Boats

The Asteria was a coastal submarine of the Platino class, “600” series, type Bernardis, with a displacement of 712 tons on the surface and 865 tons submerged. During the war, it completed 9 offensive or exploratory patrols, mainly in the central Mediterranean, and eight transfer journeys, covering 10,842 miles on the surface and 1,370 miles submerged, and spending 97 days at sea.

The Asteria soon after delivery to the Regia Marina photographed on November 27th, 1941.
(Photo Collezione Turrini)

Brief history

October 16th, 1940

The boat was set up at the Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico in Monfalcone. Build number 1262.

June 25th, 1941

The boat was launched at the Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico (C.R.D.A.) in Monfalcone.

November 8th, 1941

The boat entered active service immediately after a period of intense training.

February 9, 1942

Antonio Pardo, 21, from Portici, died on the Asteria in the central Mediterranean.

May 13th, 1942

The boat began the first war patrol, in the waters off Cyrenaica.

May 15th, 1942

The Asteria, while emerging in the evening to begin the night patrol on the surface, spotted a destroyer that was approaching at high speed in an attempt to ram it. The submarine quickly dove and it was then subjected, for a long time, to a hunt with depth charges, but damage was not serious. The boat continued its mission, concluding it on May 24th.

July 7th, 1942

Asteria (Lieutenant Pasquale Beltrame) took position between Cyprus and Syria for a week, and there were no sightings.

July 14th, 1942

At 02:00 AM of July 14th, the lookouts spotted a unit at a short distance that was identified as a destroyer and attacked it with the launch of a torpedo, which was avoided with a maneuver. The Asteria launched another one and then heard a loud explosion, however no enemy units are damaged.

On the evening of July 14th, at 11:47 PM, the boat was sighted in position 33°57′ N and 34°34′ E (about fifty miles west of Beirut), while sailing on the surface with a 100° course, by the British submarine H.M.S. Turbulent (from half a mile away). The Asteria, having already sighted H.M.S. Turbulent from 1000 meters away and believing it to be an Italian submarine with a course of 290° (the position given, 33°52′ N and 34°46′ E, is slightly different from that indicated by the British unit), turned to starboard and moved away at maximum speed to lose contact (probably in order to avoid mishaps). H.M.S. Turbulent, which correctly identified the unknown submarine as an Italian unit, mistakenly believed that it had dived, therefore, a minute later (at 11.48 OM) it dove in turn. This is how the meeting ended.

August 12th, 1942

The boat was deployed west of Malta to counter the British operation “Pedestal” (Battle of Mid-August). No major events.

November 13th, 1942

The Asteria (Lieutenant Dante Morrone) sighted two smaller units in the waters of Capo Carbon and at 02.05 AM launched two torpedoes against one of them. Due to the high phosphorescence of the water, the ship sighted the torpedoes in time and avoided them with a maneuver. Then the Asteria was subjected to a hard chase with several depth charges, from which, however, it managed to escape with only minor damage.

At 12.45 PM of the same day, the Asteria, on its way back to to base (according to another version to return to the patrol area), was attacked by a Lockheed Hudson of the USAAF (?), which attacked with bombs dropped at low altitude, but the boat avoided the bombs with a maneuver – only one exploded, on deck, without incredibly causing serious damage – and returned fire with the machine guns,  damaging the plane which flew away with an engine on fire.

December 4th, 1942

During a mission off Algeria, in the evening of December 4th, the Asteria, while coming to the surface at six miles by 45° from Cape Fer, hit the keel of a British corvette with the conning tower. The boat immediately dove, but suffered a long bombardment with depth charges, suffering serious damage (in addition to those already sustained in the collision), which forced it to return to Cagliari.

The damage to the conning tower of the Asteria
(Photo STORIA militare)

December 16th, 1942

Second Lieutenant Pietro Eugeni, 21, from Rome, died on the Asteria in the central Mediterranean.

The Last Mission and the Sinking

On February 11^th, 1943, after the completion of the repair works, the Asteria, under the command of Lieutenant Dante Morrone, left Naples for the ninth war patrol, an ambush to counter Allied traffic to and from the port of Bougie (Algeria). On February 13th, the submarine arrived in the assigned patrol area, off Cape Carbon. No ships were sighted for four days, but at 3 AM on February 17th, the boat spotted two enemy units not far away, searching for submarines.

Lieutenant Dante Morrone, born in Ravenna January 28th, 1914, the last commander of the Asteria.
Note the “wings” on his uniform as he was a “osservatore aereo”.
(Photo Giovanni Pinna)

They were the British destroyer escort H.M.S. Wheatland (sometimes mistakenly referred to as “Westland”; under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ronald L. Brooke, who would receive the Distinguished Service Order for the action) and H.M.S. Easton of the Hunt class (under the command of Lieutenant C. Wickham Malins, who would receive a second Distinguished Service Cross for the action), which together with two other destroyers of the same class,  H.M.S. Lamerton (which had already sunk the submarine Ferraris in the Atlantic) and H.M.S. Bicester, were escorting an Allied convoy off the Algerian coast.

The Asteria, remaining on the surface, immediately maneuvered to approach the launch distance and, having reached 700 meters, prepared to attack with the torpedoes, but H.M.S. Wheatland and H.M.S. Easton (H.M.S. Bicester and H.M.S. Lamerton took part in the search for the submarine, in defense of the convoy, but not in the hunt) located the submarine with radar and at first tried to ram it,  then, after the boat had made the rapid dive to avoid collision, they bombarded it with depth charges. According to the book “Ultra Versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives”, however, it was H.M.S. Wheatland and H.M.S. Easton that first sighted the Asteria, which was sailing west at eight knots, when their ASDICs reported contact less than 1200 meters away. The Asteria, for its part, sighted the two destroyers, in conditions of poor visibility, and Commander Morrone ordered the dive.

The Asteria on the surface just before being scuttled by its crew
(Photo ‘The National Archives”, U.K.)

The Asteria suffered seven hours of bombardment, suffering severe damage to various equipment. First, immediately after spotting the submarine, H.M.S. Wheatland dropped five depth charges adjusted to a depth of 15 meters, which caused some damage, then the hunt continued for about an hour, after which contact was lost for two hours. Then H.M.S. Easton carried out another attack, very effective, which totally put the Asteria’s engines out of control: the submarine, having run out of compressed air – and therefore no longer being able to change its depth adequately, and having discharged the batteries of the electric motors, had to surface, so that at least the crew could get to safety.

As soon as it reached the surface, the Asteria was immediately hit by the fire of H.M.S. Wheatland and H.M.S. Easton’s guns, which caused further damage and killed four men. When they realized that the submarine was sinking, the two destroyers ceased fire. The rest of the crew surrendered, started the scuttling maneuvers (according to another version the procedures for scuttling had already begun during the surfacing maneuver) and abandoned the unit, which at 9.40 AM of  February 17^th sank astern at 37°14′ N and 04°27′ E (for another source 37°14′ N and 04°50′ E),  about 25 miles northwest of Bougie. 

The final moments of the Asteria
(Photo ‘The National Archives”, U.K.)

The version proposed when Commander Brooke of H.M.S. Wheatland’s died, however, differs in several respects. According to this version, H.M.S. Wheatland was on patrol off Bougie with H.M.S. Bicester, H.M.S. Easton, and H.M.S. Lamerton, when, shortly before midnight on February 16^th, H.M.S. Wheatland spotted a dark shape ahead of her and went on the attack; the contact disappeared and H.M.S. Wheatland, in spite of problems with the Asdic, continued the chase throughout the next day until shortly before midnight, when the Asteria, which had been seriously damaged during the first attack on H.M.S. Wheatland and had not been able to get away, had to surface, having run out of air. It then surrendered and was scuttled. However, this version has several errors, for example in the timing, because the photos taken of the sinking Asteria clearly show that the boat sank when the sun was still brightening the day, so certainly not around midnight.

H.M.S. Wheatland

Commander Morrone, after ordering the crew to abandon ship, remained on board until the end, saving himself last (recalling the episode decades later, he said that he risked “being hit by the machine guns of enemy planes”). He was awarded a silver medal for Military Valor, the second for him (the first had been awarded in 1940 for his activity as an observer on reconnaissance aircraft). The 46 survivors (for another version 47 or 48) were rescued by H.M.S. Wheatland and H.M.S. Easton, and ended up in captivity in North Africa, Britain, and the United States. Commander Morrone returned to Italy in 1946.

Details on the casualties of the sinking of the Asteria:

• Ugo Baldini, sub-chief engineman, 22 years old, from Ancona
• Biagio Di Salvo, sailor electrician, 21 years old, from Caronia
• Giovanni Mazzon, second chief torpedo pilot, 20 years old, from Roncade
• Umberto Terigi, sub-chief gunner, 20 years old, from Camaiore

One of the survivors, sailor helmsman Nicola Daugenti, 21, from Noicattaro, died while a POW in the United States on August 27th, 1943.

Historic Fort Douglas Cemetery (Utah, USA), the grave of Nicola Daugenti

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	17		10,842	1,370	93	131.31	5.47

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
7/4/1942	2:10	T.V. Pasquale Beltrame	Mediterranean	33°48’N, 34°56’E		Torpedo	Failed	HMSAS Protea (?)	Armed Whaler	955	South Africa
11/13/1942	01:00	T.V. Dante Morrone	Mediterranean	36°46’N, 05°08’E		Torpedo	Failed	HMS Pentstemon	Corvette	940	Great Britain

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank	Date
Baldini	Ugo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	2/17/1943
Daugenti	Nicola	Naval Rating	Comune	8/27/1943
Di Salvo	Biagio	Naval Rating	Comune	2/17/1943
Eugeni	Pietro	Sublieutenant	Sottotenente di Vascello	12/16/1942
Mazzon	Giovanni	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe	2/17/1943
Mazzon	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo	2/17/1943
Pardo	Antonio	Naval Rating	Comune	2/9/1942

The Argento was a Class Platino (also known as “Metalli”, or metals), “600” series, Type Bernardis coastal submarine (displacement of 712 tons on the surface and 865 tons submerged). Laid down at the Tosi shipyard of Taranto on April 30^th, 1941, it did not enter service until May 16^th, 1942. Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Vocaturo assumed command until July of the same year proving for initial crew training.

The submarine Argento
(Photo U.S.M.M.)

1942     

In September, 1942, the boat was sent out on its first war patrol, along with the Nichelio, under the command of Lieutenant  Giovanni Tarabini Castellani. The boat reached the assigned patrol area south of the Balearic Island where it remained until October 11th. Upon returning, it sighted two units estimated to be corvettes which could not be attacked since the Argento itself had been probably been spotted.

Another patrol followed in November when the Argento was deployed as part of a barrage of 16 submarines to contrast the Allies’ landing in North Africa near the Algerian coastline. The boat remained in the originally assigned area (B) until the 11^th. On the 14^th, it penetrated the Philippeville’s outer harbor, however it was not able to engage any target.   On the 18^th, the boat was ordered back to base.

1943

Engine repaired, the boat under the command of Lieutenant Renato Frascolla was again on patrol reaching the assigned area on January 22^nd along with the Dandolo to contrast Operation Torch. The assigned area, between Cape Carbon and Cape Bougaroni, was already being patrolled by the Avorio and Malachite. The night of the 21^st, the Argento was attacked by an enemy aircraft that attempted to strife the boat many a times, but it was repelled by the fire of the boat’s Breda antiaircraft guns. Soon after, at 04:00 AM of the 22^nd, in position 37°58’N, 06°15’E, another aerial attack followed and it included the dropping of bombs. This time, the enemy aircraft, repeatedly hit by the Bredas, was seen catching fire and crashing. On the 24^th, the boat was ordered back to base.

In February, the Argento was again sent out on patrol to fill in the gap left by the sinking of the Asteria which, on the 17^th, had fallen victim of H.M.S. Easton. On the 18^th, a convoy was sighted but the Argento could not attack.

In April, the boat was deployed as part of a barrage extending 80 miles along the 08°E meridian, between 38°40’N and 40°00’N. The barrage included the Brin, Platino, and Giada. However, that area did not see any enemy activity.

The Argento in port

In June, the boat was off the Algerian coastline arriving on the 20^th positioning itself near the Island of La Galite. The night of the 30^th, the boat entered the outer harbor of Philippeville without conducting any mentionable action.

In July, starting on the 11^th, the Argento was assigned to a barrage composed of 8 boats stretching from Cape de Fer and the Island of S. Antioco (Sardinia) along the 07°30E meridian.  However, a breakdown forced the vessel back to base. Issue solved, the boat was again on patrol to contrast traffic from Sirte and Malta to Sicily. On the 23^rd, while crossing the Strait of Messina, it was targeted by an enemy submarine with the launched of three torpedoes which were skillfully avoided.

