Aldo Fraccaroli: “Naval Photographer”

Aldo Fraccaroli, one of the greatest naval photographers of all time, was born on November 17th, 1919 in Trieste, Italy. For decades naval historians and casual viewers have admired the incredible work of this dedicated man. His father, Arnaldo, was a journalist for the large daily newspaper “Corriere della Sera”, while his mother, Lisetta Camerino, was a housewife originally from Trieste. During their residence in Trieste, Arnaldo was often assigned to foreign countries, amongst them Sweden and Hungary, while his wife received the support of her family. In 1925, six years after Aldo’s birth, the Fraccaroli family returned to Milan where Aldo entered school. He graduated, on schedule, from the “Berchet” lyceum (high school) in 1937.

Aldo Fraccaroli
The photographer retired in Lugano, Switzerland and passed away in March, 2010 at the age of 91

Life in the large Lombard metropolis was as far as it could be from the sea and the only exposure were vacations and trips aboard ships, such as the one on the Conte Grande, in 1933. It is in this period that Aldo Fraccaroli, using a Kodak “Hawk Eye” ,began taking snapshots of ships, including the first picture of a military vessel, the torpedo boat Grado.

After the first tries with the Kodak, Fraccaroli received a German Rolleiflex 6×6 with a Tassar lens. This was a real step toward professional photography. This was also the beginning of a long and illustrious professional life, which resulted in the establishment of a library of 3,700 volumes and the creation of one of the largest collections of naval pictures in the world, amounting to over 77,000 snapshots.

The first foray into international publishing circles took place after the great naval show in the Gulf of Naples (also known as “Rivista H”), which took place on May 5th 1938 with Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in attendance. After the parade, the very respected Jane’s Fighting Ships published some of the pictures taken by the young photographer. This was a relationship which would last throughout the years, but which naturally had to be interrupted between 1940 and 1945. After the “Rivista H” Fraccaroli upgraded once again his equipment, acquiring another German camera, a Bentzin Permaflex 6×6 with exchangeable lenses.

Due to poor vision, Fraccaroli knew that he would have never passed the rigorous physical examination required to enter the Naval Academy in Leghorn, but with a new law passed in 1937, he was able to apply as an officer of the naval Reserve. He was admitted to the 1939 courses and he was at the Naval Academy of Leghorn when Germany invaded Poland. He entered service as sub-lieutenant in the commissary (purser) department; he would eventually retire with the rank of Captain.

After his commission, he served in the XII Minesweeping Flotilla based in Venice. In 1941 he was transferred to the XI Antisubmarine Group in Greece. In 1942, in part thanks to his frenetic activity as a photographer, Fraccaroli was transferred to the Ministry of the Navy in Rome. During the war period, Fraccaroli took some unique pictures, including those of the aircraft carrier Acquila, which, up to the present, remain the only testimony of the period. On the day of the armistice, Fraccaroli was in Rome and perhaps this fact explains the very poor photographic collection we have of the event surrounding the transfer of the Italian fleet to Malta and the sinking of the battleship Roma.

During this period of great confusion and civil war, Fraccaroli was able to return to Milan and complete his studies in Jurisprudence in 1944. In April 1945 he was able to return to duty for about one year and he finally retired in 1946. His journalistic activity began with articles and pictures published by the newspapers L’Italia and Il Popolo and magazines, such as Epoca. He also collaborated with the Reader’s Digest and began publishing quite extensively with Jane’s Fighting Ships.

In 1950 he published his first book, “Dalla piroga alla portaerei” and also translated part of A.B. Cunningham’s “Sailor’s Odyssey” into Italian (only the chapters relative to the war in the Mediterranean). In 1953, he was recalled to duty, but not by accident; his desire to return to the sea was immense and he had heavily lobbied for it. This was a small tour of duty, only three months, but yet another opportunity to take marvelous pictures. He would later return aboard Italian ships, but this time as a civilian journalist. His interest in naval affairs and his passion for photography continue to the present.

A few years ago, the renowned naval historian Erminio Bagnasco published under the Albertelli Editor label a book titled “Aldo Fraccaroli, fotografo navale”. Unfortunately for the non-Italian speaker, the book was published only in Italian, but it is strongly recommended not only for the excellent pictures, many of which were previously unpublished, but also for the pleasant narrative.

Interview with Mario Daneo. I Remember: ‘The War Diary of an Italian Submariner in Bordeaux’

Born in Fiume (this town, now part of Croatia, was at the time integral an part of Italy) on October 2nd, 1909, Mario Daneo entered the Italian Navy as a volunteer in 1929 at the age of 20. After five years in the service, Daneo left the Navy and entered civilian service as an engine officer for various Italian shipping companies. Called back to service during the war, Mr. Daneo served as a non-commissioned officer in the submarine service. After the war, Mr. Daneo returned to Fiume from which he then moved to Venice, living in Mestre until 1975, when he moved to Dolo, a small town not too far from Venice.

Mr. Mario Daneo in Dolo after retirement (Photo Marco Manfrin)


After 1987, Daneo resided at Dolo’s “Casa di Riposo”, a retirement home where he passed away a few years later. This short summary of Mr. Daneo’s life introduces us to a short manuscript he left to posterity and which we are pleased to present in a slightly edited version. In these memoirs written many years after the events, Mr. Daneo introduces us to life aboard an Italian submarine serving in the Atlantic and at the Italian submarine base of Bordeaux. Some of the dates, fogged by time, are not accurate, but the full meaning of the story remains. ——————————————————————————– I remember… We had just arrived in Venice with a load of 10,000 tons of corn, and docked under the silos. As usual, the first aboard was the shipping company’s agent for the customary paperwork, bringing along mail for the crew. In this manner, I received an express letter in which my wife let me know that five or six days earlier a representative of the Port Captaincy had come to my house with a green draft card. My wife told him that I was aboard the M/V Venier of the shipping company Sidarma. Accordingly, the representative held on to my card and began following my moves. It was May 7th or 8th and I was in Trieste where we loaded some goods (trucks, ambulances, ammunitions, food, two 120 mm guns, and two 20 mm machine guns) destined for Tripoli. Soon after, though, everything changed because during the journey the Ministry sent orders (we had been militarized) to continuously change our course. There were orders and counter orders and finally we found ourselves in Taranto. The city was under curfew and everything was dark. A raid by British torpedo bombers, I don’t remember if three or four, flew over our heads dropping torpedoes which hit an Italian battleship. What struck me were signals made by someone ashore with a flashlight to direct the airplane in the right direction for the launch of the torpedoes. People spoke of espionage or treason, but nothing came out of it. On this occasion came Mussolini with the High Command of the Navy to verify how all this could have happened, considering that we were only at the beginning of the war. We received orders from Rome to depart, escorted by two destroyers, but without being given a destination. As it was well known, there were posters both aboard and in the seaport, “Don’t talk! The enemy is listening!!” When we saw Mt. Vesuvius, we understood that we were arriving in Naples; here finally we docked in the military area. The following day, a Navy sub-lieutenant arrived aboard with a sergeant major and delivered a draft card to the captain, “Why do I have to disembark if I am already militarized?” I asked my captain. The lieutenant who had come aboard explained that since the Nostromo, a sailor, and I were former volunteers and N.C.Os with specific skills in the Navy, we had to disembark


Mr. DANEO’s family in 1940. (Photo Marco Manfrin)


Meantime, several weeks had passed since we had arrived around the 12th or 13th of December. I had five days to report to the navy depot in Pula. On December 15th, I arrived home in Fiume and at 8:30 on the 19th, I left for Pula where I arrived in the afternoon at 2 p.m.; six hours of train at the time. I went to the navy depot where I presented myself to the office and delivered the draft card. A sailor escorted me to the second floor where there was a large corridor and I was placed in a large room; there were five more noncommissioned officers dressed in civilian clothes waiting for the medical. We stayed together two days and on the third day we were called up for a medical examination performed by a colonel. The visit consisted of the measurement of height and weight. I was hoping to fare well because of a gastric ulcer, but it was not to be so! After a few days, those of us who had passed the medical went to the tailor to have measurements taken for our uniforms. Due to the confusion that reigned in that room, every Saturday I used to go home by a bus that stopped in every town on the Gulf of Quarnaro: Albona, Moschiena, Laurama (my wife’s town), Abbazia, Volosca and Fiume. Every Monday I would return to Pula at 11:00 a.m. Every day but Saturday and Sunday we had a general assembly at 2:00 p.m. in the building in front of the depot. I was lined up with the other NCO’s when it was time to receive our assignments which were given based on the requirements of the various commands. Three of us were selected because we were more than 1.7 m. tall; then sailors and officers assigned to the San Marco battalion. Those of us selected were later on posted on a bulletin board located in the caretaker’s lodge listing the assignment and departure date.


The Regia Marina’s barracks in La Spezia.

I spent Christmas and New Year’s Day 1940 at home with my wife and 2 ½ year-old son. For me the order to leave came on January 15th; I was assigned to La Spezia aboard the submarine Morosini commanded by C. V. Fraternale (in reality, the commanding officer of the Morosini was C.C. Criscualo chlater replaced by C.C. Fraternale). On February 4th, 1941 I was in La Spezia at the submarine depot. We made the usual introductions with the other members of the crew. I was the second chief mechanic. On February 10th we left but did not know where we were going. After four days of navigation, we caught a glimpse of the coast: it was the Moroccan one. The Strait of Gibraltar was controlled by British corvettes during the day and light projectors at night. I remember that we did about 10 miles underwater, then continued on the surface. We arrived in the Atlantic. At a distance, with the binoculars, we caught a glimpse of the Portuguese coast. After two days, if I remember correctly, we were in sight of the French coast in the Gulf of Biscay. At 5 AM, we entered [the Gironde] with the French pilot escorted in military uniform as they say, on close watch. After three hours, we arrived in Bordeaux in the docks, like in Venice. Each dry dock could host two submarines. After a couple of days of rest, we received orders to get ready for a mission that could last two months.


Lieutenant Commander Athos Fraternale (Photo Elio Andò)


My boat was considered the “Oceanic” type because it was larger than those operating in the Mediterranean. In peacetime, the crew included 60 men, but in wartime it was 90, 30 more. The area assigned to each boat was 40 square miles, a diameter of 65 km. Aboard, water was rationed and was needed for the kitchen. We had one-liter canteens and they had to last 24 hours for drinking, washing, etc. We all had beards and, once a week, for those who wanted to shave, the barber had a little extra water, but it was more salty than fresh. The first days on the mission, we would eat bread loaded ashore; thereafter and for as long as the mission lasted, we ate only hard tack, which required good, strong teeth and a stomach made of concrete. The first mission lasted 55 days; nothing out of the ordinary took place and we returned to base. As established, half the crew received a 15-day license, plus a round trip journey of 4 days. The journey thus began from Paris in the upper Lorena and we would arrive in Meltz, a German city, to then cross the whole of Germany to arrive in Munich. From here, a new train would take us to the Italian border. To arrive in Trieste, we had to go through Bolzano, Trento, Vicenza, and Mestre near Venice. We used local trains with 3rd class cars with wooden seats, as one might still find, but only on secondary lines. It was September 1941. In the early days of October, we left again for a new mission. Once arrived in our area of operations in the middle of the Atlantic, we stopped our main engines and started the auxiliary one to produce light and recharge the batteries in the various compartments. At a given point, from the bridge we received orders to move (smoke at the horizon) and we proceeded. The captain checked the ship’s listing; it was a Dutch ship of about 4,000 tons for civilian use as a tanker.


The submarine Morosini


We moved into position and then submerged to 7 or 8 meters to use the periscope. Two torpedoes forward and two aft were ready for launch. We heard orders from the captain “fire one”, 15 seconds later “fire two”, and after 30 seconds, which felt like an eternity, we heard two large explosions, one after another, muffled at a distance; we had reached the target. We returned to the surface and the ship was listing to one side and stopping. The second torpedo had hit the extreme stern where the propeller was located. We got close enough to see the crew members lowering the life boats into the water and getting away from the ship and closer to us, asking to be taken aboard. The captain replied that this would not be possible because they were enemy shipwrecked. We got even closer and prepared the deck gun at a distance of about 800 meters and then sank the ship. It was February 1942 when we found ourselves again in an area of operations and sighted a merchant ship. We launched two torpedoes at a depth of two meters and they left a trail visible only with the binoculars. The ship, since it was armed, opened fire, forcing us to submerge to a depth of 30 meters. After two hours, we stopped hearing gunfire and returned to the surface. It was already late evening, so the captain gave order to return to the assigned area to continue patrolling. We assumed that the ship we had attacked was British, and that it had sent a signal to base. We were later attacked by a group of destroyers. Assessing the danger, we were given orders to crash dive. We were at least at 30 meters when the bombs began exploding nearby, then we went down to 100 meters. We stayed there, still, without even a whisper. The destroyers passed above us, and then passed again, continuously dropping bombs. I don’t remember how many hours we remained like this. This way, the captain made the British believe that we were hit, so they moved on. After many hours, we slowly returned to the surface. It was night when we could breathe a little bit of fresh air. After reporting the events to the base, we were told to return: By then it had been more than 50 days since our departure. Once on land, it became known that the “Barbarigo” and the “Finzi” were also returning to base. The captain of the “Barbarigo” thought that he had sunk an American battleship off the American coast. The escort destroyers stopped to pick up the survivors.


The submarine base in Bordeaux after the bombardment of June 1943.

The episode narrated refers to the bombardment of Spring 1942..
It was March 1942. At the base in Bordeaux, in addition to officers, N.C.O.s, sailors, carabinieri, and troops of the S. Marco Battalion, there were fifty workers from the Monfalcone shipyard for the maintenance of the submarines. Suddenly, the alarm went off. We all got out and sought refuge in the bunkers built by the Germans. Here, I lost a dear friend of mine whom I had known since 5th grade. We were always together. His name was Zanella and before being called up he was a municipal policeman in Fiume. He was very dear and cared about others to the extreme. He was part of the S. Marco Battalion and was eating when a bomb fell near the kitchen barrack. A fragment wounded a 15-year old French boy who was an assistant cook. Zanella, along with other sailors, picked the wounded up to take him to the other side of the basin [Bassin à Flot]. They had to pass over the locks which were the British main target. When, along with the wounded, they arrived at the second lock, a bomb shrapnel mortally wounded my friend in the back. I will always remember all he had on him: letters, pictures, mementos, wallet, etc. I took them and delivered them to his family who had already been informed of his death. With the locks broken by the British, the “bacin a flot” emptied out and the submarines were left listing with only steel cables holding them to the docks.


The Italian submarine base in Bacalan, Bordeaux (Photo U.S.M.M.)


September 8th, 1943. Fortunately, I was at the base. Everyone was astounded and speechless. The following day we were called in the square and our commanding officer, along with the general commander in charge of the city, gave us a long speech in which he informed us that those of us who felt like it could continue with their assignment as before. My friend Precis Palesano and I (he was a 3rd class Chief) looked at each other and decided to stay. Of the 2,000 personnel from the Navy, the S. Marco Battalion, Carabinieri, workers and specialists, more than 300 stayed. The others had to pack their suitcases and backpacks. At 16:30, five or six Germans came in and began loading all those who did not want to stay, and they were brought to a camp outside Bordeaux; whatever was not needed was taken away. More than one felt guilty and came back.


Mario Daneo in wearing the uniform of the “Reggimento San Marco” (Photo Marco Manfrin)


After the landing in Normandy, we received orders to withdraw. By chance, I was given the command of a truck. I had with me six sailors and the driver, a sergeant from the S. Marco Battalion. We had to follow the caravan of retreating Germans. Once in Poitiers, halfway between Paris and Bordeaux, we stopped. The Italian commander gave me orders to refuel and get two sacks of wood and coal for the boiler. I took advantage of the situation to ask a French merchant if he could procure me some topographical maps of the region. I reversed direction and went back on the same road we had come from. Map in hand, I turned toward a boulevard with trees alongside which led to a small wood, where I was sure we were under cover. Here I met two French, husband and wife, whom I would later take to Bordeaux because they had to continue on to Spain. I instructed the French to go to a nearby village to purchase white sheets and some paint. We wanted to make some French flags and armbands. Meantime, we attempted to get rid of our uniforms and dug a hole to bury everything. We left on the truck a Breda machine gun plus my small Beretta 7.65 mm and returned to Bordeaux. Here I reported to the Italian consulate and let them know where I had hidden the weapons. The following day, they went but did not find anything because local peasants had already taken everything. I told them I would have to present myself to the Consulate in Marseilles. They placed us in a large dorm on straw mattresses. We were fine for a few days. One day, while we were eating in the refectory, we heard a few machinegun shots from upstairs, more precisely from the dorm where I was located. A worker from the Monfalcone shipyard had shot himself in the mouth. I was one of the first to help him out. The same afternoon, the French police came by truck, sequestered the weapons, and took us to a German prison camp, just outside Marseilles. We were placed in barracks with about 40 people each. We had lice and slept on straw. Every morning, the French counted us and after 20 or 25 days the Yugoslavian delegation came asking us where we were from. I answered that I was from Fiume, others were from Gorizia or other Istrian villages. Five or six of us were transferred to another camp with the Yugoslavians. Thanks to them, we were able to make it to Fiume in a freight car. Here, I gave my address and they let me go. This was the end of my war. Mario Daneo

Our special thanks to Mr. Marco Manfrin, grandson of Mr. Marco Daneo who provided us with most of the material published.


Mr. Manfrin with his grandfather, Mario Daneo while visiting the US. (photo Marco Manfrin)

Interview with Commander Romano

Mr. Romano, I would like to thank you for having given us the opportunity to interview you. As we already mentioned, we are interested in the period 1940-1943.

Before answering your question, I must make a preliminary remark. I know that you see, with great diligence and depth, the events of the “Regia Marina” during World War II in the period 1940 to 1943. Allow me to remind you that for the “Regia Marina” the war did not end on September 8th, 1943 but continued on until April 25th, 1945. For some of us, it went on until 1946, when we were no longer “Regia”, but continued our small war clearing the seas of mines of any kind to reopen them to free navigation.

This last war was not one “en masse”, but I assure you that given the dangers of the underwater weapons spread out and the technical characteristics of the equipment used to neutralize them, this was also considered a war and recognized as such to all effects

Do you remember where you were the day war was declared? (June 10th, 1940)

I perfectly remember what happened on June 10th, 1940. I was an ‘avanguardista’ (a rank within the youth movement of the Fascist Party), musketeer, actually I was a cadet. I had the highest rank an “avanguardista” (from vanguard) could reach. My responsibilities were simple, for instance: in case of “general assembly” I would gather the largest possible number of “avanguardisti” and reach, running, Piazza Venezia. I underline on foot. For those who know Rome, running from Piazza Mazzini to Piazza Venezia is not a stroll!

Thus one might ask, “What was a general assembly?” Following a prolonged wailing of the sirens, all activist had to interrupt, wear their uniforms, and run to Piazza Venezia to listen to the Duce’s words. Then, we did not call him by his last name – Mussolini – but Duce, with the capital D. Not many general assemblies took place, as far as I remember three or four; indeed four. One on occasion of the levying of the sanctions against Italy (November 18th, 1935 if I am not mistaken), one for the conquest of Addis Ababa (May 5th, 1936), one for the proclamation of the empire (May 9th, 1936) and one for the declaration of war (June 10th, 1940). I was present at all of four general assemblies and “well” placed almost under the infamous balcony. This was because we made the journey really running, arriving at the place of the assembly before the square would become crowded by the “oceanic wave” of black shirts as seen on photographic documentation of the period.

On June 10th, 1940 it was the last time we heard the sirens in peacetime. Already the night of the 10th they went off for an aerial alarm. French airplanes flooded us with leaflets (which the following morning had disappeared by a miracle), and in the Piazza Mazzini neighborhood, where I used to live, fell an intense rain of shrapnel from our antiaircraft guns. This was my June 10th, 1940.

In an Italian movie recently released in the United States, that day was described as a moment of collective euphoria. Do you think that this description is exaggerated?

I haven’t seen the movie you mentioned, thus I cannot evaluate the level of euphoria described in the motion picture. One thing is sure, collective euphoria did exist in Piazza Venezia the afternoon of June 10th, 1940 and it is abundantly documented, but it does not count. In Piazza Venezia there were, in greater part, just us, very young schoolboys, the young Fascists (18 or older), the university students, the activists from the neighborhoods’ Fascist groups, and a large number of militia and black shirts from a great variety of social backgrounds and all relatively young.

Of course we were excited by the thought of war against the “hated plutocracies”, which would have inevitably concluded with our final victory as in Abyssinia (1935) and Spain (1938). “The word of the day is Victory… and we shall win!” (this is an exert from Mussolini’s speech) But outside Piazza Venezia everyone was shaking their heads with very strong doubts about the future. The most doubtful were those who had lived the affairs of the First World War. Reflections ranged from making sacrifices, to grief and destruction, to the realization that we were not ready to face a war, even though I believe that that day no one – because you are asking me about the collective euphoria of the 10th of June – had any ideas about what would actually happen.

Victories in Abyssinia and in Spain, and those of Hitler’s Germany, exalted to the highest by Fascist propaganda, inebriated and made us feel proud, and the idea of “breaking the enemy’s back” made us particularly euphoric. But, as early as the night of the 10th of June, the presence of enemy airplanes over the skies of Rome dimmed the enthusiasm of many, but not all, and numerous were the requests for voluntary draft or voluntary transfer to a war zone. Numerous draftees for every armed force were forcefully recalled, or kept in service, and the Italians, euphoric or not, answered the call, did their duties, faced great sacrifices than had previously been forecast. Everything considered, they did their best. If things have gone the way they have, we now know whose responsibility it was.

