Korps at El Alamein.
10/23/1942
Beginning of the decisive British offensive at El Alamein. The 8th Army (gen. Montgomery) with a superiority in men of two to one, and an even greater one in materials launches the decisive push against the Axis forces. After twelve days of violent fighting and heavy losses from both the parts, the British begin the drive toward Libya and eventually Tunisia.
10/4/1942
End of the Battle of El Alamein and beginning of the Axis retreat.
10/8/1942
Operation Stoneage: American forces invade Morocco
10/8/1942
An Allied convoy from Alexandria, a mixture of four merchant ships with the escort of three cruisers and ten destroyer, succeeds in reaching Malta. The only damage is suffered by the cruiser Arethusa from an aerial attack. With this operation Malta’s crisis is over.
10/11/1942
Germany occupies “unoccupied” France.
10/14/1942
Allied troops enter Tunisia.
10/11/1942
French scuttle their fleet in Toulon to prevent Axis seizure.
10/14/1942
German armored forces enter Tolone with the purpose of capturing the French fleet. The French, warned in time, succeed in scuttling the fleet: three battleships, seven cruisers, thirty destroyer, sixteen submarines besides varied small units are destroyed. Despite the Italo-German efforts only a small number of units will be recovered and none will enter service.
10/15/1942
The Force Q, based in Bona (Tunisia) and composed of the light cruisers Aurora, Argonaut and Sirius and two destroyers attacks an Italian convoy in the Sicilian Channel and sinks all four merchant ships and the destroyer Folgore. On the way back to base, Force Q loses the destroyer Quentin sunk by an Italian torpedo bomber north of Cape Bon.
10/4/1942
During an heavy bombardment of Naples by American bombers, the light cruiser Muzio Attendolo is sunk.
12/8/1942
Axis forces occupy Biserta and capture French naval units, but despite the efforts only a very few enter service with the Regia Marina or the Kriegsmarine.
12/15/1942
After an engagment with the British destroyer Petard and the Greek Vasilla Olga, the Italian submarine Uarsciek is captured and then sunk while in tow.
1/3/1943
British insidious weapon’s attack against the port of Palermo. The cruiser Ulpio Traiano (under construction) is sunk.
1/9/1943
The Italian destroyer Corsaro sinks North-East of Biserta on a mine laid by the British minelayer Abdiel
1/17/1943
The Italian destroyer Bombardiere is torpedoed and sunk by the British submarine United near the Eastern cost of Sicily.
1/31/1943
The Italian torpedo boat Prestinari and the corvette Procellaria sink in a minefield laid by the British minelayer Welshman in the Sicilian Channel.
1/31/1943
The Italian destroyer Saetta and the torpedo boat Uragano sink in a minefield laid by the British minelayer Abdiel North-east of Biserta.
2/21/1943
Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia.
2/21/1943
Admiral Doenitz and Riccardi meet Mussolini to coordinate German support for the defense of Tunisia.
3/17/1943
The Italian destroyers Ascari and Maloncello sink in the same minefield which, two weeks earlier, had claimed the Ciclone.
4/10/1943
An heavy U.S.A.A.F bombardment on the port of La Maddalena causes the sinking of the cruiser Trieste and serious damages to the Gorizia, which brought to la Spezia, will never reenter service.
4/16/1943
British and American forces join in Tunisia.
4/10/1943
During a British raid against Italian traffic, the destroyers Paladin and Pakenham attack a convoy. In the ensuing battle, the Italian torpedo boat Cigno is sunk, but the day after the Pakenham, which had received serious damages, will be scuttle by her crew.
4/4/1943
The British destroyers Nubian, Paladin and Petard intercept and sink an Italian merchant ship and the torpedo boat Perseo near Cape Bon.
5/7/1943
Allies capture Tunis and Bizerte.
5/12/1943
Axis resistance ends in North Africa.
5/7/1943
Axis forces in North Africa surrender. After almost three years of struggle, the allied found themselves with over 250,000 prisoners of war.
5/12/1943
The Italian submarine Leonardo da Vinci returning from a successful mission near the South-African coast, is intercepted and sunk by the British destroyer Active and the frigate Ness near the Azores Islands.
5/23/1943
The British destroyer Jervis and the Greek Queen Olga sink the Italian torpedo boat Castore and two merchant ships near Cape Spartivento
6/11/1943
The Italian island of Pantelleria surrenders to the Allied.
6/12/1943
The Italian island of Lampedusa surrenders to the Allied.