With Operation Husky – the landing in Sicily – fully underway the Argento was moved from south of Catania to the southern part of Sicily possibly reaching all the way to the Gulf of Sirte. Without having been able to sight any enemy traffic, the commanding office, Lieutenant Leo Masina, began the return voyage to base. On August 2^nd, at around 10:55 PM, while navigating on the surface about 5 miles off the Island of Pantelleria, a destroyer and three other units were sighted at a very short distance.

USS Buck (DD420)

Seeking shelter in the depths of the sea, the Argento was immediately targeted by an intense drop of depth charges some of which caused serious damage. The resistant hull was compromised, and water started entering the boat.  Forced to the surface, the Argento was immediately targeted by intense gunfire and thus scuttling procedures were hastened. The American destroyer USS Buck (DD-420) rescued most of the crewmembers; a few had died during the attack.  The Argento dove one final time at around 00:30 Am of August 3^rd reaching its resting place.

Crewmembers of the Argento aboard USS Buck performing the burial at sea of one of their fallen comrades
(US National Archives)

USS Buck glory would last only a few weeks, until October 9^th, 1943, when it fell victim of U-616 off Salerno.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
19		10,745	2,299	105	124.23	5.18

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank
Cacopardo	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Contaratto	Oscar	Naval Rating	Comune
Lomuscio	Ruggiero	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Orsi	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune
Sanzari	Michele	Naval Rating	Comune
Torrone	Filippo	Naval Rating	Comune

The Aradam was a Class Adua, “600” series, Type Bernardis, coastal submarine (displacement of 698 tons on the surface and 866 tons submerged). Along with the twins Adua, Alagi and Axum, it differed from the other units of the class for the engines: CRDA, both diesel and electric (while on the other boats the electric engines were from Marelli, and the diesel, some from FIAT and some from Tosi).

Aradam early configuration with a fully enclosed conning tower
(Colletion Bonadies)

During the war, it completed a total of 50 patrols (30 offensive/exploratory and 20 transfer), covering 26,144 miles on the surface and 3,223 submerged, and spending 280 days at sea.

Brief and Partial Chronology

March 14th, 1936

Laid down at the C.R.D.A. (Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico) in Monfalcone (construction number 1179).

October 18th, 1936

Launch at the C.R.D.A.

January 13th, 1937

The boat entered active service. In the first months, it was at the disposal of the Submarine Squadron Command (Maricosom).

Aradam and the twin boat Alagi in Monfalcone
(From “I sommergibili classe 600 serie Adua” dbyAlessandro Turrini, published on “Rivista Italiana di Difesa” n. 3, March 1986)

March 6th, 1937

The boat was assigned to the XXIII Submarine Squadron, based in Naples. The commander, at the time, was Lieutenant Gino Spagone.

1937-1940

The Aradam completed training cruises between Tobruk, Benghazi and the Dodecanese.

May 5th, 1938

Under the command of Lieutenant Massimo Alesi, the Aradam took part in the naval magazine “H” organized in the Gulf of Naples for Adolf Hitler’s visit to Italy. The Submarine Squadrons were the protagonist of one of the most spectacular moments of the parade, in which the 85 boats carried out a series of synchronized maneuvers. First, at 1.15 PM, arranged in two columns, they passed opposite course two naval squadrons proceeding on parallel routes. Then, at 1:25 PM, all the submarines made a simultaneous dive, proceeded for a short distance submerged, and then surfaced simultaneously and fired a salvo of eleven shots with their respective guns.

1939

The commander of the Aradam was transferred to Lieutenant Mario Signorini, from Rome.

December 20th, 1939

Lieutenant Commander Giuseppe Bianchini, 32, from Palermo, replaced Lieutenant Signorini.

June 10th, 1940

Italy entered the World War II. The Aradam was part of the LXXI Submarine Squadron of the VII Grupsom of Cagliari, along with the sister boats Adua, Alagi and Axum.

It was sent on patrol south of Sardinia and north of the island of La Galite (according to another source, the boat was already lurking at the time of the declaration of war).

June 14th, 1940

The Aradam returned to Cagliari without having encountered any enemy ships.

June 21st, 1940

The boat was sent on patrol in the Gulf of Lion to attack French traffic heading to North Africa. The Aradam noticed numerous aircraft on anti-submarine patrol boats, which it interpreted as a sign of the passage of a convoy.

June 23rd, 1940

At 3.12 AM, in position 42°40′ N and 04°25′ E the crew sighted an unidentified light unit, probably believed to be French, proceeding at high speed. It launched a torpedo at the unit, which did not hit due to the unfavorable launch conditions.

July 1940

The boat was sent off Gibraltar and it did not observe any enemy units.

August 1940

Another mission in the waters of Gibraltar, again without encountering enemy units.

October 1940

The Aradam was sent off the island of La Galite (on a 315° bearing from the island), and was subsequently ordered to move about 60 miles north of Cap de Fer (Algeria) and then moved again 45 miles west of La Galite.

October 27th, 1940

At dawn the crew sighted a destroyer and avoid any engagement by diving.

November 9th, 1940

In the late afternoon, the unit leaved Cagliari heading into the waters north-northeast of the island of La Galite to form a large barrage (along with the Alagi, Axum, Medusa and Diaspro) southwest of Sardinia to contrast operation “coat”.

The Aradam, and the other four boats, were positioned at 315° bearing from La Galite, 30 miles apart, with the task of carrying out night search on a parallel course without going more than 120 miles west of the line of formation.  Supermarina (Admiral Domenico Cavagnari) ordered Maricosom (Admiral Mario Falangola) to form this barrage in the western Mediterranean after having already formed another one southeast of Malta with the submarines Topazio, Pier Capponi and Fratelli Bandiera.

The purpose of the barrage, of which the Aradam is part, is to intercept Force H, which, according to reports from French and Spanish aerial reconnaissance was sailing towards the Strait of Sicily. According to another source, Force H was located on the morning of November 9th by the Regia Aeronautica following the air attack against Cagliari launched by the Swordfish of the Ark Royal.

Cavagnari’s order (no. 1772, very urgent and delivered by hand), in particular, states: «Arrange that five submarines be ready to leave Cagliari at sunset today executing, during the night, a transfer to a barrage line oriented from La Galite to the northwest (stop) Submarines at a distance of 30 miles from each other on the aforesaid line will remain in deep hydrophone ambush during the day and will perform during night hours ambush on the surface moving by parallel within the limits of the initial line and parallel line moved 120 miles to the west (stop) Purpose is to attack enemy naval forces moving in the waters between Sardinia and the Balearic Islands (STOP) During the night 2 torpedo tubes are to be kept ready at each end (stop) Units will return to order (STOP) secure (STOP) Cavagnari».

Consequently, in the early hours of November 9th, Maricosom ordered the VII Grupsom based in Cagliari, with message number 43846, to send five submarines (among those chosen there was the Aradam) which were to position themselves parallel to the northwest of La Galite, moving at night, sailing on the surface, and 120 miles to the west. The Aradam did not spot any enemy ships.

November 14th or 15^th,1940

After having just returned to Cagliari, in the evening, the Aradam is sent out again, along with the Alagi and a third submarine, the Diaspro, to counter operation “white”. The Aradam did not spot enemy ships.

November 18th, 1940

The unit returned to base.

November 25th, 1940

The boat was sent south of Sardinia along with the submarines Axum, Diaspro, and Alagi, following the sighting by an Italian civilian aircraft of the British Force D. The Aradam did not spot any units.

January 1941

The Aradam was sent on patrol north of Bizerte and 40 miles east of La Galite.

January 9th, 1941

At 5:20 PM, the crew detected propeller noises on the hydrophone, and, twenty minutes later, it was subjected to an anti-submarine hunt by three enemy units, a hunt that lasted until 7:20 PM.

April 1941

During the first half of the month, the Aradam was sent on patrol off the Cyrenaic-Egyptian coast.

July 29th, 1941

Lieutenant Commander Bianchini relinquished the command of the Aradam and was replaced by Lieutenant Oscar Gran, 32, from Trieste.

Late July-early August 1941

The Aradam was sent, along with three other submarines (Alagi, Diaspro, and Serpente), lurking in ambush southwest of Sardinia in contrast to a British operation. The Aradam’s patrol is completed without any enemy units being sighted.

September 3rd, 1941

The Aradam was sent on patrol off the coast of La Galite.

September 25-29, 1941

The Aradam was sent on patrol in the Tunisian’s waters. The boat was ordered to move east of the Balearic Islands (in the Sardinian Sea, between Sardinia and Menorca) and south of Menorca (precisely, in the Menorca Channel and north of Cape Bougaroni) to create a barrage along with three other submarines, Axum, Diaspro and Serpente.

October 1941

The Aradam was sent on patrol about 60 miles east of La Galite.

November 1941

The Aradam was sent to ambush 45 miles northeast of Tunis.

December 1941

The Aradam was sent for another ambush in the waters of the Galite.

December 19th, 1941

The Aradam was sent on patrol to the north of Algeria, along with the Alagi, and further east than Tricheco and Axum (which have been deployed off Cape Bougaroni), in anticipation of a possible entry of Force H into the Mediterranean.

January 3rd, 1942

The boat was sent to lie in wait south (or east) of Malta, in the area between the meridians 14°40′ E and 15°20′ E and the parallels 34°00′ N and 34°20′ N, with the task of sighting and attacking any British naval forces that might take to the sea.

February 10th, 1942

The Aradam was sent as part of a barrage in Algerian waters. There, it detected on the hydrophone and then sighted a naval formation heading east, reporting it to the General Commands (according to another source, however, it only detected it on the hydrophone, without being able to spot it).

March 1942

The Aradam was ordered on a patrol in the waters of Cape Bougaroni.

The Aradam in Cagliari. Note the mimetic painting scheme.
(From the magazine Storia Miltare)

March 27-29, 1942

The Aradam was sent to lie in wait in the Strait of Sicily along with the submarines Narvalo, Turchese and Santorre Santarosa, to intercept Force H (under the command of Admiral Neville Syfret), which had left Gibraltar and headed eastwards, should it make it that far.

April 1th, 1942

At 00.45 AM, in position 38°29′ N and 07°40′ E (southwest of Sardinia), the Aradam was sighted on a 240° bearing, while proceeding on the surface with a 340° course, by the Dutch submarine O 23 (Lieutenant Commander Albertus Marinus Valkenburg). The Dutch vessel maneuvered to get closer, remaining on the surface, but in doing so it was spotted by the Aradam, which immediately dove at 00.52 AM not being sure if it had sighted a friendly or enemy unit. At 00:54 the O 23 also dove and managed to detect the noise of the Aradam engines on the hydrophones, but without being able to establish the exact distance and bearing; after an hour of fruitless submarine hunting, at 1:56 AM, O 23 emerged and resumed navigation towards Alexandria.

April 4th, 1942

At 1.03 AM, having finished embarking provisions the previous evening, the Aradam (Lieutenant Oscar Gran) left Cagliari along with another submarine, the Turchese, for an ambush in Tunisian waters, with the dual purpose of protecting the Italian convoys bound for Libya from incursions of the British naval forces based in Malta, and of attacking any isolated British traffic that might cross these waters.

The ambush area of the Aradam was east of Cape Kelibia, the one of Turchese north of Cape Bon. Maricosom Operation Order (209/SRP of 3 April, 7.45 PM) established: “Confidential personnel (STOP) Executive ambushes Kappa one submarine Turchese and Kappa two submarine Aradam (STOP) Turchese submarine outward route number one (STOP) return route number four with return to Trapani new location (STOP) Aradam outbound route number one (STOP) return route number five with return to Trapani new location (STOP) Leave ambush to order (STOP)  Partial modification of the general order of operation Kappa during ambush during daylight hours, remain perched on the bottom without coming periscope depth for listening to SITES (STOP) instead of sunset day five, arrive on ambush points as soon as possible after having performed hidden navigation daylight hours day four“.

April 5th, 1942

The Aradam reached the assigned area, east of Kelibia (east coast of Tunisia), not far from the lighthouse of the same name and south of Cape Bon, and began the patrol.

April 6th, 1942

At 3.12 AM the second in command of the Aradam, Second Lieutenant Edoardo Burattini, at that time on duty on the bridge, sighted a dark silhouette with an estimated course to the south, and summoned Commander Gran to the bridge; the silhouette soon turns out to be that of a large destroyer sailing westwards with a route that passed the Cape Bon peninsula at a beta angle of 25° to starboard and about 2,400-2,500 meters away.