Probably during the first year of war you were still a student; what do you remember of the war bulletins or newsreels by LUCE. Was radio important?

I remained behind a school desk until May 31st, 1941 when with a stroke of pen the final exams were abolished and the school year closed with a regular assignment of term’s marks as if it were a regular class. My memories of the time? Every day at 1:00 PM the war bulletin, called “Official Communiqué”, was radiobroadcast in all classrooms and we listened while standing. Honestly, I must say that listening to “…one of our submarines did not return to the base”, we youths were not conscious of the military tragedy, and most of all the human one which was concealed behind those words. What we knew of the war was what the official communiqué said, and a few comments, always positive, which would appear in the newspapers, and also what was shown in the movie theaters, just before the movie (newsreels by LUCE). These last one, were always referring to events of a few weeks earlier and always covered successes of our armed forces. The radio, in addition to the communiqués of 1:00 PM and the news also at 1:00 PM and at 8:00 PM, broadcast only music of various genres, a few variety shows, a few plays and some operetta. All was rigorously broadcast live and usually from EIAR with offices on Via Asiago in Rome, or some other city (Turin, Milan, Naples, Palermo).

Now and then, taped music “…we broadcast reproduced music…” was also broadcast. At night there was a “short commentary of today’s events; Politicus speaking”. Right now I don’t remember which commentator was hiding behind this pseudonym, perhaps Mario Appelius, but the comments were always positive. There was absolutely no political debate. For the record, the identification signal exchanged by the various stations when they connected to the network was the chirping of a bird, different from station to station, and which inspired a famous song. But let’s return to the war bulletins, news in the papers, in a word diffusion of news about the progress of the war. I will not dwell on comments. Let me show you a clipping from the newspaper “La Stampa” of Turin dated April 1st, 1942, that is to say three days after the tragic night of Cape Matapan. In this clipping is reported bulletin number 297. Also, let me show you the radio program for April 2nd published by the “Corriere della Sera”.

Any reflection is up to you. Keep in mind that the first pages of the newspapers of the time were headlined in large print with the visit to Italy of the Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Matsuoka. Nothing can be found about Matapan in addition to what I have already shown you. I would also like to remind you that in those days a radio was something that very few owned. The use of an external antenna was indispensable. In some lucky locations one could use, as an alternative, the box spring of a bed. Reception was not always good. Those owning a radio were easily identifiable.

Why am I saying this?

Because, for instance, Jews were not allowed to possess radios. They had them, but could not use them due to the noticeable outside antenna. Anyway, the most fortunate amongst the Italians had “powerful” radios (6 or 7 tubes) and could, even with the box spring, dial in secret into Radio London (the one with an identifying tune very similar to the beginning of Beethoven’s Fifth symphony) and receive some news from the other side. This news, naturally, was exaggerated to the opposite.

Why did you decide to enter the Naval Academy? Was this a decision dictated by a family tradition, or a voluntary choice?

My father was an officer (originally a non-commissioned one) from the signal station corps. He took part in World War I, fighting in the trenches with the San Marco battalion, and then had followed a career path with the signal corps. As a senior non-commissioned officer, he was the chief of station of some signaling posts and my mother and I, who were his family, followed him. In particular, at the Anzio station I spent my early years and my adolescence in daily contact with the signalmen group and the operational activities of the signal corps, which were essentially based on surveillance and optical and telegraphic communication. All this had surely left an imprint on me and with the years it transformed into a desire to enter the Navy through the main door, that is to say participate in the national competitive examination to be admitted to the Naval Academy. Therefore, my choice was fully my own and the only “suggestion” I received from my father was “study, study, study!”

Here I would like to remember that my father, after the period in the signal corps, participated as a volunteer in the Abyssinian War for about two years, and in 1939 in the Italian landing in Albania where, already an officer, he organized ex-novo the Albanian signal network. After a brief period in Rome at the Ministry of the Navy, in 1940 at the beginning of the war he returned, again as a volunteer, to Albania where he stayed until March 1943 when he was sent back home due to an illness contracted while in service and of which unfortunately he died.

But let’s go back to the “recommendations” of my father. I followed them to the letter since algebra, geometry, and trigonometry taught in high school were completely insufficient to pass the “killer” examination.

The announcement for the national competitive examination for the Naval Academy.

As soon as the national competitive examination was announced, I signed up. Actually, my parents did (I was 18 and legal age was 21), presenting a request for admission to the “preliminary training”. I passed the first medical in Naples, and a much more severe one in Leghorn. Finally, on July 9th, 1941 I crossed for the first time the gates of the Naval Academy, thus beginning my life in the Navy.

Training lasted about three months during which we conducted the same life as the cadets. We were taught again algebra, geometry, and trigonometry with daily lessons, tests, and oral exams. There was intense sport and sailor-like activity, and at the end, after a series of oral and written exams which were heavily weighted toward the evaluation of the “professional aptitude”, one would arrive at the yearned admission. It should be mentioned that, usually, despite the very large number of candidates, the placements available were not all filled. This is proof of the severity of the selection which did not take into consideration the strong need for young officers to replace the numerous casualties caused by the war.

Admission to the academy, about which I just spoke, was not for sure; one could always be dismissed, especially after the first year of attendance, for good reasons, suddenly, and without possibility of appeal.

During this period, cadets had to pay a monthly boarding fee, and an assessment fee for the equipment which was distributed during the three years of attendance, and a payback for eventual medicines, extracurricular material, and damages (even a broken plate). Furthermore, the cadet could go on short leave (twice a week) and the family had to contribute a small sum of money, which was used for the “purse” about which I will talk later. Age limits to enter the academy were quite restrictive. Nevertheless, there were a very limited number of seats available to non-commissioned officers with the necessary degree and with a maximum age of 25 years. Thus it happened that in my course were admitted two second chiefs, one of whom, the more advanced in age of the whole course, got the nickname “grandpa” (he was 25 and we were 18 or 19!), and “grandpa” he remained to us to the end of his days.

He was an important point of reference for all of us, a rock like those of the Dolomites from which he came. His wisdom, his calmness, were soothing moments to our boyish escapades, Yes, because amongst the austere walls, with the discipline, we were also 18-and-19 year-old boys. Grandpa had always been assigned to submarines. After a year of war he disembarked from, I believe, the Toti to be admitted with us to the academy. Forgive me this interlude not concerning your question, but going back to my past so many windows open and it is difficult to immediately close them all. Please, go on with your questions.

It is said that the academy was quite hard; long hours studying, much physical activity, and the unceasing desire to complete the courses to participate in the war. Are these mythologies or facts?

You asked me a question to which, due to the nature of the interview, I should give a short answer, but here again so many windows open up bringing back, reliving the years at the academy with the same intensity and participation with which I really lived them. Thus, I am afraid my answer will not be short. I shall not speak of the academy, but of “my” academy.

Behind the very elegant dress uniforms, the glowing red daggers with real mother of pearl hilts hid a life thought to be hard by those who had entered the academy with lesser convictions, but which instead was accepted, although with the inevitable whines, by those, like me, who had entered it with a strong desire to enjoy (in full breath) the most beautiful aspects and put up with a bit less enthusiasm, with the more rigid aspects. All is relative! The father of one of my course-mates, at the time a Vice-Admiral 1st Class who had entered the academy 40 years earlier, thought that “our” academy was not much different from a girls’ boarding school for young women from wealthy families.

My son, who entered the academy about 40 years after I did, thinks that my academy was comparable to living in the hard prison of the Cayenne (French Guiana). Throughout the years, the discipline and strictness applied in the academy have been proportioned with objective of transforming youths from a variety of social and scholastic backgrounds into men ready to consciously assume their responsibilities. One thing has never been absent from the academy in its 120 plus years of existence: inflexibility in regards to lack of loyalty and truthfulness. The disciplinary actions which derived and still derive are always the same: immediate termination. But let’s return to “my” academy.

Every day wake call at 0530 excluding Sundays when we were allowed another half hour of sleep. We slept in dorms for 60 cadets each.

0530-0600 Morning routine. Undo your bed, carefully folding sheets, blankets and pajama (making the bed was the “attendant’s” responsibility, characters those about whom I shall speak later on). Shaving was obligatory every day; no postponements allowed, not even for those who had not yet fully developed and had nothing to shave. During the morning routine, the non-commissioned officer on watch patrolled the dorms and he was the one to be asked for a medical check-up, or to call to report. “Mr…. called me to report for …..(in the Navy officers were always called by their last name preceded by “Signor”, or mister). I will give you more details later on.

0600-0630 Physical exercise in the courtyard.

Partial view of one of the “Studies”

0630-0725 study time, essentially dedicated to reviewing subject matters for the day’s lessons. The hardest part though was keeping the eyes open due to the strict watch by officers and non-commissioned officers who did not hesitate to call to report whoever was found “dozing off during study hours”. After all, getting used to fighting sleepiness was a not a subject matter but a hough thing to learn. Aboard, during the interminable sequences of four-and-four, meaning four hours of watch and four resting (so to speak), interrupted by alarms, action stations, cease action station, watch below, etc. one had to be used to keeping the eyes open and take advantage of the first five minutes available to catch up with a bit of sleep. But let’s return to my academy.

0725-0730 Brief break. All of five minutes!

0730 General assembly (in the courtyard) by section and lined up and then running to the mess for breakfast. The ritual into the mess was always the same; we entered running (a light run), we lined up at attention behind our chair (each table with about 10 cadets). “Hats off”, “sit down”. At the end of the meal “stand up”, “Hats on”, and lined up, running, we would leave the mess.

0745-0800 break. The cadets who had requested sick bay lined up and went to the infirmary for a medical check. Whoever had been called to report presented himself to the secretary of his class and waited to be called by the commander of his course to receive a good telling off, but not the disciplinary sanctions. These one would only be known at the general assembly at 1245, and I will describe it later.

During this break we also used the “patcher”, attendants who, with their toolbox, sat in the internal gallery for small patches, sewing (buttons, etc).

0800 Assembly, inspection of the uniform, hair, beard, and every other day physical exercise at the parallel bars the rope, or “battle station” at the brigantine interred in the courtyard, but identical to a real one for both sails and maneuvering.

“Action station” on the brigantine and the “rope”

0830 Beginning of the lessons. Each course was subdivided into sections of about 30 cadets and they carried on their activities, scholastic, athletic, and military, just like a regular high school class (in Italy a class is never separated and all students take the same courses). Class lasted 55 minutes. 5 minutes were needed to move from one classroom to another or from one building of the academy to another, always lined up and running. To us officers (deck officers) during the three years of a regular course were taught subject matters of the first two or three years of the faculty of engineering. In addition, subsidiary subject matters like trigonometry, visual navigation, astronomical navigation, gun ammunitions, naval guns, ballistics, explosive chemistry, underwater weaponry, naval architecture, thermodynamics, naval equipment, telecommunications, engine (machinery), equipment and maneuvering, staffing, naval history, and for now I don’t remember more, but the list is not complete!

Practice was required for all subject matters, exams, assignments and naturally written and oral examinations in February and final exams in June (in most cases both oral and written). Saturday afternoons were dedicated to class assignments; on rotation navigation, both optical and astronomical, quizzes (so called “the Americans”) in all professional subject matters.

General assembly for the reading of the “rewards and punishments”

Having completed morning classes and placed our books back into our school desks, at 1245 we had the “general assembly” for the three courses in the courtyard in the presence of the second in command or the third in command of the academy for the reading of the “rewards and punishments” by the “brigadier” cadet, meaning the head cadet of the third class (the only one wearing the “regular” uniform with a sword instead of a dagger). Here, whoever had been called to report finally knew the disciplinary sanctions he had “gotten”: one, two, or three days of confinement. One, two, three days of simple arrest, or the same or more of close arrest. In this last case, unofficially, the cadet was hinted to resign. At the end of the general assembly, still running, we moved on to the mess while the small group punished with arrests, under the orders of a non-commissioned officer in charge of the prison, moved toward “Villa Miniati”, a pompous nickname for the prison building which for many years had been managed by Chief Miniati.

Then the mess ceremony as in the morning but with two variations:

at 1300 we listened, while standing at attention to the world bulletin. Each table, in a special folder, would have mail addressed to the members of that table. But the mail could not be read. We could read it only after the “dismissed” outside the mess.

And we are at about 1330. Up to 1425: break. During this time, weather permitting, we could go sailing (star, jole, olympic beccaccini, dinghy), go to the reading room, play pool-table, play the hard fought “ugly ball” tournament (forerunner of the 5 man soccer and played with a different ball made out of old socks bundled up), or simply “graze”, that is to say stroll, sun bathe, read the mail, chit-chat with friends. Here were borne the “groups” made up of former schoolmates, people from the same town, new friends. New friendships were created or strengthened, links which were reinforced by common assignments to ships, or by being docked nearby, and which withstood the test of time, decades of ups and downs in life and, after 60 years, still hold up. Actually…

But let’s return to “my” academy. We were grazing: some sailing, some sunbathing, some in the reading room, others playing the “ugly” ball when at

1425 “the blow”. That is to say the trumpet signals which recalled us to the reality of everyday life. Two hours of intense activity as called for by each section: training with the assistant professors in some university-level subject matters, military training, and sports activities.

About sports activities, I should say that there was a requirement for all of us to pass a minimum number of disciplines, while those who had entered the academy with their own competitive experience, after passing the “minimal”, were required to participate in competitive activities between courses in their own disciplines. Swimming was a different issue. Here there was the requirement to pass the “minimum” for swimming, diving (and relative exercise, diving from a 5-meter platform). At that time fins and mask for scuba were not available and were utilized only by the special forces, thus underwater exercises were done in apnoea and without aids. The exercise were generally geared at giving us confidence in the water, thus at the end giving us a chance of survival in case of shipwreck. The swimming pool was considered the worst activity. First of all because we would die of cold (we would literally go in pink and come out purple), second because all, and I mean all without distinction for those who knew how and did not, we had to swim, without time limit, two laps (100 meters each), and dive from a 5-meter platform. For those who did not know how to swim, there was always someone in charge of the “rescue”.

Another athletic activity which did not spark enthusiasm was rowing “in a life boat with oars”. It would not create any envy to real prisoners!

Rowing “in a life boat with oars”.

But there were also some pleasant activities, sailing, kayaking, fencing, soccer, rugby, tennis (these last ones were only for those who had passed the minimal athletic requirements), shooting, scuba, “battle station exercise” on the brigantine. On average, once a month we would go out to sea aboard “old smoke crackers” for full navigational training. Astronomical navigational exercises with point fixing by sextant required a different ceremony; wake up before the others to be ready to make astronomical point fixing at the very first light of day, and wrap up calculations in time to take part regularly in the other morning activities. During the war, equestrian sports and judo were suspended

But let’s go back where we left. At 1645 “blow”. The trumpet called to an end the early afternoon activities. Sports break and then we would line up to receive the “sandwich”.

At 1645 all to the study. The “study” was a large room which could host, in separate tables, all the cadets. Monitoring was very strict. Always, one or two officers would walk between the rows of tables and there were no alternatives; with the mind, one could travel aboard ships, or go strolling with the girlfriend, but two things had to be done: keep the eyes open and the books open under the eyes. After all, there weren’t many alternatives; exams, assignments in class and after class, and the final examination forced the most turbulent not to get distracted. I was going to forget… before being released from study there were, on a rotational basis, drills with light signaling or with the horn, and naturally, with the most strict supervision! Once a week, each section interrupted studying for about 20 minutes to go take a shower (again, lined up and running). Studying continued until 1930 with a very short break at 1730 to use the toilet and smoke a cigarette (in those days we all smoked).

1945 Assembly for dinner. After dinner, a break until 2045 at the reading room, pool table, or singing (there was always someone who sang and we had a piano). Grazing was always indoor because in Leghorn, between the southwest and the north wind it was always cold at night.

2045 Assembly and running even up the stairways we would go to the dorms.

2100- 2130 Night routine and at 2130 all to sleep while the “silence” was being played. Since it was prohibited to own a watch (in those days objects of a certain value), the only sense of time at night was given by the inevitable striking of the hour from the bell tower. When, accidentally, one would go to the restroom at night and the clock was striking 0500 brrrr….only another half hour of sleep!

This was the usual day.

Variations: Wednesdays (Thursdays according to the course) and Sundays, after the break in the afternoon, we would go to the study until 1545 with the choice, alternatively, to write our families. During this time the “purser” non-commissioned officer distributed to those on short leave a small purse with 25 liras. During this period of study discipline was never relented. A classic case was the inspection officer saying, “You two down there who were talking. Stand up!” (An innocuous whisper between two desks). The two “under incrimination” would stand up. “Are you on short leave?” , “Yes, sir!” , “You were!”. Good-bye, short leave, until next week, if nothing else happened along the journey in the meantime.

At 1545 “short leave; change up!” We would go to the dorms where on our small beds the one on leave and only those on leave would find all the necessary wardrobe. Everything, and I mean everything, shined shoes, socks, shirt, starched collar, tie, etc.

1600 “Those on leave: line up!”, and then a very rigorous inspection. All it took was for the hair not to be super short and, good-bye leave. After the inspection, finally, we were free to swarm into Leghorn until 1945. Once back, we checked in and returned the purse with whatever was left of the 25 liras we had received before going on short leave. Without changing we would go to the evening assembly for dinner, and the cycle started again.

I must open a parenthesis about the financial management. Each family, as I have already mentioned, was required to send to the academy every three months a certain amount of money which included tuition, co-payment for uniforms, funds for the “purse”, money for drugs, books, refunds for damages caused (broken plates or glasses, altered hats, etc). Tuition and only tuition was reduced for particular family circumstances or for merit. The “purse” was managed independently by non-commissioned officers “pursers” and if by bad luck due to problems with the postal system the check from home was late in arriving and the balance for the purse was below 25 liras, the “purse” was not delivered and automatically one was confined.

In reference to “my” academy, I must include another topic which cannot be overseen: disciplinary sanctions, both individual and collective. Let’s start with the individual ones. The simplest were the “runaround” and the “go around”. They consisted of running loops like the bersaglieri light infantry around the courtyard (about 400 meters), or going up the mast of the brigantine from the right side, past the crow’s nest, continuing up to the bar just under the trunk, and then coming down the opposite side across the deck of the brigantine in time to go up again from the right side if the “go arounds” were more than one. These punishments were given verbally, meaning without going to report, and in number ranging from one to five, sometimes even ten, and had to be completed during the breaks. Thereafter, one would present himself to the officer who had assigned the penalty, of course standing at attention, saying “I completed …go arounds” to which followed the inevitable scolding. There were no controls but I believe that “reductions” (cheating) never took place. Self-discipline and fairness were an integral part of our professional formation, thus it was not conceivable to declare completed a punishment, which had not been fully done. More severe punishments consisted of confinement, arrest, and close arrest. These disciplinary sanctions were inflicted after having been called to report, as I’ve already narrated, and were read during the general assembly with the three courses lined up in the courtyard before going to lunch. The third in command, who was usually in charge of the general assembly, would say, “Attention to the reading of the compensations and punishments.” Compensations, in reality very rare, consisted of permission to extend short leave until 2100, dining out instead of returning at

1930. Thus they had most of all a moral value and were given generally when one had obtained the highest score during an exam or by winning an athletic competition. Arrests, like the confinements, were generally given out for reasons that today would really make us laugh. More than everything else, they were aimed at reciditivity in poor performances in studying and some minor disciplinary infractions. Close arrests, as already said, were a very different affair and were rarely inflicted due to the heavy weight they had. Confinements consisted of spending free time in the study. Arrest or close arrest were paid for in prison, “Villa Miniati”. The guests of this little villa had at their disposal a small room which included a small desk for study, and a fairly hard folding bed, but where, due to the power of the organization, the attendants would place the pajama for the night, blankets, and toiletries for each guest. No linen, though! In prison one spent the hours usually dedicated to meals, to free study and recreation. One did not miss lessons, nor training, nor class assignments. The difference between arrest and close arrest was practically none. It was the bearing on the scoring card which mattered. It did matter!

Collective disciplinary sanctions generally involved an entire section and consisted of a certain number of “go arounds” to be completed lined up, or even worse in 15 minutes or more on guard. What it meant was that the whole section had to stand still in the courtyard, “on guard” for the duration of the punishment. A real torture! I’ll skip what would cause disciplinary sanctions so harsh… Before wrapping up my answer, I must talk about some of the typical characters at the academy. First of all the non-commissioned officers; some served as instructors in professional activities and also athletic ones, others were simply in charge of the classes in regards to maintaining the discipline. I don’t know how they were selected, but all, and I repeat all of them, I remember with the greatest affection. Despite the fact that they had an ungrateful assignment (being in charge of discipline and prison), they always behaved toward us with extreme distinction and toughness. I shall say that they always considered us their sons, without considering that in a little time we could have met them again aboard but in reversed roles.

Another character typical of the academy were the “attendants”. The ones with whom we had the greatest contacts were the ones in charge of uniforms and those who served at the tables. To them, we were the “masters” and even if some parents were former cadets and had become admirals, for the attendants who had known them as cadets, they were “the master your father”. The attendant barbers? Inflexible. They did not let themselves be softened by any begging (girlfriend or parent visiting Leghorn) into being more indulgent with the cutting. Maximum length of the hair: 2 centimeters; freedom of choice for shorter lengths.