6/28/1943
A U.S.A.A..F. bombardment on Leghorn sinks the old cruiser Bari.
7/10/1943
Operation Husky. 181,000 troops land in Sicily near the Gulf of Gela and south of Siracusa. Coverage is offered by 6 battleships, 2 carriers, 15 cruisers, 128 destroyers and hundreds of other vessels. The Italian fleet does not intervene.
7/12/1943
The Italian submarine Bronzo is captured near Siracusa by the British minesweepers Boston, Cromarty, Poole and Seaham
7/15/1943
The Italian transport submarine Remo is sunk in the Gulf of Taranto by the British submarine United. Three days later, the twin ship Romolo is sunk by British airplanes near the port of Augusta. Both ships were on their first mission.
7/25/1943
Mussolini resigns. Badoglio, the head of the army, is nominated Prime Minister.
7/29/1943
Eisenhower broadcasts peace offer to Italy.
7/5/1943
British enter Catania in Sicily.
7/9/1943
The Italian destroyer Gioberti is sunk near La Spezia by the British submarine Simoon while escorting an Italian squadron in mission against Palermo.
8/17/1943
Americans take Messina. End of the Sicily campaign.
8/19/1943
Allied air raid smashes Foggia, German air base in Italy.
8/3/1943
Allies invade mainland Italy.
8/3/1943
In Cassibile, Sicily the armistice between Italy and the Allied is signed. The announcement will not be made until the 8th.
9/8/1943
Italy surrenders. German troops occupy Italy.
9/9/1943
The Italian armistice is announced. German troops take control of the Italian peninsula and disarm the Italian Army which was left without orders. The Italian fleet leaves port for Malta and during the transfer the battleship Roma is sunk by German airplanes. Five battleships, eight cruisers, a dozen destroyers and thirty submarines reach Malta. A large number of other vessels is lost or captured.
9/8/1943
British take Taranto naval base at tip of southern Italy. American 5th Army invades Italy at Salerno.
9/9/1943
Germans occupy Rome assuring “protection” of Vatican.
9/9/1943
Amongst the Italian units lost during the armistice can be found: the battleships Cavour, Roma and Impero. The carriers Aquila and Sparviero. The cruisers Gorizia, Bolzano, Taranto, Caio Mario, Cornelio Silla, Giulio Germanico, Ottaviano Augusto, FR-11, FR123, Etna and Vesuvio, 31 destroyers and 41 torpedo boats.
9/9/1943
The Germans occupy Rome.
9/10/1943
British 8th Army joins American 5th Army at Salerno.
9/1/1943
Allies take Naples.
10/13/1943
Monarchist Italy declares war on Germany. Beginning of the Italian civil war.
Following the strikingly successful attack against the Italian naval base in Taranto, the British Admiralty began planning some shifting of forces around the check board and even the passage of a convoy through the Mediterranean.
Several proposals were forwarded from London to both Alexandria and Gibraltar and , after some compromising, a final decision was reached; the operation which would materialize these changes would be named M.B.9.
R.N. Trento
Admiral Pond authorized the transferring of the Renown and the Berwick back to England through the Strait of Sicily as part of M.B.9, which called for a complex movement of merchantmen and warships similar to M.B.8.
On November 17th, after the attack on Taranto, the Italian fleet went out to sea with the two remaining battleships, the Vittorio Veneto and the Giulio Cesare. Despite having reached Southern Sardinia first, and then Cape Bon, the Italians were not able to intercept a British force tasked with the delivery of airplanes to the much-depleted Malta-based air forces. The British, despite a claim made to the contrary by Sir. Winston Churchill to the House of Common, had to reevaluate their assumed complete destruction of all Italian battleships during the Taranto attack.
The convoy from Gibraltar (Operation Collar) would be escorted by Force H which included the battle cruiser Renown, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the light cruisers Sheffield and Despatch and the destroyers Faulnor, Firedrake, Fury, Forester, Duncan, Wishart, Encounter, Kelvin and Jaguar. Missing from this battle group was the Royal Sovereign still under repair. Force H was under the command of Adm. Sommerville who was very well aware of the threat represented by the Italian Navy.
H.M.S. Ark Royal
This fear was very well founded; on the 16th of November, during operation “White”, Sommerville lost several aircrafts to both poor navigation and the presence of the Italian Fleet. After having received notification of the presence of the Italian Navy at sea, Sommerville quickly reversed direction and returned to Gibraltar. Although there was no contact, the presence of the Italian forces achieved its desired effect. Nevertheless, Somerville fear caused the subsequent operation to become more complex, requiring a combined operation of both the Gibraltar and the Alexandria-based fleets.