Commander Gran gave orders to take a new route to intercept the enemy unit. The rapid drop in distance indicates that the enemy ship was proceeding at low rpm, which is why he decides to idle the engines. The destroyer passes between the Aradam and the Tunisian coastline at a sufficient distance to allow it to be detected with the Panerai (a sort of range finder).  At 3:17 AM, having reached position 37°47′ (or 36°47′) N and 11°05′ E and a distance of less than 500 meters, thus suitable for launch and subsequent rapid disengagement, Commander Gran ordered two torpedoes to be launched from tubes 3 and 4, setting for a depth of three meters and a course angle of 15° to starboard.

However, while the torpedo of tube number 3 came out regularly, the one in tube 4 did not start due to the malfunction of the electric launch system. Moreover, the noise caused by the Aicardi mechanism for the recovery of the compressed air bubble generated by the launch, covered the manual launch order given from the bridge to the chief torpedo operator, who already worried by the rapid dive signal, had consequently closed of the outer caps of the launch tubes.

No explosions were heard. While the crew worked to restore trim which had been altered by the change in weight due to the launch (a maneuver complicated by the particularly shallow waters in which the Aradam found itself). Commander Gran decided to place the submarine on the seabed, while the hydrophones were carefully monitored for any sources of noise, which lead to fear that there could have been a second British unit in the area, one not noticed previously.

After about an hour, since the hydrophones no longer detect sound sources, Commander Gran decides to return to periscope depth; this was done at 4.30 AM.  Sailing in silent mode, and at periscope level, a destroyer was sighted stationary on a bearing of about ten degrees to the left, with a beta close to zero. Fearing that this unit would detect them and hunt them, the crew of the Aradam returned to the seabed for another hour.

At 5:52 AM, as the hydrophones still did not detect any noise, the boat returned to the surface to transmit the discovery signal. After about ten minutes – it was by then dawn – the destroyer was sighted again, as it appeared motionless and indeed immobilized.  Although confused by the unit’s lack of reaction, Gran decides to return once again to lie on the seabed, this time until 7.30 AM, when he decides to return to periscope depth to examine the situation more carefully.

Proceeding at minimum revs, so as to be able to steer without producing too conspicuous a wake with the periscope, the Aradam once again sighted the stern of the destroyer, which stood out against the coast of Kelibia, and saw clouds of black smoke rising from its bow. It was assumed that the destroyer had tried to run the coast in an attempt to save itself. The hydrophone, however, picks up noises “of considerable importance”, causing it to return once again to the bottom.

The Aradam remained in the area throughout the the 6th, so to make sure that the destroyer was sunk.

April 7th, 1942

At dawn the Aradam sighted a tugboat near the stranded destroyer and decided to return once more to the seabed to await new developments. In the evening, a radio message was received from Rome confirming the presence of a destroyer that had run aground and been set on fire and the accuracy of Gran’s previous estimations.

A few days later, the Maritime Military Command of Pantelleria sent a squadron of MAS to the site to ascertain the condition of the destroyer, which continues to emit abundant smoke; the ship, which was broken in two and half-sunk in shallow water, would be identified by the call sign painted on the bulwark, H 43, as the British destroyer H.M.S. Havock.

Based on this, in the report on the incident Maricosom assessed that the Havock was torpedoed by the Aradam. This will be the version delivered to Italian historiography. For example, Giorgio Giorgerini wrote in his book “Men on the Bottom”: “The Aradam had hit the enemy destroyer from a distance of 500 meters, immobilizing it. The Havock, coming from Malta and bound for Gibraltar, tried to save itself by trying to put back into operation at least part of its engine to try to run aground on the coast, but was prevented by the violent fire that broke out on board. Shortly thereafter, the British ship blew up and sank, broken into two pieces.”

According to some sources, after the launch, the Aradam surfaced, observing the enemy unit immobilized on the coast near Ras el Mirk, with a fire on board. Running aground on the coast, H.M.S. Havock would soon be broken in two by the explosion of the ammunition depots, observed from aboard the submarine (however, there seems to be no mention of this explosion in the description of the action of Commander Gran).

Quite different is the version given by British sources, according to which H.M.S. Havock ran aground due to a navigational error, without any involvement of the Aradam. The destroyer, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey Robert Gordon Watkins, had been damaged a few days earlier during the Second Battle of Sirte (by the fire of the battleship Littorio, which had damaged a boiler, with eight casualties among the crew) and then further damaged by an air attack on Malta on April 3rd, during a first attempt to repair the damage in a dry dock in Valletta. It had left the island on the evening of April 5^th bound for Gibraltar, with one hundred British soldiers on board who were due to leave Malta.

Before leaving Malta, Commander Watkins had been advised to scan the seabed when approaching the Kelibia lighthouse (the crossing of Tunisian waters would necessarily take place at night), and pay attention to the shallow waters to the north of the lighthouse and the shoals off Ras el Mir and Cape Bon, and to keep no more than two miles from the coast in order to avoid the minefields located further east.

He would have to decide for himself how fast he would have to keep and adjust so that he would be as far west as possible by dawn. While crossing the area, Watkins could have encountered enemy motor torpedo boats and minesweepers, as well as Axis convoys bound for Libya. Watkins had decided to round Cape Bon at a speed of 30 knots (both to be as far west as possible by dawn, and to minimize the chances of sighting in case he encountered an enemy naval force in the channel), and to keep the armament ready in case of an encounter with Italian or German motor torpedo boats.

Arriving in sight of the Tunisian coast, H.M.S. Havock had moved to pass about a mile and a half from the lighthouse of Kelibia, about ten degrees from the shore. The night was clear, moonless and with fog banks on the coast, and Watkins – who had taken over command of the voyage shortly before – had been informed by the navigation officer Lack that the ship was proceeding slightly further ashore than planned, but that this would not be a problem.

In rounding the lighthouse of Kelibia, H.M.S. Havock had made four approaches; Watkins had repeatedly asked Lack if the ship was on a safe course, each time receiving an answer that it was “a little” shifted toward land, but still safe. At 3.50 AM Watkins, who had remained on the bridge because the last segment of the course traced by Lack to round Cape Kelibia had seemed strange to him, had sighted what seemed to be a whitish wave towards the bow and had pulled a little out, and then ordered the engines to be put all the way back and the rudder all the way to starboard.

However, it was already too late: at 3:58 AM H.M.S. Havock had run aground at thirty knots on a sandbank three hundred meters from the coast, near Kelibia (more precisely, on the beach of Hammam Ghezzaz, in a position variously reported as 36°52’23.1″ N and 11°08’171″ E or 36°52′18″ N and 11°8′24″ E or 36.87167° N and 11.14° E),  in depths of about five meters.

A sump in the main steam pipe had burst, killing one man, and severely burning five others, one of whom would later die in hospital. After a vain attempt to lighten the ship by throwing ammunitions overboard, the captain concluded that the H.M.S. Havock was lost and gave orders to the crew and passing personnel to land on the nearby coast, also starting preparations to self-destruct the ship. The plan was to sprinkled the ship with fuel and cordite, and after all the crew had been disembarked (in the meantime it was dawn), ignited the cordite. A depth charge placed in the sonar room was detonated, tearing the bow apart and reducing H.M.S. Havock to an unserviceable wreck. Prior to the self-destruct, at 4:15 AM, Watkins had reported that the ship had run aground 2.5 miles by 20° from the Kelibia lighthouse (in position 36°48′ N and 11°08′ E, or by another source 36°52′ N and 11°08′ E), that he could not disentangle it and was preparing for scuttling.

David Goodey and Richard Osborne, authors of a monograph on the history of the Havock (“Destroyer at War: The Fighting Life and Loss of HMS Havock from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean 1939-1942”), compare the official Italian and British versions, emphasizing the times indicated by both sides. According to the British, when the H.M.S. Havock ran aground, the engine room clock, which followed the Maltese time zone (Malta Standard Time), stopped at 3:58 AM. This was when the ship hit the shoal while proceeding at thirty knots. The Aradam supposedly followed the Central European time zone; if the two units were in the same time zone, the Aradam probably sighted H.M.S. Havock as it proceeded along the coast and fired a torpedo at it, missing it.

Alternatively, the Aradam sighted H.M.S. Havock when it was already stranded and the torpedo exploded against the seabed (due to the shallowness) or missed the target, as it was immobilized while Commander Gran had calculated the launch data for a moving unit. The description of the attack according to Italian sources – H.M.S. Havock hit at 3.17 AM by a torpedo, run aground and then broken in two by the explosion of the ammunition depots, caused by a fire triggered by the torpedo – is incompatible with what was reported by the survivors, according to whom the ship was not hit by torpedoes at the time of the grounding nor did there be any explosion until two o’clock the following afternoon, when the crew of H.M.S. Havock, already under guard by the French and out of sight of the wreck, heard a violent explosion and saw a column of smoke hundreds of meters high, and which Watkins attributed to depth charges and/or the aft ammunition depot, probably reached by the fires that were still raging on board (and which throughout the day caused several minor explosions of reserves and other ammunition).

In reality, the controversial mention of explosions on the wreck of H.M.S. Havock seems to be the result of the retrospective reworking of the attack made by secondary sources, while in the original account it is said, on the contrary, that no explosion was heard, so much so that Commander Gran remained for several hours in the impression that the destroyer was still able to counterattack, which would have been impossible if it had been torpedoed.

The Italian (original) and British versions do not seem to be in contrast: the most logical explanation is that the Aradam launched the torpedo against H.M.S. Havock, missed it, and while the submarine disengaged and lay on the seabed, the destroyer ran aground due to a navigational error, without realizing that it had been attacked. By the time the Aradam returned to periscope depth – only for brief moments, hours apart – the destroyer had already been abandoned and set on fire by the crew, and this spectacle led to the erroneous belief that it had been torpedoed.

Other versions reported by secondary Italian sources state that H.M.S. Havock was torpedoed by the Aradam and tried to run aground, but was broken in two by the explosion of the ammunition depots; or that it would run aground on its own and be torpedoed and destroyed by the Aradam after it ran aground; or that it would have run aground in an attempt to avoid the torpedo of the Aradam, then being scuttled by the crew once it was established that it was impossible to disentangle it. None of these versions, however, is confirmed by Commander Watkins’ report or by the survivors’ accounts.

The wreck of H.M.S. Havock in a picture taken by an Italian airplane on April 11th, 1942
(From “In Passage Perilous” by Vincent O’Hara)

According to what was noted at the time in the diary of the operations division of the General Staff of the Kriegsmarine, “according to the claims of the British prisoners [of the Havock], the destroyer ran aground and was blown up by its crew after an Italian submarine attacked it unsuccessfully.”

The crew of the Havock, camped on the coast near the wreck, surrendered to the local authorities (loyal to Vichy France) and was first taken to the Coast Guard barracks in the nearby town of Kelibia, and then interned in the concentration camp of Laghouat, in Algeria, where the British were in fact treated, rather than as military belligerents interned by a neutral country (which Vichy France claimed to be),  as prisoners of war in an enemy country; they were kept by the French in worse living conditions than those of the British prisoners in Italy and Germany until November 1942, when they were liberated following the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa (Operation “Torch”) and the passage to the Allied cause of the Vichy troops stationed there.

On the night between April 7^th and 8^th, 1942 the wreck of H.M.S. Havock was boarded by the Italian tugboat Instancabile and inspected by Italian soldiers under the command of Liutenant Commander Ernesto Forza, who seized secret documents that remained on board (this too, however, is in contrast with what was stated by Commander Watkins, according to whom all secret documents would have been destroyed by fire before abandoning ship,  destruction extended even to devices such as sonar and direction finders and torpedoes which were launched towards the open sea to prevent parts from being found). This, evidently, was the tugboat observed by the Aradam near the wreck of the Havock.

The news of the sinking of the Havock was announced by the Italian Supreme Command in the war bulletin no. 675 of April 7th 1942 (“… Our naval vessels set fire to and sank the British destroyer Havok”) and then further specified in bulletin no. 691 of 23 April (“Further investigations have made it possible to establish that the British destroyer Havock referred to in bulletin no. 675 was torpedoed and sunk by our submarine Aradam under the command of Lieutenant Oscar Gran returning from a cruise“).

Commander Gran would be decorated with the Bronze Medal for Military Valor (“Commander of a submarine, on a war mission in the Mediterranean, he attacked and torpedoed an enemy destroyer with serene courage and skill, demonstrating that he possesses high fighting spirit and fine military qualities“), and his second, Second Lieutenant Edoardo Burattini, with the War Cross for Military Valor (“Second Officer of a submarine,  it ensured the combat efficiency of the unit and assisted the commander with serene courage and daring in the attack and torpedoing of an enemy destroyer“).