A special discussion should be dedicated to the officers. The hierarchy was quite extensive. The commanding admiral (nicknamed “the old bag”), the second in command and the third in command had very precise assignments and were unapproachable. With the commander of the class (one for each of the three courses), Commander or Captain (nicknamed the principal) and his assistants, Lieutenants or Sublieutenants, contacts were very numerous. They followed us in every activity; they were instructors for professional training. They watched us when we were in the study, but what to say about them? They came from one or more sinkings, a few days in a lifeboat, or recovering from wounds received in battle. Therefore, with wrecked nerves, impatient to return aboard, even if they had received multiple war decorations for military valor, none of them ever talked about their war actions.

I dwelled over so many details of the daily life, punishments included, to underline that although outside war, as we well know, ravaged, in the academy life continued in the most normal way. Thus arises the question; why?

The answer is simple: there could not be disruptions from what was the primary objective of our professional formation: discipline and honesty. Questionable educational methodologies, and today’s psychologists would have much to argue about it, but life test demonstrated that these methods were not completely erroneous. Much has been said about the strategic abilities of our military leadership. I don’t want to touch this topic, but keeping my comments restricted to the Navy, I can, without doubts, assert that never, and I repeat never, did officers, non-commissioned officers, or sailors tremble facing orders received and which often called for their, or their ships’ ultimate sacrifice.

This is the result of the constant hammering, education, discipline, and honesty taught to the future officers, and in the required proportions to non-commissioned officers and sailors.

In the academy we were not fed special speeches or doctrines. They “got us to work” studying and with discipline. We complainted but the mark which was imposed upon us demonstrated itself valid not only during the war, but also after, in our private lives. Distractions aside, back to “my academy”.

I told you, perhaps with too many details but in general terms, about my memories, my emotions, and part of my life as a cadet. Three topics are still missing: examinations, summer naval campaign, and the affairs of September 8th, 1943. Let’s begin with the examinations. As already mentioned, two rounds of exams for each academic year. Phase one in February, named the “chat”, but exams nevertheless. They covered the first half of each subject matter. Another round in June, but this differed from the previous one because the scope of each exam included what had been studied since the beginning of the year. Each session included ten to thirteen exams, some of which were both oral and written. The gap between each exam was at the most three days, thus the whole session lasted about a month. During the examinations some of the daily routine changed, but disciplinary rules did not change at all.

As everywhere, there were professors (for university level subject matters) and instructors (for professional subject matters); some very demanding, others more lenient. Failures rained frequently. I will not dwell on the misfortunes of those who were failed; anyway they were not the best. Failure meant passing a “catch up” exam; final failure meant repetition of the school year, just like in high school, or resignations to then continue the 5-year draft as a simple sailor.

At the end of each examining session, we left for the longed for vacation. Base program: sleep. Unfortunately, this was also time to come to grips with the reality of war. Cities bombed, homes destroyed, relatives or acquaintances missing, homeless families, shortage of food. We were 20 and wounds healed quickly.

Before talking about the summer naval campaign (the cruise), I must say that the war had caused a change to the three-year program. At the end of the second course, the summer cruise of three months aboard the training ships Vespucci or Colombo was no longer conducted. Instead, the cadets were sent for 20 days up to the mountains and at the beginning of August we would come back to Leghorn to begin classes for the third year. Therefore, we spared the time for the summer cruise and completed the third year in February, ready to be embarked.

Before covering the misfortunes of my course, which remain unique in the 120 years of history of the Naval Academy, I’ll tell you something about our training cruises aboard training ships. The cruise, we are in July-September 1942, for obvious security reasons took place in the Upper Adriatic; Fiume, the Dalmatian Islands, Zara, Pola. Navigation, was usually short and characterized by continuous turning in narrow waters, thus for us in charge of the sails it was very stressing. Aboard, life was quite Spartan and was made even worse by the very limited space assigned to each of us. A sailors’ life, a simple one, even if we were still served at the table in white gloves.

Spartan life I was saying. We slept on amacha which were strung at night above the tables on which we ate and studied, and did our calculations. We only studied professional subject matters, and we calculated over and over again astronomical coordinates based upon the early morning or evening’s twilight readings. That is 0400, 0500 and 1900 and 2000 at night. At that time, calculators did not exist and we did not have navigational systems. For rough calculations we used the slide rule, but perhaps you had never seen one. For astronomical calculations we used paper, pencil, and logarithmic tables which allowed us to simplify some of the calculations. In short, calculations of a navigational point required 45 minutes, and only when everything went right! “Action station” for the sail did not represent a great novelty to us.

The numerous exercises and the many “go up and around” on the brigantine interred at the academy made us relatively experienced and nonchalant about going up, lining up along the yard spar, and rolling out or wrapping up the sails. The difference was that the masts at the training ship were about 60 meters above the water, while those of the brigantine at the academy did not reach 30 meters. Also, while the deck of the brigantine was solidly anchored to the ground, those of the training ships swayed quite a bit according to sea conditions. A 15-story building moving about against a solid 7-story one. More dangerous? I should say no, even though at that time we did not have safety systems. But we never had serious accidents.

The only inconvenience was that the “go up and around” which had to be paid off at sea were longer and more annoying, and the “calls to station” were more frequent because the Dalmatian coast required frequent turning and we faced violent wind gusts. These were very insidious because they were canalized between the islands. They were so typical that our course was given the nickname “wind gusts”.

Of “my” academy in Leghorn and the time aboard the Vespucci (I was forgetting, between us of the Vespucci and “them” of the Colombo there was great rivalry), I believe I said the very least to answer your question. Buy for the “wind gusts” (in Italian the same word could mean a burst of machine gun fire), the academy was not only Leghorn the Vespucci and the Colombo.

At the end of March 1942 (I was attending the second course), the Allies began bombing Leghorn. Initially, targets were only strategic: shipyards, torpedo factories, refineries, the port. The academy in the beginning was not touched, but the cadets represented “goods” too valuable. Aboard ships they needed us to replace war losses. War events had created great vacuums amongst crew and we were still inexperienced, we represented oxygen for the ships. Thus, we could not be exposed to the danger of aerial bombardments. At the end of the school year, the first course went ahead of schedule aboard the training ships, and we of the second course, also ahead of schedule, were transferred to the mountains to take the final exams. At the end of the exams, after a small period of rest still in the mountains, we were transferred to Venice where in the meantime the academy had been transferred to begin the third course. Here were also summoned the attendees to the first course. We were lodged at the Hotel Excelsior and studied at the Casino where rooms had been transformed into classrooms. It was the normal life of the academy, even though there had not been enough time to organize a mini-academy. Lessons, training, exams, assignments, and punishments… everything just like in Leghorn, but it did not last long. The armistice of September 8th caught us by surprise.

We did not have much time to reflect on the enormity of the tragedy which had fallen upon Italy. We did not realize the level of collapse to which our armed forces had fallen. The morning of the 9th, at the general assembly “Go to your room, pick up some blankets, and leave all your belongings at the foot of your bed. The attendants will pick them up for you”. In Venice, there was a hospital ship that had been laid up, the Saturnia. It had been altered to repatriate Italian civilians and their families from our former colonies in East Africa. These were people who, at the beginning of the hostilities, used to live in those areas later occupied by the British and who had been interned in concentration camps. Along with the twin ship Vulcania, the Saturnia circumnavigated the African continent and after having disembarked its load of refugees in some Italian ports, had been laid up in Venice.

I don’t know how they were able to commission it so quickly, but in the first hours of September 9th we boarded the Saturnia. Not everything went well, but I’ll skip these details. At night the Saturnia left the dock and moved to leave Venice. Near the semaphore of the Lido, we received signal via flashes of lights (we all knew how to read them) that German motor torpedo boats were patrolling just outside. We turned around and returned to Venice. After 24 hours, that is the night of the 10th, the Saturnia sailed again and went out to sea. This time we did not encounter anything. We did not know where we were going; may be Taranto. We navigated the 11th and the 12th, zigzagging as it used to be done as a countermeasure to possible submarine attacks. The zigzagging had to be done following prescribed rules, but the Saturnia did not follow those rules at all. This zigzagging was decisive; at 1530 on the 12th the Saturnia ended up on a sandbank just off Brindisi.

In Brindisi there were no Germans, but the Allies had not yet arrived, while the royal family was there, along with the head of government Marshal Badoglio and the whole entourage. In Brindisi there used to be one of the two naval schools of the GIL (Italian Youth of the Littorio), which prepared teenagers both scholastically (high school) and under a seafaring viewpoint as if it were a pre-academy. The naval school, due to summer recess and the fall of fascism, was completely empty and it almost looked like it was there waiting for us. Even if uninhabited, it had classrooms, dorms, and kitchens. It even had a brigantine just like Leghorn.

After some attempts to free the Saturnia with the makeshift boats from Brindisi, we were disembarked and placed at the naval school. From Venice had come with us military and civilian instructors, and also the “attendants”. Thus, although with some differences from Leghorn, on September 14th, 1943 we restarted our third year with a tempo just like Leghorn. Lessons, exams, assignments, wake up calls at 0530, “patches” for the inevitable mending jobs. However, there were some differences.

First of all, hunger. Foodstuff was scarce and we were in our 20. Second difference, absolute absence of books and teaching material. This deficiency was remedied by the goodness of some instructors and some of us in taking notes and distributing them (as an example, I will show you my notes about underwater weapons). Third difference, we asked and obtained permission to participate in the first operational activities of our Navy alongside the Allies. Here war came close to home; in an evacuation of Italian personnel from Greece fell the first classmates of our course.

But let’s return for a short while to Brindisi. Lessons, as I told you, started again on a regular basis. Some subject matters were eliminated from engineering (but we were allowed to catch up in the 1948-49 upper course) and in January 1944, after the usual examinations, we found ourselves with the rank of ensign aboard ships which meantime had begun operating alongside the Allies.

Before leaving “my” academy, I must mention how, despite the events which we lived through in those months, there was no letting down of the strictness to which we were accustomed. Same rules, same discipline, same examinations, same final exams. Some of us were failed in one or more subject matters and those who did not make it continued on as non-commissioned officers. Here ends my answer to your question. I could have said “yes, life at the academy was hard, we studied much, and all wanted to go aboard to participate in the war”. I preferred describing and reliving with my memories life at the academy. Find yourself amongst these words the answer to your question. In essence, I did not find myself at the academy by accident. Actually, I entered the academy of my own free will when war had already begun by a few years, and when our Navy had already suffered a few blows. We knew that a tough life of sacrifice was awaiting us. We knew that once aboard our lives would have been even tougher and that we would have been asked, if necessary, to make even the extreme sacrifice. We accepted all of this with clear mind and much lack of patience. Events not wanted by us impeded our course to suffer the bloodshed which the previous courses had suffered. Nevertheless, we did our duties, trying to do the best of what was asked of us. In a small part, we also contributed to rebuilding our beloved navy.

So, one question arises. One which you did not ask me and that I shall ask myself: “Would you do it again? Would you make the same sacrifices?” The answer gives no room to interpretation: I would. Oh yes I surely would!”

Could you describe to us your activities after you left the academy?

My activity after I left the academy?

The whole course, deck officers, engineers, and weapon specialists were distributed aboard various units, and some volunteered in the San Marco and Bafile battalion fighting (unfortunately with wounded and dead) on land. Whoever was not assigned to a ship, most of us, received various other assignments. Some were sent aboard the battleships interned in the Bitter Lakes to replace young officers called to other assignments. There were those who were assigned to the cruisers operating in the Atlantic with base in Freetown. There were some who were assigned to destroyers conducting shuttle service with the ships of which I just spoke. There were others assigned to torpedo boats and corvettes. Some were sent to the submarines (unfortunately, one of our course mates died aboard the Settembrini). I was assigned to the corvette “Scimitarra”; initially as a subordinate to the navigation officer, and after having attended training course “A”, as a gunnery officer.

Which kind of activity did we do?

Mostly escort service for Allied convoys coming from Gibraltar or Malta that provided supplies for the frontline as this moved on. The dangers, even if lesser than those faced by our convoys to re-supply the Libyan or Tunisian front in the preceding years, were there and required much attention and seafaring skills. The convoys were many and the ships available for escort service few. Thus at sea, at sea, at sea; under all weather conditions, and at very low speed, still without radar, and with exhausting watches (the infamous four-and-four). We always attempted to keep the convoys in line, as if they were a flock of sheep. It should be considered that at the time the captains of merchant ships were less than good sailors. There was a bit of everything; lawyers, teachers, administrators, architects. After a short period of training of just a few months, they were made captains and off to sea, and the poor devils who were in charge of their escort had the task of keeping them in line, making them zigzag according to schedule, avoid hitting mine fields…and so on. All this, I repeat, without radar, in total radio silence, with ships completely darkened and with only the use of light signals. When we would arrive in ports such as Leghorn, where due to the ships sunk by the Germans the cargo ships could only enter with very calm sea, very slowly, and one at a time, the escort would be left off shore going back and forth to protect the convoy from frogmen attacks.

Recapping: these contributions made by our navy, onerous under a human and seafaring viewpoint, allowed the Allies to remove some of their ships from this activity, concentrating them in the Atlantic, but especially in the Pacific where the ever increasing amphibious operations required an ever increasing number of escort units.

This is what I did after I left the academy until the end of the hostilities when, if you will, the need for convoy escort ended. But… as I mentioned in my opening statement, for the Regia Marina the war did not end. With the end of the need for convoy escort was born the need to clean up the sea of numerous mines disseminated everywhere by Italians, Germans, and the Allies. The corvettes, affectionately nicknamed by me “the little maids of the sea”, were transformed into minesweepers and called to perform minesweeping duties. To fully answer your question, I tell you that, still on the Scimitarra, I participated in two long campaigns of mine clearing, the first in the area south of Salerno all the way down to Cape Palinuro, and the second, much longer, off Fiumicino (Rome) up to the Argentario Mountain (Tuscany). And then? Then for me this appendix to the world war ended in September 1946. I was called to other operational activities which are beyond the scope of your question. We were by then in full “post-war” period.

The history of the Italian Navy in World War Two has been characterized by extraordinary events such as the attack against Alexandria, as well as very controversial ones, such as the false sinking of Commander Grossi: in 100 years what do you think will be the historical interpretation that will be part of textbooks?

It is not easy to give an answer to your question because even if over 60 years has passed since those events, we cannot yet consider concluded both the research and the discovery of documents which would complete the knowledge of important events. Also, some new light may be shed on events about which we thought we knew everything. Research activity continues incessantly and the word “end” will be written, if ever, in many years from now.

The recanting of these events has gone from the protagonists to the journalists, from the memories of some of the protagonists to end up in the hands of the historians who, even though they are always very serious and objective, cannot avoid influencing their studies and researches with their own personality. What will end up in the textbooks? I would like to begin by describing what is now in the textbooks. I should in turn conduct a research since historians for scholastic material are few, of the most disparate political connotations, and influenced by the prevailing political wind in the country. Thus, even if not openly direct, some specific ministerial directives cannot be eluded. You know perfectly that one may say, and not say at the same time, thus putting together all the variables I just mentioned, you will understand that making an assumption of what the textbooks will look like in 100 years is a real mystery. Just to give you an example, I ask you “what is left in the textbooks of the war of independence and of the First World War?” Certainly the actions of our insidious weapons will still be spoken about, just like today we still talk about those of Luigi Rizzo, while the Mussolinian farce around the actions of Commander Grossi will be completely ignored. Luckily enough, it has been quite some time since this farce has completely disappeared.

I repeat and conclude by saying that those are just my conjectures and anyone could confirm or deny them. The appointment is in 100 years!

A special note:

Due to distance – I live in California and Commander Romano lives in Rome – the interview took place over the Internet via email. Commander Romano contacted our site back in March 2000 offering some suggestions, and since he has been a personal mentor, a source of inspiration, and certainly a reason for persevering. For those of you who might be interested, Commander Romano entered the Academy in 1941 and completed his course in 1944. After a long period of active service, he left the Italian navy in 1960, but he never severed his links with the navy.

Four Days on the Vittorio Veneto

With the collaboration of Salvatore Romano

We are glad to present copy of a memorandum written by Lieutenant Battersby of the Royal Navy, Liaison Officer aboard the Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto from September 12th to September 16th, 1943. This document was located by Prof. George Elder in the archives of NARA (National Archives and Records Administration)

Memorandum

Copy/Orig & 4

2 October 1943
H.M.S. HOWE
At War Stations.
18th September 1943.

Sir,

I have the honour [honor] to submit the following report of ay duty as British Naval Liaison Officer in the Italian Battleship Vittorio Veneto from l2th to l6th September 1943.

I arrived on board the Vittorio Veneto at about 1800 on Sunday l2th September. She was lying at Mersa Sarobh moored with two anchors stern to a buoy.

My arrival was evidently unexpected, and I was told that the British Naval Liaison Officer was not expected until the next day. I was shown into a small very hot Reception Room and left to wait. One or two officers came in and looked at me, and one of them an Engineer Officer of equivalent rank to a Midshipman informed me that he was my interpreter. His English I found to be rather limited and very affected with constant repetition of: “It is It possible – Yes?” and similar phrases; he was a thoroughly unctious [unctuous]personality. He had been in Italian Passenger ships before the war, in particular the Conti [Conte] di Savoia.

After about half an hour’s wait the Commander came in and told me I would be shown my cabin. At this stage any efforts I made to see the Captain or the Admiral were ignored by the Italians, who were evidently uncertain what attitude should be adopted toward me. I was left in my cabin for an hour and was then told that supper was ready, I had been asked previously if I would like say meals in ay cabin but had explained, to their evident surprise, that I should like to eat in their mess. This was due, I discovered later, to the fact that a German officer had had my cabin and had behaved in a Teutonic manner.

I made further efforts to see the Captain or the Admiral and was told after some delay that the Admiral would see me. Ha received me in his day cabin and was quite formal in his attitude. Later he was to be extremely friendly.

Arrangements for the passage to Alexandria were discussed during which various staff officers including the Secretary, a Lieutenant Commander, the Flag Lieutenant, a Lieutenant, the Flag Captain, and the Chief of Staff, a Commander, were called upon. Five points of importance were brought out.

1. Oil fuel was still required.
2. Water – stated to be feed water, was also required.
3. The Italian’s draught might not permit her passage through the great pass, as the Italian charts showed this as being 34 feet.
4. Tugs would probably not be required for unberthing.
5. The sailing instructions as contained in the Hand Message from Rear Admiral, Force ‘H’ for the Italian Admiral were understood.

Accordingly, signals T.0.0. 122106, 122107. 122109 and 122254 were sent. I was then taken to the Ward Room Mess for supper. Here I found the officers awaiting me before starting, and I was formally introduced by the Commander.

Many of the officers had a smattering of English and most spoke some kind of French. Reasonable conversation was possible with their little English and my indifferent French. It must then be understood that some of the views I report as being expressed by the Italians may not be strictly accurate. After supper the atmosphere was distinctly more cordial and in many cases friendly. I was taken for a brief tour of inspection of the upper deck and bridge structures.

I was &asked by the Flag Lieutenant to press the matter of fuel and water as they were extremely doubtful if they would be able to sail at the appointed time on the morrow. Accordingly at 0520 in the following morning the 15th, I sent my signal 150554.

A.M.13th

At 0650 the oiler Green Ranger arrived and fuelled first the Italia and later the Vittorio Veneto. A second oiler arrived later, the Brown Ranger, but was too late to be of any use.

09900/l3th.

By now it was apparent that if the water boats did not arrive at once that the squadron would not be able to sail on time. As I did not consider it prudent to leave the ship at that time I sent by Leading Signalman ashore with written instructions to phone up the duty staff officer at Vice Admiral, Malta’s offices to make the situation clear. This I am satisfied he did as subsequent signals were to show – at 1040 instructions were received to the affect that the movement was delayed and that steam should be kept at one hour’s notice. Rear Admiral, Force ‘H’s 131032.

During the forenoon I discovered that the Italians had an injured man whom it was desirable to land and I made the necessary arrangements through Staff Officer Operations, Rear Admiral Force ‘H’ and the Berthing Officer, Mersa Saroch. An RAF launch came to collect him and the Italian officers commented to me on the careful way that the orderlies and doctors had treated the man, in a way that made me suspect that either they did not expect such treatment from the English, or that they were not used to ratings being given such careful treatment. The rating was taken to the 45th General Hospital, Malta. There was something of a scene over this. The Admiral heard about it and “threw a temper”. It seemed that his superior admiral in the Cavour (I understood him to say) should have been consulted first – he said he had no power to land the man without his superior’s permission, and it seemed as if he was somewhat afraid of being reprimanded. I was to notice the Admiral’s “powerlessness” to do anything on his own initiative, many times before my stay was finished.

At about 1100, Staff Officer Operations to Rear Admiral, Force ‘H’ arrived on board and gave further instructions about watering and departure which were in turn cancelled by his 131318.

A water boat, the Arena, with domestic water only eventually arrived at about 1600, and first, watered the Vittorrio [Vittorio] Veneto. It was 3 hours before any water was pumped owing to delays and lack of organization, for the men were allowed to swarm over the Arena impeding the working of the ship. The Italian officers either did not wish to step their men or were unable to do so. I felt it was a mixture of the two. It was only on this occasion that I noticed any lack of control over the ship’s company of the Vittorrio [Vittorio] Veneto.

1700/13th.

Shortly after this a Captain (E) of the staff of Flag Officer, Commanding Force ‘H’ came and thrashed out the water problem with the Italians. It was evident that their demands had been excessive and he whittled them down to 200 tons of domestic water and none of feed water. The Italia similarly needed only 200 tons of domestic water. Both, ships were supplied with approximately 300 tons.