Strategies
Admiral Campioni had already decided that eventual contact with the enemy would have taken place in conditions not too favorable to the Italians. Sommerville had different issues on hand; his mission was to defend the convoy, but an attack against the incoming Italians would be the only possible way of achieving his goal. At 11:45 Sommerville was informed of the position of the Italian fleet, which at that point was about 50 miles away.
Actions of the Italian torpedo boats and submarines (Photo USMM)
The British squadron had the Manchester, Sheffield and Southampton in front with the Renown in tail. At around 12:00, time in which Force D was finally sighted, Sommerville’s fears lifted. From a defensive posture, the British suddenly found themselves ready for an offensive action. The 810 Squadron (Swordfish) was launched from the Ark Royal with the task of seeking and destroying the Italian battleships. The battle had begun.
British
At this point Sommerville prepared for battle; the slower Ramilles was left behind, coasting at a speed slightly over 20 knots in a course parallel to the rest of the formation. The Berwick and the Newcastle were ordered to move in with the 18 Cruiser Division under the command of Adm. Holland. Four of the cruisers were armed with 152mm guns, while the Berwick was the only one matching the Italian’s 203mm. During this phase, Sommerville received contradictory reconnaissance reports about the location of the Italian fleet. Sommerville decided to move on. His mission report clearly shows that he thought he had an advantage over the Italians; the sun was behind his ships, the Ark Royal’s plane could have reduced the speed of the enemy (See Matapan) and the Renown and Ramillies could match the two Italian battleships.
Adm. Pond (center) shown with the US admirals Stark and King
Holland’s cruisers were ready; the Sheffield led the Southampton, Newcastle, Manchester and Berwick. According to battle reports, the last two were slightly further away from the rest of the formation. At 12:07 the Italian fleet was sighted; first the smoke, then the masts and finally the now familiar silhouettes of the Trentos and Zaras. The Renown, steaming at about 27.5 knots 5 miles from Holland’s cruiser,s experienced technical problems with her main shaft and had to reduce speed. Not too far away, the Ramillies and 10 destroyers were already in formation ready to defend against a possible attack from Italian destroyers. The Ark Royal, with her small escort, the destroyers Jaguar and the Kelvin, was instead further south.
A beautiful view of the R.N. Trento (Photo U.S.M.M.)
The battle map shows that the various formations were arranged in groups. Two cruisers led the formation, to their south one battleship and 4 destroyers. A few miles back, three more cruisers, 1 battle cruiser and 5 destroyers. Further back, more to the south, the aircraft carrier with her escort and even further south the convoy. The convoy was still being escorted by the two cruisers, Despatch and Coventry, three destroyers (Hotspur, Duncan, Wishart) and the four corvettes.
Italian
After the change of course, which had taken place around 11:45, the Italian fleet was laid out as follows: 1st group (Pola, Fiume and Gorizia) with its escort (9th Squadriglia) 30 miles from Cape Teulada at 206 degrees.
Adm. Inigo Campioni
The other cruisers, Trieste, Trento and Bolzano and the 12th destroyer Squadron were 3 miles from the Pola group at 270 degrees. The battleship group, along with the 13th and 7 th destroyer Squadron, were 12 miles from the Pola at 75.
Balance of Power
The British battleships had five 381mm guns more than the Italians who, on the other hand, could rely on the Cesare’s 320mm. The Italian cruisers, of which most were on the “Washington”, or “heavy” ,” outgunned the British who could, on the other hand, rely on the aircraft of the Ark Royal. In all, the two fleets were balanced and the only possible tilting factor, the Regia Aeronautica, never materialized.
The Italians had a ballistic advantage; their guns could be used up to 30,000 meters (30 km or slightly less than 18 miles ) while the British ones were limited to 24-26,000 meters (24 km or 15 miles. The weight of the largest projectile was similar, 880 Kg for the Italians and 800 Kg for the British. It should be noted that, as reported by Iachino, the British cruisers did not jointly concentrate fire on a single target. According to Sommerville, this was caused by lack of joint training amongst the various units.
Adm. Iachino (Photo U.S.M.M.)
The British had the incredible advantage of the Ark Royal. Naturally, knowing the results of the engagement, one might wonder about the true value of this card, but at the time it was enormous. The Italians had not quite recovered from Taranto where a few old biplanes had crippled their fleet. The same planes, though from a different and less trained squadron, were once again in the sky. The Italians could have counteracted using the Regia Aeronautica, although once again the only result were many “holes” in the water.