April 14th, 1942

Since an Italian convoy was expected to pass through the area escorted by the torpedo boat Lince and the destroyer Premuda, the Aradam reduced its activity in order to avoid accidents.

April 15th, 1942

Strong noises on the hydrophones were detected, but they are attributed to the transit of a French convoy reported from Rome and which according to estimates should pass right off Kelibia.

April 18th, 1942

Despite rough seas and reduced visibility, the Aradam sighted a ship, but shortly thereafter also noticed a CANT Z. 506 seaplane on its vertical, indicating that it was an Axis ship to which the seaplane provided air escort.

April 19th, 1942

The crew sighted off Cape Bon an Italian steamer, the Nino Claudio, heading north.

April 20th, 1942

Visibility worsens even more, so much so that it was more profitable to stay at periscope depth to carry out hydrophones listening. Indeed, sound of propellers was picked up and the submarine emerges to try to spot the ship or ships in question; however, it was impossible to distinguish both the number and the type of ships detected on the hydrophones, and since the passage in the area of an Italian convoy (tanker Panuco and two torpedo boats) had been reported, Commander Gran preferred not to approach, thus avoiding incidents of friendly fire.

At 10:24 PM, the Aradam received an order to return to base, which was transmitted at 6:10 PM (“No. 162173 – Smg Aradam – zone A – Smg Micca fictitious. Maricosom – I cancel my previous communications (STOP) Leave ambush immediately by returning to Cagliari (STOP) Reverse return routes the outward one»). During the mission, the Aradam had received 45 telegrams from Supermarina regarding the possible presence of other targets in the area.

May 1942

The Aradam was sent on patrol north of Cape Blanc.

June 11th, 1942

The Aradam was sent, along with four other submarines (Ascianghi, Onice, Corallo and Dessiè), to lie in ambush first near Cape Blanc and then west of Malta (in the triangle between Malta, Pantelleria and Lampedusa).

September 4th, 1942

Lieutenant Gran relinquished command of the Aradam, being replaced by the 35-year-old Alpinolo Cinti, from Ripatransone.

October 20th, 1942

Lieutenant Cinti relinquished command of the Aradam and was replaced by Carlo Forni, 34, from Genoa.

November 7th, 1942

Following the sighting of large Anglo-American naval forces sailing from Gibraltar to the west (it is the invasion fleet of Operation “Torch”, the Allied landing in French North Africa, but Supermarina – while believing that a landing in North Africa is the most likely hypothesis – does not exclude the possibility that it is a convoy bound for Malta), the Aradam was sent to patrol the Gulf of Philippeville,  in the waters of Algeria, together with numerous other Italian submarines (Acciaio, Argento, Asteria, Brin, Dandolo, Emo, Galatea, Mocenigo, Porfido, Platino and Velella). In total, Maricosom – on the basis of an order from Supermarina, transmitted at 10.06 PM on November 6^th – sent 21 submarines to the western and central-western Mediterranean, to counter the enemy operation: 12 submarines of the VII Grupsom (including the Aradam) were deployed west of the island of La Galite (zone “A”), 7 submarines of the VIII Grupsom were sent off Bizerte (zone “B”),  and 2 others in an advanced position between Algeria and the Balearic Islands.

The directive was to ‘widen the waters allocated to the ambush of submarines … to give them more freedom of action in the areas themselves.” These positions turned out to be too far from the actual landing zones (Oran and Algiers), but they were not modified, because the Germans mistakenly believed that the Allies could attempt further landings in Tunisia as well (in which case the Italian submarines would be in an ideal position).

At 03:31 PM Maricosom (the Submarine Squadron Command) informed all submarines patrolling in the western Mediterranean of the position of a British naval squadron and an enemy convoy, reported at 10:40 AM. At 08:07 PM, the Submarine Squadron Command reported the position of two convoys sighted on two separate occasions, both heading east and consisting of merchant ships escorted by battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and escort ships.

November 8th, 1942

The landings began: 500 Anglo-American transport ships, escorted by 350 warships of all kinds, land a total of 107,000 soldiers on the coasts of Algeria and Morocco. Since these operations take place in the areas of Algiers and Oran, the Italian submarines are too far east to intervene; since the Germans believed that the Allies could make further landings further east, towards Tunisia, it was initially decided to leave the submarines where they were.

November 9th, 1942

At 07:09 PM the command of the Italian submarine fleet, Maricosom, reported to all boats at sea that enemy steamers are moving eastwards, and that landings are taking place at Bona and Philippeville; It therefore gives the order to attack any merchant or military ship leaving these ports, but avoids (in order not to risk incidents of “friendly fire” with other units sent to the area) attacking submarines, MAS and motor torpedo boats.

November 13th, 1942

Informed of the landing of British troops at Bona and Philippeville, Supermarina ordered the submarines at 06:38 PM to enter these harbors, attack with the utmost determination, and then return to their respective patrol sectors at dawn. In particular, Aradam, Emo, Granito and Volframio were sent to the bay of Bona, while Argento, Ascianghi, Asteria, Mocenigo and Velella were sent to that of Philippeville. None of the boats, however, were successful: many did not spot any ships, the others were unable to attack them due to the unfavorable sighting conditions and the strict enemy vigilance.

November 14th, 1942

At 06:02 PM Maricosom arranged a new offensive in the harbor of Philippeville: Aradam, Granito, Emo and Volframio received orders to carry out an offensive search during the night, acting with the utmost decisiveness, then returning to their respective patrol sectors. However, this second raid was also fruitless.

November 16th, 1942

Under the command of Lieutenant Carlo Forni, the Aradam penetrates the bay of Bona at night for an offensive reconnaissance; having sighted a convoy heading towards Bona (for another source, to the west) made up of three merchant ships, with a large escort of light units (according to another source it would have sighted an isolated ship, with a 210° course), it approached on the surface with the favor of repeated showers and launches two pairs of torpedoes against a merchant ship of 2500 GRT,  the first at 3:58 AM and the second at 5:06 AM, from close range (500 meters, in both cases).

All weapons missed their targets. Due to the counter-maneuvers of the attacked ships; having now reached waters too shallow to attempt a new attack with torpedoes, at 5.14 AM the Aradam attacked the nearest merchant ship, which was heading towards the coast, with its deck gun, believing that it had damaged it slightly (the third shot fired seems to hit between the bridge and the funnel. According to another source, it would have scored several shots. At 5:44 AM, however, a shot exploded prematurely outside the muzzle of the gun, dazzling the gunners, and forcing them to cease firing. At this point, being only three miles southeast of the entrance to the port of Bona, Forni gave up the chase due to the reduced availability of electricity and the shallow waters. The Aradam was already crawling on the bottom, and continuing like this it would end up running aground. Forni then disengages towards the open sea, diving. (According to another source, after shelling and hitting the steamer, he disengaged by diving due to the quick reaction of the escort.)

According to Giorgio Giorgerini, however, this attack would have taken place in the harbor of Bougie, while the strong enemy anti-submarine surveillance would have prevented the Aradam from penetrating the bay of Bona. According to a different version, this action took place in the bay of Bona, and then the Aradam tried to force this bay again, but failed due to enemy surveillance.

The convoy attacked was probably ET. 1, consisting of five ships, sailed from Algiers on February 18^th and it arrived in Gibraltar on November 20th. Alternatively, but less likely, it is possible that it was TE. 3, made up of about fifteen units, which left Gibraltar on November 11^th and arrived in Bona on November 17th.

The Supreme Command will give news of this action in the war bulletin no. 906 of November 17th: “One of our submarines under the command of Lieutenant Carlo Forni, forced the entrance into the roadstead of Bona and seriously damaged a large enemy merchant ship with cannon fire“.

November 20th, 1942

At 8.30 PM the British submarine P 228 (later H.M.S. Splendid, Lieutenant Ian Lachlan Mackay McGeogh) detected diesel engines noise from the southwest and after a few minutes, having begun the attack maneuver against what it correctly assumes to be a submarine, it notices that it is sight onto the left there was an approaching submarine, which is identified as Italian.

At 08.40 PM, in position 40°38′ N and 13°48′ E (off Naples), P 228 launched a salvo of six torpedoes from the bow tubes; Non hits, two of the weapons explode at the end of the run after twelve minutes. McGeogh would conclude that he had missed the target by underestimating its speed. The submarine attacked was most likely the Aradam, which did not notice the attack.

December 1942

The boat was sent for an unsuccessful ambush in the waters of Cyrenaica.

January 1943

The boat was sent for another ambush off the coast of Cyrenaica.

February 1943

The boat was sent for another ambush in the waters of Cyrenaica (Gulf of Sirte).

March 1943

The boat was sent for ambush in the Gulf of Sirte.

April 10, 1943

The Aradam was in La Maddalena when, starting at 2.37 PM, the Sardinian base was subjected to a heavy bombardment by 84 Boeing B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers of the USAAF. Immediately after the bombing, the Aradam was transferred to Bonifacio, to save it from any new air attacks.

April 1943

An inspection estimated the state of efficiency of the Aradam as “good” but highlighted the poor condition of the horns. Even more curious is the judgment expressed about the state of the crew: “regular”.

May 1943

The boat was sent for a patrol to the west of Sardinia.

Summer 1943

The Aradam entered the shipyard in Genoa to be transformed into a “carrier” submarine ” of slow-moving torpedoes (SLC), with the installation on deck of the special cylindrical containers for the transport of these assault vessels. Supermarina intended intensifying the operations of assault craft against the Anglo-American ships, and to this end increased the number of “carrier” submarines both with the conversion of existing units (the Aradam), and by adapting submarines under construction (such as the three new Murena, Grongo and Sparide of the Tritone class).

Epilogue

At the time of armistice between Italy and the Allies, on September 8^th, 1943, the Aradam  was caught in Genoa, (still under the command of Lieutenant Carlo Forni, but according to another source at the time of the armistice it would have been momentarily under the command of Lieutenant Mario Tromba) undergoing overhaul and maintenance work as well as the conversion into a “carrier” of slow-moving torpedoes.

Unable to sail, the Aradam was scuttled by its crew on September 9th, to prevent it from falling intact into German hands. The crew of the Aradam dispersed; the twenty-three-year-old sailor Gregorio Barone, after the sinking of the submarine, managed to leave Genoa and cross the peninsula which had plunged into chaos, reaching his home in Torre del Greco where he remained hidden to escape the roundups during the brief German occupation of the city. When the Allies arrived, he returned to civilian life by opening a newsstand.

The Germans resurfaced the Aradam, after which there is information that is not entirely agreed upon regarding the details of its demise. According to most sources, including the book “Attack from the Sea” by Giorgio Giorgerini, the Germans gave it to the X Flotilla MAS of Junio Valerio Borghese, loyal to them, so that they could repair it and use it as an approaching unit for assault units; in December 1943, in fact, the X MAS had reconstituted the SSB operational group, equipped with the new San Bartolomeo torpedoes, built in the workshops of the same X MAS and evolution of the Slow Running torpedoes successfully used in the raids against Alexandria, Algiers and Gibraltar between 1940 and 1943.

The submarine, already equipped with the appropriate cylinders for the transport of SLC and SSB, was placed in dry dock for repairs, and the “Aradam” assault vehicle transport group was established in Genoa (under the X MAS Underwater Assault Vehicles Department) intended to provide the crew and the necessary support. Lieutenant Carlo Forni, his old pre-armistice commander, who had in the meantime joined the Italian Social Republic, was appointed to its command.

According to “Italian Ships and Sailors in the Second World War” by Erminio Bagnasco, however, after scuttling, the Aradam was recovered by the National Republican Navy, the small Navy of the Italian Social Republic, of which theoretically the X MAS was part but which in reality constituted a force clearly distinct from it and indeed rival, since Borghese answered directly to the Germans and there was no good blood between him and the leaders of the M.N.R.

On August 18th, 1944, while the Aradam was being refitted, the Germans seized it “by force”, an episode that Bagnasco gives as an example of the difficult relations existing between the M.N.R. and the Germans, studded with “accidents” of considerable gravity, very different from those that ran between the Germans and the X MAS.

In any case, the refitting work never came to an end, because on September 4^th, 1944 the Aradam, still under refit, was sunk in Genoa by an American air raid.

A different version is the one contained in the book “The Black Prince” by Alessandro Massignani and Jack Greene, according to which the X MAS would have put the Aradam back into service by January 1944; But a mistake seems likely.