I went over to the Italia with Captain (E) and saw certain bomb damage to her Forecastle on my way there. The reception in the Italia was distinctly formal but polite. The Captain did not speak English but the Commander spoke moderately well. A first class interpreter was supplied – a young Sub-Lieutenant brought up in China, educated in an English school and decidedly pro-English. The Captain gave a first impression of being short and sharp with his subordinates and of annoyance at the defeat and surrender of Italy.

By nightfall the destroyers Artigliere, Grecale and Velite had arrived.

At 2000 approximately a water lighter was brought into the anchorage by a tug and supplied 20 tons of distilled water to both the Velite and the Grecale and a further 20 tons to the Artigliere who watered when the Arena was alongside the Italia.

To prevent the intolerable delay in commencing pumping as happened at the Vittorio Veneto I arranged for officers from the Italia to come over and inspect the arrangements in the Vittorio Veneto. This undoubtedly saved 2 hour. 6 Destroyers had been expected to arrive at Mersa Saroch by nightfall but as only 5 had arrived by 0400/14 I authorized the water lighter to make a further issue to the 3 destroyers that had arrived and the Artigliere sailed with an extra 90 tons – Grecaler and Velite – 40 tons.

0800/14th

Watering was completed by 0600 – see my 0826. At 0830 the Vittorrio [Vittorio] Veneto shipped from the buoy and began to shorten in the starboard anchor which was first reported “foul” but later as “clear.”

At 0930 we proceeded outside the boom in the order – Vittorrio [Vittorio] Veneto, Italia, Destroyers, and at about 1015, station astern of the Italian Cruisers assumed.

During the passage I remained on the Admiral’s bridge the whole time. On the Admiral’s bridge were the Admiral, his Chief of Staff, the Secretary, the Flag Lieutenant, and three other officers and a Sub-Lieutenant, and two midshipmen who kept a navigational plot taking many sights. I saw no attempt at a Tactical plot nor did I see where there could be room for one.

The Captain never visited the Admiral’s bridge, nor the Admiral the Captain’s – Communication between the two were by voice pipe.

The Admiral appeared to do little except read the signals and occasionally make them, through this perhaps might be expected in view of the fact that he had a senior admiral in company. He was interested in my reports to him derived from the British flag hoists and was impressed by our “C pt A”^ or similar signals. I was able to gather that neither he nor his staff were aware of the potentialities of RADAR in ships.

However, he at no time would act on any of the executive orders for signals that I gave him (derived from the British hoists) – ha always waited for the executive from the Eugene [Eugenio] di Savoia to come through first. (There was one exception to this and he obtained permission beforehand from the Eugene [Eugenio] di Savoia). The executive was somewhat 5 or 4 minutes late in arriving. Nor did it always arrive correctly. On one occasion 2 knots speed was received instead of 20 knots – On this occasion I informed the Admiral that he speed was to be 20 knots hut he insisted on obeying the Italian version. As we were a mile astearn of H.M.S. KING GEORGE V. this did not matter.

Signalling [signaling] was controlled from the Admiral’s bridge, R/T definitely being used at tines. The Italia V/S equipment was vary poor – they having no light equal to our battery aldis. There did not seem to be much difficulty in understanding our maneuvers, though zig-zag caused a little worry. I was much impressed by the Vittorio Veneto’s zig-zagging. That of the Italia was not as good.

The Chief of Staff work seemed to be confined to looking at signals and keeping a watch on the bridge from time to time. There were periods when there were no Italian officer on the bridge. The Secretary seemed to do little but eat, smoke, sleep and occasionally indulge in an English lesson with me. The Flag Lieutenant seamed to be maid of all work. He kept an eye on the signaling [signaling], received all signals, took sights (but had a midshipman to work them out for him) helped keep the navigational plot and kept watch on the bridge.

15th. During the early hours of the 15th at about 0250 I was called by the signalman on watch to say that the Italia was dropping astern. She dropped back to about 3 miles before recovering her position making large amount of white smoke all the while. The Admiral informed me there was water in the Italia’s fuel. She appeared to regain position at about 26 – 28 knots.

During the morning the weather had freshened and at about 0700 the starboard wing destroyer, the Velite (wrongly stated to be the Artigliere in my 150748) dropped right astern to an estimated distance of 8 miles. She however regained, position at 1300.

At 0800, on, l6th the O.F. [oil fuel] percentages remaining were:
Vittorrio [Vittorio] Veneto 80%
Italia. 56%

I subsequently made a signal to the British Naval Liaison Officer in the Eugene [Eugenio] di Savoia – my 151215. “IS RAH AWARE THAT ITALIA HAS ONLY 26 HOURS ENDURANCE REMAINING.” to which I received a reply, B.N.L.O. Eugene [Eugenio] di Savoia’s 151224 “YES. I HAVE TOLD HIM.” When the signal was made to prepare to stream Paravanes I discovered that both Battleships were so fitted, but that neither would be able to stream them.

At about 1400 a party of electricians from GREBE arrived on board to demobilize the Re 2001 on the quarterdeck of the Vittoria [Vittorio] Veneto. They were followed shortly afterwards by a party of W/T officers and two RADAR officers from shore bases.

I had no orders about such matters but knew one of the RADAR officers personally and was shown by one of the aircraft party a copy of the orders for Operation Stoneage – my first intimation of anything of the kind.

At about 1730 anti-sabotage guard arrived and I relinquished my duties as British Naval Liaison Officer to Lieutenant Herbert-Smith, R.N.V.R. I was struck by the (as I considered) bad impression that the armed guard made on the Italians who had shown to me what I believe to be a friendly attitude. Many faces that had had a friendly, cheerful aspect previously, went dour. I could not help feeling that a part of their good-will towards us, to say the least, had temporarily waned. This was particularly noticeable with regard to the ratings.

At about 2045 I left the Vittorio to return to H.M.S. H O W E.

I have the honour [honor] to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
STAMP: 19 SEP 1943 /s/ F.R.G. BATTERSBY
LEVANT STATION Lieutenant, Royal Navy.

THE REAR ADMIRAL, COMMANDING FORCE ‘H’
(Through The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. H O W E.)

Appendix I

APPENDIX I

1. The Vittorio Veneto

(a) Cleanliness. The ship’s living space were clean, the officer’s quarters scrupulously so. The messdecks were dull. The heads were well fit-feed out, but choked easily. Washing conditions for the crew would have been very good if it was not for the lack of water at sea.
The ship’s company kept themselves clean, all of them paying particular attention to their feet.

(b) Bombs. There were two large circular plates about 15’ to 20′ across either side of the forecastle where 3 bombs had hit; 2 port together and 1 starboard. They had been dropped by Liberators about June last. The repairs appeared to have been well executed. The bombs exploded on the Middle deck.

(c) Gunnery Readiness
In harbour – at Merca Sarooh, A.D.P. and about half close range continually closed up.

In harbour – at Alexandria. By day A.D.P. and (half a day experience only). quarter 7 close range closed up.

By night, none.

At sea – All close range apparently at second degree.
90mm (3.9”) and 152m (6”) in two watches, but watch off stays in vicinity of guns.

The Low Angle armament was not manned.

(d) Damage Control at Sea.
Skeleton D.C. parties kept closed up, but many doors through closed to, were in no way clipped.

(e) Handling the Ship.
On the whole, the ship was well handled, though one or two turns in succession were badly executed, and officers of the watch were apt to swing past their course when zig-zagging.
For some reason there seemed to be distinct reluctance to go astern on the engines.

(e) Telephones
A very extensive telephone system has been installed. However, I did not see it being put to much use. The exchange was an automatic dialing one. There were direct phones as well. After speaking for a few minutes, speech was apt to become blurred.
One of the commissioned gunners remarked that “there was far too much reliance place on Electrical Equipment, and that if it failed they would be finished”. “

(f) German Origins.
Much or the equipment was of German origin, or built under license to German firms

Admiral’s Name: Ammiraglio di Divisione, Enrico Accorretti.

Captain’s Name: Capitano di Vascello, Corso Pecori Giraldi.

2. Radar

There was a general lack of knowledge of the potentialities of Radar. Many of the more junior officers knowing nothing about it. The Admiral was well impressed by K.G.V’s (Kin George V) shots fired blind by Radar at one of our own planes during the night of the 15th.
The only Radar set in the ship would not work – it was a L.A. Range Finder.

3. Gunnery Barrage.

The ship’s gunnery officer said that he normally fired barrages as follow:-

He told me in fast French, and although I made notes later, I cannot be certain that the ranges are accurate).

Angle of sight – For low level attack 50°
For other attacks 50°

Ranges – 152™ gun 8,000 metres [meters]
90mm gun 2,500 metres [meters]

He said that his close range ammunitions was self distinctive (destructive) at 1,500 metres.

4. Politics

a) Officers.
Mussolini was unpopular, also the fascist party. The Admiral’s Secretary said to me “I hope England wil realize that Fascism and Italy are not one”. He added, “In Germany it is different, Nazism and Germany are one”. The Secretary had just spent two years in Germany. The King appeared to be popular, Badoglio, slightly lees so. I was definitely wanted to believe that Fascism has been expunged. I am not certain that it is so. On two occasions in the Officer’s mess, I was greeted with the Fascist salute.

(b) Men.
Some had been in three wars, Spain, Abyssinia and world war No. 2; and blamed Mussolini and Fascism for their plight. They did not seam interested in politics, except as far as it concerned themselves or their families.

5. Morale.

Officers and men seemed cheerfully resigned to their fate, and the man pleased that war was over for Them; all were eager for news of their families.
Many officers were keen to help fight the Germans out of Italy, and proudly showed me, in the Italian news sheet they produced each day, the paragraphs showing that Italians were fighting the Germans in the North of Italy.
The ratings seem to be afraid of air attacks, particularly “Dive Bombing’. The sinking of the ROMA had undoubtedly made a big impression on all.
The men were keen to show the places where signs still remained of the bombs hits scored by the Liberators, and seemed almost proud of them.
Grew on average, very young and seemed to be mostly conscript. One stated reason ships did not often put to sea, was the inability of Italians to provide air cover and the unwillingness of the Germans to provide it, except when German ships present. Greatly impressed with air escort provided on the trip. Not particular about smoking and lights on the upper deck at night.

6. The Italia.

This ship was first named the LITTORIO, but was renamed on July the 29th of this year. She was not so well handled at sea as the VITTORIO VENETO, but this may have been due to bomb damage, and her greater draught forward.
THE ITALIA was hit by (?) 2 bombs off Corsica on her way to Malta: I could see the damage caused by one; on the starboard side of the forecastle. A temporary repair had been affected by means of a large plug. The bomb landed near the ship’s aide, and came out again through the flare.

7. Personalities

The Admiral was very friendly, but did not strike me as been forceful, or domineering. He has an unfortunate twitch (St Vitus’ Dance ) which does not seem to worry him very much. I saw him loose his temper twice. On one occasion when he had not been informed of the landing of a wounded rating, and another time when, during the night, one of the cruisers started to flash with a very bright light. In one occasion he really let fly in the best continental manner, and it was quite half an hour before he calmed down. At all other times he was quit, but inclined to be crotchety. His staff treated him as rather a joke from time to time, and had a good laugh at his expense.
The Admiral’s initiative was either lacking, or it was severely cramped by his seniors. This was most noticeable. He was pro-English, liked English books, particularly letters of Lord Collingwood whom he admired. He said that his wife was even more pro-British. Before his present employment as second-in-command of the Spezia Battle Squadron, he was at the Admiralty at Rome, and before that, Had the Cruiser Squadron, wearing his flag in the LUIGI DI SAVOIA DUCA DEGLI ABRUZZI.
The Admiral said he was certain that much in the near future depended on the King and Marshall Badoglio. He was convinced that it would be a calamity if either of them were to fall into German hands. He speaks moderate English. Age 55. Apt to be untidy.

The Captain
A quit man, with a strong personality, very brief and to the point, dealt firmly with the Admiral. He spoke good English, though did not always wish to understand what was being said to him. Of smart appearance. He was apt to tret me very formally; in complete contrast to the Admiral, and managed to convey the impression of being somewhat stand-offish. I felt he was stunned by the surrender of his fleet.

The Commander
Appeared to be rather a nonentity. Quite and reserved, spoke poor English, and moderate French. Friendly, and pleasant, but like nearly all his compatriots that I met, capable of the gross procrastination.

The Assistant Commander
A dominant personality, with Prussian appearance. Evidently told the Commander what to do, and the latter used to agree quite meekly. Spoke no English, and little French.

The Gunnery Officer
Spoke no English, but good French. Seemed efficient. Quite, and pleasant character. Did not appear to know much of Radar.

The Medical Officer
The Senior Medical Officer in the ship was a Surgeon Lieutenant Commander. He was captured by us in our Abyssinian campaign in 1941 and repatriated by us two years later, so that he had been out of our hands 4 months when he surrendered with the rest of the Fleet.
He did not like the conditions of the Prisoner of War Camp in the Sudan, complaining chiefly of boredom. He is very fed up with life, but does not appear to bear us any ill will. He speaks quite good English and French.

The Junior Officers
Many of these spoke English to varying extent, and nearly all of them French. The age of some of the Midshipmen was noticeable, they must have been a full 30 years. There seemed to be no distinction between hostilities only and continuous service

The Warrant Officers.
Seamed on the whole friendly. They asked my Leading Signalman to give them a short address in English, which he was not able to do.
Many of the officers had served in the Merchant Navy, or had traveled in peace time, and there was a wide understanding of the British point of view.

8. Engineering.

There appears to have been trouble since the ship commissioned, with the condensers. The principle would seem to have been that enough water was carried to last out the few days that the ship was at sea.
Movements seem to have been restricted, owing to a lack of oil fuel, and such fuel as did come was from Germany, but of poor quality.

9. Paravanes.

Both Battleships were fitted, but the Admiral stated that they were rarely streamed, and doubted if enough sailors knew the drill for streaming, to get them out in reasonable time. However, the Vittorio Veneto’s were not working, as one of the towing wires had parted while the ship was at Spezia, and apparently there were no spares, and the Italia’s were damaged by bombs.
The Admiral said, that when, they were at Spezia and came out for practices, they dare not slow down for Paravanes, (apparently the Italian ships must nearly stop to recover or stream Paravanes) as there were always two submarines waiting outside. On one occasion they had slowed down, and all that saved his ship – so he said – was a destroyer stopping the torpedoes and getting sunk instead. He seemed to have little faith or patience in Paravanes.

10. Food.

This seemed quite adequate, was well served; action messing at sea seemed very successful. Galleys were claen; shortage of meat did not prevent steaks being served in the Admiral’s mess. Sailors food, plain and without such variety, mainly Maccaroni, Spaghetti, Rice and brown bread.

11. Air Raids.

Apparently Air Said Shelters at Leghorn and Genoa were or are inadequate; those at Milan and Turin are said to be good.
Some of the crew volunteered the information that they thought English bombing was better (more accurate) than the American, especially at Pisa and Genoa.
Generally they stated, large casualties had been caused by air raids on Italy, but they conceded that English bombing had been obviously directed against Military targets.
The flag Lieutenant had been wounded in the leg in an air raid ashore, and declared, but for that he would have been appointed the command of a Torpedo Boat.

12. Shortages.

Shortages that were mentioned most, or were most evident, included

Soap – as a result of this, the rig for officers of complete white has been abolished in favor of blue trousers and white jacket.

Tea – The substitute was terrible.

Coffee – The substitute was poor, the coffee served at sea was supposed to be the genuine product.

Rubber – There appeared to be plenty of substitutes and of good quality.

Tobacco – The stronger tobacco supplied was not liked. Apparently the Navy gets preference in supply.

Clothing – Uniforms seemed to be scarce.

Leather – Nearly all the sailors wore clogs.

13. The sinking of the Roma

This was caused by a Rocket Propelled Bomb. The occurrence had shaken the Italians, and imbued a hate against the Germans more than anything else seem to have done.

14. Position of the Admiral in the Line

If there are two Admirals present in a line of ships, the senior takes guide and the junior takes the stern position in the line. But for this Admiral Accorretti commented that he would not be alive.

15. Photographs.

I was able to take 24 photographs during the last few hours of may stay; these I handed over to Lieutenant Coote R.N.V.R., attached to force “H”, on the l7th September.

16. Attitude to the Germans.

One of the Warrant Officers said that “The Germans ware strong enough to last out 6 months for they had taken everything from the conquered countries they wanted and destroyed the rest. People in those countries were starving”. He stated that “He had visited France, , the Balkans and Germany – the latter had shortages, but the people were fairly content.” He said that “The Germans had no respect for anything but themselves and their property, they cared nothing for civilians”.

17. Listening to the News.

There was not much faith placed in the B.B.C, News, because, from time to time obvious mistakes had been made which had made then distrust the B.B.O. However, they did not trust the Rome news much either.

18. Entertainments.

I saw one Italian film of very inferior quality on the Quarter Deck. It appeared to be largely glorifying Italian Youth Movements, and the audience often booed and hissed. The officers seemed to tolerate it, some occasionally laughing. At the and large number of the crew booed and hissed in spite of the presence of the Admiral and Captain. There were two performances, and a very large number attended. I gathered that normally, 3 or so different films were shown each week and that a stock of 5 3 was carried on board. Officers and men attended the same performance.

19. The Artigliere.

This destroyer was originally named the “Black Shirt” or the Italian version of the word. It had had its named changed to its present form on the 29th July of this year.

20. The comments of the senior signal rating of the Liasion Party.
V/S equipment very poor, particularly lamps which were crude in type and of very low brilliance.
Skill of staff fairly high as regards practical work, but handicapped by the equipment and its arrangement.
The system of controlling signals was almost the same as our; signals being reported simultaneously to the Admiral and Captain.
There were a large number of Warrant officers and Senior rating who carried out all the practical work.
Signals were decoded by officers only, apparently a cumbersome system causing delays. Some R/T used, and it is apparently [missing text].