The chessboard was ready and Campioni made a critical decision; he would not engage. Before leaving Naples he had received precise orders to this effect. He was only authorized to seek battle if conditions were particularly favorable. The two battleships assigned to his battle group were the only available for service; the risk was too high. At 12:07 Campioni ordered the cruisers to change route and converge towards the battleships. The order was too late for Adm. Iachino, who was already maneuvering to engage the enemy. During this phase, while the British commander at sea was free to organize his own forces, Campioni was exchanging radio messages with Rome asking for directions. The organizational difference between the two navies was striking.
This exchange of communications would become a fertile ground for later interpretations. Some historians, among them the much respected Adm. Fioravanzo, cited the communications as a proof of Supermarina’s intent to engage the enemy. As Francesco Mattesini writes, “while Rome thought that Campioni was trying to avoid combat, Iachino was already exchanging salvos.”
Francesco Mattesini’s The Battle of Cape Teulada
Ballistic Contact
At 12:22, Adm. Matteucci aboard the cruiser Fiume opened fire against the enemy fleet. Soon after, all the cruisers of the 2nd Squadron opened fire very rapidly using explosive projectiles. According to Italian sources, fire was opened at about 23,500 meters and then the distance between the two formations decreased to 22,000 and , later on, to 14,000.
The Pola and Fiume aimed principally at the heavy Cruiser Berwick. This ship, the Manchester, Sheffield and Newcastle aimed at the cruisers of the 3rd Division, while the Southampton focused on the ones of the 1st division. At 12.24 the Renown entered the frenzy by opening fire against the Trento at a distance of about 23,800 meters; six salvos completely engulfed the Italian cruiser, which, unscathed, made smoke and evaded. It should be noted that due to miscommunication, the Trento (and not the Trieste) was leading the formation, speed was 25 knots and part of the escort was delayed due to a temporary failure aboard the destroyer Lanciere.
The Italians make smoke to protect the Lanciere (Photo U.S.M.M.)
The Ramillies opened fire at 12:26, but soon after she was out of range. The Renown was the only heavy gun platform left and targeted mostly the Bolzano. At 12:30 Iachino received orders not to engage! He commanded speed increase to 30 knots while the two battleships would get closer. These five minutes were the most dangerous for the Italian forces; British salvos were getting dangerously close and the evading maneuver clearly exposed them. One more time, the difference between Italian and British gunnery was clearly demonstrated; Italian telemetry was far superior, but Italian salvos were dispersed. British salvos were beautifully grouped, but often “short”.
The Bolzano nearly avoiding a hit
During this exchange the Lanciere was hit several times. The ship was literally devastated by several perfect hits but was able to fire up the boiler and continue moving; later it would be towed back to base. The other destroyers laid a smoke screen, which forced the attacking ship (Manchester) to change target pointing her guns at the Zaras.
The Battle Ends
At this point a French convoy named “F” created great confusion amongst the British ships. When Sansonetti ships laid a smoke screen, two French passenger ships were entering the area. Once the smoke dissipated, the battle cruiser thought that the Italian battleships were entering the scene. Her big guns were quickly aimed at the two ships, but before opening fire Sommerville recognized the two ships which were desperately trying to move away from the combat zone. A single hit from one of the British guns would have been devastating; the ships were fully loaded with French civilians and troops
The situation was critical; Iachino was engaging the enemy, but soon the heavy guns of the Renown could have quickly tilted the balance. Fortunately, at around 13.00 the Italian battleship V. Veneto was finally within range. The V. Veneto fired 19 shots in seven salvos. As soon as the British cruisers (18 Division) realized that the 381 mm guns of the battleship Vittorio Veneto had entered the fray, they quickly withdrew under the protection of the Renown. At this point Sommerville and Campioni both broke contact, Campioni by virtue of the course of his ships, Sommerville by changing course.
In all, the battle had lasted 54 minutes; the cruiser of the 2nd Sq. had fired 666, the Pola 118, Gorizia 123, Fiume 218, Trieste 96, Bolzano 26, Trento 92. For most of its duration, the Italian units were in tactical and numerical minority.
At 12:22 the heavy cruiser Berwick was hit by one of 203mm shots from the Italian cruisers. Turret Y (upper read turret) was hit, seven men killed and the weapon disabled. Her commander, C.V. Guy L. Warren, continued on. At 12.35, the Berwick received another hit, this time in the officer quarters, but there were no victims. The two hits did not diminish the Berwick’s fighting power; as a matter of fact, she was engaged in a ferocious exchange with one of the Polas for the duration of the engagement.