The date of the sinking is also incorrect, given as September 1^st, 1944, instead of 4 September. Massignani and Greene also speculate that the bombing would not have been accidental, and that “the Regia Marina del Sud was well informed that the Aradam was ready with containers to carry the ‘pigs’ beyond the Allied lines.” A website dedicated to the X MAS also states that in January 1944 the Aradam “was able to carry out sea trials and go into action”, however there is no record of any mission carried out by this unit from January to September 1944; another, apparently referring to a book by Sergio Nesi, states that the Aradam was put back into service and began sea trials at the beginning of January 1944, but was sunk in September before it could operate.

The wreck of the Aradam in Genoa.
(From the Magazine Storia Militare)

Sub-chief Giovanni Croce, 22 years old, from Piove di Sacco, part of the crew of the Aradam, was killed in the bombing. Another member of the crew, the sailor Salvatore Frega, died on 2 December 1944 in the Santa Tecla sanatorium in Genoa, from an illness contracted in service.

The sinking of the Aradam also led to the disbandment of the X MAS Assault Vehicle Transport Group. The wreck of the submarine was recovered in March 1947, just a few days after its formal removal from the roster of the now no longer Royal Navy, which took place on February 27th of the same year. It was then demolished by the Bartoli and Cavalletti company of Savona.

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo adapted and translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	50		26,144	3,223	280	104.88	4.37

The Antonio Sciesa was a boat of the Balilla class built by the OTO shipyard of La Spezia and delivered to the Regia Marina on April 29^th, 1929.

La Spezia: the “Sciesa” and “Toti” return to base after completing the African circumnavigation

On 14 September 1933, along with her twin boat Toti, the Sciesa departed La Spezia under the command of Lieutenant Commander Carlo Savio for a demonstrative cruise through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea and continuing with the circumnavigation of Africa and then returning to the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar.

November 1933: submarines Toti and Sciesa at anchor in Dar es Salaam during the African circumnavigation mission ℗

The purpose of the trip was to verify the performance of these units in warm waters. The submarines stopped at Port Said, Massawa, Aden, Mogadishu, Chisimaio, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Diego Suarez, Lourenço Marques, Durban, Cape Town, Walvis Bay, Lobito, São Tomé, Takoradi, Dakar, Porto Praia, Las Palmas, Gibraltar, and Barcelona, finally arriving at their destination on February 25th, 1934, with good overall performances.

In November 1936 it was one of the first Italian submarines sent clandestinely to support Franco’s forces in the Spanish war, however it did not achieve any results.

On Italy’s entry into World War II on June 10^th, 1940, it was sent on an offensive mission off the port of Kotor, returning on June 21^st, 1940. On 9 July 9th, she lay in wait north of Cape Passero, returning to base two days later.

On 14 August, it departed Augusta for a patrol off the North African coast, but two days later she had to abort her mission due to a breakdown and headed to Brindisi for repairs.

On 12 December it was sent north of the mouth of the Nile and six days later detected the sounds of other ships on the hydrophone but failed to spot them; The mission ended on December 21st.

In March 1941 she was under repairs up until May 1942.

On June 1^st, 1942, the Sciesa returned to operational duties, with Lieutenant Raul Galletti as the commanding officer. It was assigned, along with many other submarines, to transport missions to Libya.

On June 29^th, 1942, it left Taranto with 64 tons of fuel and 4 tons of provisions destined for Marsa el Hilal where it arrived on July 3^rd.

On July 24th, 1942, it left Taranto with a cargo of 71.6 tons of supplies and gasoline bound for Tobruk arriving at her destination four days later, unloaded the cargo and departed the next day, arriving back in Taranto on August 3rd.

On August 19th, 1942, it again left Taranto to transport 73 tons of food and ammunition to Benghazi arriving at the Libyan base on the 22nd and departing the same day after unloading the cargo, returning to Taranto on August 26th.

On October 1st, 1942, it left again Taranto, bound for Benghazi with 71.9 tons of provisions, ammunition and money from the Bank of Italy arriving in Benghazi on the 5th, unloading the materials and leaving the same day. The following day, at 9.15 PM, the boat launched a torpedo against a submarine spotted on the surface and apparently stationary, hearing a loud explosion and therefore believing that he had hit and sunk it while attempting to dive. Thereafter, it set out in an unsuccessful search for survivors However, there are no reports of losses or damage to British submarines in that area and in that period. The Sciesa docked in Taranto on October 8^th.

On October 30^th, it left Taranto but had to reverse course and return the next day, due to a mechanical breakdown.

On November 3rd, it left port with 85 tons of ammunition, arriving in Tobruk three days later. Around four o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, while unloading ammunition, it was attacked by planes and hit by three bombs: 5 officers and 18 non-commissioned officers and sailors were killed, the submarine was run aground to prevent its sinking. This was a sign of the desperate need for supplies since submarines were usually unloaded only at night.

The wreck of the Sciesa in Tobruk ℗

On November 12th, in the run-up to the fall of Tobruk to the British, the wreck of the Sciesa was mined and blown up. In 1946, the wreck was resurfaced by an Italian salvage company and tugs moved the boat to Taranto where it was sent to the scrapyard.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
12		7,311	922	57	144.44	6.02

Actions

Date	Time	Captain	Area	Coordinates	Convoy	Weapon	Result	Ship	Type	Tonns	Flag
10/2/1942	19:15		Mediterranean			Torpedo	Failed	Unknown			Unknown

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank
Aquino	Gennaro	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Avallone	Giovanni	Naval Rating	Comune
Benvenuti	Ugaglio	Ensign	Aspirante G.M.
Cattani	Luciano	Sublieutenant G.N.	Tenente G.N.
Colvaro	Dino	Ensign Other Branches	Sottotenente Altri Corpi
D’addario	Cosimo	Naval Rating	Comune
D’alba	Antonio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Daziano	Giorgio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
De Gregorio	Roberto	Naval Rating	Comune
Donatucci	Rocco	Naval Rating	Comune
Galletti	Raul	Lieutenant	Tenente di Vascello
Iannone	Martino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
La Motta	Francesco	Lieutenant Other Branches	Capitano G.N.
Melucci	Angelo	Naval Rating	Comune
Montesoro	Mario	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Mor	Mario	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Pelosi	Emanuele	Naval Rating	Comune
Pilolli	Dante	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Punzo	Giorgio	Sergeant	Sergente
Sbergo	Nunzio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Scerpa	Alfonso	Naval Rating	Comune
Squadrito	Sebastiano	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Terrenzi	Attilio	Naval Rating	Comune

The Antonio Bjamonti  was the former Yugoslavian submarine Smeli of the Osvetnik class. Built by the AC de la Loire shipyard of Nantes, France, it was lunched December 1^st, 1928. The Smeli was captured by Italian forces at the Bay of Kotor in April 1942. Initially designated N2, the armament was changed, and the conning tower modified.  Due to the advanced age, old design, and shallow diving depth, when commissioned into the Regia Marina as “Antonio Bajamonti”, service was limited to training and experimentation.

A picture of the Bajamonti around 1930, when it was the Smeli

On March 8^th, 1942

It carried out an ambush in the Gulf of Genoa along with the submarine H 6, another aging submarine, returning to La Spezia without having identified any enemy ships.

From November 8^th through 10^th, 1942

The Bajiamonti carried out another defensive mission in the Ligurian Sea and four days later it made another one off Ajaccio, but in both cases there was no sighting of enemy ships

At the proclamation of the armistice, it was under maintenance in La Spezia and therefore, unable to leave port; it was scuttled there 9 September 9^th, 1943 to avoid capture by the Germans.

Sirena class coastal submarine (displacement of 678 tons on the surface, 842 tons submerged).

The Anfitrite at the quay outfitting of the CRDA of Monfalcone in January 1934, shortly before delivery
(from it.wikipedia.org)

During World War II, it was employed in patrol and offensive ambush missions, initially in the Otranto Channel and later in the eastern Mediterranean (especially south of Crete, in the waters between the Cretan islet of Gavdo and Derna (Darnah), and in Cyrenaica to undermine the British supply lines between Greece and Egypt), carrying out a total of 7 war patrols (5 offensive/exploratory patrols and 2 transfers),  covering a total of 4,386 miles on the surface and 970 submerged, and spending 48 days at sea.

Brief and Partial Chronology

July 11th, 1931

The Anfitrite was laid down at the C.R.D.A .(Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico) in Monfalcone (construction number 258).

Anfitrite, Sirena, Medusa, Naiade, Nereide, Galatea and Ondina in  various stages of construction at the CRDA of Monfalcone, in 1931 (from www.cad3d.it)    

August 5th, 1933

Launch at the CRDA in Monfalcone. Immediately after the launch, the Anfitrite is placed at the disposal of the “Comando Marina di Pola” (Pula Marine Command) for outfitting and testing, which are completed at the CRDA.

L’Anfitrite ready for launch

March 22nd, 1934

Entered service. Placed under the “Ispettorato Sommergibili“ (Submarine Inspectorate), it was assigned to the X Squadriglia Sommergibili  ( 10^th Submarine Squadron), based in Brindisi and under the “Comando Divisione Sommergibili” (Submarine Divisional Command), along with the twin boats Sirena, Naiade, Nereide, Ondina and Galatea. Due to the names of the boats that compose it, this squadron is nicknamed “deità marine” (marine deities).

1934-1937

The Anfitrite made several training patrols in the Italian seas. According to an unverifiable source, in this period the Anfitrite was also deployed in Leros and then, during the Ethiopian War (1935-1936), in Massawa, Eritrea.

July 1937

The Anfitrite receives the combat flag, along with the similar boats Ondina and Serpente, as part of the events of the “Week of the Sea”, organized by the Taranto section of the Naval League. The flags were donated by the “fascist women” of the Taranto section of the Naval League.

August 17th, 1937

During the Spanish Civil War, the Anfitrite (Lieutenant Giovanni Bruno), part of the IV Grupsom (Submarine Group) of Taranto, sailed from Messina to carry out a clandestine mission in the Strait of Sicily (a patrol north of Cape Bon) in support of Francisco Franco’s nationalist forces.

August 29th, 1937

The boat returned to Messina without having sighted any suspicious vessels.

1938

The Anfitrite is deployed in Brindisi, as part of the XLII Submarine Squadron along with the Sirena, Naiade, Nereide, Ondina and Galatea.

1939

Transferred to Tobruk, Libya.

1939

Following complicated espionage events between France and Italy, the commander of the Anfitrite , Lieutenant Goliardo Zanfranceschi, finds himself under investigation for espionage in favor of the French secret service. In reality, in 1933 Zanfranceschi had volunteered, for a few months, pretending to collaborate with the French secret service as a double agent, but he was working for the Italian Navy‘s secret service.

Recalled to “service” by the Italian secret service in 1939, he was again “infiltrated” into an authentic network of spies working for France, contributing with his work to the arrest of dozens of spies and informers, two of whom, the Army deserter Aurelio Cocuzza and the Navy furier Francesco Ghezzi, were later sentenced to death and shot for treason for having handed over militarily sensitive information to France. According to a book by Giuseppina Mellace, Zanfranceschi, who “had to return a large sum of money to the French secret service, pocketed for services then not performed”, would have been in the same period “hooked” by the Austrian spy Margit Gross, shortly thereafter arrested.

During the trial, the defense team (evidently unaware of his real role in the affair), tried to implicate Zanfranceschi as their accomplice; It was not until December 23^rd, 1942 that he was acquitted, having clarified his complicated position. To avoid similar problems, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Cavagnari, decided that in the future the role of the young lazy officer willing to betray, played by Zanfranceschi to steal the trust of the French secret service, will have to be carried out by personnel outside the Navy (for example, the Carabinieri).

June 10th, 1940

At Italy’s entry into World War II, the Anfitrite (Lieutenant Bruno Ghersina) was the only unit of the XLIV Submarine Squadron (belonging to the IV Submarine Group), and was based in Taranto (according to another source, it was detached to the Brindisi Submarine Flotilla; moreover, at the time of the declaration of war it was in Tobruk).

L’Anfitrite at sea (from “The Roya Navy and the Mediterranean, Vol. II: November 1940-December 1941”)

June 10^th through 18th ,1940

The first war mission was a patrol in the Otranto Channel which concluded without any major event (according to one source, the Anfitrite was sent off the Greek-Albanian coast, along with the submarines Balilla, Sciesa and Uarsciek, a few hours before the entry into the war). At the time of the entry into the war, on June 10th, the Amfitrite was already at sea for an exercise: it was Commander Ghersina who announced the entry into the war to the crew. At the end of the mission, the Anfitrite reached Leros, where he was permanently stationed at the submarine base of San Giorgio.