Bibliography

TitleAuthor(s)Year PublishedPublisherLanguage
8 settembre 1943 – La dignità traditaRomeo, Mario 2004Laterza, BariItalian
Action This DayVian, Phillip 1960F. Muller, LondonEnglish
Aegean adventures 1940-43: and the end of Churchill’s dreamParish, Michael Woodbine 1993Book Guild, SussexEnglish
Aereal Warfare. The Story of the Aeroplane As a WeaponGoodwin, Hal 1943The New Home Library, New YorkEnglish
aeronautica italiana della II Guerra Mondiale, L’Santoro, Giuseppe 1950Danesi, RomaItalian
agguato di Matapan 28-29 marzo 1941, L’Zamorani, Massimo 2006Mursia, MilanoItalian
Aldo Fraccaroli – Fotografo navaleBagnasco, Erminio 1996Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Ali marine. Gli Osservatori della R. Marina nella seconda guerra mondialeMarcon, Tullio 1978Mursia, MilanoItalian
Allied Submarine Attacks of WW IIRohwer, Jurgen 1997USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Almanacco storico delle navi militari italiane 1861-1995Giorgerini, Giorgio Nani, Augusto1996USMM – RomaItalian
Ark Royal. The courageous Story of one of the best-loved and best-fought Ships to fly the White EnsignPoolman, Kenneth 1956W. Kimber, LondonEnglish
armi delle navi italiane nella seconda guerra mondiale, LeBagnasco, Erminio 1978Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Army Badges and Insignia of WW IIRosignoli, Guido 1976Exeter BooksEnglish
Arremba San Zorzo. Vita e morte dell’incrociatore San GiorgioRossi, Ubaldo Virginio 1976Mursia, MilanoItalian
Attacco dal mare. Storia dei mezzi d’assalto della Marina ItalianaGiorgerini, Giorgio 2007Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Attack on Taranto, TheSchofiled, Brian Bethan 1973Ian AllanEnglish
Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor, TheLowry, Thomas Wellham, John1995Stackpole BooksEnglish
attivita’ aerea italo-tedesca nel Mediterraneo, L’Mattesini, Francesco 1995USMM – RomaItalian
Attività in Mar Nero e Lago LadogaLupinacci, Pier Filippo 2003USMM – RomaItalian
Aviazione della Regia MarinaMarcon, Tullio 1967Warship InternationalItalian
aviazione di marina, L’De Risio, Carlo 1995USMM – RomaItalian
Avvenimenti in Egeo dopo l’armistizioLevi, Aldo 1972USMM – RomaItalian
avventure di un marinaio di BETASOM, LeFrandi, Mario 1992Erga, GenovaItalian
Axis Submarine successes of WW II. German, Italian, and Japanese submarine successes, 1939-1945Rohwer, Jurgen 1999Greenhil Books, LondonEnglish
Azione notturna al largo di Capo MatapanPack, S.W.C. 1973Mursia, MilanoItalian
azioni navali in Mediterraneo, Le – Tomo I: dal 10 giugno 1941 al 31 marzo 1941Fioravanzo, Giuseppe 1976USMM – RomaItalian
azioni navali in Mediterraneo, Le – Tomo II: dal 1° aprile 1941 all’8 settembre 1943Fioravanzo, Giuseppe 1970USMM – RomaItalian
battaglia dei convogli nel Mediterraneo, LaGiorgerini, Giorgio 1977Mursia, MilanoItalian
battaglia dei convogli, LaNassigh, Riccardo et al.1994USMM – RomaItalian
battaglia dell’Atlantico, LaPeillard, Leonce 1976Mondadori, MilanoItalian
battaglia di Capo Teulada (27-28 novembre 1940), LaMattesini, Francesco 2000USMM – RomaItalian
battaglia di Creta, LaPack, S.W.C. 1973Mursia, MilanoItalian
battaglia di Punta Stilo, LaMattesini, Francesco 2001USMM – RomaItalian
battaglie navali nel Mediterraneo nella seconda guerra mondiale, LePetacco, Arrigo 1976Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Battaglie nel deserto: da Sidi el-Barrani a El AlameinBongiovanni, Alberto 1996Mursia, MilanoItalian
Battelships: axis and neutral Battleships in World War IIGarzke, William H. Dulin, Robert O.1985USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Battle for the Mediterranean, TheMacintyre, Donald 1964Pan Books Ltd.English
Battle of Crete, TheSpencer, J.H. 1962HeneimannEnglish
Battle of Matapan, ThePack, S.W.C. 1961Batsford, LondonEnglish
Battle of the AtlanticMilner, Marc 2003Tempus, GloustershireEnglish
Battleships of the WorldGreger, René 1993USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
belle navi che non tornarono, LeNava, Nino Infante, Massimo1988F.lli Melita, La SpeziaItalian
Benvenuti a BordoSansonetti, Vito 1998Nauticard, RomaItalian
BETASOM – I sommergibili italiani negli oceaniAndò, Elio 1997Italia Editrice, RomaItalian
BETASOM – La guerra negli oceani 1940-1943Mattesini, Francesco 1993USMM – RomaItalian
British Warships of the Second World WarRoberts, John Arthur 2000USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
By Sea and by StealthWilkinson, Burke 1956Coward-McCann, New YorkEnglish
Cacciatorpediniere classe NavigatoriBrescia, Maurizio 1995Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Cacciatorpediniere Classe Soldati Vol. I, II & IIIBagnasco, Erminio 1993Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Cacciatorpediniere classi Freccia/Folgore, Maestrale, Oriani Vol. I, II & IIIBagnasco, Erminio Brescia, M.1997Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Capo Matapan. Due flotte sorpreseSeth, Ronald 1962Garzanti, MilanoItalian
Caproni e il mare. Progetti e realizzazioni per la guerra navale di un grande gruppo industriale milaneseRastelli, Achille 1999Museo aeronautico Gianni e Timina Caproni di TaliedoItalian
Carlo Fecia di Cossato – L’uomo, il mito e il marinaioRastelli, Achille 2001Mursia, MilanoItalian
Cento sommergibili non sono tornatiMeneghini, Teucle 1968CEN, RomaItalian
Che ha fatto la Marina ?Bragadin, Marc’Antonio 1949Garzanti, MilanoItalian
Ciano’s DiaryCiano, Galeazzo 1947Heinemann, LondonEnglish
Cinquant’anni nella Marina MilitareBernotti, Romeo 1971Mursia, MilanoItalian
Clash of Titans. World War II at seaBoyne, Walter J. 1997Simon & Shuster, New YorkEnglish
Clash of Wings. Air power in World War IIBoyne, Walter J. 1995Simon & Shuster, New YorkEnglish
Con la pelle appesa a un chiodoRoberti, Vero 1966Mursia, MilanoItalian
conquista degli abissi, La – Storia del battello subacqueo da Aristotele al sottomarino nucleareTurrini, Alessandro 1996Vittorelli, GoriziaItalian
Convogli. Un marinaio in guerra 1940-1942Cocchia. Aldo 2004Mursia, MilanoItalian
corazzata, La – L’evoluzione della nave da battaglia in ItaliaRastelli, Achille 2006Mursia, MilanoItalian
Corrispondenza e direttive tecnico-operative di supermarina. Scacchiere Mediterraneo Tomo I: dal maggio 1939 al dicembre 1940Mattesini, Francesco 2000USMM – RomaItalian
Corrispondenza e direttive tecnico-operative di supermarina. Scacchiere Mediterraneo Tomo II: dal gennaio 1941 al dicembre 1941Mattesini, Francesco 2001USMM – RomaItalian
Corsari in Adriatico 8-13 settembre 1943Bagnasco, Erminio 2006Mursia, MilanoItalian
Cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni, TheGay, Franco Gay, Valerio1987USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
CruisersPreston, Anthony 1982Bison BooksEnglish
Da Matapan al Golfo PersicoGiorgerini, Giorgio 1989Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Da testimone. Uomini, fatti e memorie tra la cronaca e la storiaBernacconi, Sergio 1984SATE, FerraraItalian
Dal Barbarigo a DongoGrossi, Enzo 1959Due Delfini, Roma-TriesteItalian
Dall’acqua “Corallo” all’acqua di mareMajolo, Ruello R.A.N.Italian
Decima Flottiglia MAS. Dalle origini all’armistizioBorghese, Juno Valerio 2005Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Decima flottiglia nostra: i mezzi d’assalto della Marina italiana al sud e al nord dopo l’armistizioNesi, Sergio 1986Mursia, MilanoItalian
Decima MAS. I mezzi d’assalto della Marina italianaAndò, Elio 1995Italia Editrice, CampobassoItalian
Diario 1939-1943Ciano, Galeazzo 1963Rizzoli, MilanoItalian
Diario di un marinaio. Dalla guerra di Spagna alla Repubblica di SalòCaramia, Giovanni 2004EDIT, TarantoItalian
Diario di un marinaio. Sulla corazzata Roma c’ero anch’ioBellocci, Guido 2001CLD, Pontedera PIItalian
Dieci anni e venti giorniDoenitz, Karl 1960Garzanti, MilanoItalian
difesa del traffico con l’Africa settentrionale, La – Tomo VI: dal 10 giugno 1940 al 30 settembre 1941Cocchia, Aldo 1977USMM – RomaItalian
difesa del traffico con l’Africa settentrionale, La – Tomo VII: dal 1° ottobre 1941 al 30 settembre 1942Cocchia, Aldo 1976USMM – RomaItalian
difesa del traffico con l’Africa settentrionale, La – Tomo VIII: dal 1° ottobre 1942 alla caduta della TunisiaFioravanzo, Giuseppe 1964USMM – RomaItalian
difesa del traffico con l’Albania, la Grecia e l’Egeo, LaLupinacci, Pier Filippo 1965USMM – RomaItalian
disarmo navale fra le due guerre mondiali (1919-1939), IlBernardi, Giovanni 1975USMM – RomaItalian
disarmo navale italiano (1919-1936), IlMinardi, Salvatore 1999USMM – RomaItalian
Divise per secondi capi, sottocapi e comuni. Anno 1890Galuppini, Gino 1986USMM – RomaItalian
Domenico CavagnariCernuschi, Enrico 2001Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
dovere e la memoria (Inigo Campioni), IlGabriele, Mariano 2001Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
dragaggio, IlFranti, Massimino 1969USMM – RomaItalian
dramma della Marina italiana 1940-1945, IlBragadin, Marc’Antonio 1982Mondadori, MilanoItalian
due Sirti, LeIachino, Angelo 1953Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Duel to the death. Eyewitness accounts of great battles at seaSlinkman, John F. 2001Harcourt, Brace & World, New YorkEnglish
East of Malta West of Suez. The Admiralty account of the naval war in the eastern Mediterranean, September 1939 to March 1941Ministry of Information 1943His Majesty’s Stationary Office, LondonEnglish
enigma Darlan, L’Vascotto, Vezio 2002Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
epopea dei convogli navali nel Mediterraneo 1940-1943, L’Viola, Aldo 1985ANMI, RapalloItalian
Epopea dei silurantiVingiano, Giuiseppe 1950Danesi, RomaItalian
epopea dei sommergibili, L’ (allegato al Notiziario della Marina n. 10 – Ottobre 1987)aa.vv. 1987Ufficio Documentazione Attivitò Promozionali, RomaItalian
esploratori italiani (1861-1938), GliBargoni, Franco 1996USMM – RomaItalian
falchi del deserto, IFlaccomio, Sergio 1971Longanesi, MilanoItalian
Fall of Crete, TheClark, Alan 1962William Morrow & Co., New YorkEnglish
Fighters of WW II, German, Italian and JapaneseGunston, Bill 1980Arco PublishingEnglish
Fighting Admirals, TheStephen, Martin 1991USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Fighting Tenth. The Tenth Submarine Flotilla and Siege of Malta, TheWingate, John 1991Leo Cooper, LondonEnglish
Fino alla fine – Diario di Guerra del Regio Sommergibile Scirè e del suo equipaggio redatto dal Secondo Capo Segnalatore Livio VillaPerissinotto, Marino 2006Mariva, Voghera PVItalian
flotta bianca, La – Le navi ospedale italiane nel secondo conflitto mondialeDupuis, Dibrillo 1978Mursia, MilanoItalian
flotta tradita, La – La Marina italiana nella seconda guerra mondialeDe Risio, carlo Fabiani, Roberto2002De Donato-Lerici, Bari-MilanoItalian
forze navali da battaglia e l’armistizio, LeBergamini, Pier Paolo 2002Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
Francesco MimbelliDell’Alba, Umberto 1988Poligrafica Accademia Navale, LivornoItalian
Frogmen. First battlesSchofiled, William Greenough Carisella, P.J.1987Branden, Boston MAEnglish
From the ashes of disgraceMaugeri, Franco 1948Reynal & HitchcockEnglish
Fucilate gli ammiragli. La tragedia della Marina italiana nella seconda guerra mondialeRocca, Gianni 1987Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Fuori uno! Sommergibili tascabili, MAS e mezzi d’assalto italiani nell’Operazione BarbarossaCepparo, Renato 1998CinehollywoodItalian
Gaudo e Matapan. Storia di un’operazione della guerra navale nel Mediterraneo (27-28-29 marzo 1941)Iachino, Angelo 1946Mondadori, MilanoItalian
German U-Boat commanders of WW IIBusch, Rainer Roll, Hans Joachim1999USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
German U-Boat losses during WW IINiestle, Axel 1998USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Giorgio ZanardiGallottini, Emilio 1999Corbo, FerraraItalian
Gli arditi del mare. Sottomarini – MAS “MAIALI” (1940-1943)Silvani, Lodovico 1972De Vecchi, MilanoItalian
Gli assaltatori del mare. Barchini esplosivi, maiali, sommergibili tascabilide la Sierra, Luis 1971Mursia, MilanoItalian
Gli squali dell’Adriatico. Monfalcone e i suoi sommergibili nella storia navale italianaTurrini, Alessandro 1999Vittorelli, GoriziaItalian
gradi battaglie navali del XX secolo, LeRastelli, Achille 1996Storia IllustrataItalian
Greece and CreteBuckley, Christopher 1952HMSO – LondonEnglish
guerra aeronavale nel Mediterraneo 1939-1945, LaDe Belot, Raymond 1971Longanesi, MilanoItalian
guerra che non voleva finire: agosto 1940 – giugno 1946, LaMarzi, Primo 1999Mursia, MilanoItalian
guerra della Regia Torpediniera Calliope, LaDella Rosa, Armando 2006La Stamperia, RiminiItalian
guerra di mine, LaLupinacci, Pier Filippo 1988USMM – RomaItalian
guerra italiana sul mare, La – La Marina fra vittoria e sconfitta 1940-1943Giorgerini, Giorgio 2001Mondadori, MilanoItalian
guerra navale nel Mediterraneo (1940-1943), Lade la Sierra, Luis 1976Mursia, MilanoItalian
guerra navale nell’Atlantico (1939-1945), Lade la Sierra, Luis 1992Mursia, MilanoItalian
Guerra negli abissi. Eroismo e sacrificio dei sommergibilistiCaporilli, Pietro 1998Settimo Sigillo, RomaItalian
Guerra negli abissi. I sommergibili italiani nel secondo conflitto mondialeNassigh, Riccardo 1971Mursia, MilanoItalian
guerra nel Mediterraneo (War Set Documenti illustrati della storia n. 5 feb-mar 2005), LaSgarlato, Nico 2005Delta Editrice, ParmaItalian
Guerra segreta in ItaliaAmè, Cesare 1954Casini, RomaItalian
guerra sui mari nel conflitto mondiale 1939-1941, LaBernotti, Romeo 1950Società Editrice TirrenaItalian
guerra sul mare 1939-1945, LaRuge, Friedrich 1970Garzanti, MilanoItalian
guerrieri degli abissi, IKemp, Paul 1999TEA, MilanoItalian
Guida alle corazzate dalle origini a oggiGaluppini, Gino 1978Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Hitler and the Middle SeaAnsel, Walter 1972Duke University PressEnglish
Hitler’s U-Boat BasesMallmann Showell, Jak P. 2002USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Hitler’s U-Boat War – The Hunters, 1939-1942 Vol. IBlair, Clay 2000Modern LibraryEnglish
Hitler’s U-Boat War – The Hunters, 1942-1945 Vol. IIBlair, Clay 2000Modern LibraryEnglish
Hunters and the Hunted, The (Sommergibili all’attacco)Cocchia, Aldo 1958USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Il buttafuoco. Cronache di guerra sul mareBuzzati, Dino 1992Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Il comandante aspetta l’albaMinchilli, Guido 1945Atlantica, RomaItalian
Il comandante Bardelli. Una biografiaLombardi, Andrea 2005EFFEPI, GenovaItalian
Il comandante Salvatore TodaroBoscolo, Armando 1970Volpe, RomaItalian
Il commodoro. 1938-1940 l’incrociatore Colleoni in estremo orienteCatalano Gonzaga Di Cirella, Arturo 1999Mursia, MilanoItalian
Il Corpo di Commissariato Militare Marittimo2001Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
Il delfino dorato. In guerra sui sommergibiliScardaccione, Aurelio 1988Schena, Fasano BRItalian
Il sottomarino italiano. Storia di un’evoluzione non conclusa 1909-1958Cernuschi, Enrico 1999Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
IllustriousPoolman, Kenneth 1955William KimberEnglish
impegno navale italiano durante la guerra civile spagnola (1936-39), L’Bargoni, Franco 1992USMM – RomaItalian
implicazioni navali della conquista dell’impero (1935-1941), LePellegrini, Ernesto 2003USMM – RomaItalian
In guerra sul mare. Navi e marinai nel secondo conflitto mondiale.Bagnasco, Erminio 2005Albertelli, ParmaItalian
In mare, in terra, in cielo – Vicende di pace e di guerra (1915-1945)Viglieri, Alfredo 1977Mursia, MilanoItalian
In Mediterraneo potevamo mettere in ginocchio l’Inghilterra!Meneghini, Teucle 1999Schena, Fasano BRItalian
incrociatori italiani (1861-1975), GliGiorgerini, Giorgio 1976USMM – RomaItalian
Istruzioni generali per i servizi del genio navale a bordo delle Regie navi1940Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, RomaItalian
Italia in guerra: il I Anno 1940, L’_x000D_
Italia in guerra: il II Anno 1941
aa.vv. 1992Commissione Italiana di Storia MilitareItalian
Italian Attack on the Alexandria Naval Base, TheDe La Penne, Luigi 1956USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Italian Littorio class battleshipsFraccaroli, Aldo English
Italian midget sub attacks in WW2Rosemberg, J.E. English
Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, TheMallet, Robert 1998Frank CassEnglish
Italian Navy in World War II, TheSadkovich, James J. 1994Greenwood PressEnglish
Italian Navy in World War II, TheBragadin, Marc’Antonio 1957USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean 1940-43Fioravanzo, Giuseppe 1958USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Italian War Economy. The 1940-1943 With Particular Reference to Italian Relations With GermanyRaspin, Angela 1986Garland, New YorkEnglish
Italian Warships of World War IIFraccaroli, Aldo 1968Ian Allan, LondonEnglish
Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War IIaa.vv. 1989Crown Publishers, New YorkEnglish
Junio Valerio Borghese. Un principe un comandante un italianoNesi, Sergio 2004Lo Scarabeo, BolognaItalian
Landa Guidone 6. Mas all’attaccoLo Martire, Nini Bixio 1986Schena, Fasano BRItalian
lotta antisommergibile, LaRauber, Vitaliano 1970USMM – RomaItalian
Luftwaffe at WarJeffrey L. Ethell 1997Greenhill Books, LondonEnglish
Luigi Ferraro. Un italianoCafiero, Gaetano Ninì 2000IRECO, Formello RomaItalian
Luigi Rizzo (1887-1951)Andriola, Fabio 2000USMM – RomaItalian
M.A.S. e mezzi d’assalto di superficie italianiBagnasco, Erminio 1996USMM – RomaItalian
Malta and the MediterraneanLutton, Wayne C. University Microfilm InternationalEnglish
Malta ConvoyShankland, Peter Hunter, Anthony1961I. Washburn, New YorkEnglish
Malta Convoys 1940-1942. The Struggle at SeaThomas, David Arthur 1999Barnsley, South YorkshireEnglish
Malta Convoys 1940-1943Kemp, Paul 1988Arms & Armour Press, London-New YorkEnglish
Malta Convoys 1940-1943Woodman, Richard 2000John Murray, LondonEnglish
Mare e cielo. Ricordi e nostalgieBrivonesi, Bruno 1968Istituto Andrea DoriaItalian
marina da guerra, Ladegli Uberti, Ubaldo 1940Salani, FirenzeItalian
Marina e l’8 settembre 1943, La – Tomo I e IIMattesini, Francesco 2002USMM – RomaItalian
marina italiana nella seconda guerra mondiale, LaSadkovich, James J. 2006Goriziana, GoriziaItalian
Marina Militare Italiana – 1946Fraccaroli, Aldo 1946Hoepli, MilanoItalian
Marina, gli Armistizi e il Trattato di Pace (settembre 1943 – dicembre 1951), LaBernardi, Giovanni 1979USMM – RomaItalian
Marinai d’ItaliaBravetta, Vittorio Emanuele 1942Istituto Studi Politica Internazionale ISPI, MilanoItalian
Marinai in guerra 1940-1945. Diario di tre ventenniAlfano, Guido 2002Blu Edizioni, TorinoItalian
marò di Matapan e altri racconti. Quattordici episodi di eroismo italiano nella II G M, IlBernardini Enzo 1976L’Arco dei Gavi, Montepulciano SIItalian
MatapanBausi, Maurizio 1999_x000D_
76
Alfredo Guida, NapoliItalian
Match pari tra due grandi flotte. Mediterraneo 1940-42Di Sambuy, Vittorio 1976Mursia, MilanoEnglish
Mauser 1899 e la Regia Marina Italiana, LaFortunati, Vincenzo A. 2001Editoriale Olimpia, FirenzeItalian
Med. The Royal Navy in the Meditteranean 1939-1940, TheLangmaid, Rowland 1948The Batchwork PressEnglish
medaglie d’Argento al Valor Militare. Tomo I (1793-1939), LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 1999USMM – RomaItalian
medaglie d’Argento al Valor Militare. Tomo II (1940-1991), LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 2001USMM – RomaItalian
medaglie di Bronzo al Valor Militare. Tomo I (1887-1939), LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 2001USMM – RomaItalian
medaglie di Bronzo al Valor Militare. Tomo II (II GM A-L), LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 2002USMM – RomaItalian
medaglie di Bronzo al Valor Militare. Tomo III (II GM M-Z), LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 2003USMM – RomaItalian
medaglie d’Oro al Valor Militare, LeMiozzi, Ottorino Ottone 1992USMM – RomaItalian
Mediterranean FrontMoorehead, Alan 1942McGraw-HillEnglish
Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, TheHoward, Michael 1993Greenhill Books, LondonEnglish
Mediterraneo 1940-1943. Ricordi di guerra di un giovane ufficiale di marinaRicciardi, Enrico 2004Albertelli, ParmaItalian
MemoirsDoenitz, Karl 1990USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Memoirs of the Second World War. An abridgement of the six volumes of The Second World WarWinston S. Churchill 1959Houghton Mifflin, BostonEnglish
Memoirs. Ten years and Twenty daysDoenitz, Karl 1997Da Capo Press, New YorkEnglish
memorie dell’ammiraglio De Courten (1943-1946), LeDe Courten, Raffaele 1993USMM – RomaItalian
mezzi d’assalto della Xa Flottiglia MAS, IBagnasco, Erminio Spertini, Marco1991Albertelli, ParmaItalian
mezzi d’assalto, IDe Risio, Carlo 2001USMM – RomaItalian
mia decima Mia Decima, La – Da Malta alle Hawaii. Le avventure di un ardito del mareCapriotti, Fiorenzo 2002Italia Editrice New, FoggiaItalian
Midget Submarines of the Second World WarKemp, Paul 1999Chatham Pub, LondonEnglish
mimetizzazione delle navi italiane 1940-1945, LaBagnasco, Erminio Brescia, Maurizio2006Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Missione: non attaccare!. Diario di guerraRossetto, Mario 2002Vittorelli, GoriziaItalian