H.M.S. Berwick
In expectation of British activity in the Sicilian Narrow, Supermarina had issued several orders to the local commander C.V. Mario Toscano, who was warned of possible British raids against Sicilian naval bases. The Italian plan did not contemplate the utilization of heavy ships and all offensive activities were organized around torpedo boats and MAS units. Specifically, the 10th Flotilla (Vega, Sirio, Calliope, Sagittario) would leave Trapani and MAS 516, 517, 518, 526, 527 and 528 Augusta, MAS 509, 520, 547 Mazara del Vallo, MAS 530 and 533 Trapani, while a single MAS, unit 531 would be dispatched from Pantelleria. Of all the units ordered to sea, two (MAS 516 and 530) had to return to base due to mechanical failure, while the others reached their assigned position.
Torpedo Boats
The Sagittario (C.C. Eduardo Greppi) was in his assigned patrol area when, at around 23:34 of the 27th, it sighted some vessels believed to be part of the British convoy. A few minutes later, the Sirio (C.C. Giovanni Dessy) confirmed the same sighting. During this phase, the Italian commanders erroneously believed to have been discovered by the enemy and fled. Although the Italian commanders reported a British torpedo attack, British records report that the presence of the small Italian units was never detected.
The torpedo boat Sirio (Photo Whitley)
Similar circumstances followed the sighting by the Vega at 00.28 of the 28th. Once again, the commanding officer (C.C. Giuseppe Fontana) left without attacking. The Calliope, the last unit of the flotilla, received the alert from the Vega and sought contact with the enemy, but her commander, C.C. Ludovico Puleo, decided to desist after the unsuccessful launch of two torpedoes. The explosion of one of these weapons was the only evidence to the British of Italian presence. It is not quite known what caused the explosion since the Italian weapons should not have been equipped with end-of-run fuses.
The behavior of the four Italian torpedo boat commanders was the object of great dissatisfaction within the Naval High command. Correctly, it was assumed that a great opportunity had been given away. There could be several explanations for this failure and they could all be quite plausible; we tend to agree with the local naval commander (Sicilian sector) who wrote, ”A more prompt decision making could have determined a more effective use of the torpedo boats”; An elegant way of saying that the action was not well thought out. It should be noted that throughout the war the effectiveness of the Italian torpedo boats was poor and that an attack would not have guaranteed success. Still, perfectly functioning torpedoes were returned unexpended to base.
The failure of the Calliope was similar to other nocturnal actions conducted by Italian forces. Most probably, these failures were caused by erroneous estimation of the velocity of the target, while distance was usually quite accurate.
Submarines
Two Italian submarines, the Dessiè and Tembien, were in the area of operations between Pantelleria and Malta and conducted independent attacks. T.V. Guido Gozzi of the Tembien fired four torpedoes around 23.34 of the 27th, while T.V. Adriano Prini of the Dessiè launched three at 03.05 of the 28th. None of the weapons found its target and the British ships were never alerted of the danger.
MAS
MAS 526 identified enemy vessels near the southern tip of Malta, but after a quick approach the vessels could no longer be located. The other units returned to base empty-handed. The night was over and so was the threat of Italian insidious weapons. A large number of British forces had been able to force the Sicilian Narrow without a single shot being fired, or a single enemy vessel detected.
Regia Aeronautica
On the 27th of November the Regia Aeronautica conducted a few reconnaissance missions, promptly sighting the British ships, but foul weather conditions did not allow any offensive action. The following day, Italian aerial activity focused mainly on or around Malta where some ships were already at anchor and others were fast approaching.
The various raids, dogfights, bombings, and often alleged downings took place throughout the day. Ultimately, after a day of activity, the Regia Aeronautica did not have much to show for and British forces had been able to safely reach port. The gallantry of both attackers and defenders was noted, and usually inflated Italian claims did not diminish the fact that this had been a superlative British victory.
Conclusions
The New Zealand Star reached Alexandria on the 30th under escort from Force A, while convoy M.W.4 from Malta had arrived a day earlier. Francesco Mattesini, in the official book published by the U.S.M.M. (notes…) titled “La Battaglia di Capo Teulada” (The battle of Cape Teulada) lets Admiral Cunningham conclude the narration of the events by quoting from “A Saylor’s Odyssey”: “A feature of this cruise to the Central Mediterranean, and a most unusual one, was that not a single gun was fired by the Warspite or any of the ships in company with her throughout the whole of seven days at sea”.