June 15th, 1940

At 1.20 AM the British submarine H.M.S. Rorqual (Lieutenant Commander Ronald Hugh Dewhurst) sighted the Anfitrite sailing on the surface on a 340° course in the Otranto Channel (perhaps in position 40°40′ N and 18°50′ E). Moving to an attack position, at 1.24 AM, not being sure of the identity of the other submarine, the Rorqual made the recognition signal. Having received no reply, the British boat fired three torpedoes at the Anfitrite ; None of them hit the target (on the Italian side, the attack, with a difference of one hour due to the time difference, is recorded as having occurred at 00.25 AM).

June 1940- Summer 1940

The Anfitrite, while in port during an air raid, contributed with its weapons to the anti-aircraft defense of the Leros base, contributing to the shooting down of some of the attacking aircraft.

End of June 1940

The Anfitrite Took to the sea for the second war patrol: along with the Salpa, Ondina, and Uebi Scebeli, to form a barrage of submarines between Crete and Cyrenaica. The barrage, which was expected to be formed on June 30th, was ordered by Supermarina’s General Operation Order No. 10, which stipulated that submarines must position themselves thirty miles from each other – so that the barrage has a total width of one hundred miles – along the line connecting a predetermined point 15 miles southwest of Gavdo and another 40 miles northeast of Derna (Darnah).

The barrage, however, will not be able to come into operation because the British anti-submarine forces (Force C with the destroyers H.M.S. Dainty, H.M.S. Defender, H.M.S. Ilex, H.M.S. Decoy and H.M.S. Voyager, as well as several anti-submarine seaplanes), were in charge of “mopping up” the routes of British convoys at sea as part of operation “M.A. 3” (which involved sending a series of convoys between Alexandria in Egypt,  Malta and the Dardanelles) to eliminate any underwater threats.

The force thoroughly inspected the area where the barrier was to be formed – the existence of which they suspected – sinking the Uebi Scebeli, damaging Salpa and Anfitrite and attacking the Undine. The Uebi Scebeli, among other things, before sinking, was boarded by a British team that manages to seize some secret documents, from which it discovers the positions assigned to the other submarines of the barrage.

In the diary of the Command of the Mediterranean Fleet, in fact, on the date of June 29th, 1940, is noted “Have secret orders for Italian submarines which order them to be in the following positions tomorrow June 30th:  ONDINA 34°16N, 23°24’E – AMPHITRIDE 34°46’N, 23°40’E. (…), returning to Augusta 10th July (…) Am sweeping toward Northern position. (…) on receipt of the signal VOYAGER was ordered to Alexandria and STUART and HOSTILE to sea to join the hunt for ANFITRIDE and ONDINA”. The Amfitrite, however, will not even arrive at the indicated point because it had been damaged by an air attack already during transfer .

June 28th, 1940

The Anfitrite, at 11:36 AM, sailing on the surface towards the assigned ambush area (located in the waters between Gaudo and Derna) as part of the submarine barrage to be formed south of Crete, was attacked in position 37°31′ N and 19°55′ E by a British Short Sunderland seaplane, aircraft L 5806 (aircraft “Q”) of the 228th Squadron of the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force,  piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Edward Nicholetts (commander of 228th Squadron). The seaplane dropped three bombs, missing the submarine, which, undamaged, continued navigating.

A few hours later, at 02:05 PM (according to some sources, while sailing on the surface, according to another, while at periscope depth), the Anfitrite was attacked again off Benghazi (or Tobruk), at 37°29′ N and 19°51′ E (or 37°18′ N and 19°54′ E) by another Sunderland, L 5804 “S” of the 230th Squadron (Captain William Weir Campbell,  a Canadian, credited in those days with the sinking of two Italian submarines in the space of forty-eight hours: the Argonauta and Rubino) which had taken off from Malta for a patrol (another source mistakenly speaks of the Sunderland L 5803, the “T” plane of the 230th Squadron; in reality at that time this seaplane was flying from Alexandria to Malta, and did not carry out any attack on June 28).

The plane flew over the submarine at a low altitude and dropped two 250-pound (113 kg) depth charges that missed their target, but fell so close to the hull that, due to the explosions alone, caused rather serious damage to the submarine’s vital systems, which was thus forced to return to base, interrupting the patrol. These are the first attacks by a Short Sunderland seaplane against an Italian submarine.

Following the damage to the Anfitrite , the sinking by British destroyers of a second submarine, the Uebi Scebeli, and the hunt endured by a third, the Ondina, which was unable to reach the assigned position, of the four boats that were to form the planned barrier between Crete and Cyrenaica, only one, the Salpa, managed to reach the planned position.

The episode of the bombardment is recalled by a crewmember of the Anfitrite , Carlo Zuccon: “It was around noon, these things are not forgotten, I was in the stern compartment and we were having lunch on deck, the bombs fell in the immediate vicinity of the submarine and damaged the two periscopes and an engine axle. We disengaged ourselves by resorting to crash dive, there was dishware flying in all directions. We went down to 80 mt., a couple more bombs fell, then the planes left. Given the damage, we immediately returned to Brindisi, where the submarine was sent to the yard, while we were given a 10-day leave.”

Also, according to Zuccon’s recollection, during the same mission there was an encounter with an unidentified submarine: “During the second mission, one night we heard a noise like engines and metal sheets, to which the XO (executive officer) Napoli, said: “Captain, shall we attack?” But Gersina was reluctant to attack because he did not recognize the silhouette and replied: “And if he is one of us, what shall we do?” The XO insisted: “Either one of ours or an enemy one, it should not be in this ambush zone.” In doubt, we did not attack; We later learned that it was really an enemy boat.”

July 27^th – August 5^th, 1940

Offensive patrol southwest of Cape Krio (Crete).

L’Anfitrite in drydock, late summer 1940
(Photo g.c. Carlo Di Nitto)

October 17^th through 21^st, 1940

Patrol between Crete and Ras Uleima, Egypt (according to another source the mission would have been carried out south of Crete, or off Ras Uleima), at the end of which it reached Taranto.

In the same area (south of Crete, between that island and Alexandria in Egypt) and time are also deployed the submarines Topazio, Ascianghi, Tito Speri, Fratelli Bandiera and Santorre Santarosa, with which the Anfitrite would form a barrage.

November 10th, 1940

The Anfitrite entered drydock in the Taranto’s shipyard for a round of maintenance work, which would last two months and twenty days.

February 1st, 1941

Completion of maintenance work.

February 20th, 1941

Returned to Leros.

(From “I sommergibili di Monfalcone” di Alessandro Turrini, supplemento alla “Rivista Marittima” n. 11 del novembre 1998)

The Sinking

On March 4th, 1941, the Anfitrite, still under the command of Lieutenant Bruno Ghersina, set sail from Leros for a new war patrol in the Kasos Channel, between the island of the same name and Crete (according to a source, the Amfitrite was supposed to attack an important British convoy in those waters that was known to be sailing from Alexandria in Egypt to Greece). On March 5th, the boat reached the assigned position for the ambush, and, on the morning of March 6th, while submerged in that position, it was subjected to a sudden attack with depth charges: it had been located by the British destroyers escorting convoy AS 16 (other sources speak, erroneously, of convoy GA 8, loaded with troops and bound for Greece, or of the AS 17, which left port only on March 8th), sailing from Piraeus to Port Said (“AS” in fact meant “Athens-Suez Canal”, from Athens to the Suez Canal).

According to the U.S.M.M.’s book “Lost Military Ships”, the attack took place by “ships that [Anfitrite] had already detected on the hydrophones”, which would also seem to contradict the suddenness of the attack which is also reported in the same book. Most other sources, including the report of the navigation officer Marino Ridi, stated that the hydrophone of the Anfitrite was, at that time, out of service, and that consequently the submarine did not notice the arrival of the enemy ships.

AS 16, consisting of 19 merchant ships (the British Destro, Vasco and Cyprian Prince, the Norwegian Egerø and the Greek Ais Giorgis, Axios, Ardena, Chryssoroi, Condylis, Corinthia, Hellas, Iacovos, Nicolas G. Culucundis, Pancration, Petroil, Prodromos, Santorini, Spyros and Tanais) and escorted by the anti-aircraft cruiser H.M.S. Calcutta and the destroyers H.M.S. Havock and H.M.S. Greyhound (they had departed from Piraeus to provide cover for the convoy along with the light cruisers H.M.S. Ajax and H.M.S. Perth), had sailed from Piraeus on March 4th, bound for Alexandria (arriving on March 7th, then continuing to Port Said, arriving there the following day), as part of Operation “Lustre”.

The latter had been decided by the British command a few days earlier: it consisted in sending British reinforcements and supplies to Greece, with convoys leaving from Egypt, to help the Hellenic army engaged against the Italian army in Albania and now also threatened by the imminent German intervention on the Bulgarian border, as evidenced by the “ULTRA” decryptions.

“Lustre” had begun on March 4th, with the dispatch of the first ships loaded with reinforcements from Alexandria to Piraeus. Convoy 16, sailing on the opposite route, was composed of unloaded merchant ships that went to Egypt to load troops and supplies, which they would then transport to Greece. Between March and April 1941, with the double dispatch every three days (from Alexandria to Piraeus and to Volos), of a convoy of escorted merchant ships loaded with materials and a fast convoy of warships used to transport troops (a total of 27 convoys, 15 from Egypt to Greece and 12 on the opposite route), 58,364 or 60,364 men were transferred from Egypt to Greece (the 1st Armored Brigade,  the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions) and 8588 vehicles, armored vehicles and artillery pieces, plus related equipment and supplies.

The anti-aircraft cruisers H.M.S. Coventry, H.M.S. Calcutta and H.M.S. Carlisle were available for the anti-aircraft defense of the convoys, while against possible attacks by surface ships a shadow force usually composed of a battleship or a cruiser, plus a group of destroyers.

On the Italian side, as many as eleven submarines had been sent to the waters around Crete (in the channels to the east and west of the island, as well as to the southeast of it) to hinder, throughout the month of March, the flow of British convoys. In addition to the Anfitrite, also the Beilul, Galatea, Malachite, Smeraldo, Ambra, Ascianghi, Dagabur,  Nereide, Undine and Onice were deployed.

The use of these submarines, however, was unsuccessful (no merchant ships were sunk, although on March 31st the Ambra achieved an isolated success by sinking the light cruiser H.M.S. Bonaventure), as were the first air attacks launched by the Regia Aeronautica (Royal Air-force), on March 6th (after the Anfitrite had already been lost), against convoys AS 16 and AN 17 south of the Kasos Channel. The only result was to force the escort to consume between 30% and 50% of their ammunition to repel the attacks, but no ships were hit. The Anfitrite was one of the few submarines that had encountered a British convoy, but for the boat the outcome of the meeting was ominous.

Subjected to repeated drops of depth charges (this according to an Italian version, but on the British side it would be a single volley, evidently very centered and effective given the results), especially by the British destroyer H.M.S. Greyhound (Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A’Deane), the Anfitrite soon found itself in bad shape; the explosions had caused serious damage, the rudder and planes were put out of action, some of the plates of the resistant hull had come loose, thus generating considerable waterways and flooding. Surfacing was the only option.

According to British sources (“The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: Vol. II: November 1940-December 1941”), the destroyer H.M.S. Greyhound, escorting convoy AS 16 (which at the time was exiting the Kasos Channel), attacked at 7:13 AM on March 6th a sonar contact with six depth charges. A minute after the bombs were dropped, the submarine surfaced and was immediately caught by the fire from the Greyhound’s guns.

Among the officers of the Anfitrite there was also the second lieutenant Marino Ridi, 26 years old, who held the position of navigation officer. A native of Rio nell’Elba, Ridi had graduated from the Nautical Institute and had enlisted in the Navy in 1936 as a reserve officer student. After serving on the cruisers Zara and Alberico Da Barbiano, shortly before the beginning of the war, he had obtained the transfer to submarine service aboard the Anfitrite .

On the morning of March 6th, as he wrote in the report he created upon his return from captivity, Ridi was asleep (having dismounted at four o’clock in the morning) when, around seven o’clock, he was awakened by the explosions of depth charges. Rushing to the control room, he soon realized that the surfacing maneuver was in progress and learned that the explosion of the depth charges had generated waterways in the auxiliary engine room. Commander Ghersina ordered Ridi to be ready with the secret archives, which he did; a few seconds later, the Anfitrite emerged.