Morte per acqua a Capo MatapanCapriotti, Giuliano 1965Lerici, MilanoItalian
motti delle navi militari italiane, ILupinacci, Pier Filippo et al.1998USMM – RomaItalian
muli del mare, IMarcon, Tullio 1982Albertelli, ParmaItalian
MussoliniLaura Fermi 1961Universituy of Chicago PressEnglish
Naval Battles of World War IIBennet, Geoffrey Martin 1975Batsford, LondonEnglish
Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, TheGreen, Jack Massignani, Alessandro1998Chatam PublishingEnglish
Naval Weapons of World War IICampbell, John N.M. 1985USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
navi che non combatterono (1939-1945), LeMartini, Ermanno Nani, Augusto2001USMM – RomaItalian
navi da battaglia del III Reich, Le – War Set Documenti illustrati della storia n. 4 ott-nov 2004Sgarlato, Nico 2004Delta Editrice, ParmaItalian
Navi da battaglia della 2 GMGiorgerini, Giorgio 1972Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Navi da Guerra Italiane 1940-1945Bagnasco, Erminio Cernuschi, Enrico2003Albertelli, ParmaItalian
navi da guerra italiane 1940-1945, LeBagnasco, Erminio Cernuschi, Enrico2005Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Navi d’ItaliaGaluppini, Gino 1982Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Navi e bugieLo Martire, Nini Bixio 1983Schena, Fasano BRItalian
Navi e marinai italiani nella II GMAndò, Elio 1977Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Navi e PoltroneTrizzino, Antonino 1952Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Navi mercantili perdutePagano, Gian Paolo Notarangelo, Pagano1997USMM – RomaItalian
Navi militari perduteaa.vv. 1974USMM – RomaItalian
Nell’oceano ImmensoGalli, Enrico 2001Vittorelli, GoriziaItalian
Night Action off MatapanPack, S.W.C. 1972Ian Allan, LondonEnglish
Ninth Time LuckyToschi, Elios 1955William Kimber, LondonEnglish
notte di Taranto: 11 novembre 1940, LaSchofiled, Brian Bethan 1974Mursia, MilanoItalian
odissea di un marinaio, L’Cunningham, Andrew Browne 1952Garzanti, MilanoFrench
One of our submarinesYoung, Edward 2004Pen & Sword Military ClassicsEnglish
ONI 202 Italian Naval Vessels. Il manuale per il riconoscimento delle navi da guerra italiane compilato nel 1942-1943 dall’U.S. Naval Intelligenceaa.vv. 2004Albertelli, ParmaItalian
opera di Cesare Laurenti. Realizzazioni e progetti. L’Turrini, Alessandro 2002USMM – RomaItalian
Operazione C3: MaltaGabriele, Mariano. 1990USMM – RomaItalian
operazione Gaudo e lo scontro notturno di capo Matapan, L’Mattesini, Francesco 1998USMM – RomaItalian
operazione Gaudo e lo scontro notturno di Capo Matapan. L’Mattesini, Francesco 1998USMM – RomaItalian
Operazione Mezzo Agosto. La più grande battaglia aeronavale del MediterraneoNassigh, Riccardo 1976Mursia, MilanoItalian
operazioni in Africa orientale, LeLupinacci, Pier Filippo 1976USMM – RomaItalian
organizzazione della Marina durante il conflitto, L’ – Tomo I: Efficienza all’apertura delle ostilitàaa.vv. 1972USMM – RomaItalian
organizzazione della Marina durante il conflitto, L’ – Tomo II: Evoluzione organica dal 10.6.1940 al 8.9.1943aa.vv. 1975USMM – RomaItalian
organizzazione della Marina durante il conflitto, L’ – Tomo III: I problemi organici durante il periodo armistizialeaa.vv. 1978USMM – RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 1 – Corazzate classe Conte di Cavour (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1972Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 2 – Corazzate classe Caio Duilio (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1972Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 3a – Corazzate classe Vittorio Veneto P.1 (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1973Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 3b – Corazzate classe Vittorio Veneto P.2 (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1973Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 4a – Incrociatori pesanti classe Trento P.1 (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1975Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 4b – Incrociatori pesanti classe Trento P.2 (vecchia serie)Bargoni, Franco Gay, Franco1975Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 5a – Incrociatore corazzato San Giorgio (vecchia serie)Gay, Franco 1976Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 5b – Incrociatori pesanti classe Zara P.1 (vecchia serie)Andò, Elio 1977Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 5c – Incrociatori pesanti classe Zara P.2 (vecchia serie)Gay, Franco 1977Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 6a – Incrociatori leggeri classe Di Giussano P.1 (vecchia serie)1979Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 6b – Incrociatori leggeri classe Di Giussano P.2 (vecchia serie)1979Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 6c – Incrociatori leggeri classe Cadorna (vecchia serie)1981Edizioni dell’Ateneo S.p.a., RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 7a – Incrociatori leggeri classe Condottieri gruppo Montecuccoli P.1 (vecchia serie)Andò, Elio 1982Edizioni dell’Ateneo S.p.a., RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 7b – Incrociatori leggeri classe Condottieri gruppo Montecuccoli P.2 (vecchia serie)Andò, Elio 1982Edizioni dell’Ateneo S.p.a., RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 7c – Incrociatori leggeri classe Condottieri gruppo Duca d’Aosta P.1 (vecchia serie)Andò, Elio 1985Edizioni dell’Ateneo S.p.a., RomaItalian
Orizzonte Mare 7d – Incrociatori leggeri classe Condottieri gruppo Duca d’Aosta P.2 (vecchia serie)Andò, Elio 1985Edizioni dell’Ateneo S.p.a., RomaItalian
Pagine di diario 1940-1945Bianchi, Emilio 2000Centro Studi Atesini, BolzanoItalian
partecipazione tedesca nella guerra aeronavale nel Mediterraneo (1940-1945), LaSantoni, Alberto Mattesini, Francesco2005Albertelli, ParmaItalian
Pelle d’ammiraglioDa Zara, Alberto 1949Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Per la Patria e per il Re – Memorie di un ammiraglio ottuagenarioCocco, Antonio 2006Bastogi, FoggiaItalian
Per l’onore dei Savoia. 1943-1944: da un superstite della corazzata RomaCatalano Gonzaga Di Cirella, Arturo 2003Mursia, MilanoItalian
Periscope Patrol. The Saga of Malta Submarines.Turner, John Frayn 1957Harrap, LondonEnglish
Pictorial History of the War at Sea, AKemp, Paul 1995Arms and Armour PressEnglish
Plancia ammiraglio – Vol. ITur, Vittorio 1959Edizioni moderne, RomaItalian
Plancia ammiraglio – Vol. IITur, Vittorio 1960Edizioni moderne, RomaFrench
Plancia ammiraglio – Vol. IIITur, Vittorio 1963Canesi, RomaItalian
poppavia del jack ed altre…histoire, Aaa.vv. 1997USMM – RomaItalian
portaerei del Duce, Le – Le navi portaidrovolanti e le navi portaerei della Regia MarinaLembo, Daniele 2004Grafica MA.RO., PaviaItalian
portaerei italiana, LaRastelli, Achille 2001Mursia, MilanoItalian
punto su Matapan, IlIachino, Angelo 1969Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Quelli di BETASOMRaiola, Giulio 1965Volpe, RomaItalian
Quelli di Sottocastello. Cronaca di Guerra 1940-1943Caldara, Alessandro 1978Mursia, MilanoItalian
Quota periscopio. Cento anni di sommergibili italianiDe Risio, Carlo 1990Stato Maggiore Marina – RomaItalian
R. Sommergibile Scirèaa.vv. 1996Gruppo Marinai di Montecatini Terme, PistoiaItalian
Radar at SeaHowse, Derrek 1993USNI Press, Annapolis MDItalian
Rapidi e invisibili. Storie di sommergibiliMarzo Magno, Alessandro 2007Il Saggiatore, MilanoItalian
Red Duster, White Ensign. The Story of the Malta ConvoysCameron, Ian 1959Doubleday & Bantam BookEnglish
Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of WW IISadkovich, James J. 1990Greemwood PressEnglish
Re-evaluating Who Won the Italo-British Naval Conflict 1940-42Sadkovich, James J. 1988European History QuarterlyEnglish
Reggiane 2000. Il brutto anatroccolo della Regia, IlMalizia, Nicola 1978Edizioni dell’Ateneo & Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Regia Aeronautica nella seconda guerra mondiale, LaPricolo, Francesco 1971Longanesi, MilanoItalian
Regia Marina 1919-45, La – The Order of battle and Admirals of the Royal Italian NavyKursietis, Andris J 1995Self PublishedItalian
Regia Marina Italiana – Affusto per cannone da 102/35 navale, antiaereo, per sommergibiliaa.vv. 1929Stab. AnsaldoItalian
Regia Marina: Italian Battleships of WW II. A Pictorial historyBagnasco, Erminio Grossman, Mark1986Pictorial History BooksEnglish
Regolamento per i servizi degli arsenali, delle basi navali e degli stabilimenti di lavoro…Italian
Ricordati degli uomini in mare. Le esperienze dei sommergibilisti italiani nel secondo conflitto mondialeCernigoi, Enrico Giovanetti, Massimo2005Itinera Progetti, Bassano del Grappa VIItalian
Ricordi di un marinaioMaugeri, Franco 1980Mursia, MilanoItalian
RN portaerei MiragliaIezzi, Ennio 2000Walberti, Lugo di RomagnaItalian
RN Zara Warship Profile #17Fraccaroli, Aldo English
rotta della morte, La. Canale di Sicilia 1942-1943Accini, Libero2012Mursia, MilanoItalian
rotta insanguinata, La – Tra mine e siluri nel canale di Sicilia 1943Miccinesi, Marco 2004Mursia, MilanoItalian
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys. A Naval Staff History, TheLlewellyn, M.J. 2006RoutledgeEnglish
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. I: September 1939-October 1940, TheBrown, David 2002Whitehall History Publishing with Frank Cass, LondonEnglish
Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II: November 1940-December 1941, TheBrown, David 2002Whitehall History Publishing with Frank Cass, LondonEnglish
Royal Navy in World War II, TheRobert Jackson 1997USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Sailor’s Odyssey, A – The autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of HyndhopeCunningham, Andrew Browne 1951E.P. Dutton & Co., BostonEnglish
Sangue di marinaiLeoni, Mario 1954Edizioni Europee, MilanoItalian
schnorchel italiano, LoGaluppini, Gino 1986USMM – RomaItalian
Scirè. Storia di un sommergibile e degli uomini che lo resero famosoNesi, Sergio 2007Lo Scarabeo, BolognaItalian
Scoglio e marosi. Ricordi di un chirurgo soldato e marinaio d’Italia (1915-1945)Talarico, Achille 1953Le settimane d‘Italia, MilanoItalian
Scuole R. Marinaaa.vv. Ufficio Collegamento Stampa del Ministero della Marina, RomaItalian
scuole sottufficiali della marina militare, Le_x000D_
torpediniere italiane 1881-1964
Galuppini, Gino 1996USMM – RomaItalian
Sea Battles in close-up WW IIGrove, Erin Stephen, Martin1993USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Sea DevilsBorghese, Juno Valerio 1950USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
Sea Warfare – The Encyclopedia of 20th Century ConflictKemp, Paul 1998Arms and ArmourEnglish
seconda battaglia navale della Sirte, LaSantoni, Alberto 1982Edizioni dell’Ateneo, RomaItalian
sette minuti di Punta Stilo, ICernuschi, Enrico 1998Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
Settembre neroTrizzino, Antonio 1965Longanesi, MilanoItalian
Ship, TheForester, Cecil Scott 1976Penguin BooksEnglish
Siamo fieri di voi. La storia dei nostri gloriosi battelli durante la Guerra 1940-1943 e il ricordo degli equipaggi che donarono la vita alla PatriaCapone, Corrado 1996Istituto Grafico Editoriale Italiano, NapoliItalian
Solo per la Bandiera. I Nuotatori Paracadutisti della MarinaButtazzoni, Nino 2002Mursia, MilanoItalian
Sommergibili a Singapore 1943. L’odissea di un marinaio friulanoRastelli, Achille 1990Mursia, MilanoItalian
Sommergibili all’attaccoCocchia, Aldo 1955Rizzoli, MilanoItalian
sommergibili della 2^ G.M., IBagnasco, Erminio 1973Albertelli, ParmaItalian
sommergibili emersero all’alba, IDonato, Alberto 1966Baldini & Castoldi, MilanoItalian
Sommergibili in guerraFioravanzo, Giuseppe 1956USMM – RomaItalian
Sommergibili in guerra 1940-1945Bagnasco, Erminio Rastelli, Achille1995Albertelli, ParmaItalian
sommergibili in Mediterraneo, I – Tomo I: dal 10 giugno 1940 al 31 dicembre 1941Bertini, Marcello Donato, Alberto1967USMM – RomaItalian
sommergibili in Mediterraneo, I – Tomo II: dal 1° gennaio 1942 all’ 8 settembre 1943Bertini, Marcello Donato, Alberto1968USMM – RomaItalian
sommergibili Italiani 1895-1971, IPollina, Paolo M. Bertini, Marcello1971USMM – RomaItalian
Sommergibili italiani fra le due guerreTurrini, Alessandro 1990Stao Maggiore Marina – RomaItalian
Sommergibili italiani nell’AtlanticoDe Giacomo, Antonio 1950l’Arnia, RomaItalian
Sommergibili Italiani. Cento anni di vita tra storia e leggendaFlamigni, Antonio Marcon, Tullio & Turrini, Alessandro1990Rivista Marittima, RomaItalian
Sommergibili italiani. Vol. I e IITurrini, Alessandro Miozzi, Ottorino Ottone1999USMM – RomaItalian
sommergibili negli oceani, IMori Ubaldini, Ubaldo Cocchia, Aldo1963USMM – RomaItalian
sommergibili tascabili italiani nel II conflitto mondiale, ILembo, Daniele 2006Grafica MA.RO., PaviaItalian
Sopra di noi l’oceanoTrizzino, Antonino 1962Longanesi, MilanoItalian
sorpresa di Matapan, LaIachino, Angelo 1957Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Sotto i mari del mondoCasali, Antonio Cattaruzza, Marina1990Laterza, RomaItalian
Sotto il segno di Antares. La 7a divisione incrociatori.Roberti, Vero 1976Mursia, MilanoItalian
Sottomarini Alleati della Seconda Guerra MondialePoolman, Kenneth 1993F.lli Melita, La SpeziaItalian
Sous-Marines Italiens en France, LesGillet, Jean-Pierre 2002Lela PresseFrench
Squali d’acciaioMaioli, Goly 1993F.lli Melita, La SpeziaItalian
Stalking the U-BoatSchoenfeld, Max 1955Smithsonian InstitutionEnglish
Storia della dottrina navale italianaDonolo, Luigi 1996USMM – RomaItalian
Storia della Guerra nel Mediterraneo 1940-1943Bernotti, Romeo 1960Vito Bianco, RomaItalian
Storia della Marina del Terzo Reich 1939-1945Bekker, Cajus 1974Longanesi, MilanoItalian
Storia della Marina ItalianaGuglielmotti, Umberto 1961Vito Bianco EditoreItalian
Storia delle Aerosiluranti ItalianeUnia, Carlo 1974Edizioni Bizzarri, RomaItalian
Storia delle campagne oceanografiche della R. Marina. Tomo I: dal 1861 al 1882Leva, Fausto 1936USMM – RomaItalian
Storia delle campagne oceanografiche della R. Marina. Tomo II: dal 1881 al 1900Leva, Fausto 1936USMM – RomaItalian
Storia delle campagne oceanografiche della R. Marina. Tomo III: dal 1901 al 1923Leva, Fausto 1936USMM – RomaItalian
Storia delle campagne oceanografiche della R. Marina. Tomo IV: dal 1923 al 1959Leva, Fausto 1960USMM – RomaItalian
Storia mondiale del sommergibileGhetti, Walter 1975De Vecchi, MilanoItalian
Storia Mondiale dell’Aviazione da GuerraLlauge, Dausa Felix 1972De Vecchi, MilanoItalian
Storie di una Marina che non c’è più. Tomo IGaluppini, Gino 2000USMM – RomaItalian
Storie di una Marina che non c’è più. Tomo IIGaluppini, Gino 2003USMM – RomaItalian
Stormi d’Italia. Storia dell’aviazione militare italianaLazzati, Giulio 1997Mursia, MilanoItalian
Struggle in the Mediterranean 1939-1945, TheDe Belot, Raymond 1951Princeston UniversityEnglish
Submarine Book, TheLawliss, Chuck 2000Burford Books, Short Hills NJEnglish
Submarines of World War TwoBagnasco, Erminio 1973Armd and ArmorEnglish
talia in guerra: il II Anno 1941, L’aa.vv. 1994Commissione Italiana di Storia MilitareItalian
talia in guerra: il II Anno 1941, L’_x000D_
L’Italia in guerra: il III Anno 1942
aa.vv. 1993Commissione Italiana di Storia MilitareItalian
talia in guerra: il III Anno 1942, L’aa.vv. 1994Commissione Italiana di Storia MilitareItalian
TarantoNewton, Don Hampshire, A. Cecil1959William Kimber & Co. Ltd.English
Taranto e i suoi sommergibiliLo Martire, Nino Bixio 1990Schena, Fasano BRItalian
Taranto: la Pearl Harbor italianaOttolenghi, Gustavo 2003SugaCo, MilanoItalian
Tecnica della sconfitta. Storia dei quaranta giorni che precedettero e seguirono l’entrata dell’Italia in guerraBandini, Franco 1963Sugar, MilanoItalian
Tener famiglia. Gesta, ambizioni e disinganni di un ufficiale della Regia MarinaPetrillo, Luigi 2005Lampi di stampa, MilanoItalian
Teseo Tesei e gli assaltatori della Regia MarinaBianchi, Gianni 2005Sarasota, Marina di CarraraItalian
Timone al centro… e spera in DioEmanuelli, Dino 1983Mursia, MilanoItalian
Timoni a salire. Le azioni dei sommergibili oceanici italiani in AtlanticoRaiola, Giulio 1978Mursia, MilanoItalian
Torpedini umaneCassini, Marino 1971Mursia, MilanoItalian
Torpediniere (ex ct) tipo “Pattison” e “Orlando”Rastelli, Achille_x000D_
Rastelli, Achille
1994Albertelli, ParmaItalian
torpediniere italiane 1881-1964, LePollina, Paolo M. 1974USMM – RomaItalian
Tra mare e cielo. Vita di un uomo fortunatoValli, Giulio 2004Fond. Cassa Risp. di Terni e NarniItalian
Tracking the Axis EnemyBath, Alan Harris 1998University Press of KansasEnglish
Traditori in divisaTrizzino, Antonino 1974Bietti, MilanoItalian
Tramonto di una grande marinaIachino, Angelo 1959Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Two Fleet Surprised. The Story of the Battle of Cape MatapanSeth, Ronald 1960Geoffrey Bles.English
U-Boat I Sommergibili TedeschiLeonini, Laura 2000Editoriale ZeusEnglish
U-Boat Wars, TheTerraine, John 1989G.P. Putnam’s SonsEnglish
Ultima missione in Mar Rosso. L’odissea dei naufraghi della lancia IA 463Gnetti, Fabio 1979Mursia, MilanoItalian
ultimo quarto di Luna, All’ – Le imprese dei mezzi d’assaltoRomersa, Luigi 1977Mursia, MilanoItalian
ULTRA La fine di un mito – La guerra dei codici tra gli inglesi e le Marine Italiane 1934-1945Cernuschi, Enrico2020Mursia, MilanoItalian
Umberto PugliesePellegrini, Ernesto 1999USMM – RomaItalian
Un alcione dalle ali spezzate – parte I – Il nidoNesi, Sergio 1989Grafiche ELLECI, BolognaItalian
Un alcione dalle ali spezzate – parte II – Il voloNesi, Sergio 1989Grafiche ELLECI, BolognaItalian
Un alcione dalle ali spezzate – parte III – La cadutaNesi, Sergio 1989Grafiche ELLECI, BolognaItalian
Un brindisi per MatapanZamorani, Massimo 1993Reverdito, TrentoItalian
Un marinaio. Una storiaMazzucato, T. Michele 2006Libreria CLUP, MilanoItalian
Un pomeriggio di settembre. La fine della Corazzata Roma nel diario di un marinaioAmici, Andrea 2006De Ferrari, GenovaItalian
Un sommergibile non è rientrato alla base. Memorie della guerra atlantica del sommergibile Tazzoli al comando di Carlo Fecia di CossatoMoronari, Antonio 1951Milieri, MilanoItalian
Un sommergibile per giocattoloFagioli, Giancarlo 1996Marzocchi, ForlìItalian
Una vita sul mareInnesti, Silvano Bikinzi, Jovine1985Ponsacco, PisaItalian
Underwater WarriosKemp, Paul 1999Brockmapton PressItalian
Uniforms & Insignia of the Navies of World War IIMollo, Andrew 1991Greenhill Books, LondonEnglish
Unità veloci costiere italianeBagnasco, Erminio 1998USMM – RomaItalian
Uno contro sei. Il contributo della marina italiana alla conquista di CretaRoberti, Vero 1977Mursia, MilanoItalian
Uomini contro naviPegolotti, Beppe 1991Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Uomini dell’Atlantico. Le vicende dell’eroico Gianfranco Gazzana e degli altri comandanti e equipaggi dei sommergibili italiani, 1940-1943Raiola, Giulio 1973Longanesi, MilanoItalian
Uomini e navi nella storia della Marina militare italianaColliva, Giuliano 1972Bramante, MilanoItalian
Uomini ombra. Ricordi di un addetto al servizio segreto navale 1939-1943De Monte, Mario 1955NEMI, RomaItalian
Uomini sul fondo. Storia del sommergibilismo italiano dalle origini a oggiGiorgerini, Giorgio 1994Mondadori, MilanoItalian
Vento in proraTraetta, Armando 1950l’arnia, RomaItalian
vero traditore, Il – Il ruolo documentato di ULTRA nella guerra del MediterraneoSantoni, Alberto 1981Mursia, MilanoItalian
Viaggio nella memoria di un marinaio (1940-1945)Della Rosa, Armando 2003La Stamperia, RiminiItalian
violatori di blocco, IDe Risio, Carlo 1992USMM – RomaItalian
Vita di marinaioBirindelli, Gino 1991Vito Bianco, RomaItalian
Vita segreta dei sommergibili. Gli angeli senza ali.Crepas, Attilio 1943Paravia, TorinoItalian
voce del fondo, La – Romanzi di sommergibiliMilanesi, Guido 1941Mondadori, MilanoItalian
War at SeaMiller, Nathan 1995Oxford UniversityEnglish
War Beneth the SeaPadfield, Peter 1998John Wiley & Sons, Inc.English
War in a StringbagLamb, Charles 1977Cassell and Collier Macmillan, LondonEnglish
War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, TheIreland, Bernard 1993Arms and Armour, LondonEnglish
Warship Losses of World War TwoBrown, David 1990Arms and Armour PressEnglish
WarshipsLyon, Hugh 1985Chartwell Books, Ltd.English
White Ensign. The British Navy at war 1939-1945Roskill, Stephen Wentworth 1960USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
world at arms, A – A global history of World War IIWeinberg, Gerhard L. 1994Cambridge University PressEnglish
World War II – Time Life BooksWhipple, Addison Beecher Colvin 1981Time-Life Books Inc.English
World’s Merchant Fleets, TheJordan, Roger 1999USNI Press, Annapolis MDEnglish
X MAS nella II Guerra Mondiale, LaRoccardi, Giovanni 1982Trevi, RomaItalian
ritrovamento del Regio Sommergibile Ammiraglio Millo, IlStorani, Francesco & Nazareno2015Youcanprint Italian
Odissea di un sommergibilista: Dal Mar Rosso al Mediterraneo. 1940-1943Patrizio Rapalino, Schivardi Giuseppe2011MurziaItalian
Andar pel vasto mar. La guerra subacquea del Sottocapo Luigi Pozzato sul Regio Sommergibile Alpino BagnoliniGerini Ugo2021Luglio EditoreItalian