Andrew Browne Cunningham A Sailor’s Odyssey 1951
As the Italian battle fleet was now crippled it was decided to send an important convoy from the United Kingdom right through the Mediterranean with supplies for Malta and Alexandria. As usual, it would be brought to the entrance to the Sicilian Narrows covered by force “H” from Gibraltar, and met by the Mediterranean Fleet off Malta and taken on to its destination.
Of course the Fleet Air Arm got no hits, although they claimed to have done so, and it is obvious that all enemy ships had the legs of Force “H”.
Marc’Antonio Bragadin The Italian Navy in World War II 1957
Again, the encounter had brought out clearly what the lack of effective and immediate air intervention meant in a naval battle. Although the Italian Fleet was very near the Sardinian airfileds, the British torpedo planes had been able to attack without any Italian fighter opposition.
Angelo Iachino Tramonto di una grande marina 1959
This time around, the British risked once again to be caught at a disadvantage by our naval forces. Due to our poor long-range reconnaissance and the failure of the interdiction forces in the Sicilian Narrows, once again we could score a success, which would have balanced the misfortune of November 11th (Taranto).
S.W. Roskill White Ensign – The British Navy at War, 1939-1945 1960
Though the operation had been completely successful, Somerville was criticized in London for not continuing the pursuit of the Italian fleet, and the Admiralty had actually set up a Board of Inquiry at Gibraltar before he returned to that base.
Donald Macyntyre The Battle for the Mediterranean 1964
Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly air power which had decided the course of events, the presence of the Ark Royal weighing most heavily on Campioni’s mind as he made his decision to retire. The capital ships on the other side again failed to come within range of each other’s guns. Meanwhile, the convoy for Malta had been left undisturbed to reach harbor safely with their precious cargo.
Luis de la Sierra La guerra naval en el Mediterràneo (1940-1943) 1976
As it usually happens under such circumstances, after the battle of Cape Teulada both navies over evaluated their success. The official British war bulletin announced the torpedoing of a “Littorio” class battleship and the damaging of three cruisers and two destroyers. The Italian media denied, and since the British insisted, Supermarina decided to put an end to the controversy inviting seventeen foreign journalists to the naval bases of Naples and Messina. This was a very unusual maneuver, but a successful one because the BBC eventually gave up.
Arrigo Petacco Le battaglie navali del mediterraneo nella seconda guerra mondiale 1976
The Battle of Cape Teulada ended with two shots aboard the Lanciere and two more aboard the Berwick. Once back to their bases, both the British and Italian admirals faced very bitter times.
Gianni Rocca Fucilate gli ammiragli 1987
Even Campioni felt better; he had faced the British fleet a few days after Taranto and now he was seeing it sailing away. The Italian forces were undamaged, and this was what mattered the most.
Bernard Ireland The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 1993
Campioni knew nothing of the convoy, nor of the presence of Ark Royal and force “D”. Assuming himself faced only with force “H”, at less than full strength, he felt justified in seeking a fight, in accordance with the cautious post-Taranto guidelines that had been given to him.
James J. Sadkovich The Italian Navy in World War II 1994
In Britain Sommerville was almost censured for cowardice, and in Italy a reshuffling of the naval command assuaged Italian disappointment over Campioni’s decision not to engage.
Cunningham’s claim that Sommerville had force the Italian into “full flight” was disingenuous, and Di Sambuy was more accurate to see the action as a tactical victory for the RMI, which had held its own against the British fleet.
Nathan Miller War at Sea 1995
Upon sighting the battleships, the Italians realized they had lost the opportunity to exploit their earlier superiority, and broke off the action.
Robert Jackson The Royal Navy in World War II 1997
The enemy force was now in full retreat under cover of a dense smokescreen, and Admiral Somerville, realizing that the engagement had brought him within easy striking distance of enemy bomber bases, decided to break off the chase and return to the vital task of guarding the convoy.
Jack Green and Alessandro Massignani The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 1998
This battle showed that the Italian strategy now required that the Regia Aeronautica keep fighters over the fleet to protect it both from British torpedo planes and reconnaissance aircraft, and this need to provide air cover would give rise to both the proposed conversion of the Acquila to a carrier equipped only with fighters, and mounting catapult-launched fighters on warships.
Italian Naval Forces
1st Squadra Navale Commander at Sea Admiral Inigo Campioni, aboard the Vittorio Veneto
These links connect to in-depth articles related to the major naval battles. Please note that there is a separate section for naval engagements. These articles were published by various authors.