As soon as the boat reached the surface, it was immediately subjected to fire from H.M.S. Havock and H.M.S. Greyhound’s artillery. The conning tower’s hatch was locked, so the crew went on deck through the aft hatch. Sub-Lieutenant Ridi was the second man to go out, immediately after the sailor who had opened the hatch, and as soon as he was on deck, he proceeded to throwing into the sea the two regulation boxes containing the secret archives, which immediately sank to the bottom.

Meanwhile, the rest of the crew was also going out on deck. Towards the bow Ridi saw a convoy consisting of a dozen steamers and two destroyers (H.M.S. Greyhound and H.M.S. Havock), which immediately opened fire on the Anfitrite. The second salvo fired by H.M.S. Greyhound hit the submarine at the base of the conning tower, killing five men and wounding as many (according to Ridi’s report; other sources claim that this shot killed three men and wounded others), while other men, according to one source, noted that the deck gun had been rendered useless by depth charges.

The sergeant electrician Francesco D’Amelio, 23 years old from Lecce (he had volunteered in the Navy in 1937), would later recall that the Anfitrite emerged heavily down by the stern. The first men who came out of the hatch moved forward, perhaps because of the inclination, and were immediately mowed down by a burst of machine gun fire from one of the British units, probably in the presumption that they were heading forward (where the gun was located) to attempt a reaction. One of those men, hit in full by a volley as he was going out on deck, fell on him “almost cut in half”.

All that remained to be done was scuttling. On the orders of the captain, the chief engineer, Lieutenant Perrucca of the Naval Engineers Corps, went below deck and performed the necessary operations. The British ships, realizing that the submarine was no longer in a condition to react, did not delay in ceasing fire and put a launch overboard to rescue the survivors of the Anfitrite. When the boat came aboard the dying submarine, the wounded were transferred to it, after which a general order was given to abandon ship. Barely eight minutes had elapsed since the start of Greyhound’s attack: the aforementioned British source comments in this regard that “this [the time elapsed from the start of the action to the abandonment of the submarine] was considered to be a record”.

Shortly thereafter, at about eight o’clock in the morning of March 6th, the Anfitrite sank twenty miles southeast of Cape Sidero, on the island of Kasos, in position 34°55′ N and 26°43′ E (25 miles east of Crete; other sources indicate 34°55′ N and 23°45′ E or 35°15′ N and 26°43′ E, but it must be a mistake).

Also from the book “The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: Vol. II: November 1940-December 1941” another question arises: according to the British version, after being hit by British fire the submarine surrendered and a launch with a boarding party was put to sea by H.M.S. Greyhound; “Despite difficulties in getting close to [the submarine] and hindrance from the Italians who were struggling to get on the launch , Lieutenant [Robert] Scott and two men reached the control room of the submarine and seized some books. As they returned to the main deck, the Anfitrite sank, forcing them to abandon their books and swim; But some of the books were fished out later.”

This contrasts with the statement of Sub-Lieutenant Ridi that he threw the secret archives into the water immediately after it emerged; It should be noted, however, that the detailed book “The Real Traitor” by Alberto Santoni, which describes – based on research in British archives – the various cases in which British sailors took possession of Italian ciphers on submarines captured or boarded while they were sinking, makes no mention of the capture of documents on the Anfitrite. Thus, it could be assumed that the secret archives was thrown overboard by Ridi to prevent its capture, and that Scott and his men seized other publications that were not considered important, and therefore not destroyed or sunk (nor has there been any mention of a British use of documents or ciphers captured on the Anfitrite).

Lieutenant Robert Scott would later be decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for his role in the sinking of the Anfitrite (“For courage and skill in a successful attack on an Italian Submarine”), while Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A’Deane would be awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the same reason. Three other members of the Greyhound’s crew (Petty Officer Leonard George Charles Rose, stoker Frederick William Simpson, and sailor Frank Robinson) would receive the Distinguished Service Medal. Scott, Rose and Marshall-A’Deane would lose their lives less than two months later, in the sinking of H.M.S. Greyhound, bombed by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Crete.

A telegram-report on the military situation, sent from London (presumably, to the United States) on March 9th, 1941, and now preserved at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Great Britain Diplomatic Files, briefly announced the destruction of the Italian submarine: “His Majesty’s Destroyer “Greyhound” sank Italian submarine “Anfitrite” forty miles south of Crete on March 6th and took thirty-nine prisoners“.

The news of the sinking of the Anfitrite would have been given, rather succinctly, by some British newspapers on March 10th (“The Admiralty announced today that the Italian submarine Anfitrite(590 tons) attempted to attack a British convoy in the Aegean last Thursday and was immediately sunk by the convoy’s escort. The Anfitrite, which was completed in 1933, normally carries a complement of 41“).

Of the crew of the Anfitrite, five men died in the short engagement, and two others, seriously wounded, died aboard H.M.S Greyhound.

Their names:

• Cataldo Antonante, sub-chief gunner, from Brindisi, missing.
• Giacomo Certo, sailor motorist, from Messina, deceased.
• Michele Martinelli, sub-chief engineman, from Capannori, missing.
• Doris Matteucci, sailor electrician, from Carmignano, missing.
• Salvatore Perrone, sailor electrician, from Maglie, missing.
• Alfredo Sebastianutti, Chief Mechanic Third Class, from Udine, missing.
• Guido Speciale, stoker sailor, from Naples, missing.

Above, a picture of the Anfitrite’s crew. Below, signatures from the crew members
(Coll. Alfredo Sebastianutti, via www.grupsom.com)

Commander Ghersina and the other survivors were all rescued from the water by H.M.S. Greyhound; some of the survivors, including sub-lieutenant Ridi, were initially gathered in the British commander’s quarters. The total number of Anfitrite’s survivors is variously given by different sources as 39 or 43; the aforementioned “The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: Vol. II: November 1940-December 1941” speaks of 43 survivors rescued, two of whom died on board the Greyhound, which would mean that there were 41 survivors, while the British telegram of March 9, 1941, mentioned above, speaks of 39 survivors.

Once the recovery of the survivors was completed, Greyhound started up again. Sub-lieutenant Ridi, who was left alone with Commander Ghersina, learned from the latter that the Anfitrite’s hydrophones had not heard the enemy convoy, and that the explosions of the depth charges had caused waterways in the auxiliary engines compartment, forcing the surface to emerge.

The survivors of Anfitrite were disembarked by H.M.S. Greyhound in Alexandria; from there they were shortly transferred to a sorting camp near Cairo, where a few days later they were interrogated by Royal Navy officers (it would appear that, in June 1941, the survivors of the submarine, in whole or in part, were prisoners in Egypt). Sub-Lieutenant Ridi then recalled that the questions concerned the base from which the Anfitrite had departed, the position where the capture had taken place, the number of submarines based in Leros, and other things he did not remember; He refused to answer technical questions.

Then, the paths of the men of the Amfitrite diverged: some, like the sergeant electrician Francesco D’Amelio and several comrades, were taken to captivity in England; others, such as Sub-Lieutenant Marino Ridi, in India; still others, such as Sergeant Motorist Edmondo Tardi, remained in South Africa. Many were able to return to Italy only in 1946, a year after the end of the war: both Francesco D’Amelio and Edmondo Tardi, for example, were released from captivity only in April 1946; Marino Ridi, even later.

Francesco D’Amelio was initially interned for a few months in prison camp No. 8 of Zonderwater, near Pretoria, South Africa, from where he was later transferred to England, in prison camp No. 59 of Sawtry (Huntingdonshire, Cambridgeshire), remaining there until April 23rd, 1946. Camp 59 at Sawtry (also known as Wood Walton Lane camp) hosted a few hundred Italian prisoners, housed in prefabricated concrete (some of which, used in the post-war period to house homeless families, still exist today) and “barracks nissen” (rounded buildings made of corrugated iron); It also had its own hospital and chapel.

Later in the war, the Italians were joined by German prisoners, whose number increased to over a thousand by the end of the war. The prisoners were assigned to work in the fields for the local farms, or even in “gardening” work. After the armistice, apparently, the contingent of Italian prisoners was reorganized as the 59th Italian Labor Battalion, which also included D’Amelio; the “Italian Labor Battalions” were created after September 8^th, 1943, when Italy was no longer an enemy of the Allies, and were composed of prisoners – the majority (about 114,000, throughout the United Kingdom), although there was a not insignificant number (40,000 in the United Kingdom) who refused for various reasons – who, given the new situation, had agreed to collaborate in the Allied war effort (cooperative volunteers); they would have received better working treatment, they would have been paid more and in British currency (instead of the camp currency) which they could also send to their families in Italy, and they would have enjoyed greater freedom (elimination of fences, abolition of armed guards when they went to work).

Like so many others in Sawtry, Francesco D’Amelio was made to work on a farm; The treatment was good, so much so that for several years after the war he maintained cordial correspondence with the owners of the farm, and during his imprisonment, he also had the opportunity to learn English very well. Much worse, in his memory, was his treatment during his initial period of imprisonment in South Africa.

D’Amelio’s family, however, was initially informed that he was missing in the sinking of the submarine, not a prisoner: believed to have died at sea, a solemn funeral was celebrated with the participation of the local authorities and a “card” was even printed (“Francesco Antonio D’Amelio, October 5th 1917-March 20^th, 1941, heroically fallen in the Aegean Sea for the greatness of Italy”) with photos and a prayer in his memory. Only 6-8 months after the sinking was it known that he was alive and a prisoner in England; His family sent him a prayer card and he was able to laugh about it.

The story of Edmondo Tardi is very similar: he too was declared missing in action, and in his town, Finale Ligure, a symbolic funeral was celebrated, with an empty coffin. On his tomb, in the local cemetery, a cross was erected that read: ” Edmondo Tardi, 1917-1941, missing”. Five years later, “like a ghost”, Edmondo Tardi reappeared alive and well in front of his mother.

Francesco D’Amelio, one of the crew members of Anfritrite
(Coll. Antonio D’Amelio, via www.grupsom.com)

Diametrically opposed, however, is the story of the third-class chief mechanic Alfredo Sebastianutti, 31, from Friuli. In his case, the family received a letter stating that their relative was alive and well, a prisoner in Greece: but then nothing more was heard of him, he never returned after the war. A mysterious case for at least two aspects: apparently, the survivors of the Anfitrite, after the sinking, were taken to Egypt, not to Greece (so it is not clear how Sebastianutti could have ended up in a Greek prison camp); moreover, on the lists of the fallen and missing of the Navy in the last world war Sebastianutti Alfredo is missing, not in captivity but in action, on March 6th, 1941, that is, that of the sinking of the Anfitrite…

(**) Searching for information about the loss of the Anfitrite, a profoundly different version has also emerged, narrated on some forums by a nephew of a survivor of the Anfitrite, the sub-chief Edmondo Tardi. According to these, the Anfitrite would have sighted and attacked the convoy (which would have been escorted by six destroyers), approaching with a shrewd maneuver and launching after waiting for the favorable moment, after darkness fell, a salvo of torpedoes, which would have hit three destroyers, setting them on fire. Quickly submerged to a high depth, the submarine would have been subjected to a series of attacks with depth charges, getting closer and closer, until it was hit by bombs and sunk with some victims among the crew, while the survivors, stuck inside the submarine resting on the seabed and unable to rise, would have escaped from the submarine and reached the surface,  one at a time, by means of the “Gerolimi-Arata” bell (a device installed on Italian submarines in the 1930s and designed precisely for the escape and ascent of sunken submarines). Most of the men who thus emerged would be killed by automatic weapons fire as soon as they reached the surface, except for seven (including Tardi, who would be wounded in the left thigh by a bullet, not seriously), who would be rescued by the same British ships several hours later, at dawn the following day.

This version does not seem reliable, since it appears to be completely incompatible both with the official version reported by both Italian and British sources, and with the testimonies of other survivors of the Amfitrite (which are instead consistent with the official version: Marino Ridi, Francesco D’Amelio), and because it appears from the lists of the Navy that the fallen of the Amfitrite were seven, and not the majority of the crew. Finally, the ascent of the survivors from the sunken submarine would have been completely impossible, since at the point where the Anfitrite sank the sea is over a thousand meters deep, and if there were any compartments left inside it that were still watertight, the boat would have been crushed by the pressure well before reaching the seabed (no submarine of the time could withstand more than 200-300 meters of depth. 

Moreover, the Gerolimi-Arata bell – like any other escape system existing at the time – would have allowed the ascent only from a submarine sunk to a depth of no more than a hundred meters). Nor does it seem plausible that the British crew, if indeed they had killed most of the survivors as they resurfaced, would then have changed their minds, and rescued the remaining seven, that is, with many dangerous witnesses of what would have been unequivocally a war crime.