Submarines

Introduction

During the period between 1925 and 1940, the Regia Marina dedicated large resources to the strengthening of its submarine force, which resulted in the deployment of 50 large, 89 medium, 2 cargo and 50 small units. At the beginning of the hostilities (June 10th, 1940), Italy had a total of 117 submarinesof which only 7 could be categorized as obsolete.

The first medium displacement boats built were the four 830 ton. “Mameli” in 1929. Later units had larger displacements. In 1932, Italy began producing the class “600“, units of only 650 tons. The same configuration was maintained on the “Sirena” (12 units), the “Perla” (10 units), the “Adua” (17 units). The “Platino” class (13 units) were increased to 710 tons.

From experience gather during the initial days of the war, displacement of all units was increased, with the Tritone class (13 units) reaching 905 tons. The first large submarines were the 4 units of the Balilla class. These double-hull, 1405-ton units were first deployed in 1928. Later models were decreased to about 1,100 tons, with the only exception of the ocean-going “Ammiragli” class (4 units), and the 2 transports of the “R” class.

Most medium and large units were armed with a single gun, placed in front of the conning tower. Some had a second gun place on the conning tower itself or just behind it. Torpedo launchers were installed both forward and aft. Usually, medium size units had two tubes aft and four forward. Some had a four and four configuration with the only exception of the “Bragadin” class, which had the aft torpedo tubes replaced by mine laying devices.

Large units were usually configured with four and four tubes, with the exception of the Balilla, which had only two stern tubes. The Foca, which was dedicated to mine laying, was equipped with only two tubes installed under the aft mine-laying devices. The ocean-going “Ammiragli” class was equipped with six forward and four aft tubes. These were 450 mm torpedoes (nicknamed ‘silurotti‘, small torpedoes) instead of the standard 533 mm ones. The “R” class, which was exclusively used for transport, did not have torpedoes. The standard propulsion system consisted of diesel engines for surface navigation and electric motors for submerged one. The “Ammiragli” and “Balilla” class had a third diesel engine attached to a dynamo used to produce electricity for surface navigation, thus providing for low-speed long-range capabilities.

Although in 1922 the Regia Marina had began research on submerged navigation using diesel engines, a device invented by Major Pericle Ferretti was never fully deployed. Even while collaborating with the German Navy, Italy never implemented this Dutch-invented device, known as the schnorchel, thus greatly impeding the performances of all of its submarines.

At the fall of France, Italy was able to set up an Atlantic submarine base in Bordeaux, thus eliminating the perilous passage through the Gibraltar Strait. Admiral Donitz, the supreme German submarine commander, attempted to integrate the Italian forces in the Wolf-pack strategy, but the Italian boats were technically poor, slow to dive and possessed a large and easily detectable profile. As a result, most Italian submarines operated in the Central and Southern Atlantic in solitary missions.

Adapted and translated from the book “Guida alle navi d’Italia”, by Gino Galuppini, published in 1982 by Arnoldo Mondadori Editore.

Evolution

Some authors date the invention of the submarine, or at least a conceptual development of it, around the 15th century in England, but the real revolution in underwater warfare began in the United States. John Phillip Holland, a brilliant engineer of Irish origin and militantly anti-British , developed at the very end of the 18th century the first modern submarine, the Holland. The sixth evolution, denominated Holland VI, began a series of naval tests in March 1898, soon proving its excellent military capabilities. Eventually, the U.S. Navy purchased the boat and named it USS Holland, thus giving birth to the illustrious history of the “silent service”. Eventually, Holland’s talent would mature in the highly recognized Electric Boat Company, while a patented copy of his work was also produced by the renowned and respected British shipbuilder Vickers of Glasgow. The Royal Navy was slow in embracing the new weapon, but by 1903 it had already deployed five “Hollands”, while the U.S. Navy had already seven.

Italy, at the time one of the emerging naval powers, experimented with submarines as early as 1890, date of the realization of the first prototype name “Delfino” (Dolphin), a fully electric boat built by the naval shipyard of La Spezia. The boat produced good technical results: it was stable and maneuverable, but due to the absence of an internal combustion engine, had limited endurance. However, it was instrumental in training naval engineers in this completely, and complex new field.

The period preceding the Great War would be of immense importance in defining the technical nature of the weapon, thus inducing various navies into creating practical and theoretical plans for their integration within the existing tactical organizations. One of the technical factors of greater importance was the basic design of the boats. Two different methodologies were followed in organizing the submarines’ means of submerging and surfacing. The two solutions were the simple hull, mostly of American design, and the partial double hull, a French design later improved by the Germans. The Italian designed Cesare Laurenti, still utilizing the American concept of the single hull, introduced a third solution, which provided for internal ballast tanks. Italian innovations, especially in the area of safety, would continue for decades.

These new, larger, and more powerful boats forced an evolution of their strategic employment. The initial models were strictly used for coastal patrol, the defense of ports, and possibly some other minor employments not requiring speed and endurance. The newer boats were faster, and capable of remaining at sea for extended periods of time, thus it was immediately conceived to have them operate as part of the battle fleet – a concept very dear to the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy – or against enemy merchant ships – a concept later evolved to a level of science by the German Navy.

It is important to consider that in the first part of the 19th century, naval affairs were mostly revolving around Great Britain and the Royal Navy. As the most powerful fleet at sea, the Royal Navy set the standards for all other navies to follow. The British navy was very traditionalistic, sectarian, and intrinsically connected to the mighty British war industry, thus it favored large, powerful, and highly armored ships: the battleships. In 1904, in naval maneuvers conducted off Portsmouth, the British “Hollands”, essentially very rudimental vessels, were successful in simulating the torpedoing of four British battleships. The event was possibly noticed, but the Royal Navy had to wait for the ascendancy of Jacky Fisher to First Lord of the Sea to finally see change take place.

Just before the Great War, most of the larger navies had already developed an adequate submarine force. Great Britain had 92, France 52, Russia 48, Germany 38 , but the United States had only 30, and Italy only 20. Japan, with 13 boats, figured last. Italy, beginning an irreversible trend which would cause many repercussions during the second world conflict, had already fractioned its fleet into multiple classes. In addition to the already mentioned “Delfino”, there were the “Foca” and the “Atropo”, 8 units of the “Medusa” class, 5 of the Glauco class, 2 of the “Pullino” class, 2 of the “Nautilus” class, plus the shipyards were ready to introduce the “Argonauta”, the “Balilla” and two units of the “Pacinotti” class.

German boats were showing their superiority mostly thanks to the quality of their diesel engine, and the Italian shipyard of Muggiano (La Spezia) began utilizing diesel engines produced by FIAT and C.R.D.A. This tendency to develop domestic technology would be omnipresent in the development of the Italian submarine force, but it would also reflect the constant tension present within the high ranks of the Regia Marina, and the service’s inability to define a clear design standard. Furthermore, since some of the design work was conducted by the navy itself, and some by private industry, political mingling and financial interest were omnipresent.

Another aspect of the evolution of the Italian submarine force which we should not ignore is its role in the context of the naval doctrine developed by the Regia Marina at the time. Following the conclusion of the First World War, Italy and many other nations faced very severe financial hardship. In the case of Italy, economic, social, and political turmoil created the necessary fertile ground for the ascendancy of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Party. The Italian Navy (Regia Marina), perhaps catalyzed by events surrounding it, did not fail to enter the highly controversial debate between the followers of the “Jeune école” and the “old guard”. The new school openly declared that the experience of the war just concluded demonstrated that large capital ships were vulnerable to smaller vessels, an argument this clearly in favor of the submarine forces. Eventually, as in other European countries, the think tanks within the Italian navy were divided between those who believed that the submarine was a new decisive weapon, and those who proposed that the war’s submarines exploits (mostly by the Germans) were simply the result of lack of readiness by the surface forces. This gap, it was asserted, had been filled and the submarine was now highly vulnerable.

Admiral Romeo Bernotti (1877-1974)

Italian naval doctrine was evolving under the impetuosity of the academic diatribe between Admiral Bernotti (new school) and Admiral di Giamberardino (old school). The latter was a prolific writer whose successful career was probably the result of his acclaimed intellectual work. Also prominent during this period was Commander Giuseppe Fioravanzo , who in rebutting di Giamberardino’s concept of “the final battle”, proposed a more defensive standing and a greater reliance on lighter vessels, especially submarines. This same author was also the first proponent of what, later on, would become the LCC-Class or command ship. In 1922 Admiral Bernotti reopened the “Istituto di Guerra Marittima” (Italian War College), but in the eighteen years that follow, Italy failed to establish a clear naval strategy inclusive of all naval elements, limiting itself to what could be considered an excessively simplistic approach: equal the French or else.

Admiral Oscar di Giamberardino (1881-1960)

The clearest demonstration of the divide between the navy’s good intentions and the actual results could be found in Adm. Guido Po’s writing (1940), in which he states that the Italian naval strategy was based on:

(1) the offensive use of warships and extensive use of submarine packs;

(2) the exploitation of Italy’s geographical position in the Mediterranean to disrupt the enemy’s communication lines; and

(3) seeking to maximize cooperation with the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) to overcome the lack of aircraft carriers.

An analysis of the Italian Navy in World War Two would exceed the boundaries of this discussion, but it should be said that most of these points were clearly missed and that the navy actually operated to the contrary of its established principles. The point which does pertain to this discussion is the utilization of submarines in packs; this strategy, based on the German experience of the previous war, would actually be one of the few areas in which disobedience to the originally established doctrine produced the greatest results.

In World War I, the Germans soon realized that the blockade imposed upon the Central powers would soon deplete these nations of vital imports. Germany had bountiful natural resources, but lacked rare minerals and materials necessary to the war effort. To balance the field, Germany had to impose similar restrictions upon its enemies, and mostly upon Great Britain. Submarine warfare was only partially regulated by the pre-war convention of the Hague. In general, the terms of the Hague agreement did not, and could not consider the technical evolution of the submarine, thus the weapon was bound to rules of engagement designed for surface compact. In essence, in raiding enemy ships, submarines were asked to surface, identify themselves, inspect the enemy vessel, allow for the crew to leave the ship, and eventually sink it.

This almost medieval set of rules, reminding us of the “singolar tensone” (single combat) of a long gone era, would surprisingly be revisited by the Italian boats in the early stage of the Atlantic battle. Two important technical evolutions made this kind of submarine warfare outdated: first, ships began receiving Marconi’s apparatuses, thus they could warn base of the presence of an enemy submarine. Second, even merchant ship began receiving the installation of deck guns capable of causing considerable damage to a flimsy submarine. The German decision to migrate from restricted to unrestricted warfare was inevitable. Despite America’s outcry regarding the barbarism of unrestricted warfare, in reality this conflict had already reached unprecedented barbarism with the massive butchery of troops at the front, the bombardment of civilian targets, deportations , the use of gasses and other means of destruction. Thus, submarines emerged as the villains, but at the same time as one of the most effective weapons of the war. Considering that during the highest point of the crisis up to one forth of all shipping to Great Britain was being sunk, the level of success reached by the German Imperial submarine fleet was unprecedented, unexpected, and almost succeeded in changing the outcome of the war.

This latter aspect should be clearly remembered since it contributed in shaping some of the Italian naval doctrine of the Second World War. German submarine warfare was not limited to the North Sea and the Atlantic, but it also expanded into the Mediterranean where the German boats easily overcame the passage of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Otranto to reach Austrian ports. This is another factor that should be kept under consideration; geographical barrier did not necessarily limit the effectiveness of the submarine, but German losses in the Mediterranean evidenced that certain conditions dramatically increase the percentage of losses. The end of the atrocious conflict, and the social, economical, and political turmoil that swept Europe and the rest of the world in the 1920 caused a partial loss by amnesia of all lessons learned during the first submarine conflict.

Taken as a whole, Italy’s position was precarious: the nation had participated in the Great War, suffered great losses, and received very little benefit from it (many historians root the advent of Fascism to these factors). Although the nation had now expanded into former Austrian territories with large Italian populations, Italy was still the weakest of the larger powers. The industrialization of the country was mostly reserved to the north western part of the nation (Turin, Milan and Genoa) and the other regions languished in economic disparity, poor communication, and a mostly agricultural economy utilizing antiquated methodologies. The Conference of Washington bolstered the Italian Navy’s confidence especially because it had achieved its primary goal, naval equivalency with what was perceived as its primary foe: France.

Friction between the two nations dated back to the reign of Napoleon III, and French opposition to the establishment of an Italian national identity. Still, a monarch whose family origins were distinctively French governed this recently established unified Italian kingdom. Italy, the equivalent of a European social climber, was forcibly trying to establish itself as one of the major players. As a matter of fact, Italy’s abandonment of the three-way alliance with Germany and Austria in favor of France and Great Britain had been a conniving and well-calculated gamble more than moral support of democracy versus central government.

The Regia Marina did not have a relevant role during World War I, bar the sinking of an Austrian battleship by insidious weapons toward the very end of the conflict. With the advent of a new and stronger government after the 1922 march on Rome, the new prime minister, Benito Mussolini, pursued a noticeably more defined and aggressive naval policy. Mussolini, in addition to consolidating his quasi-democratically obtained power utilizing demagogical, and later authoritarian means, immediately recognized the value of a strong navy, thus dedicating Italy’s scant resources to the building of a world class, qualitatively superior, modern, powerful, and well equipped navy. This “prima donna” role would have to be shared with the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air Force), while the army remained far behind.

While accumulating massive debts, the Italian government maintained a difficult balance between resources available and the escalating requirements imposed by this newly acquired military leadership. Naval constructions could easily benefit from Italy’s established naval technology, but suffer from shortage of essential material which had to be imported. Although most of the original engine and gunnery technology was clearly of British origin, the national industry had been able to develop a distinct Italian identity producing excellent ships capable of conquering the blue ribbon. As part of this fervent program of naval construction, the Regia Marina deployed the second largest submarine fleet in the World, second only to Russia. The Italian boats, as seen in the period preceding World War One, would be built by different shipyards following radically different designs.

A submarine fleet is not just an assembly of boats, nicely docked, and dressed in colorful flags. Submarines, by nature of their technical complexity, required specialized training and a new class of sailors. Italy established three distinct submarine schools. In addition to the already existing and reputable Royal Naval Academy of Leghorn for officers, the submarine schools were specifically designed for training submarine personnel, mostly specialized non-commissioned officers in the complex operations surrounding the operation of the boat, and their utilization as an offensive weapon (the schools were in Pula). Still, upon Italy’s entry into the war, a shortage of qualified personnel would be one of the most important factors in restricting submarine operations. This shortage of personnel was typical of all submarine services since the harsh and unhealthy conditions aboard diesel submarines did not allow for an extensive service, not to mention that casualties were extremely high.

The submarine force was organized under a single command structure, but its strategy had to fulfill multiple tactical requirements. Italian submarines were asked to defend the coastline, intercept enemy shipping, provide scouting for the fleet, transport essential war material, and lay minefields. Essentially, the submarine fleet had a variety of boats designed for a variety of tasks for a war scenario which failed to materialize. Italy’s “mortal” enemy, France, dissolved under the crushing German offensive of spring 1940 and Italy found itself face-to-face with the mighty Mediterranean Fleet. Although a scenario of a British-Italian conflict had been studied during the Ethiopian crisis, the efforts involved were very limited and consequently the naval command found itself dealing with the unimaginable: an offensive war.

While the surface fleet was tasked with the defense of the traffic with North Africa, Albania, and the Aegean, the submarine fleet had the arduous task of intercepting and sinking the non-existing British commercial traffic. It is interesting to note that, upon the declaration of war, while the air force and the army were given very conservative, if not defensive operational orders, the navy was tasked with providing Italy with all of her offensive initiatives.

Eventually, the war record of the Italian Mediterranean submarine fleet would be a pitiable one with slightly less than 100,000 t. of shipping sunk, and a large number of losses. Additional submarines were deployed in Eastern Africa and later the Atlantic. The first group, with operational guidelines developed before the war failed to produce noticeable results , while the second, faced with unforeseen conditions, would be able to write some of the most lustrous pages in the history of the Italian submarine force. In essence, wherever the Italians planned, they failed, and where they improvised, they succeeded.

With the Italian expansion in East Africa, despite the limited docking facilities, one would have expected a forceful Italian presence in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea to impede British maritime traffic. Unfortunately, due to poor planning, defective equipment, and waning supplies, the fear of an Italian menace in the area failed to materialize. On the Atlantic side, and especially in 1939, no one expected the availability of docking facilities. Spanish support, although much sought after, never materialized and therefore there weren’t any other friendly harbors available. Thus, the Regia Marina envisioned a series of Atlantic sorties which would have originated from Italian bases and had to endure the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar. On the other hand, German submarines had to sail from their home bases, thus allowing only for very limited patrol time. The Italians, as already mentioned, had to deal with the Strait of Gibraltar and the local British presence, which despite Spanish pro-axis tendencies still gave the Royal Navy dominant control over the narrow passage.

The fall of France and the subsequent occupation of the French Atlantic ports radically changed the scenario. The German navy immediately sought to capitalize on the new opportunity, but the availability of ocean going vessels was very limited. Due to the post war limitations, Germany had to develop its submarines in other nations, mostly Holland, and preferred small, inhabitable boats with the maximum war load, while Italian engineers gave plenty of focus to habitability. Leveraging some of the discussion which had taken place in Friedrichshaffen (Germany) on the 20th and 21st of June, 1939 following the signing of the Italian-German “Pact of Steel”, the Germans requested the transfer of Italian boats to the Atlantic. During these meetings, Admiral Cavagnari, the Italian equivalent of the First Sea Lord, committed to an Italian presence in the Atlantic. It should be remembered that Italy and Germany were conducting parallel wars, and that the submarine agreement amounted to the first practical collaboration.

For a navy specifically built for a strictly Mediterranean war against France, this commitment was a stretch; still the Italian shipyards had developed and built several classes of submarine specifically designed for operations in the oceans. Since the late twenties and early thirties, Italy had begun building high displacement submarines capable of crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, reaching the Atlantic for long patrols along the French and African coast. During the 1939 discussions, the glamorous successes of the German U-Boot during World War I were still vivid in the minds of all Italian naval strategists: the glitter of glory was irresistible.

The communalities of interests between the two navies, especially in the area of submarine warfare, were limited. Although Italy had a larger fleet, it lacked the industrial power, which would later allow Germany to begin a program of mass construction. During the conflict, while Italy was barely able to produce 40 newer boats, Germany’s war machine produced over 1000. Surprisingly, with the evolution of the war, Germany, which had originally sought the collaboration of Italian boats, later would seek Italian crews to man new U-boats.

Destroyers

Between 1925 and 1945, the Regia Marina built only one kind of explorer, the “Navigatori” class. These units were classified explorers in 1929 and reclassified destroyers in 1938. During the period leading to World War II, the Regia Marina built or refurbished 8 battleships, numerous light and heavy cruisers, but the units which were built in the largest number were destroyers and explorers.

The destroyers were, by then, units belonging to naval squadrons and not any longer than the original torpedo boat hunters. This new class of ships was required to be able to attack using torpedoes and cannon fire and was also expected to provide escort for larger units. These new units not only grew in scope, but also in displacement which from the original 1,560 tons of the “Turbine” class, grew to the 2,460 tons of the “Soldato” class. The armament usually consisted of several 120mm guns and 4 to 6 533mm torpedo launchers.
One of the original requirements was speed. These new units were capable of speed of 38 to 39 knots while being sufficiently seaworthy. Unfortunately, on March 23rd 1942, during the Second battle of the Sirte, the “Scirocco” of the “Maestrale” class and the “Lanciere” of the “Soldati” class were lost to an unusually violent gale.

The general silhouette, armament, and the location of the smokestacks did not vary much between older and newer models. All the italian destroyers, from the “Sauro” class onwards, had a main armament of two twin 120 mm. guns, one on the forecastle and one at the stern (often on a bandstand). The only exceptions to this general rule were: the “Sella” class (initially they had only a single gun on the forecastle, replaced in 1929/1930 by a twin turret), the “Navigatori” class (armed with six 120mm. guns in three twin turrets, the third being between the torpedo tubes, amidships), the second group of the “Soldati” class (with the exception of the Velite) had a fifth gun in a single turret amidships) and the planned “Comandanti” class that was to be armed with four single 135 mm guns. We do not consider in this analysis the ex enemy destroyers of the Premuda, Sebenico and FR classes.
Torpedo launchers were twin mountings in the “Sella” class and (for some periods only) in the “Navigatori” class, and triple mountings from the “Sauro” class onwards. These launchers were fully adjustable and always mounted on the centerline.

All units had two propellers, with two separate engine rooms and two or three boilers. Up to the “Turbine” class, all units had two smokestacks, which were later reduced to one starting with the “Freccia” class (1931).
The war decimated the Regia Marina, especially in the area of explorers and destroyers: 11 out of 12 explorers and 30 out of 41 destroyers were lost. Of the remaining 12 units, two were captured by the Germans, while others were transferred to the victorious Allies. At the end of the hostilities, Italy was left with only four units.

Adapted and translated from the book “Guida alle navi d’Italia”, by Gino Galuppini, published in 1982 by Arnold Mondadori Editore.

Edited by Cristiano d’Adamo and Pierluigi Malvezzi

Italian Cruisers

Introduction

The Italian participation to World War I confirmed that the Regia Marina was ready and well trained despite the fact that, due to the will of the Allies, the fruits of victory had been limited. Italian successes were mostly the result of a complete control of the sea and continuous actions of defense and offense conducted under the command of the “Duca degli Abruzzi” and Admiral Thaon de Revel. The peace treaty of 1919 radically changed the balance in the Mediterranean, and although it had given Italy a better position in the Adriatic, it also created a delicate situation in the Mediterranean. This was mostly due to the new French expansions in Morocco and Syria, and the British control over Gibraltar, Egypt and Palestine.

After the failed Naval Conference of Geneva in 1932, where Italy had sought parity with the strongest European continental navy (France), the situation changed due to the Anglo-German and Anglo-Soviet agreements along with changes in Japanese naval policy. Thereafter, the international agreement of naval limitation expired and a period of limitation (Naval Holiday) was followed by almost complete freedom thus causing an escalation in naval rearmament. At this point, even the Italian Navy gave an impetuous boost to new constructions; still it was not allowed to develop the armament which would have most impacted the upcoming conflict: naval aviation. The war in Ethiopia demanded a great effort from the Regia Marina; not much in terms of combat but in logistics. This period of crisis, especially the one with Great Britain, demonstrated the importance of the naval affairs in the life of a country which had expanded to overseas dominions but who was still dependant on the British-controlled Suez canal. This situation should have suggested a different and more appropriate policy, instead it laid the tragic foundations of World War II where naval affairs were to have a great influence. Between 1922 and 1925, the Regia Marina reorganized incorporating German and Austrian ships captured during or obtained after the war, while keeping into consideration the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Washington (1921-22).

After having radiated the older units, the Regia Marina restarted the construction program under a plan originally started by Grand Admiral Thaon de Ravel and continued by Admiral Sirianni. Taking advantage of the progress made in the area of naval contraction during the previous conflict, the first round consisted in the manufacturing of torpedo boats for which the Treaty of Washington had set no limits. Great innovations were introduced in the area of propulsion. Engines, by this time fueled by oil, implemented super heated steam and turbines thus greatly increasing power and capable of obtaining over 30,000 H.P. per axle. At the same time, great developments took place in the area of diesel engines for both surface and submerged vessels. In the field of armaments, all units began installing anti-aircraft guns, while the new 533 mm (21”) torpedo became the standard. Catapults appeared on larger units for the deployment of hydroplanes to be used for tactical reconnaissance and the observation of gunnery. Special attentions were dedicated to the protection of battleships against underwater attacks. In 1932, having completed the first round of constructions, the Regia Marina allowed for the deployment of heavy cruisers of the “Trento” and “Zara” class and light cruisers of the “Condottieri” class.

Trento Class

Also, during this period, began the construction of the destroyers of the “Sella”, “Sauro”, “Turbine” and “Freccia” class and the submarines of the “Balilla”, “Mameli”, “Vector Pisani” and “Argonauta” class. The first large cruisers of the “Washington” class (10,000 British tons and 8” guns) were the “Trento”. Designed and built for speed (this obtained at the price of protection), they were equipped with a light armor belt, while the similarly built French vessels had no protection at all. The Italian “10,000” which took to the sea after the “Trentos” were the “Zara”, units these with greater protection and lesser speed. This class was the best “Washington” built by Italy and had a harmonious balance of armament and protection. The fact that the enemy, in particularly advantageous circumstances, sank three of these units should not diminish their value. For the sake of speed, protection was completely sacrificed on the light cruisers of the “Da Giussano” class. Designed by Rota, these ships were initially designated as “Esploratori” (scout). In 1932, due to the failure of the Conference of Geneva for the limitation and control of the armament, Italy was forced to speed up the strengthening of her Navy. Starting in 1933, to partially reduce its inferiority respect to the French Navy, the Navy decided to radically rebuild the battleships Cesare, Cavour, Duilio and Doria, all veterans of World War I. In 1934-38, as a result of the building up in the international political situation, Italy began the construction of four modern battleships; fast and well armed they were named Vittorio Veneto, Littorio, Roma, and Impero.

Duca degli Abruzzi Class

While the core of the fleet was been rebuilt, Italy placed into service cruisers, and numerous destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines. The last of the sever “10,000”, the Bolzano, was based on the Trentos, but it had much improved characteristics. A clear improvement over the first cruisers of the “Condottieri” class, was the release into service of the units type “Montecuccoli” and “Duca d’Aosta”. Even better were the two “Duca degli Abruzzi”, which during the period 1940-43 proofed themselves strong and with excellent performances. The last improved version of the cruiser class “Condottieri” was not completed, due to the bad turn taken by the war. The Ciano and Venezia would have been based on the “Duca degli Abruzzi” class, thus bringing the total number of light cruisers built by the Regia Marina between the two wars to fourteen. In 1939-40 began the construction of 12 cruisers of the class “Capitani Romani”; ships these with characteristics similar to the “grandi esploratori” (super destroyers) and equipped with efficient anti-torpedo boat and anti-aircraft armament. Constructions of these units were delayed due to the shortage of raw materials during the war, and up to September 8th, 1943, only three units (Attilio Regolo, Scipione Africano, Pompeo Magno) had entered service. In conclusion, the Regia Marina, which had planned to complete its building programs in 1942, entered the war on June 10th, 1940 with about 700,000 tons including 19 modern cruisers, for what was to be the harsh testing ground of World War II.

Heavy Cruisers

In June 1940 the Regia Marina, as it did with its battleships, entered the war with a fleet of relatevely new cruisers. There were still the old San Giorgio, Bari and Taranto (ex Pillau , and ex Strassburg received from the Germans after WW I), but all other units were of the kinds contemplated by the Treaty of Washington. The heavy cruisers had a displacement of 10,000 tons and were armed with guns up to 203 mm (8in); light cruisers had a displacement ranging from 5000 to 9000 tons and guns up to 152 mm (6in).

Bolzano Class

Initially, the Regia Marina followed the trends set by other navies, especially the French one, building the 10,000 tons Trento and Trieste placing more emphasis on speed to the decrement of armor.

The Italian heavy cruisers were built in only two classes: 3 units of the Trento class with 4 propellers and 150,000 HP, and 4 units of the Zara Class with only two propellers and 95,000 HP, but a much heavier armor, almost twice as thick as the one on the Trentos. It is to be noted that the Bolzano, even though like the Trento class had 4 propellers and 150,000 HP, was a much improved version of this class and it took advantage of the operational experience acquired between 1925 and 1930.

Both heavy and light cruisers were equipped with torpedoes at exemption of the Zara class. The Trento class had 4 double launchers in fixed installations. The catapults for airplanes on the Trento, Zara were fixed and place on the most forward part of the bow, while the Bolzano had a single catapult installed between the two funnels.

Zara Class

While the “Trento” class (Trento and Trieste) was still under construction, within the high command Regia Marina dissent began to mount over the choices made during the design phase. Specifically, critics complained that the new cruisers, despite their large displacement (10,000 t, as mandate by the Treaty of Washington, also known as the Five-Power Treaty), were too lightly protected. In essence, protection had been too greatly sacrificed to the benefit of speed: a remarkable 35.6 knots during the 1929 trials. Still the actual operation speed was limited to about 31 knots.

Zara Class

The first heavy cruiser class, the Trento, as well as the later Zara, were the result of an obsession with speed that dated back almost 70 years and that drove the Italian ships to always being a few knots faster than their foreign counterparts. It should be considered that during this period the Regia Marina did not have any operational battleship, thus these heavy cruisers, at least while the older battleships were being rebuilt and the new one built, represented the core of the fleet. Thus, the new cruiser had to be equipped with substantial armor, 200 mm, and the most powerful guns, 203 mm (8”), allowed by the treaty.

Having received a secretive consent from the head of government and the high hierarchy of the Navy to proceed with a project which would exceed the limit set forth by the aforementioned treaty, the “Comitati Progetto Navi” (the bureau in charge of naval constructions) produced a new design. Notwithstanding the original desired requirements, weight limitation (there was a limit to cheating after all) forced a reduction of the armor to 150 mm for the vertical surfaces and 70 mm for the horizontal ones. The main armament was kept at 8, 203 mm guns (8”) but the power plan was reduced from 150,000 to 95,000 HP. Still, the maximum trial speed ranged between 32.9 and 35.2 knots, while the final operational speed equaled the one of the Trento Class at about 31 knots. This high speed was mostly due to the power plan exceeding the requirements set forth by the construction specification by well over 23,000 HP. Thus, the true power for this class should be rated at about 118,000 HP. Most sources still report 95,000 HP.

Unlike the two Trento Class, and later the R.N. Bolzano, which had four shafts, the Zara Class had only two shafts. The Zara Class had eight boilers of the Thornycroft 3-drum type. Two groups of Parsons type, OTO-built, geared turbines moved two three-blade propellers.

At the end, the Regia Marina was to have a total of seven heavy cruisers that, despite their difference in design, could operate jointly. The first of the four new heavy cruisers of this class was the Fiume (build in Trieste), followed by the Zara (La Spezia), and then the Gorizia and Pola (Leghorn). The class was named after four provinces in the Italian northeast (Venezia Giulia). Fiume, Pola and Zara had been added to the territory in 1924, while Gorizia was created in 1927. After the war, all but the last one were lost to Yugoslavia (later Slovenia and Croatia) and renamed Rijeka, Pula and Zadar.

On the Zara class the armor was thick enough to withstand hits from guns equal to her own (they were designed to fight directly other heavy cruisers), resulting in the best armored cruisers in the world at the time. This was an important achievement because the standard for many of the Washington Treaty cruiser was a much lighter armor belt, and even less armor for the turrets and barbettes. Theorists assume that a 150 mm armor plate was not enough to withstand an incoming 203 mm armor piercing naval shell; this theory was never tested on these ships, but during the war, lighter British cruisers kept their distance from these frightening engineering marvels.

To achieve this improved armor, the Zaras were almost 2000 t heavier (as standard displacement) than the limit set forth by the treaty. In addition to the armored main belt, up to 150mm thick, there was also a very thick main deck armor of up to 70mm. Turrets and barbettes were also protected by 100mm armor. In addition to this armor, there was even another series of minor armors: the upper deck was 20mm, and the flank hull above main belt was 30mm. Almost no other cruisers were equipped with two armored decks and two armored belts. This design followed, in fact, not quite a cruiser scheme, but rather the one of a small battleship. A somewhat similar design was later implemented on the Littorio class with the introduction of de-cupping plates. Of course, this was only possible by ignoring the treaty limitations under which other constructors operated with their 203mm cruisers. Only the Des Moines class ended up having heavier armor than the Zara, but these were 17,000 tons units.

)In 1943, the only surviving unit, the R.N. Gorizia, was hit by three bombs launched by American heavy bombers. The main deck resisted the blasts and the ship continued firing during the whole bombardment. This is the only realistic test of the effectiveness of the Zara Class armor since the other three units were lost in the Battle of Matapan in extremely unusual circumstances.

The Zaras were equipped with the new Ansaldo 203 mm 53 caliber guns, models 1927 and 1929. These guns were superior to the Trento 203/50 for rate of fire, but shared the same salvo dispersion issues. While the 203/50s were produced by Ansaldo under industrial agreements with Schneider of France, the new 203/53 were a home-grown project. The projectile’s speed, originally at 930 m/s, was later reduced to 900 m/s to address serious dispersion issues, in addition to an unusually high barrel wear (this was common to many Italian naval guns). Thus, the original range of 31.5 km was also reduced to 29 km. Each turret hosted two guns each with an independent ammunition loading system. The guns could be loaded while elevated, thus increasing the rate of fire. The secondary armament was identical to the previous class of heavy cruisers and consisted of 12 100/47 and 2 120/15. There were also some 8 37/5 and 8 13.2 machine guns. Later, some of the 100/47s were replaced with 37/54 to be used against aircrafts. In general, anti-aircraft protection remained weak.

What might have appeared as an odd design, the installation of an airplane catapult on the aft desk, was instead a well thought out compromise. Since the aircrafts on board were to provide a spotting, rather than defense service, it was not considered useful to be able to catapult planes while the forward guns were in use. Furthermore, the launching of the plane required the ship to be steered into the wind, thus making this operation almost impossible during combat. Initially the Zara received two Piaggio P6 bis reconnaissance seaplanes, later replaced by M41s, then Cant 25 ARs, then M.F.6s, and finally (1938) by Ro. 43s.

At the time of their construction, the Italian Navy did not have radar equipment, thus these ships were not equipped with any such apparatus. Possibly, the Gorizia received one of these installations of the Gufo type around 1943. Fiume and Zara were quite similar, while the Gorizia had a taller and wider forward funnel. The silhouette of the Pola was quite recognizable having the forward funnel integrated with the bridge structure.

At the beginning of the conflict, these four cruisers made up the 1st Cruiser Division which formed the more important squadron of the Regia Marina. The Zara, Gorizia, and Fiume participated in the Battle of Punta Stilo. The Pola, Fiume and Gorizia participated in the Battle of Cape Teulada. As commonly known, all but the Gorizia were lost during the Battle of Matapan. Thereafter, the Gorizia was grouped with the Trento Class units and participated in all major engagements and battles of the Mediterranean. After the already mentioned American bombardment of the Gorizia on April 10th, 1943 in the port of La Maddalena (Sardinia), the unit was sent to La Spezia for repairs and never reentered service. Sabotaged by an Anglo-Italian group of frogmen, its hull was found at the end of the conflict, semi submerged, in the harbor of La Spezia.

Light Cruisers

In June 1940 the Regia Marina, as it did with its battleships, entered the war with a fleet of completely renovated cruisers. There were still the old San Giorgio, Bari and Taranto (ex Pillau , and ex Strassburg received from the Germans after WW I), but all other units were of the kinds contemplated by the Treaty of Washington. The heavy cruisers had a displacement of 10,000 tons and were armed with guns up to 203 mm (8in); light cruisers had a displacement ranging from 5000 to 9000 tons and guns up to 152 mm (6in).

Montecuccoli Class

The light cruisers included four different types, the so called “5000” of the Condottieri class, the “7000” of the Montecuccoli class, the “8000” of the Eugenio di Savoia class to end with the “9000” of the Garibaldi class. During the construction of the first “5000”, the four Di Giussano, Da Barbiano, Colleoni and Bande Nere, as with the Trento, focus was almost exclusively given to speed. Therefore, these units had power plant of 95,000 HP similar to the 10,000 ton Zara class, which propelled these units up to 37 knots. Consequently, armor was very light with only 20-24 mm, completely inadequate to protect the vital organs of the ship against guns of 152 mm of which they were armed. Furthermore, due to the absence of underwater protection, all four units were sunk by enemy attack by means of torpedoes.

The “7,000” of the Montecuccoli class represented an improvement over the “5000”, but shared the same structural deficiencies with the Attendolo loosing its bow to a torpedo attack , and then being sunk in Naples by aerial bombardment. Definitely improved were the subsequent Duca d’Aosta and Eugenio di Savoia and finally the two Garibaldi and Duca degli Abruzzi which represented the completion of the evolution of the Italian light cruiser reaching 10,000 tons and an armament of 10 152mm guns while all other units had only 8. Both heavy and light cruisers were equipped with torpedoes at exemption of the Zara class. The light cruisers of the Condottieri class had 4 double launchers in trainable installations placed on deck near the stern smokestack. Similar layout was present on the Montecuccoli class, but with the launchers placed slighter more forward, at about half way between the two smokestacks.

The Cadorna Class

The Duca d’Aosta and the Garibaldi had instead only 6 launchers in two triple-complexes, placed in the same location on deck. The catapults for airplanes on Di Giussano class were fixed and place on the most forward part of the bow. Instead, the Cadorna, Montecuccoli and the Duca d’Aosta had movable catapults placed between or behind the smokestacks. Finally, the Garibaldi had two catapults placed behind the stern smoke stack.

During the war, the Regia Marina laid down 12 light cruisers of the Attilio Regolo (or Capitani Romani) class, but by September 8, 1943 only three, Attilio Regolo, Pompeo Magno and Scipione Africano had entered service. The remaining units were either scraped or captured by the Germans.

Two anti-aircraft cruisers, the Etna and the Vesuvio were built transforming two units ordered by Siam from the Cantieri Riuniti dell’Adriatico, but never entered service. During the war, the Regia Marina incorporated two French cruisers captured in Toulon, the FR 11, Jean De Vienne, and the FR 12, La Galissonlère but they never entered service.

Italian Battleships

In the years following WW I, following the Treaty of Washington, there was a period of so-called “naval holidays” during which not only the construction of new vessels was stopped, but also existing ones were scrapped. On the basis of this treaty, Italy demolished the four battleships of the Caracciolo class of which one had already been launched and three were laid down.

After this period of standstill, when construction started again, an interesting phenomenon took place; instead of building new ships, most navies remodeled more or less extensively all the units built after the period 1908-1910. Generally, these ships received new machinery, which altered the configuration of the funnels and often the number of propellers. On many ships, the principal armament was replaced, and on most the secondary armament completely replaced thus making it more adept at air defense and involving changes to the forecastle including the installation of new range finding apparatuses and catapults for reconnaissance airplanes.


R.N. Andrea Doria

The Regia marina adapted itself to the trend set by the other navies, and in 1931-32 began studying the radical transformation of 4 battleships of the Conte di Cavour class, ships which were originally built with substantial help from British firms. These transformations were completed in two periods: 1933- 1937 for the Cavour and Cesare and 1937-1940 for Duilio and Doria. More than transformation, we should refer to this work as a reconstruction since of the original ships only the hull and the side armor plates were re-utilized. The hull itself was altered with the installation of a new bow, which increased the overall length, by 10.30 meters. Inside the hull, a new system of defense against torpedo attacks invented by General Pugliese was installed. This installation required the complete removal of all internal structures. The original power plan was replaced, reducing the number of propellers from 4 to 2. The primary and secondary armaments were completely replaced. The triple turret centrally located between the two funnels was also eliminated as were all the pillbox-installed 152 mm and 76mm guns.

The new armament was based on 10 320mm guns on two double and two triple turrets, 12 120mm guns in 6 small turrets and 8 100mm guns on 4 mounts plus minor armament. Three torpedo tubes originally installed under the waterline, were also eliminated. After reconstruction, these could have been considered new ships. During the reconstruction of the 4 old battleships, the Regia Marina began studies on new units based on the dictates of the Treaty of Washington which allowed up to 35,000 tons and guns of up to 406 mm which were rejected in favor of guns of 381 mm.

The project was directed by the General of Naval Constructions Umberto Pugliese, and around October 1934 the first two units, Littorio and Vittorio Veneto were contracted, and entered service in 1940. In 1938, two more units were contracted, Roma and Impero, but only the first was completed in June 1942, while the second one was abandoned during construction in September 1943 and never completed.


R.N. Vittorio Veneto.

The battleship of the Littorio class, which in 1943 was renamed Italia, were the only Italian battleships armed with triple turrets, two forward and one aft, configuration typical of those of other navies. These ships had a power plant capable of generating 140,000 HP distributed over 4 propellers, while the Cavour had only 93,000 HP over 2 propellers. These new units, both for their seagoing and fighting performances, were comparable to those of other navies. Unfortunately, they were not equipped with RADAR. While the protection of the Cavour class battleships was the original dating back to 1914-15, the new units had a more modern armor similar to the one adopted by other navies such as in the British battlecruiser H.M.S. Hood, the battleships H.M.S. Nelson and H.M.S. Rodney, the German Graf Spee, the French Richelieu, or the Japanese Yamato.

The armour was not built by vertical plates, like the Cavour, but by two layers of plates placed an at angle protruding on the high part and caving on the lower one. The external plate was 350mm thick and at about 600mm a second armor of about 36mm served as a shield against shrapnel. The horizontal armor was designed against the new aerial bombs and was organized over three bridges. This protection was inadequate against the new German rocket bombs, which were able to penetrate the vital parts of the battleship Roma and blow it apart.

Underwater defenses were particularly taken care of, on both the Cavour and Littorio class with the adoption of an “absorbent structure” invented by General Umberto Pugliese. This structure was made of a large cylinder of low resistance contained in a stronger structure filled with liquid and completely surrounding the inner cylinder. The explosion of a torpedo was to cause the external bulkhead to give way and the pressure generated by the explosion would be transferred by the liquid and absorbed by the internal cylinder thus preventing damage to the internal bulkhead.

Partially adapted and translated from the book “Guida alle navi d’Italia”, by Gino Galuppini, published in 1982 by Arnoldo Mondadori Editore.