The question remains, also considering that the passage of time that often distorts the memory of veterans (Francesco D’Amelio, for example, also “remembered” that the Anfitrite, not having detected the enemy ships due to the faulty hydrophone, had accidentally surfaced right in the middle of the British convoy, and then immediately dived with the rapid once he realized the mistake, but was immediately damaged by the counterattack of the escort. This surfacing in the middle of the convoy does not appear from the official sources), on how a story so different from what appears from other survivors and official sources was born (the story would be the result in part of the diary written by Edmondo Tardi during his imprisonment, and in part in the stories of Tardi himself, reported, however, through his wife, that she listened to them from her husband and told her nephew decades later; his nephew was only thirteen years old when Tardi died.)

Original Italian text by Lorenzo Colombo translated by Cristiano D’Adamo

Operational Records

Type	Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
Submarine – Coastal	7		4,386	970	48	111.58	4.65

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank
Antonante	Cataldo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Certo	Giacomo	Naval Rating	Comune
Martinelli	Michele	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Matteucci	Loris	Naval Rating	Comune
Persone	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune
Sebastianutti	Alfredo	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Speciale	Guido	Naval Rating	Comune

The Ammiraglio Millo was an oceanic submarine of the “Ammiragli” class. Built by the CRDA shipyard of Monfalcome, it entered active service on May 1^st, 1941. From May to October 1941, it was engaged in crew training becoming fully operational on September 15th. Due to its large size, it was used to transport supplies rather than the original design as ocean rader. The “Ammiragli” class was designed to navigate from Italy to Italian Somalia around the African continent without stopping.

The submarine Millo

On November 21^st, 1941, it sailed from Taranto for the first mission to transport 138 tons of gasoline cans and 6.8 tons of anti-tank ammunition boxes to Derna. The Millo arrived in the Libyan port on the evening of November 23rd, unloaded, and departed on the morning of November 24th, arriving in Taranto two days later. Unloading took usually place at night to avoid British aerial attacks which were common and precise.

Other missions of this type took place on November 30th (Bardia and Benghazi), December 23rd (Tripoli) and January 26^th, 1942 (Tripoli). While returning from this last voyage and near the coast of Libya, the boat was the target of an air attack with bombs but escaped unscathed. In all, on these four transport missions, the Millo carried 365.2 tons of fuel, 167 tons of ammunition, and 91 tons of supplies.

On March 6^th, 1942, the boat was deployed southeast of Malta as part of Operation V5, protecting an Italian convoy carrying supplies bound for Libya. Millo, along with other submarines, was to attack any surface units that had departed from Malta to attack the convoy. Six days later, finding no enemy ships, it returned to base.

The MILLO in 1942 outside Taranto
(Photo courtesy Erminio Bagnasco and Achille Rastelli)

At 01.23 PM on March 14th, the Millo was navigating off Cape d’Armi (Motta San Giovanni, Calabria) and zigzagging on the surface heading towards Taranto to return to base. There, it was sighted by the British submarine H.M.S. Ultimatum (Lieutenant P.R.H. Harrison) under a waning moon. The British captain launched a spread of four torpedoes: two of the weapons hit respectively amidships and aft of the Conning tower, causing the sudden sinking of the Millo in position 38°27′ N and 16°37′ E. Images of the wreck, found in 2005, would suggest a single hit to the bow, not aft. The official report of Lieutenant Harrison reads:

1255 hours – Sighted the conning tower of a submarine bearing 270°. Range was about 8000 yards. Started attack.

1319 hours – Fired four torpedoes from 2200 yards. Two hits were obtained and the submarine was seen to sink.

1325 hours – Surfaced and picked up fourteen survivors. These included four officers and ten ratings.

1402 hours – Dived and withdrew from the area. In the evening Lt. Harrison decided to return to Malta to land the Italian survivors.

The second explosion was probably one of the Millo’s own torpedoes going off. It should be noted that Ultimatum went undetected by the Millo for 24 minutes.

Officially, the Italian skipper, Commander Vincenzo D’Amato, two other officers and 52 non-commissioned officers and sailors were lost with the submarine (some sources indicate a total of 58 victims), while the second lieutenant commander Marcello Bertini (who after the war wrote important manuscripts on Italian submarines in the Mediterranean for U.S.M.M., the historical office of the navy) three other officers, two non-commissioned officers and eight sailors were rescued and captured by the Ultimatum. A last survivor, electrician Sergeant Lingua, was rescued by a boat which had witnessed the sinking.

As mentioned, the wreck of the submarine was found in September 2005, lying on its left side, at a depth of between 65 and 72 meters.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
10		8,045	532	40	214.43	8.93

Actions

No offensive actions reported.

Crew Members Lost

Last Name	First Name	Rank	Italian Rank
Agnoloni	Renzo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Aimone	Antimo	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Alessandria	Lorenzo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Almasio	Domenico	Naval Rating	Comune
Barbieri	Nino	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Bassi	Franco	Naval Rating	Comune
Benini	Paride	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Bonini	Luigi	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Bressan	Igino	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Buccolieri	Benedetto	Naval Rating	Comune
Buonanno	Vincenzo	Naval Rating	Comune
Buratta	Aldo	Sergeant	Sergente
Capadura	Giulio	Naval Rating	Comune
Cellai	Giorgio	Naval Rating	Comune
Cesarini	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune
Chiesa	Giuseppe	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Ciampa	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune
Colloredo	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Crocetta	Antonio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Cucinotta	Antonio	Naval Rating	Comune
D’amato	Vincenzo	Lieutenant Commander	Capitano di Corvetta
Dameri	Carlo	Ensign Other Branches	Sottotenente Altri Corpi
De Poli	Rino	Naval Rating	Comune
Del Mastro	Davide	Naval Rating	Comune
Di Biase	Giulio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Di Fonzio	Pietro	Naval Rating	Comune
Di Meglio	Salvatore	Naval Rating	Comune
Di Sebastiano	Giuseppe	Naval Rating	Comune
Diana	Desiderio	Naval Rating	Comune
Federigo	Mario	Naval Rating	Comune
Ferrandina	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Fioretti	Canzio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Fracchioni	Leiio	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Gallo	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune
Garofalo	Eduardo	Naval Rating	Comune
Leotta	Salvatore	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Loffredo	Nicola	Chief 3rd Class	Capo di 3a Classe
Marigo	Antonio	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Paci	Andrea	Ensign	Guardiamarina
Palumbo	Rocco	Naval Rating	Comune
Parati	Vittorio	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Pasini	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Piccolroaz	Bruno	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Prati	Guido	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Prodigi	Civili	Naval Rating	Comune
Rogora	Luigi	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Rossanda	Francesco	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Saggiomo	Domenico	Naval Rating	Comune
Santese	Francesco	Naval Rating	Comune
Sebastio	Leopoldo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Stefanini	Danilo	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Stilo	Giovanni	Junior Chief	Sottocapo
Storani	Nazareno	Chief 2nd Class	Capo di 2a Classe
Vaccaro	Umberto	Naval Rating	Comune
Vianello	Walter	Junior Chief	Sottocapo

The Uebi Scebeli was a costal submarine of the Class Adua, “600” series, Type Bernardis, built by the Tosi shipyard of Taranto and delivered to the Regia Marina on December 21^st, 1937.

Taranto, October 3rd, 1937 – the launching of the Uebi Scebeli

At the beginning of the conflict – June 10^th, 1940 – it was dispatched to lie in wait off Cerigotto (Antikythera, Greece), but returned to base five days later with no sightings reported. It then carried out a second patrol, in an antisubmarine function, in the Gulf of Taranto along with the Settembrini.

On June 27^th, 1940, it left Taranto under the command of Lieutenant Bruno Zani, bound for a point 35 miles northeast of Derna (Libya), as the assigned area of operations. At 6:30 AM on June 29th, while on the surface on the approach route, she sighted three British destroyers: H.M.S. Dainty, H.M.S. Defender, and H.M.S. Ilex. These units were at sea as part of the British operation “MA 3” (to protect British convoy traffic between Egypt, Malta and Greece). Two days earlier, these destroyers had already sunk the submarine Console Liuzzi, after Uebi Scebeli they later attacked and sunk the Argonauta.

The Uebi Scebeli had to make the crash dive – it was in fact not in a suitable position to attack – and then tried, at periscope depth, to go to the attack. Detected by British destroyers, the submarine was heavily bombarded with depth charges which it was unable to avoid despite various evading maneuvers, thus suffering serious damage which caused waterways.

The crew of the Uebi Scebeli taken prisoner by the Royal Navy
(Australian War Memorial)

Forced to the surface, the Uebi Scebeli was  targted by cannon and machine-gun fire. It was abandoned by the crew, who in the meantime had started the self-scuttling maneuvers. Part of the secret documents (mostly maps and codes) were thrown into the sea and others locked inside the submarine now irreparably in the process of sinking, but a lifeboat from H.M.S. Defender boarded it before it sank. The submarine sank at 7:00 AM, at 35°29′ N and 20°06′ E finished off by the 4.7 inch guns of H.M.S. Dainty.

However, some of the ciphers thrown into the water did not sink immediately – even though these documents were equipped with weights specifically for this purpose – and thus fell into British hands. The salvage encryption material, including the latest codebook may have been responsible for the sinking of the submarine Argonauta on June 29^th as it was returned from Tobruk. The entire crew of the Uebi Shebeli was rescued – and taken prisoner – by the British destroyers.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
3		1,437	149	11	144.18	6.01

The Vettor Pisani was a coastal submarine of the Pisani class which also included the Des Geneys, Giovanni Bausan, and Marcantonio Colonna. It secretly took part in the Spanish War with a single patrol during which it unsuccessfully launched two torpedoes at a ship.

At the outbreak of World War II, under the command of Junio Valerio Borghese, it carried out only two offensive patrols. The first in the last ten days of June 1940 and the second in the middle of July. Both patrols took place west of Malta and were not successful in locating enemy traffic.

The Vector Pisani still on the slip in Monfalcone

The Vettor Pisani also conducted patrols along the Italian coast until the end of 1940. Thereafter, due to its operational state – the boat was quite old – it was assigned to the Submarine School in Pula, for which he carried out 286 training missions, as well as some anti-submarine patrols.

Following the armistice, at the time the commander was lieutenant Commander Mario Resio, it relocated to Taranto and from there, in October 1943, to Naples. In January 1944 the Vector Pisani moved to Augusta and two months later back to Taranto; It continued to train until the end of the war, when it was laid up. Decommissioned on 1 February 1948, the Vector Pisani was sent for scrapping.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
21		4,759	286	29	173.97	7.25

Volframio was a costal submarine of the Class Platino (also known as “Metalli”, or metals), “600” series, Type Bernardis. The boat, built by the Tosi shipyard of Taranto, was delivered to the Regia Marina on February 15^th, 1942. On August 7th, the boat was sent on patrol between Algeria, Ibiza, and Mallorca, in an area between the meridians 1°40′ E and 2°40′ E. Three days later, he was ordered to report any sightings and to attack only thereafter. The British operation “Pedestal” had begun, which later resulted in the Battle of Mid-August, and it was necessary for the enemy formation to be attacked by packs of submarines. However, the Volframio was unable to attack.

Volframio alongside the Bronzo

Thereafter, the Volframio was deployed in Cagliari, with Lieutenant Giovanni Manunta as commander. The boat was then chosen for some special operations. The Volframio sailed from the Sardinian base on the evening of February 2^nd, 1943, with a group of 11 saboteurs on board to be disembarked between Cape Carbon and Cape Sigli, Algeria. It arrived in the area set for the landing of the saboteurs on the night of February 6th but was unable to disembark the team immediately due to rough seas. On February 8th, the Volframio was detected by enemy units and bombarded with depth charges, however it managed to evade the hunt. On February 9th, unable to land the raiders because the weather and sea conditions had not improved, Captain Manunta was forced to return to Cagliari.

On March 30th, in the afternoon, the boat left La Maddalena to attempt again the failed prior mission. It was expected to arrive between Capo Carbon and Capo Sigli between April 5^th and 8^th and disembarked the eleven raiders. Again, the landing of the saboteurs had to be abandoned due to bad weather.

The armistice surprised the Volframio in maintenance in La Spezia. Unable to leave port, it was scuttled on September 9^th, 1943, to avoid capture. Recovered by the Germans, in 1944 it was hit during an Allied air raid and sank again in the port.

Operational Records

Patrols (Med.)	Patrols (Other)	NM Surface	NM Sub.	Days at Sea	NM/Day	Average Speed
15		9,040	1,733	79	136.37	5.68